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Summary 
The point of departure of this dissertation is that transformation in South Africa 
depends on transformative politics – extra-institutional, substantive, 
oppositional, transformation-oriented politics. One challenge South Africa’s 
constitution therefore poses to courts is to take account of the impact of 
adjudication on transformative politics. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
investigate the relationship between adjudication and transformative politics 
within a specific context – adjudication of socio-economic rights cases. 
This relationship is commonly described in a positive light – either that 
adjudication of socio-economic rights cases promotes transformative politics 
by giving impoverished people access to the basic resources required for 
political participation; or that adjudication of such cases is in itself a space for 
transformative politics. Although there is much truth in both these 
descriptions, both under-estimate the extent to which adjudication also limits 
transformative politics. This dissertation focuses on the extent to which 
adjudication limits transformative politics – it comprises an analysis of socio-
economic rights cases with the aim of showing how adjudication of these 
cases, despite positive results, also limited transformative politics. 
The theoretical aspects of this problem are outlined in the first chapter. After a 
description of the body of case law on which the analysis focuses two 
chapters follow in which two ways in which adjudication limits transformative 
politics are investigated. The first traces how courts in socio-economic rights 
cases participate in discourses about impoverishment that tend to describe 
the problem as non-political – specifically how courts tend to describe 
impoverishment as technical rather than political in nature; and how courts 
implicitly legitimise in their judgments liberal-capitalist views of 
impoverishment that insist that impoverishment is best addressed through the 
unregulated market. Then follows a chapter investigating how views of legal 
interpretation in terms of which legal materials have a certain and 
determinable meaning that can be mechanically found by courts limit 
transformative politics by insulating adjudication from critique and 
emphasising finality in adjudication. Throughout it is shown how courts can 
mitigate the limiting effects of adjudication, by legitimating the political agency 
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of impoverished people, by using remedies requiring political engagement 
between opponents and postponing closure in adjudication, and by adopting a 
different approach to interpretation, that emphasises the pliability and relative 
indeterminacy of legal materials. Despite this, the conclusion of the 
dissertation is that courts can never wholly avoid the limiting impact of 
adjudication on transformative politics, but should rather aim to remain 
continually aware of it. 
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Opsomming 
Die uitgangspunt van hierdie proefskrif is dat transformasie in Suid-Afrika 
afhang van transformatiewe politiek – buite-institusionele, substantiewe, 
opposisionele, transformasie-gerigte politiek. Een eis wat Suid-Afrika se 
grondwet daarom aan howe stel, is om ag te slaan op die impak van 
beregting op transformatiewe politiek. Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die 
verhouding tussen beregting en transformatiewe politiek binne ‘n spesifieke 
konteks – beregting van sake oor sosio-ekonomiese regte – te ondersoek. 
Meeste beskouinge van hierdie verhouding beskryf dit in ‘n positiewe lig - óf 
dat die beregting van sake oor sosio-ekonomiese regte transformatiewe 
politiek bevorder deur vir verarmde mense toegang tot basiese 
lewensmiddele te bewerkstellig sodat hulle aan politieke optrede kan 
deelneem; óf dat beregting van sulke sake opsigself ‘n spasie is vir 
transformatiewe politiek. Hoewel daar waarheid steek in beide beskrywings, 
onderskat hulle die mate waartoe beregting ook transformatiewe politiek kan 
beperk. Hierdie proefskrif fokus op hoe beregting transformatiewe politiek 
beperk - dit behels ‘n analise van sake oor sosio-ekonomiese regte met die 
doel om te wys hoe beregting van hierdie sake, ten spyte van kennelik 
positiewe gevolge ook transformatiewe politiek beperk het. 
Die teoretiese vergestalting van hierdie probleem word in die eerste hoofstuk 
beskou. Na ‘n beskrywing van die liggaam van regspraak waarop die analise 
fokus volg twee hoofstukke waarin twee maniere waarop beregting 
transformatiewe politiek beperk ondersoek word. Die eerste beskou hoe howe 
in sake oor sosio-ekonomiese regte deelneem aan diskoerse oor verarming 
wat neig om hierdie probleem as non-polities te beskryf - spesifiek hoe howe 
neig om hierdie problem as tegnies eerder as polities van aard te beskryf; en 
hoe howe liberaal-kapitalistiese sieninge van verarming, ingevolge waarvan 
verarming deur die ongereguleerde mark aangespreek behoort te word, 
implisiet in hul uitsprake legitimeer. Dan volg ‘n hoofstuk wat naspeur hoe 
sieninge van regsinterpretasie ingevolge waarvan regsmateriaal ‘n sekere en 
vasstelbare betekenis het wat meganies deur howe gevind word, 
transformatiewe politieke optrede beperk deur die openheid van beregting vir 
kritiek te beperk en finaliteit in beregting in die hand te werk. Deurgaans word 
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gewys hoe howe die beperkende effek van beregting kan teëwerk, deur die 
politike agentskap van verarmde mense te legitimeer, deur remedies te 
gebruik wat politieke onderhandeling tussen opponente bewerkstellig en finale 
oplossings uitstel, en deur ‘n ander benadering tot interpretasie, wat die 
buigsaamheid en relatiewe onbepaalbaarheid van regsmateriaal erken, te 
omarm. Tog is die gevolgtrekking van die proefskrif dat howe nooit die 
beperkende effek van beregting op transformatiewe politiek geheel kan vermy 
nie, maar eerder deurgaans daarop bedag moet wees. 
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Introduction 
 
 
I have always been interested in two things about South Africa’s new 
constitutional order. The first of these is the socio-economic rights in the 1996 
constitution1 and in particular the way in which our courts have dealt with 
these rights.2 The second is the constitution’s ‘transformative’ orientation – 
the fact that it explicitly and indeed emphatically requires the large-sca
transformation of South African society – and again in particular the ways in 
which our courts have responded to this orientation.
le 
 
ign 
                                                
3 This dissertation is 
about these two things. In broad terms, I examine in it to what extent and how
our courts, in deciding socio-economic rights claims, have managed to al
themselves with the constitution’s transformative orientation. 
 
This is by no means a novel undertaking. Most legal scholars who have 
written about the socio-economic rights case law in South Africa so far have, 
implicitly or explicitly, analysed and evaluated the cases precisely for the 
extent to which they can be squared with the constitution’s transformative 
mandate. So, for example, scholars such as Sandra Liebenberg and Marius 
Pieterse have asked to what extent the general approach of our courts to 
socio-economic rights cases succeeds in effecting transformation in the lives 
of poor people, by providing to them access to housing, or health care, or food 
and water – to what extent, that is, socio-economic rights case law has 
 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the constitution’). 
2 With socio-economic rights I mean rights to the basic material things people need to survive 
and live well – in the constitution these are the rights to a safe and healthy environment and 
to the preservation of the environment (sec 24); to have equitable access to land (sec 25(5)); 
to have access to adequate housing (sec 26 – including the right to be protected against 
arbitrary eviction); to have access to health care services (including reproductive health care), 
sufficient food and water and social security and assistance (sec 27(1)(a) - (c)); the right not 
to be refused emergency medical treatment (sec 27(3)); the right to basic and to further 
education (sec 29); children’s right to parental, family or alternative care and to basic nutrition, 
shelter, basic health care service and social service (sec 28(1)(b) & (c)); and the right of 
detained persons to conditions of detention consonant with human dignity, including at least 
exercise and the provision, a state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading 
material and medical care (sec 35(2)(e)). 
3 See K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 146 for the original description and elaboration of the theme of 
transformative constitutionalism in South Africa. 
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operated as an ‘… effective tool[ ] in challenging poverty’.4 More recently, 
Sandra Liebenberg has explored to what extent socio-economic rights case 
law has promoted other broad transformative goals, such as human dignity 
and social inclusion.5 In the same vein Pierre de Vos, writing about the 
Constitutional Court’s first two socio-economic rights judgments, has 
explained and attempted to justify some of the more puzzling aspects of these 
cases as contributing to the broad transformative goal of achieving a 
substantively equal society.6 
 
I distinguish my focus from the different accounts related above in two ways. 
First, my own analysis proceeds, I believe, from an understanding of 
transformation that differs importantly from the understanding of 
transformation informing other accounts of the transformative performance of 
courts in socio-economic rights cases; and second, I focus on an aspect of 
transformation – transformative politics – that has not been prominently 
addressed in other accounts. 
 
The different examples of writing about the transformative performance of our 
courts in socio-economic rights cases mentioned above have in common a 
certain understanding of what transformation entails and, as a result, a certain 
understanding of what the constitution’s transformative orientation requires of 
courts. 
 
This understanding equates transformation with the achievement of certain 
tangible results or outcomes – be it the concrete alleviation of 
impoverishment;7 the achievement of substantive equality;8 or the protection 
                                                 
4 S Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: an effective 
tool in challenging poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 159; M Pieterse 
‘Resuscitating socio-economic rights: constitutional entitlements to health care services’ 
(2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 473. 
5 S Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ in AJ Van 
der Walt (ed) Theories of social and economic justice (2005) 141 (Liebenberg ‘Dignity’) and 
‘Needs, rights and transformation: adjudicating social rights’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 5. 
6 P De Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as contextual 
fairness’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 258. 
7 Pieterse (n 4 above) 477. See also Liebenberg (n 4 above) 160. 
8 De Vos (n 6 above). 
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of human dignity.9 The work of courts in enforcing socio-economic rights is 
assessed on this view for the extent to which it contributes to the achievement 
of these transformative goals. The relationship between the work of courts in 
enforcing socio-economic rights and transformation is therefore sketched in 
positive terms. Courts are seen as one set of instruments through which 
transformative goals can be achieved and the point of scholarly engagement 
with the socio-economic rights work of courts is to show how courts can shape 
their modus operandi so as better to achieve transformative results.10 
 
I have an affinity with this outcomes-oriented manner in which to evaluate the 
contribution of courts to transformation. Just as the proponents of this 
approach do, I believe that law and adjudication can contribute meaningfully 
to the achievement of transformation. In addition, I have no doubt that, given 
the acute deprivation, inequality and social exclusion that most South Africans 
face every day, scholars should devote their energies to the achievement of 
concrete transformative goals. In short, I do not discount in any way the 
importance and virtue of a results-focussed understanding of transformation 
and of an analysis of the work of courts in enforcing socio-economic rights 
that asks to what extent courts contribute to the achievement of transformative 
results. However, my approach here is a different one. 
 
In the face of a pervasive constitutional optimism11 – a belief in the power of a 
constitution, law generally and adjudication specifically to achieve meaningful 
transformation - a small group of scholars (Henk Botha, Karl Klare, Wessel le 
Roux, André van der Walt, Karin van Marle) have over the last several years 
warned that the choice to ground South Africa’s transformation in a 
constitution guarded over by courts is not without adverse consequences. 
These scholars have argued that, in different ways, a constitution and 
constitutional adjudication are both limited and limiting instruments of 
transformation. Whilst recognising the transformative potential of constitutional 
                                                 
9 Liebenberg ‘Dignity’ (n 5 above) 158. 
10 See eg Liebenberg (n 4 above) 160. 
11 I borrow the term ‘constitutional optimism’ from Emilios Christodoulidis (‘Constitutional 
irresolution: law and the framing of civil society’ (2003) 9 European Law Journal 401 403 and 
what follows). 
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adjudication, they have focussed their energies on identifying the different 
ways in which adjudication can work in a counter-transformative fashion. Karl 
Klare, for example, has pointed to the fact that the belief in legal determinacy 
evident in a number of early Constitutional Court judgments resulted in the 
Court denying the politically imbued nature of its work and so worked against 
the maintenance of a transformative politics;12 Henk Botha has similarly 
pointed out that our courts’ reliance on traditional  conceptions of legal 
meaning as self-evident potentially works in a counter-transformative 
fashion;13 and André van der Walt – reacting specifically to the kind of results-
oriented view of transformation outlined above – has argued that the search 
for finality inherent in such a view and central to the process of adjudication, 
limits transformation.14 
 
The work of this group of scholars - with which I align myself – is informed by 
an understanding of transformation quite different from the results-oriented 
understanding related above. In this view of the matter transformation, more 
importantly than that it indicates the achievement of certain tangible goals, 
refers to the radical change of the institutions and systems that produce 
results themselves. In the words of Drucilla Cornell, transformation in this view 
is ‘change radical enough to so dramatically restructure any system – political, 
legal, or social – that the “identity” of the system is itself altered.’15  
                                                 
12 Klare (n 3 above) 172 - 188. 
13 H Botha ‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2)’ 2003 Tydskrif 
vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 20 34 (Botha ‘Metaphoric 2’). See also his ‘Metaphoric reasoning and 
transformative constitutionalism (part 1)’ 2002 Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 612, ‘Freedom 
and constraint in constitutional adjudication’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 249 and ‘Democracy and rights. Constitutional interpretation in a postrealist world’ 
(2000) 63 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 561. 
14 AJ van der Walt ‘Resisting orthodoxy – again: thoughts on the development of post-
apartheid South African law’ (2002) 17 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 258. See also his ‘Dancing 
with codes – protecting, developing and deconstructing property rights in a constitutional 
state’ (2001) 118 South African Law Journal 258 and ‘Tentative urgency: sensitivity for the 
paradoxes of stability and change in social transformation decisions of the Constitutional 
Court’ (2001) 16 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 1. For other examples of scholarly work engaging 
with these themes, see H Botha & JWG van der Walt ‘Democracy and rights in South Africa: 
beyond a constitutional culture of justification’ 2000 Constellations 341; WB le Roux ‘From 
Acropolis to metropolis: the new Constitutional Court building and South African street 
democracy’ (2001) 16 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 139; and K van Marle ‘Revisiting the politics 
of post-apartheid constitutional interpretation’ 2003 Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 549. 
15 D Cornell Transformations: recollective imagination and sexual difference (1993) 1. See 
also Nancy Fraser’s description of ‘transformative strategies’ as aiming ‘to correct unjust 
outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework’ (my emphasis) (N 
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 To view transformation in this, rather than the results-oriented way has two 
important consequences for my purposes. First, it heralds a change in focus 
of analysis. Whereas the results-oriented view of transformation requires a 
focus on the outcomes generated by systems and institutions, this second 
view of transformation requires one to focus on the systems and institutions 
themselves – their processes, manner of operation, modes of reasoning and 
ways of doing things. If one studies the transformative role of courts, as I 
propose to do here that means that one studies and critiques the way in which 
decisions are reached, rather than simply the decisions themselves. Second, 
such a view of transformation necessarily eschews the positive mould in 
which the relationship between adjudication and transformation is cast in the 
results-oriented view. The point of departure here is much rather negative - 
that the way in which institutions are currently structured and how they 
currently operate limits transformation and that, for meaningful transformation 
to be possible, institutions and systems have to be transformed radically. In a 
study of the transformative work of courts as I engage in, that means that the 
point of departure is that the work of courts necessarily, even whilst promoting 
transformation, also limits transformation in important respects and that the 
focus in studying the transformative performance of courts should be on those 
respects in which adjudication limits transformation. 
 
The second way in which my analysis of the transformative role of courts in 
enforcing socio-economic rights differs from the other accounts is in the 
particular aspect of transformation that I focus on. 
 
The limiting effect that adjudication exercises on transformation that I focus on 
is in the literature most often presented in a specific form – as the limiting 
effect of adjudication on democracy, or, more correctly, on transformative 
politics.16 When Karl Klare examines the early jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court for its transformative fit, he asks in particular to what 
                                                                                                                                            
Fraser ‘Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, recognition and participation’ 
in N Fraser & A Honneth Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange 
(2003) 74. 
16 I explain what I mean with the term ‘transformative politics’ in Chapter 1 15 - 26. 
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extent the way in which the Court reaches its decisions leaves space for 
continuing political contestation about the issues in question – to what extent 
the Court’s reasoning processes ‘empower [ ] publics to examine, discuss and 
criticize the now often hidden political and moral assumptions that steer 
adjudication’.17  When Henk Botha explores the role of metaphors in 
constitutional adjudication to assess our courts’ transformative performance, 
he urges us to re-conceive ‘rights as relationships and fundamental rights 
litigation as dialogue’, because to do so would offer ‘far more scope for a 
critical debate about the meaning of constitutional norms than the idea of 
rights as boundaries’.18 The links between transformation and the possibility 
of a vibrant, contested transformative politics are obvious. The existence of 
such a politics is in the first place a goal of transformation – part of the new 
society that the constitution envisages.19 At the same time, more important
real transformation can only occur if a space and capacity for progressive 
politics already exist where current orthodoxies can be contested an
possibilities imagined – transformative politics is a prerequisite for, a way of 
doing, transformation. In my analysis here I consequently also focus on this 
one particular aspect of transformation: the need, both as a goal of and a 
prerequisite for transformation, to foster and maintain a vibrant transformative 
politics. I ask what the effect of the manner in which courts decide socio-
economic rights cases is in particular on the fostering and maintenance of 
such transformative politics. To what extent and in which ways does the work 
of courts in socio-economic rights cases, despite its emancipating effects 
(despite it generating transformative outcomes such as access to housing, 
health care, food, water, education or social assistance, or enhancing 
substantive equality or human dignity), operate simultaneously in a repressive 
fashion in that it limits the potential for transformative political action, closes 
down politics? And, finally, how and to what extent is it possible to counteract 
this erosion of the potential for transformative politics? 
ly, 
d new 
                                                
 
 
17 Klare (n 3 above) 164. 
18 Botha ‘Metaphoric 2’ (n 13 above) 34 & 33 respectively (my emphasis). 
19 Klare (n 3 above) 150 (describing the transformative constitution as ‘committed … to 
transforming [South Africa’s] political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction’ (my emphasis)). 
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A professed concern with the extent to which ordinary people, through 
democratic participation, can determine their own and their collective destinies 
has of course – in one form - been central to the debate about the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa. This debate and indeed 
the development of a socio-economic rights jurisprudence has been 
dominated so far by what can best be described as separation of powers 
concerns – concerns that courts deciding socio-economic rights cases, 
because of the particular subject matter at stake, will exceed the sensible 
scope of their powers and unduly interfere in the powers of the other branches 
of government.20 Most clearly these kinds of concerns have been related to 
the effectiveness of courts, as opposed to the legislature and executive, to act 
as agents for social transformation and in particular the extent to which they 
can do so effectively without antagonising the other branches of government 
and so jeopardising their institutional integrity. In this respect the focus has in 
other words been on the institutional capacity of courts, relative to the other 
branches of government, to analyse and decide the kinds of policy-laden 
questions that most often arise in socio-economic rights cases and on their 
capacity effectively to enforce whatever findings they are able to make, 
without their confronting the other branches of government too directly.21 But 
a certain concern with politics has also informed separation of powers 
arguments in this context. Scholars writing about socio-economic rights and 
judges deciding socio-economic rights cases have shown themselves also to 
be particularly sensitive to the perceived problem that, when courts decide 
socio-economic rights cases and issue orders to enforce their findings, they, 
who are not democratically mandated, place themselves in opposition to the 
political will of the electorate as expressed in the conduct of the legislature 
and executive.22 This expression of the familiar ‘counter-majoritarian dilemma’ 
is given added poignancy in the South African context, where it is recognised 
both that the other two branches in government are engaged in a 
constitutionally and politically mandated process of social transformation, and 
                                                 
20 With respect to the currency that separation of powers concerns have enjoyed in the socio-
economic rights debate in South Africa, see M Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383. 
21 As above 392 - 396. 
22 As above 390 - 392. 
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that they, at least under current circumstances, enjoy an extraordinary level of 
political legitimacy in doing so. In this sense then the debate about the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa has indeed been shaped 
by a concern, similar to the one I propose to explore here, for the friction 
between the work of courts in enforcing these rights and the democratic 
process. 
 
But again, my examination of the relationship between the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights and transformative politics comes from 
a different angle than such separation of powers concerns. Although I do not 
discount the importance – and indeed the intractability – of this question, my 
concern is not with the extent to which the adjudication of socio-economic 
rights claims counteracts or pre-empts the general political will as it is 
expressed in the conduct of the legislature or executive. To explore the 
relationship between socio-economic rights adjudication and politics solely as 
a problem of institutional relations between the different branches of 
government reflects, to my mind, a peculiarly limited ‘institutional’ or 
‘dependent’ understanding of politics and democracy in terms of which politics 
legitimately takes place only in formally constituted democratic structures, 
where political questions of, for example, distribution of resources are decided 
for and the results presented to ordinary people. My analysis, by contrast, 
proceeds from a broader and more flexible conception of transformative 
politics – one in terms of which the concern is precisely with the extent to 
which ordinary people mostly outside of the formally constituted democratic 
structures and processes are able to engage in critical, transformative political 
action. Indeed, a major part of the concern driving my examination is the 
question how the work of courts in socio-economic rights cases curtails the 
capacity of ordinary people to engage in an oppositional political sense with 
the very conduct of the formal democratic structures (eg parliament and the 
executive) that, in the separation of powers conception, is seen as 
expressions of the general political will that should not be curtailed by courts. 
 
To recapitulate: in this dissertation I explore the extent to which our courts, in 
deciding socio-economic rights cases, give effect to the constitution’s 
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transformative orientation. In particular I am interested in the relationship 
between the work of courts in these cases and transformative politics – the 
capacity of ordinary people outside the formally constituted structures of 
government to engage in transformative political action. I investigate the 
extent to which the work of courts deciding socio-economic rights cases, even 
when manifestly achieving transformative direct results, erodes, de-
legitimizes, discourages or displaces transformative politics. 
 
Apart from this introduction and a short conclusion, my dissertation consists of 
four chapters. The first of these, Chapter 1, provides the background to the 
rest of the work – the framework of analysis that will later be employed. In it, 
drawing on, amongst others, the work of Drucilla Cornell, Nancy Fraser, Karl 
Klare, André van der Walt and Antie Krog, I outline my conception of the kind 
of transformation that the constitution demands – transformation as a change 
in the essence or identity of a system or institution, rather than only 
evolutionary change. With reference in particular to Chantal Mouffe, I also 
describe the kind of transformative politics as an aspect of transformation that 
my further analysis will focus on – a conception of such politics that 
emphasises the non-institutional sphere and that focuses on the capacity of 
and space for marginalised and oppressed publics to engage in an 
oppositional political sense with more mainstream, powerful publics to ensure 
their individual and collective self-determination. Following on that, the bulk of 
the Chapter is devoted to a discussion of the different ways in which the 
process of adjudication can have an anti-transformative impact by limiting 
transformative politics. I focus on two such ways. First, drawing primarily on 
Nancy Fraser, Thomas Ross and Lucy Williams, I describe how courts can 
confirm and legitimise a variety of depoliticising rhetorical strategies employed 
by dominant participants in the political debate about impoverishment to 
depoliticise issues of need and deprivation and so immunise them from 
political contestation. Second, drawing on Karl Klare, Henk Botha, Duncan 
Kennedy, Robert Cover and André van der Walt, I describe how a denial by 
courts of the intractable tension between freedom and constraint in 
adjudication – whether through a belief in the self-evidence of legal meaning 
or through a depiction of adjudication as operating free of all constraint – 
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discourages transformative political action by de-emphasising judicial 
responsibility for adjudicative results and inviting normative closure. 
 
In Chapter 2 I describe the existing body of socio-economic rights case law in 
South Africa as background to the analysis of that case law that follows in 
Chapters 3 and 4 - in the manner of an overview, the whole body of extant 
case law that can in a broad sense be described as ‘socio-economic rights 
case law’. My focus in this Chapter is on doctrinal description – in particular I 
describe the standard of review that our courts have adopted in these cases 
and their remedial approach. 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I explore to what extent the two ways in which 
adjudication can work to limit transformative political action that I describe in 
Chapter 1 has operated in the case law. 
 
In Chapter 3 I ask to what extent our courts have in their socio-economic 
rights decisions sought to de-politicise their subject matter by participating in 
prevalent discourses of de-politicisation. In particular, I explore to what extent 
our courts have related their adjudication of socio-economic rights claims to 
discourses of proceduralisation and technicisation of debates around 
impoverishment. 
  
Chapter 4 focuses on the legal ideal of certainty as it manifests both in the 
drive to finality or conclusion that is inherent in adjudication and indeed law 
more generally and in the tendency for courts to regard legal materials as 
determinative of legal meaning. I trace the operation of a belief in the self-
evidence of legal meaning in the cases, but also point to ways in which our 
courts, through the manner in which they deployed the reasonableness 
standard in deciding socio-economic rights cases, have been more candid 
about the extent to which they, rather than the materials alone generate legal 
meaning and adjudicative outcomes. I also consider to what extent the search 
for finality or closure characterises our courts’ socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence and point to ways – the use of a flexible, context sensitive 
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standard of scrutiny and the employment of open-ended remedies – through 
which our courts have managed to postpone normative closure.  
 
At the end of this dissertation I reach no firm conclusions and present no final 
solutions. Indeed, my only real conclusion is equivocation: I point out first that 
the limiting effect that the adjudication of socio-economic rights claims exerts 
on transformative politics is inevitable, and second that every attempt to avoid 
or overcome that limiting effect has inherent in itself the potential to limit 
politics again. My only proposal is then that judges should be aware that their 
work inevitably exerts a limiting effect on transformative politics, often 
precisely in those instances where they seek to advance transformation. In 
the final, concluding section of the dissertation I make this latent point explicit. 
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1 Courts and transformative politics 
 
We do not have a say … That’s how our grandparents found themselves oppressed 
just as we are.1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
My purpose is to explore the relationship between the adjudication by courts 
of constitutional socio-economic rights claims and the capacity and space for 
political action intended to advance the interests of impoverished people – 
what I call a transformative politics.2 To the extent that this relationship has so 
far been considered in the literature, it has mostly been cast in a positive light. 
That is, socio-economic rights litigation has in the main been seen as, in 
different ways, supportive of the political struggles of and on behalf of 
impoverished people. 
 
I do not deny that the work of courts in enforcing socio-economic rights can 
importantly support transformative political action. Even so, this positive 
account of the relationship between socio-economic rights adjudication and 
transformative political action is not the one I adopt. Instead, I am interested in 
the negative aspects of the relationship. My purpose is to take stock of the 
inevitable limiting effect that the work of courts adjudicating socio-economic 
rights claims has on the space and capacity for a transformative politics. I 
refer here to the variety of arguments emanating from critical views on rights, 
rights talk and rights adjudication, which hold forth that, at the same time as 
the process of rights adjudication attempts to advance freedom and 
participation in political life, it also limits and erodes political capacity. I 
                                                 
1 Comment of participant in workshop presented by the Association for Rural Advancement 
(AFRA) investigating perceptions of farm dwellers about the nature and causes of their 
impoverishment and vulnerability, in response to the question: ‘Why are you a farm dweller?’ 
reproduced in AFRA This is our home – our land, our history and our right. Consolidated 
verbatim report – farm dweller workshops May 2005 33, available at 
http://www.afra.co.za/upload/files/AP24.pdf, visited on 24 August 2008. For a discussion see 
L del Grande ‘ “Farms came to the people”: Where have all the farm dwellers gone?’ Paper 
presented at the Living on the Margins Conference, Stellenbosch, 26 - 28 March 2006, 
available at http://www.plaas.org.za/events/conference/2007%20LOM/papers/delgrande, 
visited on 24 August 2008. 
2 I describe what I mean with this term more fully in 1.2 below. 
 13
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
investigate the different ways in which this limiting effect operates in the socio-
economic rights decisions of our courts and attempt to think ways in which our 
courts can account for it. 
 
In this Chapter I delimit my field of enquiry – I describe the particular aspects 
of the relationship between transformative political action and socio-economic 
rights adjudication that draw my focus, attempting in the process to craft a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the case law that follows in Chapters 
3 and 4. 
 
I start in section 1.2 by describing the kind of political action – transformative 
politics – I am concerned with.3 My description is determined neither by the 
forums within which political action takes place (it potentially encompasses 
formal and extra-formal, institutional and extra-institutional political action) nor 
by the identity or position of the agents engaging in it (it potentially 
encompasses political action of impoverished people acting in their own 
interest or of other groups acting on behalf of or in concert with impoverished 
people). It is determined in the first place by orientation – that is, I am 
concerned with political action oriented toward addressing the plight of 
impoverished people;4 and by form – I am concerned with an oppositional or 
agonistic politics, one which presupposes a certain level of contestation rather 
than consensus or participation.5 
 
I proceed in section 1.3 to describe and analyse different accounts of the 
relationship between the capacity and space for transformative political action 
and socio-economic rights litigation.6 I start, in 1.3.2, by relating the most 
common such accounts in the literature -  accounts that see the relationship in 
a positive light, with the enforcement of socio-economic rights regarded as 
constitutive of transformative political action; or as one way in which to 
engage in transformative politics; or as opening up space elsewhere for 
transformative political action. So, for example, it has often been argued that 
                                                 
3 See 15 – 26 below. 
4 See the discussion at 16 - 18 below, and the sources referred to there. 
5 See the discussion at 23 - 26 below, and the sources referred to there. 
6 At 26 and further. 
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the access to basic resources that courts can through their adjudication of 
socio-economic rights claims create for impoverished people enables them to 
participate in political life – is constitutive, that is, of their political agency.7 It 
has also been pointed out that legal action around socio-economic rights, 
rather than being political action itself, is an important strategy to use in 
addition to political action and that it can strengthen and add impetus to the 
political struggles of or on behalf of impoverished people.8 
 
In section 1.3.3 I distinguish my own focus from these more common 
accounts.9 I describe two specific ways in which adjudication in general, but in 
particular adjudication of socio-economic rights claims, can operate to limit 
transformative political action. Although a wide variety of such critiques are at 
my disposal, I focus on one analysis of this kind. I investigate ways in which 
the work of courts enforcing socio-economic rights can discourage and limit 
transformative political action by bracketing previously contested social 
questions as somehow not subject to further political contestation – either 
because of the finality with which courts usually present their decisions; or 
because of the presentation by courts of their engagement with contested 
social issues as value-neutral, conducted on the basis of an objective set of 
materials; or because courts in their judgments use language and rhetorical 
strategies to describe social issues as incapable of political engagement – as, 
for example, too technically complex for political engagement, or of private 
rather than public concern, or simply as insoluble, so that political 
engagement with it becomes futile.10 
 
1.2 Transformative politics 
I use the term ’transformative politics’ to denote the kind of political action that 
I am concerned with. I could hardly ask for a better description of this kind of 
politics than that provided by Edgar Pieterse and Mirjam van Donk in a short 
article they wrote on the politics of socio-economic rights in the ESR Review. 
                                                 
7 See discussion at 32 - 36 below, and the sources referred to there. 
8 See discussion at 37 - 39 below, and the sources referred to there. 
9 See 39 – 46 below. 
10 See 46 – 73 below. 
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Calling for a ‘democratised’ approach to the implementation of socio-
economic rights, they describe the realisation of these rights as a ‘political 
process of negotiation, disagreement, conflict, occasionally consensus, and, 
at a minimum, forms of mutual accommodation.’11 Three broad features 
characterise this kind of politics: it is critical in its orientation; it is non-
institutional; and it is substantive and agonistic rather than procedural and 
consensual in nature. 
 
1.2.1 A critical orientation 
Nancy Fraser, writing to describe critical theory, starts by quoting Karl Marx’s 
definition of critical theory as ‘the self-clarification of the wishes and the 
struggles of the age’.12 What strikes her about this definition is its 
‘straightforwardly political character’ – the fact that it distinguishes critical 
theory from other forms of theory not by virtue of any ‘special epistemological 
status’, but by virtue of a certain political orientation.13 On this basis she 
provides her own description of critical theory as theory 
 
that frames its research programme and its conceptual framework with an eye to the 
aims and activities of those oppositional social movements with which it has a 
partisan though not uncritical identification.14 
 
The political partisanship that according to Fraser distinguishes critical from 
other theory reminds one of Tshepo Madlingozi’s description of ‘progressive 
politics’. In a contribution investigating possible roles for legal academics in 
social transformation in South Africa, Madlingozi describes progressive 
politics – the kind of politics that he, a la Fraser, urges legal academics to 
orient their research toward – as politics that ‘eschews elite-driven reforms in 
favour of people-driven reforms and aims to overturn liberal democracy for 
                                                 
11 E Pieterse & M van Donk ‘The politics of socio-economic rights in South Africa. Ten Years 
after Apartheid’ (2004) 5:5 ESR Review 12 13. 
12 N Fraser ‘What’s critical about critical theory? The case of Habermas and gender’ in S 
Benhabib & D Cornell (eds) Feminism as critique (1987) 31 31 quoting K Marx ‘Letter to A 
Ruge, September 1843’ in Karl Marx: early writings (1975) (transl R Livingstone & G Benton) 
209. 
13 As above. 
14 As above. 
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participatory democracy’.15 Progressive academics, so he proceeds, should 
orient their research and activism toward such progressive politics and 
‘connect with the struggle that is being waged by new social movements’.16 
 
Both these descriptions I find suggestive for my purposes. Because the 
concern underlying my writing is a partisan political one – a concern with 
radical transformation of South African society so as to alleviate the plight of 
impoverished people – the conception of politics that I work with is not simply 
a mode of practice devoid of specific political content. Rather, it is politics 
explicitly oriented to the goal of combating impoverishment and addressing 
severe deprivation. I am interested, therefore in politics, or political action, 
regardless of by whom it is performed,17 that has as its aim the eradication of 
impoverishment. 
 
I find it important to make this point to avoid misunderstanding down the line. 
In some of my earlier writing I identified as one of the problems with current 
                                                 
15 T Madlingozi ‘Legal academics and progressive politics in South Africa: moving beyond the 
ivory tower’ (2005) 2 PULP Fictions 5 6. 
16 As above. Initially, following Madlingozi, I used the term ‘progressive politics’ to describe 
the politics I am concerned with. However, I have since been alerted to the fact that the term 
‘progressive’ can be taken to refer not to a leftist politics, as Madlingozi clearly intends it to be 
taken, but to a modernist, instrumentalist stream of thought that espouses a belief in 
‘progress’ through reason and that has given rise to predominantly conservative streams of 
legal theory (see G Minda Post-modern legal movements. Law and jurisprudence at century’s 
end (1995) 25 – 33, describing two streams of legal thought that arose from the American 
Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s – radical legal realism that ‘emphasised a “political 
critique” ‘ (28) attempting ‘to expose the political ideology of conceptual legal thought’ (29) 
and that gave rise to Critical Legal Studies (31); and progressive legal realism that 
emphasised the pragmatist aspects of legal realism (28), adopting a more ‘constructive and 
apolitical’ approach to law (29) and giving rise to legal process theories and law and 
economics, both of which tend to de-emphasise the political stakes of law (32)). To avoid the 
possible conservative implications of the term that this history raises, I opted for 
‘transformative’ rather than ‘progressive’ politics. My thanks to Karin van Marle for alerting me 
to this point. 
17 Here again, perhaps, I depart slightly from Madlingozi. Madlingozi clearly requires of 
‘progressive’ academics an alignment with new social movements – he requires academics to 
place themselves at the disposal of such social movements (for his own description of what 
such social movements are, see T Madlingozi ‘Post-apartheid social movements and the 
quest for the elusive “new” South Africa’ in S Motha (ed) Democracy’s empire: sovereignty, 
law and violence (2007) 77 86 – 91; for his own problematisation of the relationship between 
such social movements and academics that he urges see T Madlingozi ‘Hayi bo! Refusing the 
plan: acting, thinking and revolting by post-apartheid social movements and community 
organisations’ in K van Marle (ed) Refusal, transition and post-apartheid law (2009) 
(forthcoming). Instead, I regard any political action with the goal of alleviating impoverishment 
as potentially the kind of transformative politics I discuss here, whether performed by social 
movements consisting of and controlled by impoverished people, or by other actors of civil 
society. 
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jurisprudence on socio-economic rights the deference that courts showed in 
evaluating social policy for consistency with constitutional socio-economic 
rights to the supposed superior skill and capacity of the legislature, executive 
and state administration.18 Clearly, so I argued, at heart this kind of deference 
was motivated by an entirely appropriate and accurate concern that courts do 
not have the institutional capacity to solve many of the difficult policy problems 
that socio-economic rights cases require them to engage with.19 However, to 
respond to this concern by deferring to the political branches of government 
potentially limits political contestation around issues of need and deprivation. 
It does so by signalling to impoverished people and those who engage in 
political action with them or on their behalf not only that the issues in question 
are difficult ones that courts (and perhaps they themselves) cannot solve, but 
also that they are issues that are appropriately only the business of the 
legislature, the executive or state administration.20 Rather than defer to the 
political branches of government, I argued, courts should simply acknowledge 
the complexity of the issues at hand (decline to conclusively decide them) and 
then find ways in which to reopen the issues to broad political contestation (by 
for example issuing orders for mediation of socio-economic rights disputes).21 
A respected colleague found this argument potentially problematic. She 
cautioned that it runs the risk of giving a voice or political space not only to 
impoverished people, but might, given current power imbalances in society, 
simply confirm the hold that economic elites exert over issues of economic 
policy.22 In this light I find it prudent to emphasise the political partisanship of 
my concern – to the extent that I issue to courts a call to re-orient their 
doctrine in socio-economic rights cases so as to strengthen political 
engagement outside of government with issues of need and deprivation, the 
call is for them to privilege the kind of critical, politically partisan political action 
described above. 
                                                 
18 D Brand ‘The “politics of need interpretation” and the adjudication of socio-economic rights 
claims in South Africa’ in A J van der Walt (ed) Theories of social and economic justice (2005) 
17 30 – 33. For my recapitulation of this point in this dissertation, see 147- 155 below. 
19 As above 31. 
20 As above 32 – 33. 
21 As above 33 – 36. 
22 As the point was raised in private e-mail correspondence, I will not identify the colleague 
involved. Nevertheless I thank her for it and for the rethink of my ideas that it occasioned. 
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 1.2.2 Politics as practice or culture 
 
[T]he political cannot be restricted to a certain type of institution, or envisaged as 
constituting a specific sphere or level of society. It must be conceived as a dimension 
that is inherent to every human society and that determines our very ontological 
condition.23 
 
There is a pervasive tendency in our courts in their dealings with the concepts 
political action or democracy, to equate political action, politics or democracy 
with a certain institutional arrangement – that is, to regard politics as 
embodied in a set of institutions. This tendency is, for example, evident in two 
of the most prominent cases in which the Constitutional Court has had 
occasion to elaborate upon the nature of South African democracy - New 
National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa24 and United 
Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa.25 
 
NNP, it will be recalled, concerned the question whether or not the imposition 
of a requirement for registration to vote and to vote in South Africa’s second 
free general election of possession of a new identity document, in 
circumstances where it seemed clear that a substantial number of otherwise 
eligible voters would not be able to obtain the document in question before 
registration and voting took place, constituted an unjustified breach of the right 
to vote. Yacoob J, for the majority of the Constitutional Court, decided that it 
did not, in essence holding that regulation of the right to vote was necessary 
for voting at all to be possible and useful and that such regulation that limited 
the opportunity of eligible voters to vote in order to make voting possible, 
would pass constitutional muster if it was simply rationally related to the 
legitimate goal of presenting free and fair elections.26 In the process of 
reaching this conclusion, Yacoob J articulated a two-fold duty imposed on the 
                                                 
23 C Mouffe The return of the political (1993) 3. 
24 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 3 SA 191 (CC) 
(NNP). 
25 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa (African Christian 
Democratic Party Intervening; Institute for Democracy in South Africa as Amicus Curiae) (No 
2) 2003 1 SA 495 (CC) (UDM) 
26 NNP (n 24 above) para 12. 
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state by the right to vote.  First, the right requires the state indeed to present 
regular elections.27  Second, these elections must be arranged such that they 
are free and fair and that any arrangement with this purpose that prevents 
otherwise eligible voters from registering to vote and from voting will be 
upheld as long as ‘people who would otherwise be eligible to vote are [despite 
the arrangement at issue] able to do so if they want to vote and if they take 
reasonable steps in pursuit of the right to vote’.28  For Yacoob J then, the 
state, to give effect to a right central to the constitutional principle of 
democracy, can be asked to do no more than present regular elections, and 
to arrange those elections to be free and fair in such a way that it is possible 
for otherwise eligible people to vote. 
 
In UDM, the issue was whether representative institutions were arranged in a 
manner that meets that element of the constitutional standard of democracy 
that requires the existence of a multi-party democracy.  The Court’s definition 
of multi-party democracy – a system ‘that contemplates a political order in 
which it is permissible for different political groups to organize, promote their 
views through public debate and participate in free and fair elections’29 – and 
its finding that the floor-crossing legislation passes constitutional muster 
because, although it probably frustrates the will of the electorate, it doesn’t 
actively ‘undermine multi-party democracy’,30 seem informed by the same 
understanding of the nature of the state’s democracy-related duties as  
Yacoob J’s judgment in NNP.  Again the idea seems to be that the state has 
done enough if it (a) ensures that the required institutions of democracy exist 
and (b) ensures that they are arranged in such a way that it is possible for 
democracy to operate within them.31 
 
                                                 
27 As above paras 12 – 17. 
28 As above para 21. 
29 UDM (n 25 above) para 26. 
30 T Roux ‘Democracy’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed OS 
(2006) ch 10 10-27. 
31 The duty as described in UDM is lighter than in NNP – it is acceptable for the Court that 
representative institutions are operated such that they render permissible the free political 
activity that is required by multi-party democracy. UDM (n 25 above) para 26. 
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In sum, the NNP/UDM Court’s understanding of what the state must do to 
give effect to the constitution’s conception of democracy requires only that the 
state build the institutions of democracy (elections; representative institutions; 
processes of direct consultation etc) and then to sit back and wait for 
democracy to arrive. 
 
One problem with this articulation of the content of the right to vote is that it 
reflects an entirely institutional understanding of democracy that equates 
democracy with the institutions of government intended to give effect to it. 
This view of democracy reflects liberal democratic theory, where democracy is 
routinely equated with the institutional, in an attempt to assert neutrality.32 
Quite apart from the political critique that this liberal conception draws,33 with 
which I agree, I have argued elsewhere that such an institutional 
understanding is flawed simply as a matter of description.34  A collection of 
democratic institutions is not democracy – it is simply a structure inside which 
democracy might take place.  Democracy itself is a value-system,35 a 
discursive practice,36 a way of doing and being, a mode of political action, a 
culture.  Certainly the Constitutional Court is correct in assuming that the 
constitution requires in the first place that certain democratic institutions be 
created and maintained.  But that is only part of the picture.  Such a 
democratic system without a democratic culture and practice amongst those 
that partake in it is an empty shell.  A statement of the democracy-related 
constitutional duties of the state that requires only that a series of democratic 
institutions be created, without also engaging the problem of creating and 
fostering the democratic culture with which to give those institutions life, is 
incomplete. 
 
                                                 
32 Mouffe (n 23 above) 3. 
33 As above 123. 
34 D Brand ‘Writing the law democratically: a response to Theunis Roux’ in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 97 100. 
35 T Roux ‘The principle of democracy in South African constitutional law’ in Woolman & 
Bishop (eds) (n 34 above) 79 82 and Roux (n 30 above) 10-23. 
36 N Fraser ‘Talking about needs: interpretive contests as political conflicts in welfare-state 
societies’ (1989) 99 Ethics 291 297. 
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The position related above with respect to democracy applies with equal force 
to the conception of politics that is my concern in this dissertation. I am not - 
at least not for present purposes – interested in institutional renditions of 
politics. The kind of politics that I am interested in is a mode of political action 
– political practice – that can occur and can be performed inside the formal 
democratic institutions, but that occurs mostly outside those institutions, in 
political movements, social movements and in everyday life.37 It is the politics 
‘conceived as a dimension that is inherent to every human society and that 
determines our very ontological condition’ that Mouffe refers to.38 
 
Again I make this point to avoid confusion later. Politics has featured most 
obviously in the development of our courts’ socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence in a decidedly institutional form. I refer here to the pre-
occupation our courts have shown in their socio-economic rights decisions 
with that old bugbear of constitutional theorists, the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma – the dilemma that democratically unaccountable courts through the 
exercise of their power to review conduct of the representative branches of 
government get to trump formal expressions of the collective will and in that 
sense can or cannot be said to work in a counter-democratic manner. This 
pre-occupation has manifested itself in a variety of forms – either in the 
traditional form of a concern with limiting the conduct of the executive or 
legislature because that would amount to limiting the collective political will 
expressed through those branches of government,39 or in the form of a 
concern for institutional security, where the attempt is to protect the 
institutional position of courts against possible encroachment by the ‘political’ 
branches occasioned by activist or robust court judgments.40 In both these 
forms, the politics involved in socio-economic rights adjudication is reduced to 
a matter of institutional relations or, at least, is mediated through institutional 
                                                 
37 See Mouffe (n 23 above) 3. 
38 As above. 
39 See, in general, M Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights’ (2004) South African Journal on Human Rights 383; P Lenta ‘Democracy, rights 
disagreements and judicial review’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 1. 
40 For an extensive and excellent engagement with this topic in the South African context see, 
in general, T Roux ‘Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ 
(2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 106. 
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forms. I say reduced, because to express the matter in such institutional terms 
divests it of substantive political content and presents politics simply as a 
matter of strategy or of process.41 The politics that I am concerned with is 
quite obviously not this kind of institutional politics. However, given the 
pervasiveness of this kind of institutional analysis of the political stakes of 
socio-economic rights adjudication in the jurisprudence and academic 
literature, I consider it prudent to distinguish my focus explicitly at the outset.  
 
1.2.3 An agonistic and substantive rather than a liberal politics 
 
The illusion of consensus and unanimity, as well as the calls for “anti-politics”, should 
be recognised as being fatal for democracy and therefore abandoned.42 
 
Asserting that liberal democracy is in crisis in the world, Chantal Mouffe, in 
her book The return of the political proceeds to describe a form of politics – 
agonistic politics – that to her would be able to re-insert the political into liberal 
democracy. I find her concept of agonistic politics suggestive for my purposes. 
 
Mouffe distinguishes her agonistic model of politics from liberal conceptions of 
politics in two ways. First, she decries the drive to consensus in liberal politics 
– the tendency, in order to maintain a fiction of neutrality with respect to 
substantive visions of the good, to deny conflict and contestation and to 
emphasise unanimity.43 This drive, for her, threatens liberal democracy itself.  
For democracy to survive, she argues, it has to be re-imbued with the political 
– and the political occurs for her only where there is a measure of antagonism 
rather than consensus. As she puts it: 
 
By “the political”, I refer to the dimension of antagonism inherent in human relations, 
antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social 
                                                 
41 In this sense it is an example of the operation of a liberal conception of politics, that 
presents politics as process rather than substance, attempting in this way to claim a position 
of neutrality with respect to substantive (political) question of the good (see in this respect 
Mouffe (n 23 above) 128 – 130; K van Marle ‘The politics of consent, friendship and 
sovereignty’ in R Hunter & S Cowan (eds) Choice and consent. Feminist engagements with 
law and subjectivity (2007) 75 (Van Marle ‘Consent’) 79 - 82; ‘Art, democracy and resistance: 
a response to Professor Heyns’ (2005) 2 PULP Fictions 15 (Van Marle ‘Art’) 19 – 20). 
42 Mouffe (n 23 above) 5. 
43 As above. 
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relations. ”Politics”, on the other hand, indicates the ensemble of practices, 
discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize 
human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they 
are affected by the dimension of “the political”.44 
 
As Karin van Marle points out, in an agonistic conception of democracy such 
as Mouffe’s, the central aim is not to achieve consensus through rational 
deliberation, but to strive toward unity in the face of (ever present) conflict. 
Although the antagonism inherent in the ‘us’/’them’ relation is constitutive of 
the political in such an agonistic view, an agonistic politics is not an ‘ensemble 
of practices, discourses and institutions’ through which the enemy (the ‘them’, 
other than the ‘us’) can be overcome or eradicated. Rather its aim is to find 
ways in which the enemy can be respected despite difference and conflict: 
‘The enemy is reconceptualised as adversary, antagonism reconceptualised 
as agonism’.45 This point is important. Mouffe’s agonistic politics is not a 
revolutionary politics – the aim is not to obliterate the enemy. Despite its 
emphasis on contestation, opposition, plurality and difference, agonistic 
politics does require a certain basis consensus about a set of ‘ethico-political’ 
principles. Nevertheless, agonism characterises even this basis consensus – 
it is a ‘conflictual consensus’, because the ethico-political principles on which 
it is based, remain open to conflictual interpretations.46 
 
The second way in which Mouffe distinguishes agonistic politics from liberal 
politics relates to the emphasis in liberal conceptions of democracy and 
politics on process. In the liberal mind democracy amounts to nothing more 
than a set of procedures, the aim of which is to provide to individuals the 
space and mechanism within which to express their preferences and 
demands. For the liberal there is no such thing as the achievement of a single 
and homogenous general will, or truth – the aim of democracy is rather to 
provide procedures capable of arriving at agreement in circumstances where 
                                                 
44 C Mouffe ‘For an agonistic model of democracy’ in N O’Sullivan (ed) Political theory in 
transition (2000) 113 125 - 126, also quoted in Van Marle ‘Consent’ (n 41 above) 81. 
45 Van Marle ‘Consent’ (n 41 above) 81 – 82. 
46 As above 82. 
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the achievement of such a homogenous will or truth is impossible.47 Mouffe’s 
response to this ‘empty’ idea of democracy and politics relates to her idea of a 
‘conflictual consensus’ around a set of ‘ethico-political principles’ related 
above. She proposes the following: 
 
[A]dherence to the political principles of the liberal democratic regime should be 
considered as the basis of homogeneity required for democratic equality. The 
principles in question are those of liberty and equality and it is clear that they can give 
rise to multiple interpretations and that no-one can pretend to possess the “correct” 
interpretation.48 
 
In this way she avoids the fiction of an empty, substance-less politics of 
liberalism without lapsing into the essentialist and potentially exclusive and 
totalitarian politics of communitarianism or nationalism – she posits politics as 
a mechanism through which to respect the enemy despite difference and 
conflict. 
 
Mouffe’s conception of agonistic politics described above resonates closely 
with the politics that I am concerned with in this dissertation. Both her focus 
on agonism or conflict and her emphasis on substance rather than only 
procedure are important for me for the following reason. Patrick Heller, in a 
comparative study of institutional strategies designed to ‘democratise’ 
developmental processes in local government structures, notes that the notion 
that impoverished people must participate in the planning and decision-
making processes through which their fates are determined (that development 
must occur as a political process) is accepted across the political spectrum in 
development studies and development economics. This is so to such an 
extent, he intimates, that the notion is in danger of losing real meaning and its 
credibility: ‘Officially, almost all parties to the debate support … democratic 
decentralisation. [Even] [t]he World Bank now routinely underscores the 
                                                 
47 Mouffe (n 23 above) 128 – 129. See also Van Marle ‘Consent’ (n 41 above) 79; ‘Art’ (n 41 
above) 19 – 20. 
48 Mouffe (n 23 above) 130 (my emphasis). 
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importance of promoting ‘empowerment’ …’.49 Andries du Toit is more 
forthright, noting that attempts by the state to engender participation by 
impoverished people in developmental processes are often ‘based on 
simplistic assumptions about buy-in’, and given local currents of power, often 
operate as processes of co-option by the liberal state.50 The danger he 
alludes to is that the liberal state, employing purely procedural mechanisms of 
participation where contestation about substantive questions are not possible, 
functions in a disciplining fashion, stilling political contestation through co-
option. To the extent that this dissertation results, in its Chapters 3 and 4 and 
its conclusion, in suggestions for institutional change designed to engender 
the politics I am concerned with, I distinguish my notion of transformative 
politics from the proceduralist and consensus-seeking notion of politics that 
underlies such subverted institutional mechanisms for participation. I do this 
by emphasising the conflictual and substantive character of transformative 
politics. 
 
Against the background of this description of the kind of politics that I am 
concerned with, I proceed with a consideration of different aspects of the 
relationship between such a politics and socio-economic rights adjudication. 
 
1.3 The adjudication of socio-economic rights claims and 
transformative politics 
1.3.1 Introduction 
In the main, courts in South Africa in enforcing socio-economic rights and 
those writing about their work in this respect have focussed their analytical 
efforts on two (related) issues: they have focussed on finding ways in which 
socio-economic rights can be enforced effectively – that is, in a way that 
results in concrete change for the better in the lives of impoverished people; 
and they have focussed on institutional questions relating to the capacity of 
                                                 
49 P Heller ‘Local democracy and development in comparative perspective’ in E Pieterse, S 
Parnell, M Swilling & M van Donk (eds) Consolidating developmental local government (2008) 
152 152. 
50 A du Toit ‘Chronic and structural poverty in South Africa: challenges for action and 
research’ (2005) PLAAS Chronic Poverty and Development Policy Series no 6; Chronic 
Poverty Research Centre Working Paper no 56 available at 
http://www.plaas.org.za/publications/researchreports/2006, visited 24 August 2008 16 17. 
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courts and their relations with the other branches of government. Given this 
preoccupation with the concrete and the strategic, whence my rather more 
abstract focus on the relationship between the adjudication of socio-economic 
rights claims and transformative politics as described above? 
 
Economists, development specialists and sociologists interested in the causes 
of and solutions to impoverishment have long recognised the crucial 
importance for sustainable socio-economic transformation of building 
institutions and practices that foster and create space for the kind of 
transformative politics I describe above. In his book, A history of inequality in 
South Africa 1652-2002,51 Sampie Terreblanche observes that inequality in 
socio-economic welfare in South Africa has throughout our history been 
mirrored by inequality in access to political power: that ‘the social and 
economic history of South Africa has been one of unequal distribution of 
power’.52 Terreblanche makes this claim about the three hundred years of 
racial domination prior to the changes of the 1990s, but also argues that it still 
largely holds today.53 He details the extent to which members of the most 
impoverished half of the population have, post 1990, been further 
impoverished and attributes their further impoverishment, at least in part, to 
their continued exclusion (now by a coalition of white economic and black 
political elites) from political power and their consequent inability to influence 
government economic and social policy and practice.54 From this he 
concludes that lasting and sustainable socio-economic transformation in 
South Africa will only occur if the unequal distribution of political power is also 
addressed – to quote from him again in slightly garbled fashion: we ‘cannot 
address the huge inequalities and injustices that have accumulated during 
[our history]’ if the ‘democratic part’ of the ‘new politico-economic system of 
democratic capitalism’ that is taking hold in South Africa ‘remains weak and 
                                                 
51 S Terreblanche A history of inequality in South Africa 1652 - 2002 (2002).  
52 As above 14. 
53 As above 16, 17, 18. 20. 
54 As above 419 - 423. See also P Bond Elite transition (2005) 253 and further. 
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underdeveloped compared to the powerful (and deeply institutionalised) 
“capitalist” part’.55 
 
Terreblanche’s concern with the need for dispersal of political power from 
elites to impoverished people and groups resonates in a concrete fashion with 
accounts of socio-economic transformation in South Africa from the fields of 
development studies and economics that emphasise the need for the 
democratisation of social and economic processes designed to address 
impoverishment and deprivation. These accounts oppose the ‘top-down’ 
approach to socio-economic transformation espoused by the Mbeki 
government over the last decade, in terms of which a ‘benevolent and rational 
state’ ‘sets the agenda for’ socio-economic transformation ‘and other actors 
and stakeholders have to embrace and support the path chosen’.56 Instead, 
they emphasise the politically contested and complex nature of problems of 
transformation and development57 and focus on fostering and strengthening 
the political agency of impoverished individuals and groups on the one 
hand,58 and fashioning developmental institutions and processes that a
for effective political contestation around issues of poverty and need on th
llow 
e 
                                                 
55 As above 17 – 18, 21. This is, of course, one element only of the solution Terreblanche 
proposes for South Africa’s current economic woes. His full proposal is for the construction of 
what has elsewhere been called a ‘democratic developmental state’ (E Pieterse & M van 
Donk ‘Incomplete ruptures: the political economy of realising socio-economic rights in South 
Africa’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 193 195 - 196) - in his own terms, a state 
operating according to a social-democratic version of democratic capitalism (see in general 
his Chapter 11 ‘Working toward a social-democratic version of democratic capitalism’ 419 - 
474). Such a state would in the first place be explicitly committed to human development and 
socio-economic transformation through the provision of social welfare (415 - 455). In terms of 
economic structuring, it would be a strong state in the sense both that it would adopt a 
‘leading and enabling’ (446, quoting an excerpt from the ANC’s The Reconstruction and 
development programme: a policy framework (1994) 78 - 79) role in the economy in terms of 
regulation and intervention and that it would possess the infrastructural, organisational and 
administrative capacity required to carry out its developmental role efficiently and effectively 
(446 - 449). Finally, it would operate in a democratic fashion with respect to its economic and 
developmental policy – it would acknowledge and have in place processes and structures to 
give effect to the idea that decisions about the allocation and utilisation of resources and 
about economic structuring and developmental policy ‘ought to be taken collectively through 
the democratic process and through continuing public discourse about what our national 
interest is, or what will best promote the social welfare of society at large in the long run’ (453; 
see also 449 - 451). 
56 Pieterse & Van Donk (n 11 above) 14. See also Pieterse & Van Donk (n 55 above) 195 - 
196 and Heller (n 49 above) 152. 
57 See eg E Pieterse, S Parnell, M Swilling & M van Donk ‘Consolidating developmental local 
government’ in Pieterse, Parnell, Swilling & Van Donk (eds) (n 49 above) 1 18; Pieterse & 
Van Donk (n 11 above) 13. 
58 See eg Du Toit (n 50 above) 16, 17. 
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other,59 so that solutions to impoverishment can be found through a ‘political 
process of negotiation, disagreement, conflict, occasionally consensus, and, 
at a minimum, forms of mutual accommodation’.60 
 
The ‘democratised’ approach to addressing impoverishment that arises from 
these accounts is first justified at a structural level in the way that 
Terreblanche does it – if what made and makes it possible for some in our 
society to impose an unequal distribution of wealth and resources on others 
was and is at least in part an unequal distribution of political power, then the 
unequal distribution of wealth can only be addressed if the unequal 
distribution of power is challenged.61 
 
The democratised approach is often also justified in directly instrumental 
terms, by linking democratisation to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
development. On this argument the complexity of problems of socio-economic 
transformation is such that no one actor in the process of transformation such 
as the state can claim to hold all the answers – answers are more likely to be 
effective if they are arrived at after input from a variety of actors. Also, so it is 
claimed, transformative processes and their outcomes are more likely to be 
effective if they were in part designed by or with the participation of those who 
derive benefit from them, as they know best what their own needs are and, in 
many cases what the most direct ways are of addressing them. Finally, it is 
recognised that the chance for viable and sustainable development is 
enhanced if impoverished people ‘buy into’ developmental processes and 
outcomes because they were involved in conceptualising and implementing 
them.62 
 
                                                 
59 Pieterse, Parnell, Swilling & Van Donk (n 57 above) 18 - 20. 
60 Pieterse & Van Donk (n 11 above) 13. 
61 Terreblanche (n 51 above) 17 - 18, 21. 
62 See eg Pieterse & Van Donk (n 11 above) 15 and Pieterse & Van Donk (n 55 above) 207; 
Pieterse, Parnell, Swilling & Van Donk (n 57 above) 18. This particular justification can of 
course be problematic – if the motivation for engaging with impoverished people when 
designing programmes to alleviate their plight is merely to generate this kind of ‘buy-in’ 
political engagement comes close to co-option. See my brief discussion of this problem at 25 
- 26 above and the sources cited there. 
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Perhaps most importantly, a democratised approach to socio-economic 
transformation is also justified in explicitly normative terms. In this view 
democratic empowerment of all in South Africa is an important element in 
itself of our vision of a just society. That is, one of the desired outcomes of 
transformation, alongside the physical eradication of poverty and socio-
economic inequality, is the creation of a society in which all – perhaps in 
particular impoverished people - are able to participate in a meaningful 
fashion in the decisions that affect them and that affect the society of which 
they are a part.63 
 
Although there is disagreement about exactly what participation entails and 
when it will be effective,64 and about which degree of participation in 
developmental processes can be allowed before the efficiency of those 
processes will be affected,65 there seems to be a least surface consensus in 
the literature about socio-economic transformation in South Africa from 
disciplines other than law that the ability of impoverished people and those 
acting in their interest to engage in transformative political action is a 
prerequisite to sustainable and viable transformation.66  
 
Importantly, development economists seem to recognise that South African 
courts, when deciding cases dealing with issues of impoverishment and 
deprivation, can play an important role in fostering the kinds of democratised 
developmental processes they support, because ‘they are located in the 
political space between [the state and impoverished groups and people] and 
therefore shape the focus of the contestation between civil society and the 
state’.67 The implication seems to be that courts and those interested in their 
work should be alive to the relationship between the process of adjudication 
                                                 
63 Pieterse & Van Donk (n 55 above) 208. 
64 Du Toit (n 50 above) 17. 
65 Heller (n 49 above) 152. 
66 As above. 
67 Pieterse & Van Donk (n 55 above) 198. One hears here echoes of Karl Klare’s assertion 
that ‘[w]e may … legitimately expect constitutional adjudication to innovate and model 
intellectual and institutional practices appropriate to a culture of [democracy] …’ (K Klare 
‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 146 147). 
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and transformative political action and should be sensitive to the need to 
foster, legitimise and create space for such politics. 
 
Surprisingly, however, both our courts and those who engage with their work 
have, at least until relatively recently, shown little interest in this issue. Once 
the normative debate about whether or not justiciable socio-economic rights 
should be included in the 1996 constitution – the debate, that is, about their 
legitimacy – had been concluded,68 academic writing about socio-economic 
rights in South Africa for an extended time moved away from theory and 
focussed instead on the development and description of legal doctrine to aid 
the engagement of courts with these rights. Institutional concerns about the 
relationship between courts and the other branches of government and about 
the institutional capacity of courts in deciding socio-economic rights cases, 
and practical concerns about the extent to which the decisions of courts could 
indeed generate concrete change in the lives of impoverished people have 
dominated the debate, leaving the seemingly more abstract or theoretical 
question of the relationship between the work of courts enforcing socio-
economic rights and transformative politics by the wayside. 
 
Such engagement with this question that there has been, has also mostly 
been of a certain kind and orientation – one that is different from my own 
engagement with it here. Most scholars have emphasised the possible 
positive aspects of the relationship, pointing out that the adjudication of socio-
economic rights claims can in different ways be constitutive of transformative 
political action, or a channel through which such action can occur or a way in 
which to open up space for transformative political action. In what follows I 
first describe these more common positive accounts of the relationship, before 
I turn to describing my own perspective on the question. 
 
                                                 
68 For an overview of the terms of this debate see S Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving 
jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: an effective tool in challenging poverty?’ (2003) 6 
Law, Democracy and Development 159 161 - 162; D Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic 
rights in the South African constitution’ in D Brand & CH Heyns Socio-economic rights in 
South Africa (2005) 1 21 - 22. 
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1.3.2 Common accounts of the relationship between socio-economic 
rights adjudication and transformative politics 
Most existing accounts of the relationship between socio-economic rights 
adjudication and transformative politics in the existing literature in South Africa 
fall into one of two broad streams. 
 
First, and most prominent, there are those who see socio-economic rights as 
constitutive of transformative politics, in that the access to basic resources 
that these rights supposedly enable for impoverished people makes it 
possible for them to engage in political action – I will call this approach, with a 
nod in the direction of John Hart Ely,69 the ‘representation-reinforcing’ 
approach. 
 
1.3.2.1 Representation reinforcement 
This kind of argument was most clearly presented during the debate about 
whether or not socio-economic rights should be included in the constitution – 
in other words, when the aim of those supporting these rights was still to 
legitimise their inclusion as justiciable rights in the constitution. A prominent 
participant in the debate at that time – Nicholas Haysom - forcefully articulated 
the point in an article in an issue of the South African Journal on Human 
Rights that focussed on the question whether or not justiciable socio-
economic rights should appropriately be included in the constitution.70 
Referring to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s assertion in the 1940s that freedom 
from hunger is as important for the survival of democracy as freedom of 
speech,71 Haysom describes what he calls a ‘civic equality’ argument for the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights in the constitution. The premise is that 
democracy can function only if political and civil equality exists – if all citizens 
are equal social and political participants. This equality is more than a simple 
formal equality of opportunity, which requires no more than a guarantee of 
open access to political life for whoever is able to make use of it. It is a 
substantive vision of equality in terms of which it is recognised that people 
                                                 
69 See sources cited in and text accompanying n 77 below. 
70 N Haysom ‘Constitutionalism, majoritarian democracy and socio-economic rights’ (1992) 8 
South African Journal on Human Rights 451. 
71 As above 460. 
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need to be guaranteed the basic material conditions for survival and dignified 
life in order to be able to participate actively in political life. In short, for 
Haysom, ‘an illiterate, hungry person’ cannot ‘participate in the political 
process let alone social life’,72 at least not on a basis of equality with those 
who do not suffer from want. Accordingly 
 
a minimum floor of rights should be constitutionalised to enrich political contest and 
democratic participation - not by limiting political choice but by facilitating real 
participation in social and political life.73  
 
In developing an argument in the late 1960s and 1970s that a constitutional 
right to minimum material welfare – what we would call socio-economic rights 
to housing, health care, education and a minimum income - should be 
recognised in the US constitutional system, Frank Michelman relied on a 
similar line of thought. Michelman sought to justify the proposition that a 
society should be ordered such not only that a fair opportunity exists for 
people to generate through their own effort an income sufficient to meet their 
basic material needs, but that the satisfaction of such basic needs is 
absolutely insured, ‘free of any remote contingencies pertaining to effort, thrift 
or foresight’.74 He did so using four discrete lines of argument: what André 
van der Walt has called a jurisprudential, a moral, a procedural fairness and 
an interpretivist argument.75 The interpretivist argument comes close to 
                                                 
72 As above. 
73 As above 461. 
74 F Michelman ‘The Supreme Court 1968 term – Foreword: on protecting to poor through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’ (1969) 83 Harvard Law Review 7. 
75 See AJ van der Walt ‘A South African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of social justice’ 
in H Botha, JWG van der Walt & AJ van der Walt (eds) Rights and democracy in a 
transformative constitution (2003) 163 181 - 193. The jurisprudential argument, developed in 
Michelman (n 74 above), involves analysis of a series of cases in which welfare rights were 
protected, but explicitly or implicitly on the basis of equal protection guarantees – Michelman 
proposes that these cases can be explained more coherently as having been decided on the 
basis of a constitutional right to minimum welfare and argues, in typical counter-intuitive 
fashion, that the cases in fact show such a right already exists in US constitutional law. In the 
moral argument, developed in his ‘In pursuit of constitutional welfare rights: one view of 
Rawls’ theory of justice’ (1973) 121 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 962, Michelman 
defends the proposition, on the basis of John Rawls’ A theory of justice (1971), that ‘morality 
and justice demand that certain basic social and economic needs should be satisfied by the 
state’ (Van der Walt (above) 183). The procedural fairness argument, developed in his 
‘Formal and associational aims in procedural due process’ in J Pennock (ed) Due process 
(Nomos XVIII) (1977) 126 again posits that welfare rights are implicitly recognised in US 
constitutional law, this time by analysing procedural due process cases and pointing out that 
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Haysom’s justification of justiciable constitutional socio-economic rights as 
constitutive of political capacity and participation.76 In this respect Michelman 
refers to the theory of constitutional interpretation of John Hart Ely. To explain 
the recognition of rights not explicitly enumerated in the US constitution 
without at the same time having to abandon the theoretical point of departure 
that interpretation of the constitution has to proceed from a premise that is 
inside the constitution, Ely formulated his well-known ‘representation-
reinforcing’ theory of interpretation.77 In broad terms Ely managed to justify 
the recognition of unenumerated rights relying on a basic constitutional value 
that he argued is implicit in the constitutional text – the value of ‘political 
participation through representation’.78 Judges interpreting the constitution 
and giving content to its provisions can opt for interpretations that are not 
explicit in the text if those interpretations enhance the potential for 
participation in representative politics. Relying on this interpretive principle of 
‘representation-enhancement’, Michelman argues that minimum welfare rights 
to things such as housing and a minimum income can legitimately be read 
into the constitution, because command of a minimum level of material 
welfare is a prerequisite for participation in the political process – indeed, in 
his words, ‘the universal, rockbottom prerequisite[ ] of effective participation in 
democratic representation.’79 
 
Michelman’s ‘representation-reinforcing’ justification for a constitutional right 
to minimum welfare is similar to Haysom’s argument in support of justiciable 
                                                                                                                                            
procedural due process strictures were imposed on state conduct more readily in cases 
involving decisions affecting aspects of minimum welfare, than in cases involving less basic 
needs. The interpretivist argument, developed in his ‘Welfare rights in a constitutional 
democracy’ (1979) 3 Washington University Law Quarterly 659 (Michelman ‘Welfare rights’), 
is described below at 34 - 35. 
76 For Andre van der Walt’s description and analysis of the interpretivist argument, see Van 
der Walt (n 75 above) 189 - 193. 
77 JH Ely ‘Constitutional interpretavism: its allure and impossibility’ (1978) 53 Indiana Law 
Journal 399; ‘The Supreme Court, 1977 term – Foreword: on discovering fundamental values’ 
(1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 5; and ‘Toward a representation-reinforcing mode of judicial 
review’ (1978) 37 Maryland Law Review 451. 
78 Michelman ‘Welfare rights’ (n 75 above) 669. 
79 As above 677. For Ely’s response to the use to which Michelman put his theory of 
interpretation, see his ‘Democracy and the right to be different’ (1981) 56 New York University 
Law Review 397 399 n 5 and Democracy and distrust (1980) 162 (expressing his frustration 
that his theory does not, in his view, extend the kind of protection to impoverished people as a 
discrete class that Michelman envisages). 
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socio-economic rights not only in content, but also in purpose. Both 
Michelman and Haysom’s aim was justificatory – their arguments were at the 
time they were made intended to justify the constitutional recognition of 
justiciable socio-economic rights there where they were not (yet) 
recognised.80 The ‘representation-reinforcing’ view of the relationship 
between adjudication of constitutional socio-economic rights and 
transformative politics did not translate as an explicit approach to the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights when these rights were included in the
constitution in South Africa and courts started to engage with them. Rather, it
has operated as an important inarticulated, or perhaps mutely articulated, 
premise of one of the most prominent critiques of the earlier half of our co
socio-economic rights
 
 
urts’ 
 jurisprudence. 
                                                
 
Early commentators on that jurisprudence such as Sandra Liebenberg and 
David Bilchitz mounted a spirited attack on the broad and generalised 
reasonableness review approach adopted by the Court in Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom81 and applied in subsequent cases.82 
The gist of their concern with this approach was that it had made of what 
could be rights of real people to real things such as houses, food, water and 
health care, rights of a generalised collective of people to reasonable policies. 
Instead they advocated what has come to be called the ‘minimum-core’ or 
‘basic needs’ approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights. For 
them, in cases where what was at stake was access to a certain minimum 
level of a basic material resource such as housing (the minimum core), courts 
should forego the attenuated and generalised reasonableness review 
approach occasioned by their perceived lack of institutional capacity relative 
to the political branches of government. Instead, in such cases, the courts 
should operate in a more activist fashion and interpret and enforce socio-
economic rights as individual rights in the first place, on the basis of which, in 
 
80 With respect to Michelman on this point, see Van der Walt (n 75 above) 181. 
81 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
82 For representative samples of their work in this respect, see D Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-
economic rights teeth: the minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 119 South African Law 
Journal 484 (Bilchitz ‘Teeth’) and ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: 
laying a foundation for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 1 (Bilchitz ‘Reasonable approach’); Liebenberg (n 68 above). 
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the second place, claimants can be awarded concrete and immediate relief to 
alleviate their acute deprivation.83 Their justification for the claim that courts 
should in such cases of acute deprivation throw deference to the wind was in 
part that the basic level of welfare at stake in such cases is indispensable not 
only to human survival, but is also a prerequisite for the capacity to operate as 
a social and political being.84 
 
Sandra Liebenberg has recently returned to the ‘representation-reinforcing’ 
theme in her work about the use of human dignity as a value in the 
interpretation of socio-economic rights. In this work, drawing amongst others 
on Jennifer Nedelsky,85 she develops a specifically relational conception of 
dignity that operates not as an aspect of an individualist autonomy but as an 
aspect of social relations. Against this background, she asserts that: 
 
Socio-economic rights are not valued as commodities, but because of what they 
enable human beings to do and to be. If basic subsistence needs are not met, 
humans face severe threats to life and health. But, in addition, such deprivation 
impedes the development of a whole range of human capabilities, including the ability 
to fulfil life plans and participate effectively in political, economic and social life.86 
 
                                                 
83 Bilchitz ‘Reasonable approach’ (n 82 above) in general, but specifically 26; Liebenberg (n 
68 above) 168 – 169, 176 – 177, 188, 190. The ‘minimum core’ approach to interpreting 
socio-economic rights, in particular as it has been articulated by its most vociferous advocate, 
David Bilchitz, can itself be subjected to the critique that it tends to depoliticisation and so 
works counter to transformative politics. The gist of such a critique would be that Bilchitz’s 
insistence that courts interpret socio-economic rights so as to impose certain immutable, 
universal basic standards of social provisioning, denies the inherently political nature of the 
process of determining the degree and nature of needs and deprivation. I do not engage in 
such a critique in this dissertation more than in passing. In this respect I should mention that 
Sandra Liebenberg, the other prominent protagonist of the ‘minimum core’ approach I identify, 
has departed from Bilchitz in this respect, making it clear from the outset that her concern is 
not, as with Bilchitz, the perceived need to ‘give content’ to socio-economic rights by 
describing universal standards and, more recently, stating that she seeks to avoid doing so 
precisely because such an attempt denies the politics of socio-economic rights (see in this 
respect, for example, S Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights: revisiting the reasonableness 
review/minimum core debate’ in SC Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations 
(2008) 303 313). 
84 See, for example, Bilchitz ‘Reasonable approach’ (n 82 above) 12 (‘[w]ithout protecting 
people’s survival interests, all other interests and rights that they may have – whether civil, 
political, social or economic – become meaningless’). 
85 J Nedelsky ‘Reconceiving rights as relationships’ (1993) 1 Review of Constitutional Studies 
1. 
86 S Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ in Van der 
Walt (ed) (n 18 above) 143 143 – 144. 
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1.3.2.2 Socio-economic rights adjudication as a tool of politics 
The second broad stream within which accounts of the relationship between 
socio-economic rights adjudication and transformative politics fall, addresses 
that relationship more explicitly than the representation-reinforcing stream. On 
this account, socio-economic rights litigation and decisions of courts in socio-
economic rights cases can operate as part of political struggles by or on 
behalf of impoverished people – as tools to be used strategically within that 
struggle. 
 
In South Africa, this understanding has been expressed most consistently in 
writing recounting the experience of political campaigning of the Treatment 
Action Campaign. This conglomerate of civil society organisations 
successfully challenged the refusal of the Department of Health of the South 
African Government to make available the antiretroviral medicine Nevirapine 
to HIV positive women giving birth at public health facilities in order to prevent 
the transmission at birth to their babies of HIV in the case of Minister of Health 
v Treatment Action Campaign.87 Some of those involved in the Treatment 
Action Campaign and commentators analysing its campaigns as examples of 
successful political advocacy and mobilisation have consistently emphasised 
the extent to which, supposedly, the Treatment Action Campaign used 
litigation targeted on specific issues to create space for and strengthen its 
broader political campaigns.  
 
So, for example, in an article explicitly styled as a review of the implications 
for political strategies of the Treatment Action Campaign case, Mark 
Heywood, at the time National Secretary of the Treatment Action Campaign, 
recounts the way in which the case was used strategically as part of the 
organisation’s broader campaigns to intensify the fight against HIV/AIDS.88 
He details the manner in which the decision was taken to take the matter to 
court, the way in which the case was developed and run through the different 
courts, and the way in which the implementation of the final order of the 
                                                 
87 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
88 M Heywood ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in South Africa: background, 
strategies and outcomes of the treatment action campaign case against the Minister of 
Health’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 278. 
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Constitutional Court was monitored by the Treatment Action Campaign. In the 
process he argues persuasively that, if used creatively, litigation around socio-
economic rights - not only the judgments of courts, but also the process of 
litigation and of adjudication – can contribute to political struggles on much 
broader issues than those relevant to the case itself. 
 
By way of illustration, he points to an ‘interesting dialectic’89 between law and 
political struggle that arose from the decision of the state to appeal against the 
order of the High Court in favour of the Treatment Action Campaign and from 
its attempts to stay execution of the High Court order that Nevirapine be made 
available, pending the finalisation of its appeal to the Constitutional Court. In 
Heywood’s words: 
 
During this time … [t]he pressure of the ongoing legal action forced the government 
back into court, and the different stages of the appeal and the application for an 
execution order spurred further advocacy and social mobilisation – which in turn 
placed new pressures on government.90 
 
Heywood recounts how the Treatment Action Campaign throughout this 
process, through the skilful use of publicity, mobilisation and protest, 
managed to build pressure on government with respect to its policies on 
HIV/AIDS to such an extent that, two weeks before the hearing on the 
Nevirapine issue would commence in the Constitutional Court, the 
government announced a plan for the universal provision of anti-retroviral 
medicines to HIV carriers at public health facilities, and for the first time 
publicly acknowledged that anti-retrovirals had an important role to play in 
managing the impact of the disease. This, a major political victory for the 
Treatment Action Campaign at the time, illustrates to Heywood the extent to 
which litigation targeted to address a specific issue can generate political 
pressure that leads to gains in other issues that are part of a broader political 
struggle.91 
                                                 
89 Heywood (n 88 above) 304. 
90 As above. 
91 As above 303 – 307, 310, 314. See also J Berger ‘Litigation strategies to gain access to 
treatment for HIV/AIDS: the case of South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign’ (2002) 20 
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 Others have also emphasised how the Treatment Action Campaign’s use of 
litigation has managed to place the issues at stake on the public agenda and 
to raise political awareness about them92 or how victories in litigation have 
‘facilitated empowerment’ of the movement and its members by expanding the 
horizons of the possible and so opening space for further political action.93 
 
1.3.3 My own account – the limiting effect of the adjudication of socio-
economic rights on transformative politics 
1.3.3.1 Introduction 
The two accounts of the relationship between the adjudication of socio-
economic rights claims and transformative politics related in section 1.3.1 
above share two characteristics. 
 
First, both these accounts depict the relationship in a positive light. That is, 
both accounts see litigation and adjudication around socio-economic rights as 
supportive in some way of transformative politics – in the representation-
reinforcing account because the access to basic material resources that can 
be leveraged for impoverished people by such litigation enables them as 
political actors and in the second account because such litigation operates as 
a tool of transformative political struggle. 
 
Second, both these accounts can be described as ‘outcomes-oriented’. That 
is, both evaluate the nature of the relationship between the adjudication of 
socio-economic rights claims and transformative politics by virtue of the 
concrete results generated in the process of socio-economic rights 
adjudication. For the representation-reinforcing analysis the relationship 
                                                                                                                                            
Wisconsin International Law Journal 596 598 (‘[w]hile the TAC aims to secure a legal victory 
whenever litigation is undertaken, the organisation is also highly aware of the role of the 
litigation process beyond the orders made in court judgments’). 
92 Berger (n 91 above) 599 (‘[l]itigation is also used to place issues on the agenda, both 
before the judge and in the court of public opinion’). 
93 S Friedman & S Mottiar ‘Rewarding engagement?: the Treatment Action Campaign and the 
politics of HIV/AIDS’ (2004) Research report prepared for the Centre for Civil Society and 
School for Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, available at 
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/CCS/files/FRIEDMAN%20MOTTIER%20A%20MORAL%20TO%20TH
E%20TALE%20LONG%20VERSION%20.PDF, visited 1 November 2008 text accompanying 
notes 190 – 191. 
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between adjudication of socio-economic rights claims and transformative 
politics and the positive nature of that relationship are defined by the results it 
can generate. It is determined by the fact that such adjudication can result in 
impoverished people getting access to certain material things – houses, food, 
water, health care, education – that make it possible for them to operate as 
political agents. The second account is equally results-oriented: it defines the 
relationship by virtue of the fact that socio-economic rights litigation can 
achieve concrete political gains within a broader political struggle. 
 
The outcomes-oriented nature of the two common accounts of the relationship 
between socio-economic rights adjudication and transformative politics 
reflects, I believe, a certain understanding of what transformation entails. 
South African poet and novelist Antjie Krog describes this understanding of 
transformation thus:94 
 
The word consists of two parts: the prefix ‘trans’, which is Latin for across, the other 
side (as in Transkei, Transvaal); and ‘form’ which means to give structure to, to 
create, to bring forth. In its deepest structure then, the word ‘transformation’ means: 
to form the other side, to start creating where you are going. 
 
 In terms of this understanding transformation is first and foremost results-
oriented – it is concerned with real and concrete changes in society, with the 
achievement of certain concrete transformative goals. The transformative 
performance of courts in socio-economic rights cases is as a consequence 
also evaluated in a results oriented fashion: the transformative litmus test 
becomes the extent to which doctrine and remedial approaches in socio-
economic rights cases can and do ‘tangibly alleviat[e] the consequences of 
poverty and deprivation’,95 or achieve ‘a specific contextual form of equality’,96 
or ‘give[ ] effect to the value of human dignity’.97 It would seem that this 
concept of transformation underlying the two accounts of the relationship 
                                                 
94 A Krog A change of tongue (2003) 126. 
95 M Pieterse ‘Resuscitating socio-economic rights: constitutional entitlements to health care 
services’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 473 477. See also Liebenberg (n 
68 above) 160. 
96 P De Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as contextual 
fairness’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 258 258.  
97 Liebenberg (n 86 above) 158. 
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between socio-economic rights adjudication and transformative politics is 
determinatively linked to the positive description of that relationship found in 
those accounts. In this approach the point of departure is in the first instance 
a positive one - that the enforcement by courts of socio-economic rights holds 
real transformative potential – and the project is to shape the work of our 
courts with respect to socio-economic rights in such a way that the potential is 
realised, that transformative goals are achieved.98 
 
I am naturally drawn to this kind of pragmatist, results-oriented approach to 
assessing the transformative performance of our courts in socio-economic 
rights cases.99 I share with those operating in terms of it, at least to some 
extent, a certain constitutional optimism, a belief in the potential for law, rights 
and specifically adjudication to achieve meaningful social transformation and 
in the virtue of pursuing the realisation of that potential.100 I am also, as they 
are, acutely aware that in South Africa today homelessness, hunger, ill-health, 
poverty, inequality and the resultant social and political exclusion are 
enormous and urgent problems that require concrete and immediate solutions 
and believe that legal scholars should focus their attention on generating such 
solutions. Indeed, much of my writing about the judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights to date has proceeded from precisely the assumption that 
these rights and our courts’ work with respect to them are potential 
transformative instruments and should be interpreted as such.101 
Nevertheless, I approach my own evaluation of the relationship between 
transformative politics and the adjudication of socio-economic rights claims on 
the basis of a different understanding of transformation. 
                                                 
98 This point of departure and this project are most clearly articulated by Sandra Liebenberg, 
who states that ‘ ... socio-economic rights were included as justiciable rights in the Bill of 
Rights primarily to assist the poor to protect and advance their fundamental socio-economic 
needs and interests. These rights should therefore be interpreted in a way that promotes this 
purpose.’ (Liebenberg (n 68 above) 160). 
99 Pragmatist in the sense that it is an approach that evaluates law and adjudication for its 
‘actual consequences for … people’, for the extent to which it does or does not satisfy human 
needs (JW Singer ‘Property and coercion in federal Indian law: the conflict between critical 
and complacent pragmatism’ (1990) 63 Southern California Law Review 1821 1821 - 1822). 
100 I borrow the term ‘constitutional optimism’ from Emilios Christodoulidis who uses it (and 
critiques it) in his ‘Constitutional irresolution: law and the framing of civil society’ (2003) 9 
European Law Journal 401 403 and what follows. 
101 See, for example, my ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence, or “What are socio-economic rights for?” ‘ in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der 
Walt (eds) (n 75 above) 33. 
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 I take my cue in this respect from Karl Klare, who in his now famous article 
‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ cautioned that the choice 
of South Africans to allow a significant portion of their transformation to occur 
through adjudication, although alive with possibility and potential, is also 
‘fraught with ... consequences’.102 Neil Walker has recently pointed out that, in 
this age of unprecedented constitutional optimism, in which more faith is 
placed internationally than probably ever before in the potential for 
constitutions and the associated institution of constitutional judicial review to 
manage and effect social organisation, constitutionalism and judicial review 
‘have also been subject to a perhaps unprecedented range and intensity of 
attack’.103 In South Africa, to a lesser extent, we have also seen this. 
Certainly, as pointed out above, there is currently in South Africa a great deal 
of belief in the power of the constitution and of courts enforcing that 
constitution to drive and manage the transformation of our society – indeed in 
some quarters our transformation is conceptualised as nothing but a 
constitutional transformation.104 But at the same time, a small group of legal 
academics have cautioned against constitutional over-optimism and have 
focussed their writing on the negative consequences of our choice to allow a 
significant portion of our transformation to occur through adjudication. 
Recognising that adjudication, despite its transformative potential, is at best a 
limited and at worst a limiting instrument for transformation, they have 
focussed their energies on identifying the different ways in which adjudication, 
whilst effecting transformation or attempting to do so, can at the same time 
have an anti-transformative effect. 
 
So, for example, at an early stage in the debate, Karl Klare traced the extent 
to which the Constitutional Court in some of its early judgments, through 
                                                 
102 Klare (n 67 above) 147. 
103 N Walker ‘The idea of constitutional pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317 318. 
104 For a description and critique of the extent to which our transformation has been 
constitutionalised, see K van Marle ‘Revisiting the politics of post-apartheid constitutional 
interpretation’ 2003 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg/Journal for South African Law 549 
(‘Revisiting’) and ‘Love, law and the South African community: critical reflections on “suspect 
intimacies” and “immanent subjectivity” ‘ in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) (n 75 
above) 231. For a description of the ways in which this kind of constitutional optimism 
presents itself internationally, see Christodoulidis (n 100 above) 403 and what follows. 
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denying the politically contingent nature of its work, exerted a negative 
influence on the maintenance of a vibrant progressive politics – something 
that he regards as a prerequisite to transformation.105 More recently, Henk 
Botha has analysed the modes of reasoning and in particular the metaphors 
employed by both pre- and post-apartheid courts and has pointed out how 
reliance on the metaphor of boundaries to describe legal rules and rights 
rather than a conceptualisation of rights as relationships limits the extent to 
which our courts can develop a ‘potentially transformative constitutional 
jurisprudence’.106 As a final example, André van der Walt has highlighted the 
anti-transformative tendency of adjudication to reach finality or to establish 
orthodoxy – to close issues off from further contestation (and further 
transformation).107 
 
These different analyses also have in common a certain understanding of 
transformation, importantly different from the understanding of transformation 
related above, and, as a result, a certain understanding of what the 
transformative orientation of the constitution requires of courts. In terms of this 
understanding transformation is not, at least not only, concerned with the 
outcomes generated by a system or an institution, with the achievement of 
certain goals. Much rather, real transformation requires that the system or 
institution itself be transformed – that the system or institution itself be 
                                                 
105 Klare (n 67 above) 172 - 188. See 48 - 52 below for a fuller discussion. 
106 H Botha ‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2)’ 2003 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse reg/Journal for South African Law 20 34. See also his ‘Metaphoric 
reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 1)’ 2002 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse 
reg/Journal for South African Law 612, ‘Freedom and constraint in constitutional adjudication’ 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 249 (‘Freedom’) and ‘Democracy and 
rights. Constitutional interpretation in a postrealist world’ (2000) 63 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 561. See 55 - 61 below for a fuller discussion. 
107 AJ van der Walt ‘Resisting orthodoxy – again: thoughts on the development of post-
apartheid South African law’ (2002) 17 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 258 (‘Orthodoxy’). See also 
his ‘Dancing with codes – protecting, developing and deconstructing property rights in a 
constitutional state’ (2001) 118 South African Law Journal 258 and ‘Tentative urgency: 
sensitivity for the paradoxes of stability and change in social transformation decisions of the 
Constitutional Court’ (2001) 16 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 1, where he explores other aspects 
of the conflicted nature of the role of courts participating in social transformation. The 
examples I mention in the text here are of course only examples of an extensive literature. 
See at the minimum also H Botha & JWG van der Walt ‘Democracy and rights in South Africa: 
beyond a constitutional culture of justification’ 2000 Constellations 341; WB le Roux ‘From 
Acropolis to metropolis: the new Constitutional Court building and South African street 
democracy’ (2001) 16 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 139; and Van Marle ‘Revisiting’ (n 104 
above) 549 (see 52 - 55 below for a fuller discussion). 
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changed so radically that its very identity is altered.108 Again, Antjie Krog 
comes to my aid:109 
 
But ‘trans’ also appears in words like transfigure, transfer, transcend, transaction, 
transgress, transience. And it is embedded in the Dutch hemeltrans, where it means 
‘firmament’. One could say that in order to create the other side, one has to remake 
the firmament – no mere change of structure or exterior, but of the guiding essence. 
  
Certainly, this understanding of transformation is not apathetic to the need to 
achieve concrete transformative goals. Indeed, it is partly motivated by the 
recognition that an institution’s capacity to generate truly transformative 
outcomes is importantly limited if it unreflexively continues to operate in terms 
of its accepted methods and intuitions.110 But the focus is different: whereas 
the first conception of transformation related above focuses on the law and 
adjudication’s transformative potential, this second conception of 
transformation is concerned with law and adjudication’s inevitable anti-
transformative impact. The transformative performance of courts in terms of 
the latter conception is consequently evaluated not in terms of the immediate 
and direct results they generate with their decisions, but through scrutiny of 
the process of adjudication itself: the transformative litmus test becomes to 
what extent courts, while seeking to achieve transformative outcomes in their 
decisions and while developing the legal doctrine with which to do so, are able 
to limit the broader anti-transformative impact of their work by reconsidering 
and adjusting their ‘professional sensibilities, habits of mind and intellectual 
reflexes’.111 The point of departure is, at least in part, negative – that the work 
of courts inevitably has a transformative cost – and the project is to seek ways 
in which this cost can be accounted for. 
                                                 
108 This conception of transformation as I describe it here is derived from the work of Drucilla 
Cornell (see D Cornell Transformations: recollective imagination and sexual difference (1993) 
1 - 2) but is current elsewhere also – see, for example, Nancy Fraser’s description of 
‘transformative strategies’ as aiming ‘to correct unjust outcomes precisely by restructuring the 
underlying generative framework’ (my emphasis) (N Fraser ‘Social justice in the age of 
identity politics: redistribution, recognition and participation’ in N Fraser & A Honneth 
Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (2003) 7 74. 
109 Krog (n 94 above) 126. 
110 Klare (n 67 above) 171 - 172. See also Krog (n 94 above) 128: ‘Marx had another 
definition of transformation, the Internet reminds me. The superstructure can only change if 
the underlying economic base changes’. 
111 As above 166. 
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 In my own analysis of the relationship between a transformative politics and 
the adjudication of socio-economic rights claims, I adopt this second, less 
commonly applied conception of transformation. I do not focus on the 
transformative potential of socio-economic rights litigation, on the extent to 
which such litigation can advance and strengthen a transformative politics. 
Rather, I focus on ways in which such litigation can limit a transformative 
politics. I do not analyse the cases in the first place for the results they 
generated or the results they could have generated. I analyse the manner in 
which the cases were decided with the aim of identifying instances where the 
work of courts in them may have an anti-transformative impact on 
transformative politics more generally than simply with respect to the discrete 
issues before the court. 
 
From the broad realm of critical accounts of law – in particular the US Critical 
Legal Studies – I have at my disposal a number of well-established analyses 
and critiques with which to explore this anti-transformative impact. I could, for 
example, employ a ‘false consciousness’ critique, investigating to what extent 
legal victories achieved in socio-economic rights cases induce a false sense 
of achievement in political actors that real change will result, when, instead 
they operate only to legitimize the status quo.112 Alternatively, I could trace to 
what extent the translation of collective issues of need and deprivation into the 
language of individual rights works to erode the different forms of collective 
organisation necessary to achieve real change in the political realm.113 
 
I elect to do neither. Instead, I choose to employ two other lines of critique. 
Both these lines of critique investigate the ways in which adjudication, through 
the rhetoric, metaphors, language and conceptual structures that it employs, 
                                                 
112 M Jackman ‘Constitutional rhetoric and social justice: reflections on the justiciability 
debate’ in J Bakan & D Schneiderman (eds) Social justice and the constitution: perspectives 
on a Social Union for Canada (1992) 17 22. See in this respect S Wilson ‘Taming the 
constitution: rights and reform in the South African education system’ (2004) 20 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 418 423 - 424, who points out how the Department of Education 
has effectively co-opted rights-talk to ‘provide ideological window-dressing for policies and 
practices, which actually countenance significant limits on the very rights they are supposed 
to advance’ (424). 
113 See 70 - 71 below and the sources cited there. 
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works to depoliticise issues of political concern – to depict them as matters 
that are not open to political contestation and in particular not open to the kind 
of transformative politics I work with. In the first I am concerned with the 
tendency in adjudication toward achieving closure or certainty – the tendency 
to depict issues that have been decided as removed from political 
contestation because they have been finally and authoritatively decided or as 
conclusively determined by a self-evident legal text. In the second I am 
concerned with the tendency in adjudication to depict, in different ways, 
issues as removed from political contestation because they are in some way 
devoid of political content, or politically neutral. 
 
Below I explore these two critiques of the nature of the relationship between 
transformative political action and adjudication – the former primarily with 
reference to the debate in South African law about the relative virtues within a 
transformative legal setting of rules and standards, relying on the work of Karl 
Klare, Duncan Kennedy, Robert Cover, Andre van der Walt and Henk Botha 
in this respect; the latter relying on the analysis of Nancy Fraser of the political 
debate around poverty and deprivation and the ways in which that debate is 
depoliticised, echoed in the more closely legally oriented work of Thomas 
Ross and Lucy Williams, who trace the operation of the kind of depoliticising 
rhetoric that Fraser also identifies in the work of courts.  
 
1.3.3.2 Final decisions and straight lines – the drive to certainty 
Writing about the early property and equality Constitutional Court decision of 
Harksen v Lane NO,114 André van der Walt and Henk Botha provide the 
following appraisal of the equality standard enunciated by the Court in that 
case on the back of its earlier decision in President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Hugo115 (despite its length it is worth, for my purposes, quoting it in 
full): 
 
Few lawyers would fail to be impressed by the court’s neat and orderly exposition of 
its equality jurisprudence. Here, it seems, is a sophisticated yardstick which combines 
                                                 
114 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 1 SA 300 (CC). 
115 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC). 
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analytical rigour with a sensitivity to context; and which draws upon the strengths of 
both United States (different levels of scrutiny) and Canadian (the two stage 
approach) jurisprudence, in a manner which does justice to the language, structure 
and underlying values of the South African bill of rights. The fact that the two judges 
who applied this test reached quite different conclusions should perhaps not distress 
us, as we have come to realise that the meaning of words is never fixed, and that it is 
precisely the fact that a constitution is open to a variety of interpretations which 
enables it to unify a nation consisting of groups and individuals with radically different 
values and belief systems. Seen thus, the generality of the equality standard may be 
regarded as a strength and not a weakness. In any event, it may be argued, the 
(relative) indeterminacy of the test is not the result of a lack of interpretative 
guidelines laid down by the Court, but has more to do with the margin for 
contextualisation allowed by its approach. And surely that can’t be a bad thing!116 
 
This passage heralds for me the extension into the realm of public law in 
South Africa of the debate about the difference between rules and standards 
and the equation of the former with individualism and the latter with altruism 
that had long been ongoing in private law circles.117 It also, in the space of a 
few words, prefigures the link that would be explored in later writing in South 
Africa between the fashioning and application of broad and flexible standards 
in adjudication rather than bright-line rules on the one hand and the 
transformative ethos of the constitution and the fostering of a transformative 
politics on the other. In what follows I explore this debate and this link. First, I 
trace Karl Klare’s use of Duncan Kennedy’s extended exposition of the extent 
to which judicial choice determines legal interpretation in his own exposition of 
                                                 
116 AJ van der Walt & H Botha ‘Coming to grips with the new constitutional order: critical 
comments on Harksen v Lane NO’ (1998) 13 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 17 35 (references 
omitted). 
117 In private law, this debate was initially introduced by Duncan Kennedy with his ‘Form and 
substance in private law adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1658 and brought to 
South Africa by Alfred Cockrell in his ‘Substance and form in the South African law of 
contract’ (1992) 109 South African Law Journal 40. For an excellent recent discussion within 
the context of South African contract law, see AJ Barnard-Naude ‘ “Oh what a tangled web we 
weave …” Hegemony, freedom of contract, good faith and transformation – towards a politics 
of friendship in the politics of contract’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review (forthcoming). 
Alfred Cockrell, in his ‘Rainbow jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 1 had of course two years earlier than Van der Walt & Botha touched upon the use of 
flexible and general standards in constitutional adjudication. However, his engagement with 
the issue stops at a critical appraisal of what he at the time perceived to be an uncritical 
engagement by courts with such standards that operated to hide the substantive reasoning 
underlying their judgments – he does not explore the link between the use of flexible 
standards and transformation through adjudication that Van der Walt & Botha allude to. 
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the transformative nature of the constitution.118 Then, I briefly describe André 
van der Walt’s caution against the adoption of new orthodoxies or final 
answers in post-apartheid law as an illustration of Robert Cover’s idea that the 
law through its drive to finality exerts violence.119 Finally for this section, I 
dwell for a more extended time on Henk Botha’s description of the nature of 
adjudication, which he develops on the basis of Duncan Kennedy’s 
description of adjudication as a field, and which he links to the transformative 
ethos of the constitution.120 
 
(a) Klare – indeterminacy as openness 
In his 1998 article on the character of the South African constitution, Karl 
Klare sets out to do two things. First, he makes and describes the claim that 
the South African constitution is a transformative or post-liberal document. 
Second, having made that claim, he proceeds to describe the implications of 
that nature of the constitution for judges and their work – he makes some 
observations about what an approach to adjudication aligned to the 
transformative ethos of the constitution would look like. 
 
For his description of such a transformatively inclined notion of judging Klare 
relies on Duncan Kennedy’s problematisation of the liberal legalist 
understanding of interpretation of legal texts as a mechanical and politically 
untouched exercise of judges finding law from a set of determinate legal 
materials. In a lucid account of the familiar CLS indeterminacy thesis, Klare 
begins by reminding us that legal materials do not self-generate meanings. 
Meaning is generated from them through interpretative work – ‘adjudicators 
perform work within a medium’.121 The medium within which judges work – 
                                                 
118 Klare (n 67 above), relying on D Kennedy A critique of adjudication: {fin de siècle} (1997) 
(A critique); 'Strategizing strategic behavior in legal interpretation' (1996) Utah Law Review 
785; 'The stakes of law, or Hale and Foucault!' in Sexy Dressing Etc. (1993) 83; and 
'Freedom and constraint in adjudication: a critical phenomenology' (1986) 36 Journal of Legal 
Education (‘Freedom’) 518. 
119 Van der Walt ‘Orthodoxy’ (n 107 above) 258 – 278, relying on, amongst others, R Cover 
‘Violence and the word’ (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1602 (‘Violence’) and ‘The Supreme 
Court, 1982 term - foreword: nomos and narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4 
(‘Narrative’). 
120 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 106 above), relying on Kennedy 'Freedom’ (n 118 above) 518 and 
further and A critique (n 118 above). 
121 Klare (n 67 above) 160. 
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legal materials – is indeed constraining, but that constraint is never an 
absolute quality. First, legal materials are ambiguous, ‘shot through with gaps 
[and] conflicts’ – those gaps have to be filled through legal work.122 Second, 
even there where constraint appears at face value – where a rule seems 
articulated with one clear meaning only or where a particular professional 
sensibility seems ineluctably to mandate a specific reading of a legal text – 
this is ambivalent. This is so because constraint is not some innate quality of 
the materials. Rather, it is an experience of the materials, mediated through 
the context, professional codes and sensibilities and ability of the particular 
interpreter.123 Klare recounts that any lawyer has experienced how, in 
circumstances where her political intuition points to a certain result, but that 
result is resisted by the materials, despite her best efforts she is unable to 
make the material budge. However, any lawyer has also experienced that 
material that initially seemed to indicate in an absolute constraining fashion a 
certain result, dissolves with the application of a measure of extra effort, so 
that the result initially intuited can be achieved.124 
 
What determines the ‘bindingness’ of constraint, therefore, is not only the 
professional sensibilities, habits of mind and skill of the particular interpreter, 
but also sometimes the question whether or not the interpreter is willing to 
expend the extra effort to achieve a result not initially indicated by the 
materials – ‘in contested cases, what makes for a “good” or “legally sound” or 
“legally correct” interpretation is partly a question of the practitioner's training, 
skill and insight, and partly a question of choices about the allocation of her 
intellectual energies and resources’.125 Crucially, this leads to the conclusion 
that legal interpretation, and therefore the process of adjudication, is laden 
with politics in at least two ways: 
 
First, legal work - the interpretive practices in which judges, advocates and 
commentators engage - partially constitutes the legal materials, thereby imbuing them 
with value-laden meanings. Indeed, legal work even shapes lawyers’ sense of what 
                                                 
122 As above 159. 
123 As above 160.  
124 As above. 
125 As above 163. 
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materials are pertinent to a particular legal question. Second, judges and other 
participants in adjudication constantly make conscious and unconscious choices 
about how to deploy their intellectual energy and resources. These choices rest on 
values, perceptions and intuitions external to the legal materials, since the choices 
only arise in response to apparent gaps, conflicts and ambiguities in the materials.126 
 
Taken on its own, Klare’s explanation of the indeterminacy of legal materials 
and of the political stakes of legal interpretation is uncontroversial – it is no 
more than a (particularly well-constructed and lucid) recapitulation of a well-
known postulate of CLS theory. It is what he does with it that matters. 
 
Duncan Kennedy, with his account of the process of adjudication from which 
Klare derives his description related above presents no explicit normative 
conclusions.127 Klare, however, draws clear normative implications from it for 
the South African context. His article concludes with an extended plea for a 
shift in legal culture in South that would enable South African lawyers more 
readily to acknowledge and work with the pliability of legal materials and to 
acknowledge and work with the political stakes of interpretation and 
adjudication. Such a ‘leavening’ of lawyerly attitude would for him, in our 
context, hold two signal advantages. First, he argues that the belief that the 
prevailing legal culture has in the constraining nature of legal material and the 
consequent strict separation between law and politics ‘obscure[s] and 
mystif[ies] the choices judges and advocates routinely make in their 
interpretive work’.128 This has the effect that the transparency and 
accountability of the legal process is undermined. Acknowledgement of the 
open texture of legal materials and the element of choice operating in 
adjudication would have the opposite effect, opening up the decisions to 
public scrutiny and contributing in this way to the deepening of democratic 
culture.129 In addition, Klare proceeds, failure to adapt current legal culture 
and an unreflexive application of current conservative jurisprudential attitudes 
may result in a certain intellectual caution – an unwillingness to stretch legal 
                                                 
126 As above 162 - 163 (references omitted). 
127 Kennedy 'Freedom’ (n 118 above) 518. 
128 Klare (n 67 above) 171. 
129 As above. 
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materials beyond their initial impression of constraint. For him this raises the 
possibility that 
 
“caution” of this kind (some would call it “professionalism”) might in some cases 
discourage a judge or advocate from investing intellectual resources in interpretive 
projects that might, if successful, produce 'non-obvious' results (ie, results that, while 
morally or politically appealing, appear to require a leap too far beyond what the legal 
materials - on first impression - appear obviously to require or permit) [and that] 
[c]onstitutional transformation might suffer accordingly.130 
 
To take one step back, then: Klare’s description and his normative conclusion 
related here raises a number of salient points relevant to my concern with the 
limiting effect of the adjudication of socio-economic rights claims on 
transformative politics. 
 
Klare is concerned about attempts to describe the law as clear and certain 
and related attempts to describe legal work (judging and lawyering) as 
processes of apolitical, neutral extrapolation of rules from a clear and certain 
text – that is, about accounts of legal work that emphasise the constraint that 
inheres in legal materials. These accounts he finds troublesome because they 
both limit the extent to which legal interpreters will seek to find new 
interpretations of materials, on the basis of which to achieve transformative 
results and, in presenting law as given, as a-political, insulate judicial work 
from scrutiny and from accountability. 
 
Instead he points out that legal materials are much more pliable than 
traditional legal minds would have it, and urges, in South Africa, an 
acknowledgement of this fact. 
 
Importantly, he recognises that legal materials do indeed constrain decision 
making. However, constraint is never absolute – it is pliable, so that legal 
interpretation occurs within the tension between freedom and constraint. 
 
                                                 
130 As above. 
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Finally, he gives a normative spin to his critique of legal certainty – he points 
out that recognition of the potential for uncertainty in law both enhances the 
prospects of judges and lawyers seeing and generating new possibilities 
through their work and exposes judicial work to public scrutiny, enhancing in 
this way the possibility for the occurrence of a transformative politics. 
 
(b) Van der Walt and Cover: the violence of closure 
 
It is remarkable that in myth and history the origin of and justification for a court is 
rarely understood to be the need for law. Rather, it is understood to be the need to 
suppress law, to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon laws a 
hierarchy.131 
 
One finds a similar idea about the anti-transformative effect of law’s drive to 
certainty and finality in the work of André van der Walt on the post-apartheid 
transformation of South African land law.132 Van der Walt discusses two land 
cases – Lebowa Mineral Trust Beneficiaries Forum v President of the 
Republic of South Africa133 and Woerman & Schutte NNO v Masondo134  - in 
which courts were presented with the opportunity to change existing law. 
Lebowa Mineral Trust dealt with the consistency of legislation abolishing a 
trust that held mineral rights on behalf of an erstwhile homeland government 
with the section 25 property guarantee. The applicants in the case argued that 
the legislation was inconsistent with the constitution because it deprived or 
expropriated their property interest in the mineral rights held by the Trust in 
conflict with the requirements for deprivation or expropriation in section 25. To 
decide this question, the Court first had to decide whether or not mineral 
rights were property qualifying for the protection of section 25. Despite ample 
authority to the contrary, including persuasive indications from the drafting 
history of section 25 that mineral rights were indeed intended to be included in 
the term ‘property’, the Court held that mineral rights were not property for 
purposes of section 25. 
                                                 
131 Cover ‘Narrative’ (n 119 above) 40. 
132 Van der Walt ‘Orthodoxy’ (n 107 above). 
133 Lebowa Mineral Trust Beneficiaries Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2002 1 BCLR 23 (T). 
134 Woerman & Schutte NNO v Masondo 2002 1 SA 810 (SCA). 
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 Woerman concerned an application for an eviction order that raised the issue 
whether or not the common law rules relating to eviction were changed by 
section 26(3) of the constitution, which in broad terms determines that no one 
may be evicted from their home without a court order granted after all relevant 
circumstances had been considered. The court declined to decide this 
question, holding instead that the real issue was whether or not the 
respondent was a labour tenant, so that the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act 3 of 1996 would apply.135 
 
Asking why the respective courts declined development of the existing law 
where the law clearly presented itself for change, Van der Walt suggests that 
the reason might be a ‘structural inertia’ or a complacent response to 
tradition.136 Courts, so he argues, where they have a choice whether or not to 
change the law ‘will avoid the interpretation that necessitates or promotes 
change, and opt for the interpretation that seems to stabilise and uphold the 
status quo.’137 Such complacency, so Van der Walt continues, reflects not so 
much an opposition to transformative politics as a failure to see the possibility 
of change where an interpretation of the law is available that ‘preserves 
stability and certainty’ – where such an interpretation is available, courts 
simply seem as a matter of habit to slip into it.138 
 
Is one way in which to break this cycle, Van der Walt asks, to ‘establish a 
whole new jurisprudential attitude, or even a whole new perception of the law, 
a whole new system of law?’139 He cautions against any such attempt. He 
points out that such an attempt, based as it is on a modernist conception of 
transformation as linear progress, through which failed understandings of the 
past can be jettisoned and replaced with new and better understandings, will 
simply lead to the replacement of one orthodoxy with ‘a new, constitutional 
                                                 
135 Van der Walt ‘Orthodoxy’ (n 107 above) 260 – 268. 
136 As above 264, 267 – 268. 
137 As above 268. 
138 As above 268 – 269. 
139 As above 269. 
 53
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
orthodoxy [that] could be as restrictive’ as the old.140 Drawing on Robert 
Cover,141 he recalls how orthodoxy, whether in an old, or a new ‘transformed’ 
system of law or legal method, is never more than a hierarchical imposition on 
law, designed to achieve what are perceived as the virtues of clarity, certainty 
and predictability. Such an imposition always occurs through suppressing 
other views and understandings. Clarity, certainty and predictability are 
attained at the expense of at least ‘some of the energy and diversity that is at 
work in a legal system.’142 Thus described, a linear progressive understanding 
of transformation that underlies an attempt to propose a new, transformed 
legal method, in fact presupposes the end(ing) of transformation. In Van der 
Walt’s own words: 
 
Transformation and legal reform depend on the energy of change, but when 
orthodoxy is established in the name of transformation the message is that there has 
been enough change, that the process is complete and can be terminated. 
… 
[T]he goal of transformation cannot be regarded as a definable and stable position 
that is justifiably occupied once the move has taken place – transformation is a 
continuous process that demands continuous attention, analysis, critique and 
adaptation. By aiming for a simple, straightforward process of linear reform we are 
setting our transformation sights too low.143 
 
Aspects of Van der Walt’s analysis remind one of Klare’s description of the 
nature of legal interpretation and judicial work described above. Although he 
is concerned with the broader question of legal transformation and not, more 
narrowly, the question of the nature of legal interpretation, Van der Walt also 
identifies and is concerned about a tendency in law to veer toward certainty, 
predictability and finality and to avoid uncertainty, change and unpredictability. 
His concern also relates to the possibility of transformation of and through law 
– for him the tendency toward certainty, predictability and finality works to 
                                                 
140 As above 269 – 270. 
141 Cover ‘Violence’ (n 119 above); and ‘Narrative’ (n 119 above). 
142 Van der Walt ‘Orthodoxy’ (n 107 above) 271. 
143 As above. Van der Walt also points out that the linear model of transformation as progress 
establishes a false dichotomy between old-style and new, transformative legal attitudes, 
which obscures the actual complexity of transformation (271). 
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privilege the status quo, persuading lawyers and judges to fall back on what is 
known, rather than to think new possibilities.  
 
Similar to Klare’s description of legal interpretation as a flexible, ‘plastic’ 
process rather than a mechanical one, Van der Walt’s preferred view of legal 
transformation is also open-textured, a continuous process of change that 
never reaches complete conclusion or finality. 
 
Van der Walt, like Klare, urges neither a complete subjugation to certainty 
(quite obviously), nor a complete embrace of freedom (less obviously so) – for 
him a complete break with tradition and existing lines of development (an 
attempt at complete freedom) inevitably results in a complete reversion to 
certainty, in the establishment of a new orthodoxy. 
 
As Klare cautions against an over-emphasis on constraint in legal 
interpretation, because that would decrease the possibility that judges could 
achieve new interpretations of legal materials leading to transformative 
outcomes, Van der Walt links his preferred open-textured, continuous view of 
transformation to transformative possibility. He points out how the closure and 
finality achieved when at the end of a linear progression of development a 
new orthodoxy is imposed, in the first place stops change and in the second 
place limits the extent to which new possibilities can be thought. 
 
(c) Botha and Kennedy: lines and fields 
 
When it comes to obstacles, the shortest line between two points may be the crooked 
one.144 
 
In an article considering the influence that the metaphorical structure of legal 
thought and argumentation exerts on legal work, Henk Botha, relying on the 
work of Duncan Kennedy, describes three different ways in which legal rules 
are metaphorically depicted.145 
                                                 
144 B Brecht The life of Galileo (1987) (transl H Brenton) sc 14 83. 
145 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 106 above). 
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 Kennedy relates the first of these – the traditional account – as depicting legal 
rules as straight lines, or borders of a field.146 Previously decided cases (trees 
– constraints) giving meaning to the rule thickly occupy the space right next to 
it. Should the case considered by a judge according to its facts fall within an 
area close to the line or border that is thickly populated by previously decided 
cases and interpretations, the judge will be constrained in the outcomes she 
can achieve.147 
 
But there are also spaces or clearings along the border, where previously 
decided cases have not yet taken root to give meaning to the rule. Should the 
judge’s case fall within one of these clearings she is free from constraint to 
decide the case as she sees fit. Note that this metaphorical depiction of legal 
rules posits a strong and clear distinction between certainty and gap, between 
constraint and freedom. Either the judge is completely constrained or 
completely free. Moreover, whenever a case falls in a clearing rather than a 
thicket, the judge is, by deciding her case, filling in part of that gap and 
creating constraint that will be binding in subsequent cases. In this sense 
freedom is ‘self-annihilating’ – its exercise leads to its demise.148 Also, finally, 
constraint is experienced as ‘pervasive and impenetrable’, whilst freedom is 
transitory and exceptional.149 Botha concludes his description of this account 
of rules by noting that it 
 
has been particularly influential in South Africa. The image of the judge who is merely 
following the rules laid down by legislation or existing at common law, who is giving 
effect to straight, solid boundaries and only occasionally fills in gaps in the law, has 
had – and still has – a powerful hold on the South African legal imagination.150 
 
Botha contrasts the traditional view of rules, in terms of which legal meaning 
is self-evident, found in a mechanical process of interpretation, and legal 
                                                 
146 Kennedy ‘Freedom’ (n 118 above) 538. 
147 As above. 
148 As above 539, also quoted in Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 106 above) 255. 
149 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 106 above) 255.  
150 As above. 
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materials absolutely constraining, with Kennedy’s alternative description of 
legal rules as argument-bites.151 
 
In this account, legal rules are depicted as pairs of ‘argument-bites’ – pairs of 
arguments and counter-arguments recognised as valid according to 
professional legal sensibility. An assertion of the rule pacta sunt servanda can 
be countered with ‘as long as it doesn’t run counter to public policy’; or the 
idea that constitutional provisions should be interpreted in a generous fashion 
with the counter-bite that words should be given their ordinary meaning. In 
such argument-bite pairs there is no hierarchy. Although only a given number 
of such pairs are recognised according to professional sensibility as valid, 
within a pair one bite is potentially as valid as the other. Which bite, which 
rendition of a rule prevails in a given set of facts, depends entirely on the 
judge: 
 
Legal materials are, therefore, plastic and manipulable, rather than solid and 
determinate … Adjudication itself is strategic activity, in which judges employ those 
legal arguments that provide the best justification for their preferred outcomes.152 
 
Despite this plasticity, however, judges are to an extent constrained by the 
fact that only certain argument-bite pairs are regarded as valid. In order to 
have their arguments accepted in the professional circle of which they are 
part, judges must reduce their arguments and the specificities of cases before 
them to fit a set of stock argument-bite pairs. 
 
Botha concludes his description of this second account of the nature of legal 
rules by pointing out that the notion of legal rules as argument-bites, although 
superficially seeming to be in direct opposition to the notion of legal rules as 
straight lines or borders (the former depicts legal work as entirely free and 
legal meaning as generated by the preferences of judges; the latter depicts 
legal work as entirely constrained and legal meaning as self-generated) is 
also importantly similar: 
                                                 
151 As above 256 and what follows. 
152 As above 257. 
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Like mainstream legal scholars, Kennedy seems to assume that law must be either 
determinate, or irreducibly subjective and ideological. Kennedy, too, looks for meta-
principles to demarcate the scope of application of conflicting rules. When he finds 
none, he declares that adjudication is simply ideology dressed up as law. In short, 
Kennedy’s account is structured in terms of the same either/or logic as the 
conventional understanding.153 
 
Viewed from a transformative perspective, Botha finds both depictions 
problematic. The traditional understanding of legal rules as long, straight lines 
of development tends to favour the status quo – to encourage an unreflective 
falling back onto existing rules of common law, without interrogating their 
content.154 It also depicts law as devoid of politics, legal meaning as found 
rather than generated. The depiction of rules as argument bites in turn both 
empties law of all content, subjecting it to the personal preferences of 
individual judges, and at the same time requires legal argument to occur in 
terms of a series of stock phrases, thrusts and parries. This for Botha does 
not bode well for ‘attempts at serious ethical debate’.155 
 
However, Botha also describes another way in which to depict legal rules 
metaphorically: Kennedy’s rendition of law and rules as ‘fields of action’.156 On 
this account, the constraint that a judge experiences when first considering a 
case where the applicable legal rule contradicts the judge’s preferred 
outcome, is not an immutable characteristic of the legal materials as in the 
first metaphor of rules as straight lines. Rather, it is the judge’s experience of 
those materials. If a case falls right alongside the boundary of a rule that a 
judge seeks to avoid in order to achieve a preferred outcome, the judge can 
‘work through the field’ to attempt to move further away from the boundary, for 
example by distinguishing it from other cases on the facts, or reinterpreting 
the rule in question, or finding other rules that are applicable. Judges can 
therefore ‘work with’ the legal materials in an attempt to come closer to their 
                                                 
153 As above 260. 
154 As above 255. There are echoes here of the ‘complacency’ described by Van der Walt 
‘Orthodoxy’ (n 107) above. 
155 As above 260. 
156 As above 260 and what follows. 
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preferred outcomes in the face of a rule that at first glance seems to exclude 
it.157 
 
Judges are aided in this endeavour by the operation in the field of policies as 
vectors – the closer the case at hand falls to a given policy, the stronger the 
pull of policy and the more likely will be an interpretation that gives effect to 
the policy in question. The further away a case falls from a policy the weaker 
its pull and the greater the capacity for the judge to reach her preferred 
outcome without being constrained by the policy in question.158 
 
In this depiction, there is no either/or opposition between freedom and 
constraint. Certainly the judge is constrained – by the professional sensibilities 
within which she operates; at the outer limits by the material itself; by her 
capacity (intellectual and otherwise) to press the material to conform to her 
needs; and by her need to maintain a reputation of professionalism, among 
other things. But, because constraint is culturally determined, it is pliable, so 
that freedom and constraint operate in tension with rather than in opposition to 
each other.159 
 
The introduction by Kennedy of the idea that constraint is culturally 
constructed and of the notion of policies operating in the field as vectors, 
exerting a pull on interpretation is significant for Botha: 
 
The metaphor of the field then, enables an understanding of constraint as cultural. It 
allows us to understand freedom and constraint as graded categories, legal 
reasoning as imaginative and therefore capable of resisting the conclusion that a 
particular outcome is necessitated by the relevant legal materials. Field configurations 
are not objective properties of a particular legal field, but are part of the cognitive 
apparatus through which we order and understand law. It is because of this that 
judges are often able to reconfigure the field and thus to resist the ways in which 
inequality, exclusion and violence are sanctioned and normalised in the name of the 
law.160 
                                                 
157 As above 261. 
158 As above 263. 
159 As above 262. 
160 As above 265. 
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 Seeing legal rules as straight lines or boundaries, with freedom and constraint 
innate properties of the materials, leads to complacency with respect to the 
status quo and to an understanding of law that is devoid of politics. This 
means that possibilities for transformation cannot easily be imagined and that 
legal work is insulated from public scrutiny and democratic evaluation. 
 
Seeing legal rules as sets of argument bites leaves legal meaning entirely to 
the preference of the individual judge and therefore divests law of any 
meaningful content and makes it a matter of politics alone. At the same time, 
the highly structured and constructed nature of argument that such a view of 
legal work implies, means that substantive ethical argument as a way in which 
to seek solutions becomes impossible. 
 
By contrast, the notion of legal rules as a field introduces the idea that 
constraint is culturally constructed and ‘may form the basis of a more self-
conscious style of adjudication, which is characterised by a greater 
willingness on the part of judges to subject deeply held assumptions to critical 
scrutiny and to articulate the moral and political reasons for their decisions.’161  
 
Again, links appear between the analyses of Klare, Van der Walt and now 
Botha. Botha is also concerned about a view of law that depicts it as clear and 
self-evident, and certain and final (constraining). This view for him ineluctably 
leads to a preference for the status quo, because it excludes the possibility of 
imagining new things. It also denies the political nature of law and insulates 
legal work from political debate. 
 
Botha proposes a way to look at the law that presents it as pliable – constraint 
is depicted as culturally determined, so that it can be overcome. Like Klare 
and Van der Walt, Botha sees neither freedom nor constraint as absolute – 
indeed, he demonstrates how absolute freedom has the same depoliticising 
effect on the operation of the law as absolute constraint. He proposes instead 
                                                 
161 As above 266. 
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that freedom and constraint operate as ‘graded categories’ in creative tension 
with one another. 
 
Botha links his preferred view of law as a ‘field of action’ with a certain 
transformative potential, showing how, because it depicts constraint as 
culturally determined, it invites a new judicial imagination, a willingness to 
interrogate deeply held assumptions and intuitions, that opens the judicial 
mind to new possibilities. 
 
Botha introduces one further innovation that I find important for my purposes: 
reaching back to his and Van der Walt’s appraisal of the equality standard 
developed in Hugo and Harksen, Botha manages to operationalise his 
analysis of the metaphorical stakes of law. He argues that a preference in 
constitutional adjudication for broad and flexible standards – standards such 
as the equality standard developed in Harksen - rather than clear and fixed 
rules, reflecting as it does a view of law as a field of action, is better attuned to 
both the culture of justification underlying the constitution and its 
transformative vision.162 
 
1.3.3.3 The rhetoric of poverty – the drive to neutrality 
The second line of critique I develop in this Chapter draws on the work of 
political philosopher Nancy Fraser to show how courts can be complicit in the 
depoliticisation of political debates about impoverishment by confirming and 
legitimating rhetorical tropes intended to still political contestation. Fraser 
argues that poverty and basic need – those social problems of hunger, 
homelessness and inadequate access to health care, social assistance and 
education that give rise to socio-economic rights litigation – are questions of 
major political concern. These issues occupy a significant part of the 
discourse in our formal political institutions. In the competitive environment of 
parliamentary politics, different understandings of, for example, the causes of 
HIV/Aids, of who bears responsibility for providing treatment for people living 
with HIV/Aids and of how best to treat them are centrally important subjects of 
                                                 
162 As above 275 and what follows. 
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political contestation and forms of political currency. These issues are also 
central to informal participatory forms of politics. An issue like inadequate 
access to basic services such as water and electricity gives rise to popular 
demonstrations and constitutes the raison d’être of informal social movements 
that engage in direct political action; uncertainty about the nature and extent 
and the causes of homelessness sustains political debates in the print and 
visual media; and questions about whether or not South Africa should extend 
its social assistance system occupy the discursive politics of social activists 
and academics. In sum, in South Africa ‘talk about people’s needs is an 
important species of political discourse,’ ‘has been institutionalised as a major 
vocabulary of politic[s]’ and is ‘an idiom in which political conflict is played out 
and through which inequalities are symbolically elaborated and challenged’.163 
 
At the same time there is, in the different political discourses about these 
questions, a pervasive tendency toward their depoliticisation – that is, a 
tendency to talk about them in such a way that they are bracketed as non-
political, not subject to or not capable of being subjected to political 
contestation. When government publicly warns that further extension of the 
social assistance system would lead to the inculcation in poor people of a 
‘culture of dependency’,164 the implication is that poor people somehow are 
themselves to blame for their predicament, that they are poor because they 
are lazy or lack entrepreneurial vigour. The political causes of their poverty 
are hidden, papered over. When ordinary people lament the enormity of 
poverty in South Africa, pointing to the inexorable impact of a globalised 
economy, or an inadequate natural resource base as its cause, something 
similar happens. Poverty is attributed to forces over which we have no control, 
with which political engagement is impossible or futile.165 
                                                 
163 Fraser (n 36 above) 291. 
164 See the remarks of government spokesperson Joel Netshitenze, in response to the 
proposal by the Taylor Commission of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social 
Security for South Africa for a universal basic income grant, saying that it would amount to a 
‘handout’ and would encourage a culture of entitlement. Netshitenze further indicated that the 
cabinet prefers a public works programme, because it believes ‘able-bodied’ South Africans 
should enjoy ‘the opportunity, the dignity and rewards of work’ (quoted in A Habib & C Skinner 
‘The poor must fend for themselves’ (04-08-2002) Sunday Times 14). 
165 LA Williams ‘Welfare and legal entitlements: the social roots of poverty’ in D Kairys (ed) 
The politics of law. A progressive critique 3 ed (1998) 569 569. 
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 Against this background, Nancy Fraser describes what she calls the process 
of ‘need interpretation’ – giving meaning to basic need and poverty, 
determining their causes, deciding which needs and what poverty merit state 
intervention and deciding how best to address deprivation – as follows: 
 
[N]eeds talk appears as a site of struggle where groups with unequal discursive (and 
non-discursive) resources compete to establish as hegemonic their respective 
interpretations of legitimate social needs. Dominant groups articulate need 
interpretations intended to exclude, defuse and/or co-opt counterinterpretations. 
Subordinate or oppositional groups, on the other hand, articulate need interpretations 
intended to challenge, displace, and/or modify dominant ones.166 
 
In short, the political discourse around issues of poverty and basic need is a 
process of politicisation, depoliticisation and repoliticisation of the issues at 
stake. Particular questions of deprivation – say, inadequate access to anti-
retroviral treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS, or insecurity of tenure for 
the propertyless – are inserted into political discourse, and claimed as 
legitimate political concerns through the oppositional social action of social 
pressure groups or political movements. Dominant societal groups, intent on 
immunizing their privileged position as property owners or hiding their 
complicity in the suffering of people living with HIV/AIDS or justifying to 
themselves their position of relative privilege, attempt to remove these issues 
from the searchlight of robust political contestation, to depoliticise them. 
Subordinate groups – the people living with HIV/AIDS or the propertyless - in 
turn, intent on challenging their positions of relative deprivation and on 
claiming from society the assistance to which they feel entitled, work to retain 
these questions as issues of political concern, to politicise or repoliticise them. 
 
In this political to-and-fro, this process of depoliticisation and repoliticisation, a 
set of stock depoliticizing rhetorical strategies are usually employed. The first 
of these strategies is to ‘domesticate’ issues of poverty and need – to 
describe them as issues that fall within the domestic rather than the political 
                                                 
166 Fraser (n 36 above) 296. 
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sphere. As such, these issues can be cast as private or familial issues rather 
than public or political.167 Martha Fineman describes the nature and effect of 
this domestication strategy as follows:  
 
The private family is the social institution that is relied upon to raise children and care for 
the ill, the needy and the dependent. Ideally it performs these tasks as a self-contained 
and self-sufficient unit without demanding public resources to do so. In the societal 
division of labor among institutions, the private family bears the burden of dependency, 
not the public state. Resort to the state is considered a failure. By according to the 
private family responsibility for inevitable dependency, society directs dependency away 
from the state and privatizes it.168 
 
In a patriarchal, capitalist society such as ours, the depoliticizing effect of the 
domestication of an issue is profound. One needs think only of how recently still 
forced sex within a marriage was in South Africa not regarded as rape but as a 
‘private matter’ between husband and wife, to be reminded of how startlingly 
strong the perceived normative split between the public (political) and the private 
(personal) still is, or until recently was, in this respect.169 
 
The second common depoliticisation strategy employed by dominant groups 
is the personalisation of need and dependence – the status of poverty, of 
being dependent, is attributed to the personal character traits, the failure, the 
abnormality of poor people themselves, rather than to the social, political and 
economic forces that actually shape it. Thomas Ross writes that this rhetorical 
process of personalisation of poverty takes place in two stages. The first 
rhetorical step is the creation of the ‘abstraction the “poor”’ as a distinct class 
of people ‘who are them, not us’.170 This makes possible the second rhetorical 
move – the attribution to the poor of moral weakness. To describe the poor as 
morally weak, they first have to exist as a separate group. This creation of 
                                                 
167 As above 299. 
168 MLA Fineman ‘Masking dependency: the political role of family rhetoric’ (1995) 81 Virginia 
Law Review 2181 2205. 
169 As late as 1993 our courts still held that Roman Dutch law did not recognise the crime of 
marital rape. See S v Ncanywa 1992 2 SA 182 (Ck) and S v Ncanywa 1993 2 SA 567 (CkA). 
Section 5 of the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 settled the matter by explicitly 
outlawing non-consensual marital sex. 
170 T Ross ‘The rhetoric of poverty: their immorality, our helplessness’ (1991) 79 Georgetown 
Law Journal 1499 1499 - 1500. 
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otherness has a further result: it makes it possible for the middle class and the 
affluent to proclaim not only the moral weakness of the poor, but also their 
deviance, their abnormality.171 In similar vein, Lucy Williams relates how 
popular understandings of poverty and dependence in the US distinguish 
between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor. Poverty or dependence 
that cannot be explained as the result of ‘natural’ factors such as natural 
disaster, physical or mental disability or age is undeserving of social 
assistance. Such ‘undeserving’ poverty, in the absence of a ‘natural’ cause, 
so the assumptions go, can only be explained by the personal degeneracy 
and deviance of the poor person, who is to blame for her own position and 
consequently doesn’t deserve assistance.172 Perceptions or assumptions 
about the moral degeneracy of the poor and their consequent 
blameworthiness for their predicament are prevalent in South Africa. South 
Africa’s social assistance system is built on a distinction between deserving 
and undeserving poor. It is almost wholly special-needs based – regular 
grants are paid only to groups such as children, older people and the 
disabled, who cannot be blamed for the condition of poverty, while no 
provision is made for social assistance to people who are poor, but ‘able 
bodied’. Government’s reaction to the proposal made in 2002 by the Taylor 
Commission of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security system for South 
Africa that a universal basic income grant should be introduced, is illuminating 
in this respect. Government rejected the proposal and introduced instead an 
extended Public Works Programme. At the time, a government spokesperson 
explained this move as motivated by the fear that a basic income grant would 
breed in poor people both a ‘culture of entitlement’ and dependency, and went 
on to say that a public works programme is apposite, as ‘able-bodied’ South 
Africans should enjoy ‘the opportunity, the dignity and rewards of work’.173 
 
A third rhetorical strategy employed by dominant groups within the political 
discourse about need and poverty to depoliticise the debate is the 
                                                 
171 As above 1500 - 1501. 
172 Williams (n 165 above) 569. See also Ross (n 170 above) 1501 - 1502; and N Fraser & L 
Gordon ‘A genealogy of dependency: tracing a keyword of the US welfare state’ (1994) 19 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 309 (reproduced in LA Williams Welfare law 
(2001) 47) 323 - 324. 
173 Joel Netshitenze, quoted by Habib & Skinner (n 164 above). 
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naturalisation of poverty. Poverty and deprivation are depoliticised by them 
being attributed to ‘natural’ causes, wholly outside of the control of society. 
This process of naturalisation can occur in two ways. The first is through the 
act of throwing one’s hands in the air and succumbing to the enormity of the 
problem of poverty – simply saying that there is so much of it that it will always 
be with us. The second is through the act of attributing inexorable causes to 
poverty, over which society has no control, such as the uncompromising, 
impersonal forces of the global market. Common to both these assertions is 
the idea that poverty is somehow ‘naturally’ part of the structure of our society, 
and will consequently always be there, whatever we do: 
 
The causes of poverty, we assume, are a product of a complex set of factors tied to 
politics, culture, history, psychology and philosophy. Thus, only in a radically different 
world might poverty cease to exist. And, whatever the extent of [our] … powers … , 
radically remaking the world is not one of them.174 
 
A fourth and for now the final depoliticizing rhetorical strategy employed in the 
political discourse about poverty is the process of technicisation of needs-
talk.175 The political discourse about poverty and need occurs in different 
discursive arenas – within informal social movements and pressure groups, 
more formal organs of civil society such as NGO’s and academia and, finally, 
within official discursive arenas such as Parliament or specialist administrative 
agencies.176 These different discursive arenas occupy positions of relative 
power in the struggle to determine and fix meaning in the interpretation of 
questions of poverty and need. The descriptions given to poverty and need in 
the official discursive arenas such as parliament and specialist administrative 
agencies are officially sanctioned. As such they exert an authoritative 
influence on the political discourse around poverty and need. At the same 
time the interpretation of poverty, need and deprivation that takes place in 
these official discursive arenas is explicitly depoliticizing. When Parliament, or 
a department of state, speaks about a particular need and engages in the 
interpretation of that need, they do so with a specific purpose. The need in 
                                                 
174 Ross (n 170 above) 1501. 
175 Fraser (n 36 above) 299. 
176 As above 295. 
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question has been legitimized as deserving of state intervention and their 
purpose is to find the best way to satisfy it – they are in the process of 
‘translating politicized needs into administerable needs.’177 As such, the 
previously politicized issues with which they were confronted become 
‘technical problems for managers and planners … in contradistinction to 
political matters.’178 This process of translation depoliticises the issues in 
three ways. First, on the understanding that a technical approach to a problem 
such as impoverishment and the standard of efficiency that underlies it is 
politically a neutral approach, impoverishment is in this way bluntly depicted 
as devoid of politics, a problem that can be solved without the need to engage 
political questions of redistribution and social justice.179 Second, this process 
brackets the issues in question as technically complex issues with which 
ordinary, non-expert participants in the discourse on poverty cannot usefully 
engage. And third, the subordinate participants in the discourse are 
repositioned – whereas before they where active participants in the process of 
interpretation of their needs, engaged in political action, they now become the 
passive recipients of services – their predefined needs are administered to 
them through a process of therapeutic assistance.180 As a result, their political 
engagement is negated. 
 
The different strategies of depoliticisation described above are politically 
motivated – they are used to further particular political agendas and are as 
such in themselves acutely political.181 Dependence and deprivation is 
attributed to the personality traits of poor people so that the complicity of the 
legal and political system in creating their predicament can be obscured; 
challenges to these systems can be avoided; and positions of relative 
affluence can be justified – it is the fault of poor people themselves that they 
are poor and of no one else. Poverty is described as inevitable, as a constant 
                                                 
177 As above 306. 
178 As above 299. See also J Habermas ‘Law as medium and law as institution’ in G Teubner 
(ed) Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (1986) 204 210. 
179 See Singer (n 99 above) 1824 where he points out that such a ‘complacent’ pragmatist 
approach to social problems with its exclusive focus on ‘what works’ is adopted precisely to 
avoid the need to engage substantive political questions of redistribution and social justice. 
180 Habermas (n 178 above) 210; see also Fraser (n 36 above) 307. 
181 Fraser (n 36 above) 298: ‘[O]ne of the primary stakes of social conflict in late-capitalist 
societies is precisely where the limits of the political will be drawn.’ 
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presence in society so that personal and collective inaction with respect to it 
can be justified – society can assert its helplessness in the face of ‘natural’ 
deprivation and so avoid having to do anything in particular about it. In broad 
terms all these strategies of depoliticisation are aimed to preserve the status 
quo, both by immunizing it from attack by hiding its complicity in creating and 
maintaining poverty and by justifying inaction in the face of poverty and 
hardship. As such these acts of depoliticisation are cause for concern: they 
constitute attempts by society to assert its helplessness in the face of poverty, 
to get away with doing nothing about something that indeed is, at least to 
some extent, within its control.182 
 
That the law is determinatively involved in the discourse about the political 
stakes of poverty and need is a point that hardly requires making. Precisely 
the social provisioning activities of the welfare state – state provision of 
housing, of health care services, of education and of other social services - 
are regulated by vast, complicated and ever-expanding networks of law, in the 
widest possible sense of that word, including formal legislation, administrative 
rules and decisions and, more recently, constitutional or statutory welfare 
rights elaborated in judgements by courts. The law in question is of a 
particular kind – it is ‘regulatory’, ‘instrumentalised’ law aimed, not as law 
traditionally was at resolving particular and discrete disputes, but at 
regulating, guiding, constituting and giving effect to the social provisioning 
programmes and goals of the state. As such it is part of and in certain 
respects constitutive of the political discourse around poverty and need. South 
Africa certainly also experiences this kind of what has come to be called 
‘juridification’.183 Although the apartheid-state already operated according to 
its fair share of regulatory law, South Africa has, post-liberation, seen an 
explosion of law intended to control, guide and give effect to the ‘societal 
                                                 
182 Ross (n 170 above) 1509 - 1513. 
183 ‘Juridification’ is the term used to describe the phenomenon of growth of regulation or 
growth of law in the welfare state. See, for a good synopsis of both the phenomenon of 
juridification itself and the body of scholarship that has developed from the study of its nature, 
causes and effects, JWG van der Walt The twilight of legal subjectivity: towards a 
deconstructive republican theory of law (1995) unpublished LLD dissertation, Rand Afrikaans 
University 319 - 326; see also the various contributions in Teubner (ed) (n 178 above) and 
GTeubner (ed) Juridification of social spheres (1987). 
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guidance intentions’184 of the new state. Courts’ socio-economic rights 
judgements, and the doctrine established and elaborated in those 
judgements, form a significant part of our process of juridification. 
 
The effects of juridification - the role of law in the welfare state, its impact and 
the consequences of its operation there - have for long attracted scholarly 
attention. Scholars have first analysed and questioned the effect of legal 
expansion on the law itself, arguing for instance that, because law is bound to 
fail in its social engineering role, juridification causes a crisis of credibility for 
law185 and that the instrumentalisation of law for social purposes threatens its 
conceptual structures,186 rendering it internally incoherent and ‘disintegrat[ing] 
basic legal values and the unity of the legal system.’187 
 
More pertinently, juridification scholars have also devoted considerable 
attention to the effect of juridification on the areas of life and society into which 
law newly expands or in which existing regulation densifies. In this respect 
juridification commentators have explored and analysed a familiar problem. 
They have pointed to the ‘ambivalence of guarantees of and denials of 
freedom’188 that is occasioned by the process of juridification – the problem 
that, whilst juridification patently has an emancipatory intent (guaranteeing, for 
instance, access to basic social benefits to protect against the depredations of 
the market), it operates simultaneously in a repressive fashion in that it limits 
the potential for transformative and critical political action.189 
 
Juridification – including the work of courts in the process of interpreting and 
applying socio-economic rights - can exercise this stilling effect on 
transformative and critical political action first by destructing or subverting the 
                                                 
184 G Teubner ‘The transformation of law in the welfare state’ in Teubner (ed) (n 178 above) 3 
3. 
185 G Teubner ‘Juridification concepts, aspects, limits, solutions’ in Teubner (ed) (n 183 
above) 1 6. 
186 N Luhman ‘The self-reproduction of law and its limits’ in Teubner (ed) (n 178 above) 111, 
in general. 
187 Teubner (n 184 above) 4. See also Van der Walt (n 183 above) 324. 
188 Habermas (n 178 above) 209. 
189 Van der Walt (n 183 above) 323 (juridification is aimed at ‘serving the goal of social 
integration, yet … merely contribute[s] to the process of social disintegration’). 
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various forms of social organisation upon which such action depends.190 
Johan van der Walt, for example, refers to the ‘individualizing tendency’ of 
juridification – rights and the individual entitlements emanating from them that 
are inserted into the social sphere through juridification ‘take[ ] the place of 
spontaneous communal support in family as well as in local community life’, 
so that collective organisation and collective political action is impaired, 
replaced by self-interest seeking action.191 This kind of ‘privatisation of right’ 
has been well documented in historical accounts of labour movements in 
Europe, where the creeping legalism of juridification has contributed to the 
transformation of these movements from collective bodies advocating for the 
emancipation of workers as a class, to ‘encorporated organisations’ 
representing the individual consumer interests of their members. Membership 
of the group loses its political dimension, becoming instead an instrument for 
the furtherance of individual interests.192  
 
Juridification further works to ‘gloss over’ and ‘pacify’ political conflict and 
contestation.193 The intrusion of rights and the language of rights in the social 
sphere runs the risk of promoting ‘a false expectation in disadvantaged 
individuals and groups that the pursuit of legal rights through the courts can 
effect lasting social change’, whereas ‘rights…operate instead to...channel 
potentially radical demands for change into legal claims which, by definition, 
will not be disruptive of the social and economic status quo.’194 
 
Juridification can also diminish the potential for critical political action in 
another way. The law can, through the language it uses, through the 
interpretations of need and poverty that it authorizes, confirm and legitimate 
the depoliticizing strategies that participants in the political debate around 
need employ. Courts can play a particularly significant role in this respect. The 
                                                 
190 Habermas (n 178 above) 211: ‘ … [W]hile the welfare state guarantees are intended to 
serve the goal of social integration, they nevertheless promote the disintegration of life 
relations.’ 
191 Van der Walt (n 183 above) 324. See also AAG Peters ‘Law as critical discussion’ in 
Teubner (ed) (n 178 above) 250 276 - 277. 
192 Peters (n 191 above) 276. See also S Simitis ‘Juridification of labor relations’ in Teubner 
(ed) (n 183 above) 113 132 - 134. 
193 Van der Walt (n 183 above) 324. 
194 Jackman (n 112 above) 22. See also Wilson (n 112 above) 423 - 424. 
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particular rhetorical power that their processes and their work-product enjoy in 
our democracy has been noted before – in Karl Klare’s words, we may 
‘legitimately expect’ adjudication ‘to innovate and model intellectual and 
institutional practices’ in our democracy.195 To some extent at least, and it 
might be to only a very small extent,196 but nevertheless, when courts speak, 
people listen and sometimes copy. When courts engage with issues of 
poverty and need in socio-economic rights cases they also engage with and 
participate in the political discourse around poverty and need. This happens in 
different ways. First, courts’ adjudication of socio-economic rights claims 
becomes part of the political discourse, even a medium through which this 
discourse partly plays out. Civil society organisations and social movements 
regard and use socio-economic rights litigation as tools of political struggle, 
not separate from but as part of that struggle.197 Court judgments in these 
kinds of cases, once handed down, become rallying points, political currency 
in their struggles. Second, courts also occupy a symbolic or, perhaps more 
accurately, an exemplary role with respect to poverty and need discourses – 
their vocabulary, the conceptual structures they rely on, the rhetorical 
strategies they employ infiltrate and so influence and shape the political 
discourses around poverty and need. This is, despite its protestations to the 
contrary,198 particularly true of the Constitutional Court, because of its 
prominence and its symbolic significance – one can but think of the extent to 
which the ‘reasonableness’ test that the Court developed in Grootboom and 
Treatment Action Campaign with which to evaluate the state’s social 
provisioning activities has shaped civil society monitoring of planning and 
                                                 
195 Klare (n 67 above) 147. 
196 Wilson (n 112 above) 420 - 421. 
197 See Wilson (n 112 above) 436 - 442 for an account of use of the right to education in this 
‘instrumental’ sense by social movements and NGO’s in struggles pertaining to basic 
education. With respect to the use of litigation in this sense, see Heywood (n 88 above) 314 - 
315; and Liebenberg (n 68 above) 159. 
198 See eg Treatment Action Campaign (n 87 above) paras 20 - 21: ‘[T]he issue of HIV/AIDS 
has for some time been fraught with an unusual degree of political, ideological and emotional 
contention … [S]ome of this contention and emotion has spilt over into this case … Ultimately, 
however, we have found it possible to cut through the overlay of contention and arrive at a 
straightforward and unanimous conclusion.’ For a discussion see Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 106 
above) 249 - 250 and Van Marle ‘Revisiting’ (n 104 above) 552 - 553. 
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delivery with respect to social services and the political advocacy informed by 
that monitoring.199 
 
Now, as I pointed out at the start of this section, the political discourse about 
poverty and need in the welfare state in which law is a participant consists not 
only in a political process of the interpretation of need, but also in a political 
process of drawing the limits of the political, of determining which issues 
related to poverty and need are legitimately subject to political contestation.  
In the political struggle around issues of poverty and deprivation, rhetorical 
strategies of domestication, personalisation, naturalisation and technicisation 
are employed, usually by the socially dominant participants, to depoliticise 
issues in need-interpretation, to cast them as non-political, as falling outside 
the scope of legitimate political contestation. Were courts to invoke these 
rhetorical strategies in their interpretation and judgement when deciding 
socio-economic rights cases, they could potentially exert a profound 
depoliticising influence on the political discourse around poverty and need. 
Invoking such depoliticizing rhetorical strategies will in the first place 
significantly determine the outcomes of their decisions – courts, like the 
participants in the political discourse, usually invoke such strategies to justify 
their avoidance of particular issues, to assert, as Thomas Ross has described 
it, their helplessness with respect to a particular aspect of poverty or 
deprivation.200 This means in the first place that the court does not decide the 
issue in question. However, more importantly for my purpose, it also means 
that substantive political discussion of that issue in court is precluded.201 In 
the second place, invocation of these rhetorical strategies could also, because 
of the rhetorical power that the language of courts enjoy in our political 
discourse around poverty and need, influence and shape that discourse, 
contribute to drawing the limits of the political there. 
 
                                                 
199 See eg J Streak & J Wehner ‘Children’s socio-economic rights in the South African 
constitution: towards a framework for monitoring implementation’ in E Coetzee & J Streak 
(eds) Monitoring child socio-economic rights in South Africa: achievements and challenges 
(2004) 50 79. 
200 Ross (n 170 above) 1511. 
201 As above. 
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To recapitulate: in this section I described ways in which courts can work to 
erode and limit political contestation. I focussed on one particular way: the 
invocation by courts in their interpretation and judgment in socio-economic 
rights cases of depoliticising rhetorical strategies of domestication, 
personalisation, naturalisation and technicisation of issues of poverty and 
basic need. I pointed out that courts’ reliance on these strategies could limit 
the transformative impact of their decisions and could work to depoliticize the 
political discourse around issues of poverty and basic need. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter serves as the analytical background to the Chapters that follow. 
In it, I describe the two different but related ways in which adjudication of 
socio-economic rights claims can limit transformative politics. First, I describe 
critiques of the tendency of legal work to seek finality, certainty and 
predictability, showing how this intuition can lead to a confirmation of, or at 
least complacency toward, the status quo and how it can insulate legal work 
and its results from public scrutiny and evaluation. Second, I describe the use 
in political debates about the causes and nature of impoverishment of a set of 
rhetorical tropes intended to depoliticise that debate and described how courts 
can become complicit in the resultant processes of depoliticisation. 
 
Chapter 2 comprises an overview of the case law that is the subject matter of 
my study. In Chapters 3 and 4 I trace the two lines of critique that I developed 
here. I show in Chapter 3 how some of the rhetorical tropes of depoliticisation 
that I identified here have impacted on and formed the socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence of our courts, but at the same time I identify a number of 
nascent countervailing trends. In Chapter 4, finally, I consider the broad and 
flexible reasonableness test developed by our courts to decide socio-
economic rights cases to evaluate to what extent this standard takes account 
of the critiques of legal certainty and finality in decision-making that I focussed 
on here. I also take issue with the remedial approach of our courts in socio-
economic rights cases and point out how this approach relates to the critique 
of certainty and finality that I develop here. 
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2 Socio-economic rights in the courts 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I described the theoretical framework in terms of which I analyse, 
in Chapters 3 and 4, the relationship between the work of courts adjudicating 
socio-economic rights cases and transformative political action. This Chapter 
is also devoted to description: I describe the broad body of case law (socio-
economic rights case law) on which I focus my analysis in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
To do so imposes on me two tasks. First, it is necessary to describe what I 
mean with the general category ‘socio-economic rights case law’. As Amartya 
Sen has famously asserted, the law, in the form of 'a system of legal relations 
(ownership rights, contractual obligations, legal exchanges, etc)', literally 
‘stands between’ the basic resources such as shelter, food, water, healthcare 
and education that form the objects of socio-economic rights, and the 
impoverished people who need access to those resources.1 In this light, more 
or less any run-of-the-mill case in which the rules of ownership, exchange or 
transaction are applied and potentially developed can qualify as a socio-
economic rights case - at least indirectly, the outcome of such a case would 
affect the system of law that controls access to basic resources. A related 
problem is that the interests that socio-economic rights are there to protect 
and advance (broadly speaking access for everyone to basic material 
resources) are often at issue in constitutional cases involving other – ‘non-
socio-economic’ - rights, as these rights are concerned with the capabilities 
that are required for people to gain access to the basic resources that socio-
economic rights provide an entitlement to.2 Examples of these capabilities are 
                                                 
1 A Sen Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation (1981) 166. See also J 
Drèze & A Sen Hunger and public action (1989) 20. 
2 For and extended discussion of what is meant with this term ‘capabilities’ and an extended 
exposition of the idea that the capabilities entailed in more traditional civil and political rights 
such as the ones I list here, see A Sen Development as freedom (1999), in particular 54 – 86 
(describing the link between personal freedom in its various guises and access to basic 
material resources) and 87 – 110 (describing the term ‘capabilities’ and the link between an 
absence of capabilities and impoverishment). 
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political agency and power (freedom of assembly; freedom of association; 
freedom of expression; voting rights); a measure of control over administrative 
processes (administrative justice rights; the right to have access to 
information); a livelihood (freedom of trade, occupation and profession; labour 
rights); and, most broadly conceived, personal freedom (freedom and security 
of the person; freedom of movement and residence). To what extent would 
cases involving these ‘capabilities-related’ rights have to be included in the 
category ‘socio-economic rights cases’? A final related problem is that it is, of 
course, not only the courts that have actively engaged with constitutional 
socio-economic rights. The legislature has also exercised its constitutional 
mandate to give effect to socio-economic rights by enacting legislation, in a 
variety of different areas. This legislation, in particular in an area such as 
access to housing and shelter, has given rise to a large and complex body of 
additional case law. 
 
My second task is to describe the particular sub-category of socio-economic 
rights cases that my analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 will engage. However one 
delimits the category ‘socio-economic rights cases’, it by now encompasses 
an enormous body of case law. After an initial slow start when the 1996 
constitution entered into operation fifteen years ago, more and more cases 
have reached our courts in which socio-economic rights have, in some way or 
other, been at issue. For this study to be useful I cannot engage the whole 
body of case law that has so emerged directly – particularly because my 
purpose is not to describe developments in the positive law, but to describe 
and analyse approaches to adjudication within a specific context. I must 
therefore determine my particular focus. To do so I need to describe a 
typology of the body of socio-economic rights case-law, a way in which to 
distinguish the different kinds of cases that form part of the whole. 
 
This Chapter is organised around these two tasks – defining the category and 
then determining a typology for it. I start, in 2.2 below, by describing what I 
see qualifying as socio-economic rights cases. Then, in 2.3 below, I consider 
two ways in which to design a typology – either by categorising the cases 
according to the manner in which socio-economic rights were applied in them; 
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or by following the categorisation suggested by section 7(2) of the 
constitution, organising the cases according to the nature of the duties derived 
from socio-economic rights that were at issue in them. 
 
I conclude that these two possible bases for a typology are sufficiently related 
and intersecting that I can use both. I then proceed, still in 2.3 below, 
nominally on the basis of a section 7(2) categorisation, but taking account 
also of the manner in which rights applied in the different cases, to describe – 
in the manner of an overview - the body of socio-economic rights case law. 
 
Finally, in 2.4 – my conclusion for this Chapter – I briefly describe and justify 
my particular focus within the general body of cases. 
 
2.2 What are ‘socio-economic rights cases’? 
To the first question then: what, for purposes of this Chapter, are socio-
economic rights cases? Clearly, to define the category as including all 
decisions that relate to socio-economic rights in the sense that they affect the 
broad legal framework indirectly regulating access to basic material resources 
for human welfare would make it so wide as to render it unworkable. Although 
the point of departure in such an approach – that it is precisely the ‘ordinary’ 
law that most acutely blocks access to basic resources for impoverished 
people3 – is theoretically sound and intuitively appealing, such a category 
would include virtually all cases in which the private law rules of contract and 
property (at the very least)4 were developed. 
 
Equally, to limit the category to the obvious cases where litigants or courts 
explicitly relied on constitutional socio-economic rights would exclude a large 
body of cases in which, without direct reliance on constitutional socio-
                                                 
3 See Sen (n 1 above) 166 and Drèze & Sen (n 1 above) 20. 
4 Rules of contract, property and exchange are those rules of the ordinary law most evidently 
applicable, but access to resources is clearly also regulated by other, seemingly innocuous 
rules of, for example procedure. See, for two examples where the rules relating to prescription 
of money claims related to access to basic resources were at issue Njongi v Member of the 
Executive Council, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 4 SA 237 (CC) (prescription of 
a claim for payment of arrears on a disability grant) and Deysel v Truter 2005 5 SA 595 (C); 
Truter v Deysel 2006 4 SA 168 (SCA (prescription of a claim for damages due to negligent 
medical treatment). 
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economic rights, the interests or values underlying these rights played a direct 
and explicit role. Although eminently manageable, such a category would be 
too narrow, as it would exclude a large number of cases where the interests 
that socio-economic rights are designed to protect were directly at issue. 
 
For purposes of this Chapter I choose a middle road between these two 
extreme options: socio-economic rights cases are for me any decisions in 
which the interests which socio-economic rights are intended to protect – 
access to basic material resources for impoverished people - in whichever 
way played an explicit role. This category would include in the first place 
cases  explicitly decided on the basis of constitutional socio-economic rights; 
cases decided on the basis of other constitutional rights or other constitutional 
provisions in which the interests protected by socio-economic rights were 
explicitly at issue; cases decided on the basis of statutory entitlements giving 
effect to the interests underlying constitutional socio-economic rights; and 
cases decided on the basis of legislation not explicitly giving effect to 
constitutional socio-economic rights, but where that legislation is interpreted in 
light of the values underlying constitutional socio-economic rights or cases 
where common law rules were developed to give effect to those values. In 
what follows below I briefly describe each of these groups of cases.  
 
2.2.1 Explicit rights 
Socio-economic rights cases are obviously in the first place those cases in 
which constitutional socio-economic rights are at issue.5 Constitutional socio-
economic rights are those rights that create direct entitlements to the material 
conditions for human welfare – rights to things such as food, water, health 
care services and shelter, rather than rights to vote, or speak, or associate.6 
                                                 
5 That socio-economic rights can be ‘at issue’ in a case in a number of different ways is a 
point that should be obvious to any constitutional lawyer – at a minimum socio-economic 
rights can be used to challenge law or conduct ‘directly’, or the values underlying these rights 
can be relied upon to interpret legislation or develop the common law (‘indirectly’). Socio-
economic rights can also play a role in interpreting other constitutional rights – to determine, 
for example, whether a deprivation of property is constitutionally sound. For a more extensive 
discussion of this point see 89 - 94 below. 
6 There are, of course, controversies regarding this description that I gloss over in this simple 
statement. Much work has been done in jurisdictions other than South Africa about the 
question whether it is legitimate to recognise as constitutional rights anything more than 
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Such rights are found in a variety of provisions of the constitution. Section 24 
guarantees everyone’s right to a safe and healthy environment and requires 
the state to protect the environment. Section 25(5) requires the state to 
enable citizens to gain equitable access to land. Section 26 provides for 
everyone the right to have access to adequate housing and prohibits arbitrary 
evictions. Section 27 guarantees everyone’s right to have access to health 
care services, sufficient food and water and social security and assistance 
and prohibits the refusal of emergency medical treatment. Section 28(1)(c) 
entrenches children’s rights to shelter and to basic nutrition, social services 
and health care services. Section 29 provides for everyone’s right to basic 
education and to further education. Finally, section 35(2)(e) guarantees the 
right of detained persons to be provided with adequate nutrition, 
accommodation, medical care and reading material. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
entitlements to the very basic level of access to basic resources required for human survival. 
Frank Michelman has, for example, argued strongly for the recognition of constitutional 
‘welfare’ rights to only the ‘universal, rock-bottom prerequisites’ for human life (‘Welfare rights 
in a constitutional democracy’ (1979) 3 Washington University Law Quarterly 659 669), 
without extending these rights to create entitlements to any higher level of social provisioning 
(arguing that such extension would render socio-economic rights unmanageable as legal 
standards; and would present legitimate problems with respect to judicial overreach and the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma) (‘The Supreme Court 1968 term – Foreword: on protecting to 
poor through the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1969) 83 Harvard Law Review 7 8 & 11). See also 
AJ van der Walt ‘A South African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of social justice’ in H 
Botha, JWG van der Walt & AJ van der Walt (eds) Rights and democracy in a transformative 
constitution (2003) 163 182 – 183. Michelman’s arguments in this respect were of course 
directed at establishing the legitimacy of a claim for recognition of constitutional socio-
economic rights in a context where the idea that such rights could exist was (and perhaps is) 
generally regarded as outlandish (see Michelman ‘Welfare rights’ (above) 659, where he 
notes the ‘skeptical, critical, and even derisive’ reaction to his argument for the recognition of 
such rights in the US; see as an example of such a reaction R Bork ‘The impossibility of 
finding welfare rights in the constitution’ 1979 Washington University Law Quarterly 695 and, 
for an example of the traditional view that welfare rights have no place in the US constitution, 
DP Currie ‘Positive and negative constitutional rights’ (1986) 53 University of Chicago Law 
Review 864). As such his arguments are perhaps more limited than they would have been in 
another context. In South Africa, the constitution clearly seems to envisage that socio-
economic rights create a floor of entitlement to the ‘rock-bottom prerequisites for human 
survival’ but also entitlements to something more (the ‘progressive realisation’ of, for example, 
‘access to adequate housing’, rather than only shelter  - sec 26 of the constitution; see D 
Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: the minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 119 
South African Law Journal 484 490 – 493, where he distinguishes a ‘minimal interest ... in 
survival’ and a ‘maximal interest ... in living well and flourishing’, of which both, according to 
him, are recognised in the South African constitution). An attempt was made in Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) by the amici in that case to 
establish a distinction between a – more or less absolute - individual right to Bilchitz’s minimal 
interest in survival; and a qualified duty on the state to provide to everyone, within the limits of 
resources and over time, satisfaction of Bilchitz’s maximal interest in living well. However, this 
distinction was rejected by the Constitutional Court (paras 30 - 39). 
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The precise formulation of these rights determines the scope and nature of 
the duties they impose and entitlements they create. Three groups of socio-
economic rights can be distinguished. First, some rights - the ‘qualified socio-
economic rights’ - follow a standard formulation, circumscribing the positive 
duties7 they impose on the state. These rights (all rights of ‘everyone’) are 
formulated as ‘access’ rights rather than rights to a particular social good, and 
the positive duties they impose on the state are described as duties to take 
reasonable steps, within available resources, to achieve their progressive 
realisation. Standard examples are the section 26(1) right to ‘have access to 
adequate housing’ and the section 27(1) rights to ‘have access to’ health care 
services, including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and 
social security and assistance. The positive duties of these rights are explicitly 
described in subsections 26(2) and 27(2) respectively, so that the state is 
required to take ‘reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve … [their] progressive realisation ...’ Other 
qualified socio-economic rights are those in section 24(b) (‘[e]veryone has the 
right to have the environment protected … through reasonable legislative and 
other measures’); in section 25(5) (‘[t]he state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable 
basis’); and section 29(1)(b) ([e]veryone has the right ‘to further education, 
which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively 
available and accessible’) (my emphasis). 
 
A second group of such rights - ‘basic socio-economic rights’8 - are neither 
formulated as access rights, nor subjected to the qualifications of 
‘reasonableness’, ‘available resources’ or ‘progressive realisation’. These are 
the section 29(1)(a) right of everyone to ‘basic education, including adult basic 
education’; the section 28(1)(c) rights of children to ‘basic nutrition, shelter, 
basic health care services and social services’, and the section 35(2)(e) rights 
                                                 
7 See 96 - 102 below for a discussion of the viability of the distinction between positive and 
negative duties. 
8 S Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in S Woolman, T Roux & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed OS) (2003) ch 33 5. 
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of detained persons to ‘the provision, at state expense, of adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment’. 
 
Third, sections 26(3) and 27(3) describe particular elements of the section 
26(1) right to have access to adequate housing and the section 27(1)(a) right 
to have access to health care services respectively. These rights are 
formulated as prohibitions of certain forms of conduct, rather than as rights to 
particular things. Section 26(3) prohibits arbitrary evictions and section 27(3) 
the refusal of emergency medical treatment. These two rights are also not 
subjected to any of the special qualifications that are typically attached to the 
qualified socio-economic rights. 
 
2.2.2 Related rights 
In addition to these explicit socio-economic rights one should take note also of 
rights not explicitly formulated as rights to material conditions for human 
welfare, but that can be interpreted to create entitlements to such things. 
Although these rights cannot be described as socio-economic rights, the 
interests at stake in the explicit socio-economic rights are clearly in some 
cases also at stake in the interpretation of these rights – cases decided on the 
basis of such ‘related’ rights are also socio-economic rights cases. Obvious 
examples are cases in which the section 11 right to life, the section 9 right to 
equality or the section 33 right to administrative justice were at issue. The 
right to life can be interpreted as not only requiring the state to refrain from 
killing, but also requiring it positively to protect and sustain life and to foster 
and maintain a certain quality of life.9 The right to equality, in turn, could be 
used to ground claims that a particular socio-economic benefit provided to a 
specific class of impoverished people should be extended to others.10 In 
                                                 
9 This argument was advanced in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 
SA 765 (CC) to support a claim that a patient suffering from renal failure was entitled to 
receive dialysis from a state hospital for free, but was rejected on the reasoning that the claim 
fell properly to be decided on the basis of secs 27(3) and 27(1). However, the Court did not 
deny that such a positive interpretation of the right to life was possible. For discussion of the 
space this leaves for advancing claims for material conditions for welfare through the right to 
life, see M Pieterse ‘A different shade of red: socio-economic dimensions of the right to life in 
South Africa’ (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 372 384. 
10 See eg Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) (a challenge against 
provisions of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 restricting eligibility for social assistance 
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addition, the section 9(3) and 9(4) prohibition on unfair discrimination is 
relevant to poverty-related legal claims in the sense that socio-economic 
status could be recognised as a ground for distinction analogous to the 
grounds explicitly listed in section 9(3), thus rendering distinctions made on 
the basis of socio-economic status actionable as unfair discrimination.11 
Finally, equality is relevant to claims decided in terms of socio-economic 
rights in that a contextually fair12 conception of equality is part and parcel of 
the review standard of reasonableness that the Constitutional Court has 
developed to determine whether state efforts to realise qualified socio-
economic rights are constitutionally sound.13 
 
The administrative justice rights in section 33 are also relevant. Most state 
decisions affecting access to health care, housing, education, social services, 
food and water qualify as administrative action and must comply with the 
standards of procedural fairness, lawfulness and reasonableness. 
Administrative law grounds of review are potent tools for the protection of 
socio-economic rights. Courts are comfortable with applying these grounds of 
review and, particularly in the field of social assistance a large body of socio-
economic rights case law based on administrative law principles has 
developed.14 
                                                                                                                                            
grants to South African citizens and excluding people with permanent residence status 
upheld, both on the basis that the exclusion violated sec 27(1) and discriminated unfairly 
against permanent residents in violation of sec 9(3)). 
11 Sec 34(1)(a) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 lists socio-economic status as one of a number of grounds that must be considered by 
the Equality Review Committee established in terms of sec 32 of the Act for future inclusion in 
the list of prohibited grounds. The special consideration accorded socio-economic status in 
sec 34 indicates that, at the very least, it will be regarded, for purposes of the Act, as a 
ground analogous to the listed grounds. This seems to indicate that the legislature regards it 
for constitutional purposes also to be a ground analogous to those listed in sec 9(3) of the 
constitution. See, in general, P de Vos ‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act and socio-economic rights’ (2004) 5(2) ESR Review 5. 
12 See, in general, P De Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive 
equality as contextual fairness’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 258.  
13 See Mokgoro J for the majority in Khosa (n 10 above) paras 42 & 44 - 45. 
14 See N de Villiers ‘Social grants and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act’ (2002) 18 
South African Journal on Human Rights 320; AJ van der Walt ‘Sosiale geregtigheid, 
prosedurele billikheid, en eiendom: alternatiewe perspektiewe op grondwetlike waarborge 
(Deel Een)’ (‘Social justice, procedural fairness, and property. Alternative perspectives on 
constitutional guarantees (Part One)’) (2002) 13 Stellenbosch Law Review 59 and (n 6 above) 
172 - 174 187 - 189. The sec 33 administrative justice rights have been given effect in the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘the PAJA’), which currently forms the 
basis for review of administrative action. For two recent cases involving access to housing 
 82
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 Socio-economic rights are not only indirectly protected through other 
constitutional rights. Any number of non-rights related constitutional 
provisions, that seemingly have nothing whatsoever to do with socio-
economic rights, can be used to protect and advance socio-economic rights. 
In Mashava v President of the Republic of South Africa,15 the validity of a 
presidential proclamation assigning administration of the Social Assistance 
Act16 from national government to the provincial governments was at issue. 
The case was decided on the basis of a number of technical, non-rights 
related provisions of the interim constitution regulating transitional 
arrangements and determining the relationship between the legislative power 
at national and provincial level, without any explicit mention of a socio-
economic right. However, the mischief that the case sought to address was 
the inability of provincial governments properly to administer the social grant 
system in terms of the Social Assistance Act. This inability resulted in the 
frustration of access of people like the complainant to social assistance. In a 
very direct way, therefore, the case was about the right of everyone to have 
access to social assistance. 
 
2.2.3 The interpretation of statutory entitlements 
Socio-economic rights in South Africa are not only entrenched in the 
constitution. They are also extensively protected as statutory entitlements in 
legislation. The constitution is replete with commands directed at the 
legislature to enact legislation to give effect to specific constitutional rights. 
Examples are found in section 9, in relation to the prohibition on unfair 
                                                                                                                                            
and water respectively that were in part decided on the basis of administrative justice rights, 
see Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City 
of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) (Olivia Road) (held that a decision to evict was an 
administrative decision and so subject to the PAJA and that the decision was taken without 
considering relevant circumstances, so that it could be set aside) and Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg (Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions as Amicus Curiae) 2008 4 SA 471 
(W) (Mazibuko) (decision of local authority to install pay-per-use water meters set aside on 
procedural fairness grounds). For a discussion in particular of the administrative law aspects 
of Olivia Road (the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment - City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA)), see G Quinot ‘An administrative law 
perspective on “bad building” evictions in the Johannesburg inner city’ (2007) 8 ESR Review 
25. 
15 Mashava v President of the Republic of South Africa 2004 12 BCLR 1243 (CC). 
16 n 10 above.  
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discrimination; in section 32, in relation to the right to access to information; 
and in section 33, in relation to the right to administrative justice. Along similar 
lines, several of the socio-economic rights explicitly require statutory 
measures to be enacted to give effect to them. So, for instance, sections 
26(2) and 27(2) require that the state take ‘reasonable legislative … 
measures’, amongst other things, to realise the right to have access to 
adequate housing and the rights to have access to health care services, food, 
water and social security and assistance, respectively.17 The legislature has 
reacted to these constitutional commands by enacting a wide range of 
legislation aimed at facilitating, providing and protecting access to basic 
resources. In terms of my definition, cases in which these statutory 
manifestations of constitutional socio-economic rights were determinatively 
interpreted are also socio-economic rights cases.  
 
The statutory measures envisaged here of course include legislation creating 
and empowering structures and institutions and setting in place processes for 
the implementation of socio-economic rights.18 However, an important aspect 
of such legislation is the creation of statutory socio-economic rights. Such 
statutory socio-economic rights can take the traditional form of subjective 
legal entitlements of particular persons to particular things or services. 
Examples are statutorily sourced entitlements to receive defined social 
assistance benefits if one meets certain eligibility conditions that can be 
enforced against the state19 and entitlements to tenure on land exercised 
through legal protection against eviction that can be enforced against other 
private persons.20 Importantly, such statutory socio-economic rights also 
include rights or entitlements of a less traditional nature. Given particularly the 
liberalised law of standing that applies in bill of rights-related litigation in South 
Africa pursuant to section 38 of the constitution, it is possible for individuals 
                                                 
17 See also secs 24(b) & 25(5). 
18 See eg the Social Assistance Act (n 10 above), ch 3 & 4 and the South African Social 
Security Agency Act 9 of 2004. 
19 See ch 2 of the Social Assistance Act (n 10 above), which for eligible persons creates 
entitlements to a Child Support Grant, a Care Dependency Grant, a Foster Child Grant, a 
Disability Grant, a War Veteran’s Grant, an Older Person’s Grant, a Grant-in-Aid and a Social 
Relief in Distress Grant.  
20 See eg secs 8(1) & 11(1), (2) & (3) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 
(ESTA). 
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either on their own behalf, on behalf of a group or class of persons or in the 
public interest,21 to enforce broadly phrased statutory duties, or statutory 
commands against the state - a person doing so would not so much be 
claiming something specific for him or herself (perhaps also that), but the 
performance of a public statutory duty or commitment on behalf of a larger 
collective. In Kutumela v Member of the Executive Committee for Social 
Services, Culture, Arts and Sport in the North West Province,22 the plaintiffs had 
applied for the Social Relief of Distress Grant, but despite clearly being eligible, 
did not receive it. Their complaint in response was not framed only as an 
application for each individual complainant to receive the social assistance grant 
for which they were eligible and to which they each had a subjective statutory 
right. Instead, the complaint alleged that, although, in terms of the Social 
Assistance Act23 and its regulations, the state had statutorily committed itself to 
provide to eligible persons a Social Relief in Distress Grant and had placed a 
duty on provincial governments to make good that commitment, the province in 
question had not dedicated the necessary human, institutional and financial 
resources to do so: the grant was available only on paper. The case was settled 
and resulted in a particularly wide-ranging order requiring certain relief specific 
to the parties, but also various forms of general relief. Apart from requiring the 
provincial government in question to acknowledge its legal responsibility to 
provide Social Relief of Distress effectively to those eligible for it, the order 
requires it to devise a programme to ensure the effective implementation of 
Social Relief of Distress and to put in place the necessary infrastructure for the 
administration and payment of the grant. In essence, the state was ordered to 
make good on a statutory commitment to give effect to an aspect of the right to 
                                                 
21 Sec 38: 
 ‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging 
that a right in the bill of rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court 
are – 
anyone acting in their own interest; 
anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
anyone acting in the public interest; and 
an association acting in the interest of its members.’ 
22 Kutumela v Member of the Executive Committee for Social Services, Culture, Arts and 
Sport in the North West Province Case 671/2003 23 October 2003 (B). My thanks to Nick de 
Villiers, of the Legal Resources Centre in Pretoria, for providing me with a copy of the order. 
23 n 10 above. 
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have access to social assistance, with the result that the grant would in future be 
available to all eligible persons, in addition to it being paid out to the individual 
complainants. 
 
The enforcement of socio-economic rights through both these kinds of 
statutory entitlements holds great promise. Statutory entitlements are first 
likely to be much more detailed and concrete in nature than the vaguely and 
generally phrased constitutional rights forming their background, and are 
consequently much more direct in the access to resources that they enable 
people to leverage. In addition, courts are likely to enforce these statutory 
entitlements more robustly than they would constitutional rights, because they 
are enforcing a right, duty or commitment defined by the legislature itself, 
rather than a broadly phrased constitutional right to which they have to give 
content. As such they are, when enforcing statutory entitlements, not to the 
same extent confronted with the concerns of separation of powers, 
institutional legitimacy and technical competence that have so directly shaped 
and limited their constitutional socio-economic rights jurisprudence.24 
 
In many jurisdictions other than South Africa, where socio-economic rights do 
not enjoy constitutional status, they are protected as statutory entitlements in 
the ordinary positive law. Possibly the best examples are a number of the 
Scandinavian countries, in particular Finland, where rights such as the right to 
social assistance, the right to housing, the right to day-care for small children 
and rights of specified assistance for the severely handicapped are protected 
as subjective rights in national legislation.25 For the same reasons mentioned 
above in the South African context, this form of protection of socio-economic 
rights has there been shown to be very effective. However, in the absence of 
constitutional socio-economic guarantees, the existence of statutory socio-
economic entitlements is often precarious. As has been shown in the United 
States with respect to statutory welfare entitlements at federal level, where 
                                                 
24 See 150 - 151 below where these limitations on the power of courts to develop concrete 
entitlements on the basis of constitutional socio-economic rights are discussed. 
25 For a discussion, see F Viljoen ‘The justiciability of socio-economic and cultural rights: 
Experiences and problems’ (2005) (unpublished paper on file with author) 12 - 13; M Scheinin 
‘Economic and social rights as legal rights’ in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas Economic, social 
and cultural rights: a textbook (1995) 41 61. 
 86
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
broad social agreement that the state has a duty to protect against severe 
socio-economic deprivation does not exist, or dissipates, statutory 
entitlements that are not sourced in some substantive constitutional guarantee 
are always vulnerable to legislative interference.26 In South Africa, statutory 
socio-economic rights are not subject to legislative fiat to the same extent as 
in other jurisdictions where constitutional socio-economic rights are absent. 
These rights in South Africa are enacted by the legislature to give effect to 
constitutional socio-economic rights.27 Legislative interference with a statutory 
socio-economic right - such as a restrictive legislative redefinition of a social 
assistance benefit - therefore constitutes an infringement of the constitutional 
socio-economic right that the statutory entitlement gives effect to and will only 
be constitutionally permissible if it is justifiable in terms of the appropriate 
standard of scrutiny. By the same token, a statutory scheme that is intended 
to give effect to a socio-economic right can be evaluated against that right to 
see whether or not it does fully give effect to it.28 Apart from this corrective or 
protective background role played by constitutional socio-economic rights vis-
à-vis statutory socio-economic rights, constitutional socio-economic rights of 
course inform the interpretation of statutory socio-economic rights. Also, the 
fact that a statutory right or scheme is intended to give effect to a 
constitutional socio-economic right can in specific cases in a rhetorical sense 
reinforce the enforcement of that statutory right or scheme.29 Finally, 
                                                 
26 See LA Williams ‘Welfare and legal entitlements: the social roots of poverty’ in D Kairys 
(ed) The politics of law: a progressive critique (1998) 569 570 - 571 and WH Simon ‘Rights 
and redistribution in the welfare system’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law Review 1431 1467 - 1477, 
both describing the gradual cutbacks in statutory welfare rights occasioned by changed public 
perceptions about the sustained viability of comprehensive welfare provision and by erosion 
of the idea that the state should provide in the basic needs of its people. 
27 Much of the social legislation that has so far been enacted is explicit as to this purpose. 
See eg the Preamble of the Social Assistance Act (n 10 above), where it is stated that one 
purpose of the Act is to give effect to sec 27(1)(c) of the constitution. Courts, in their 
interpretation of such legislation, have also emphasised the link between social legislation 
and the constitutional rights they are intended to give effect to; see eg with respect to the 
relationship between the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 0f 1998 (PIE) and secs 26(3) & 25 of the constitution, Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 17 and Cape Killarney Property 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba 2001 4 SA 1222 (SCA) para 21. 
28 So, eg, in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), the 
Housing Act 107 of 1997, the statutory framework for the state’s measures to give effect to 
the right to have access to adequate housing, was found to be lacking in that it made no 
provision for the shelter needs of those in housing crisis (para 52). 
29 In Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Council 2002 6 BCLR 625 (W) 
the High Court, on the basis of secs 4(1) & 4(3) of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 gave 
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constitutional socio-economic rights protect statutory socio-economic rights 
from legal challenge on the basis of other constitutional rights. City of Cape 
Town v Rudolph30 dealt with a constitutional challenge, brought on the basis 
of section 25 property rights, to provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Evictio
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE).
n 
is 
                                                                                                                                           
31 The impugned provisions 
of PIE were intended to give effect to section 26(3) of the constitution. The 
High Court relied on this fact to reject the challenge.32 
 
2.2.4 Interpretation of ‘ordinary’ legislation/development of the common 
law 
The interests protected and advanced by constitutional socio-economic rights 
can also be at issue in non-constitutional cases where no legislation explicitly 
related to constitutional socio-economic rights plays a role. Section 39(2) of 
the constitution requires courts, when interpreting legislation or developing the 
common law, to give effect to the ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the bill of 
rights. This section is widely understood to require courts to infuse in 
particular the ‘ordinary law’ (that is, law not explicitly constitutional in status or 
nature) with the values underlying the provisions of the bill of rights and as 
such is seen as the major channel through which the constitution can have an 
influence on the private law. Cases in which ordinary legislation is interpreted 
in terms of section 39(2) to give effect to constitutional values related to socio-
economic rights,33 or cases in which courts are asked to develop common law 
rules to give effect to such values34 will also in terms of my definition qualify 
as socio-economic rights cases. Given Sen’s warning related above that it 
precisely the ordinary rules of contract and property, actuated in legislation 
 
an interim order that the plaintiff’s water supply be reconnected. Although the decision was 
based on statutory entitlements, the court invoked the sec 27(1)(b) constitutional right to have 
access to sufficient water to reinforce its finding. The Court proceeded from the assumption 
that a disconnection of a household water supply was a prima facie infringement of the sec 
27(1)(b) constitutional right, which had to be justified in order to be constitutionally sound 
(para 20). The Court then held that the provisions of the Water Services Act constituted ‘a 
statutory framework within which such breaches may be justified’ (para 21). Further, 
throughout the judgment the Court made reference to the fact that the Act was intended to 
give effect to the constitutional right and that non-compliance with its provisions constituted an 
infringement of the constitutional right (eg paras 28 - 30). 
30 2004 5 SA 39 (C). 
31 n 27 above. 
32 Rudolph (n 30 above) 74H - 75J. 
33 For examples see my discussion at 115 - 116 below. 
34 For examples see my discussion at 116 - 119 below. 
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and the common law that regulates and limits access to basic resources for 
impoverished people,35 one would have expected this group of socio-
economic rights cases to represent a significant portion of the category. 
Instead, only a very few cases in which ordinary rules of property or contract, 
or other areas of law, were subjected to evaluation in terms of the values 
underlying constitutional socio-economic rights have reached the courts.36 
This is particularly true of cases decided on the basis of the common law. In 
addition, with one possible exception, in those cases in which our courts have 
so far been asked to develop common law rules in line with socio-economic 
rights-related constitutional values, they have declined to do so.37  
 
2.3 An overview 
In this section I provide a descriptive overview of the body of case law 
delimited in section 2.2 above. Because this body of case law is evidently so 
large and, more importantly, so diverse, it is necessary to organise my 
overview in some way – as I noted in the Introduction to this Chapter, to craft 
a typology of sorts. There seem to be two obvious bases upon which to do so. 
First, one can arrange the cases according to the manner in which socio-
economic rights played a role in them – to use the ordinary parlance, 
according to the manner in which socio-economic rights applied in them. 
Second, one can take a cue from section 7(2) of the constitution, and arrange 
the cases according to the nature of the duty imposed by socio-economic 
rights – the duty to respect, or to protect, or to promote and fulfil – that was at 
issue in them. Below I describe and problematise each of these two possible 
bases for a typology. 
  
2.3.1 A typology 
2.3.1.1 The manner in which the rights applied 
The power of courts to translate socio-economic rights into concrete legal 
claims in this way is mediated through two provisions of the constitution. 
Sections 8 and 39(2) (the application sections) regulate the question of how 
                                                 
35 See (n 1 above). 
36 See the discussion at 115 – 119 below. 
37 See 116 - 119 below for a description. 
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and under what circumstances fundamental rights, including socio-economic 
rights interact with existing law and with conduct. As such, these sections 
indicate which kinds of legal claims can be launched through the courts on the 
basis of constitutional socio-economic rights, against whom and how such 
claims may be handled by courts. 
 
Section 8(1) declares that the bill of rights ‘applies to all law’38 and ‘binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state’. Section 8(2) 
extends the reach of the bill of rights to the private sphere, declaring that, if 
the ‘nature of [a] right and the nature of any duty imposed by [that] right’ 
allows, the right ‘binds a natural or a juristic person’. In terms of section 8(3), a 
court, once it has in terms of section 8(2) found that a right in the bill of rights 
is applicable in litigation between private parties, and that the right has been 
limited by one of the parties to the litigation, must give effect to that right by 
applying an existing statutory or common law remedy, or, in the absence of 
such an existing remedy, must develop the common law to create a remedy 
that will give effect to the right.39 Finally, section 39(2) determines that a court, 
when interpreting legislation or developing the common law, ‘must promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’, thus placing a general 
interpretive injunction on courts to infuse existing law with constitutional 
values. 
 
What exactly these sections mean is still mired in uncertainty.40 In this 
Chapter, I do not engage in any of the many controversies that have 
developed around them. I am interested only in the different ways in which 
they allow the socio-economic rights in the bill of rights to be used to 
                                                 
38 See Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) for a unanimous holding that the same 
term in sec 7(2) of the interim constitution referred to statute, common law and customary 
law. 
39 A court can also develop a common law rule to limit the right, provided that such a rule 
would then have to be justifiable in terms of sec 36(1) of the constitution. 
40 The application of rights in the bill of rights has been one of the most contentious issues in 
South African constitutional law scholarship over the last several years; see eg SC Woolman 
‘Application’ in Woolman, Roux & Bishop (eds) (n 8 above) ch 31; ch 10 ‘Application of the bill 
of rights’ in J de Waal et al (eds) The bill of rights handbook (2001) 35; H Cheadle 
‘Application’ in H Cheadle et al (eds) South African constitutional law: the bill of rights (2002) 
19. 
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challenge law and conduct. In this respect, and with an inevitable degree of 
over-simplification, the application sections provide the following possibilities. 
 
One can challenge the constitutionality of any law – that is any statutory rule, 
common law rule or customary law rule - whether it is the state or a private 
party that relies on it.41 The consequence of a successful constitutional 
challenge to a statutory rule is that the rule is overturned and the situation 
reverts to the common law position that existed before the particular rule was 
enacted. This should lead to the legislature enacting new legislation to 
regulate the same issues, but the court can also itself remedy the 
constitutional defect by reading words into the impugned provision. If a rule of 
common law is successfully challenged, a court will employ its inherent power 
to develop the common law to change that rule, or develop new rules so as to 
make the common law position consistent with the constitutional right in 
question.42 A statutory provision was challenged in this way as inconsistent 
with a constitutional socio-economic right in the recent case of Khosa v 
Minister for Social Development,43 where provisions of the Social Assistance 
Act and the Welfare Laws Amendment Act44 that restricted access to social 
assistance to South African citizens, to the detriment of permanent residents 
and their children, were successfully challenged as inconsistent with the 
section 27(1) right of everyone to have access to social security and 
                                                 
41 The textual basis for a bill of rights challenge to a statutory or common law rule relied upon 
by the state as against a private entity is sec 8(1). Similarly, the textual basis for a bill of rights 
challenge to a statutory rule relied upon by one private entity against another is clearly sec 
8(1). However, there is some controversy about whether the textual basis for a challenge to a 
common law rule relied upon by one private entity against another is sec 8(1) rather than sec 
8(2) read with sec 8(3). The Constitutional Court in Khumalo & Others v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 
401 (CC) rejected reliance on sec 8(1) in a challenge directed at the existing common law 
rules of defamation relied upon by a private party, opting instead to bring the bill of rights to 
bear through secs 8(2) & (3). 
42 It seems that this would be the case, irrespective of whether the bill of rights is brought to 
bear upon a dispute through sec 8(1) or secs 8(2) & (3). 
43 n 10 above. See also Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) 
(provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 allowing for the sale in execution of 
debtors home to satisfy judgment debt found inconsistent with sec 26(1) of the constitution; 
words read into the Act to remedy the defect.) 
44 Secs 3(c), 4(b)(ii) & 4B(b)(ii) of the Social Assistance Act (n 10 above) and sec 3 of the 
Welfare Laws Amendment Act 106 of 1997. 
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assistance and the section 9(3) prohibition on unfair discrimination.45 More 
recently, in Olivia Road, provisions of the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act46 that effectively authorised a local authority to coerce 
occupants of unsafe buildings to vacate those buildings at pain of criminal 
sanction, without recourse to a court, were found to be inconsistent with 
section 26(3) of the constitution.47 The court remedied the inconsistency with 
a reading order providing that a criminal sanction would only follow once a 
court had given an order for eviction.48 An example of where a common law 
rule was challenged as inconsistent with a constitutional socio-economic right 
occurred in Brisley v Drotsky,49 where the existing common law rules 
regulating private evictions were (unsuccessfully) challenged as inconsistent 
with the section 26(3) prohibition on arbitrary evictions. Had the challenge 
been successful, the court would have had to develop the common law so as 
to take adequate account of the section 26(3) injunction that courts take 
account of ‘all relevant factors’ before issuing an eviction order, with the result 
that courts would have a discretion, exercised on the basis of their 
consideration of relevant circumstances whether or not to grant the order.50 
 
One can challenge state or private conduct as inconsistent with a 
constitutional right. If state conduct is successfully challenged, it would simply 
be invalid and the court will craft a constitutional remedy to vindicate the right 
in question. If private conduct is successfully challenged, a court will attempt 
to find a remedy in the existing statutory or common law that can be adapted 
to vindicate the right in question, and in the absence of such existing remedy, 
will develop the common law so as to provide such a remedy. An example of 
a successful constitutional challenge to state conduct as inconsistent with a 
constitutional socio-economic right is Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
                                                 
45 The various sections were found to be inconsistent with the constitution, but were not 
invalidated to the extent of their inconsistency. Instead, the Court read words into the section 
to remedy the constitutional defect; Khosa (n 10 above) para 98. 
46 Act 103 of 1997. 
47 Olivia Road (n 14 above) para 49. 
48 As above para 50. 
49 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
50 This decision was effectively revisited in Olivia Road (n 14 above); see my discussion at 
117 - 118 below. For a variety of reasons, the use of constitutional socio-economic rights in 
this indirect, interpretative way to influence the existing law is potentially extremely important. 
See 116 below for further discussion of this point. 
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Campaign,51 where a policy position of the national department of health was 
successfully challenged as inconsistent with the section 27(1) right to have 
access to health care services, with the result that the policy was invalidated 
and the government ordered to adopt and implement a policy that would be 
constitutionally sound. There has as yet not been an example of a challenge 
to private conduct as inconsistent with a constitutional socio-economic right. 
 
Finally, one can, in the course of litigation, argue that a rule of law that the 
other party to the litigation relies on is inconsistent, not with a particular right, 
but with the general tenor of the bill of rights, the ‘objective value system’ that 
underlies its particular provisions. A court that accepts such a proposition 
would then interpret the statutory provision in question, or develop the 
common law rule so as to give effect to the ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the 
bill of rights. An example of this kind of interaction between the bill of rights 
and the existing law occurring in the context of socio-economic rights 
protection is the much-maligned decision in Afrox Health Care (Pty) Ltd v 
Strydom,52 where the Supreme Court of Appeal was (unsuccessfully) asked to 
develop the common law of contract, through the rule that contractual terms 
that conflict with the public interest are unenforceable, so as to render 
unenforceable disclaimers in contracts between hospitals and their patients 
that indemnify the hospitals from liability for damage negligently caused to 
patients. A more recent decision – Tswelopele Non-profit Organisation v City 
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality53 - concerned the development of the 
common law remedy of a spoliation order to protect against destruction of 
property during unlawful evictions. Again the Supreme Court of Appeal 
declined the invitation to develop the common law. 
 
To arrange my overview of the case law according to these different ways in 
which socio-economic rights, or the interests underlying them, played a role in 
litigation is tempting. Such a typology would have the signal virtue of avoiding 
                                                 
51 n 38 above. 
52 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). 
53 2007 6 SA 511 (SCA). For a discussion and critique of the decision, see AJ van der Walt 
‘Developing the law on unlawful spoliation and squatting’ (2008) 125 South African Law 
Journal 24. See also my own discussion at 117 below. 
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the ‘ghettoisation’ of socio-economic rights case law – of underscoring the 
important point that socio-economic rights interact with law and conduct in the 
same way as all other constitutional rights and are not an exotic add-on that 
has to be treated differently.54 However, such a typology would suffer from the 
flaw that it would not sufficiently cater for the range of different kinds of socio-
economic rights cases forming part of the category as delimited above. As will 
become clear from my discussion below, socio-economic rights (indeed all 
rights in the bill of rights) are regarded as imposing a range of different 
possible duties on those they bind – duties to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil.55 Although, again as I make clear below, the distinction made between 
these different kinds of duties is in itself flawed,56 it remains important, 
primarily because our courts have relied on that distinction to fashion their 
approaches to deciding different kinds of socio-economic rights cases. 
Importantly, depending on which of the duties are at stake in a case, our 
courts have applied different standards of scrutiny.57 Clearly, from my 
perspective, where I am interested not so much in the results (in legal 
development and otherwise) generated in the cases, but in the nature of the 
process of adjudication in those cases, these distinctions in approach and in 
standard of scrutiny are important. Consequently, the failure of a typology 
based on the different ways in which to apply socio-economic rights on its 
own to make these distinctions is problematic for my purposes. 
 
2.3.1.2 The duties at stake 
Section 7(2) determines that ‘[t]he state must respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’. Section 7(2) is central to the transformative 
ethos of the constitution. It explicitly conveys the idea that the state is not 
simply required to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights, but 
                                                 
54 This ‘ghettoisation’ is hinted at by André van der Walt in his ‘The state’s duty to protect 
property owners v the state’s duty to provide housing: thoughts on the Modderklip case’ 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 144, where he questions the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s decision to rely on a ‘duty to protect’ construction rather than simply, or 
also, on its duty to develop the common law in order to reach a conclusion in the case that 
develops the law relating to the relationship between the housing rights of squatters and 
property rights of landowners. 
55 See 94 - 96 below. 
56 See 96 - 99 below. 
57 See 99 – 103 below for a discussion. 
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must act so as to protect, enhance and realise the enjoyment of rights.58 For 
practical purposes, this provision is important, as it indicates the scope and 
nature of the duties and entitlements that socio-economic rights can create 
and so shows when and how they can be used to advance legal claims. 
 
The duty to respect rights requires the state to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of rights. The state must first not limit or take away people’s 
existing access to, for instance, housing, without good reason and without 
following proper legal procedure; second, where limitation or deprivation of 
existing access to housing is unavoidable, must take steps to mitigate that 
interference (in the context of state eviction, for example, must take steps to 
find alternative accommodation for the evictees); and third, must not place 
undue obstacles in the way of people gaining access to housing. 
 
The duty to protect rights requires the state to protect the existing enjoyment 
of rights, and the capacity of people to enhance their enjoyment of rights or 
newly to gain access to the enjoyment of rights against third party 
interference. The state must, for instance, regulate private health care 
provision to protect against exploitation by private institutions and must, 
through such regulation, provide effective legal remedies where such 
exploitation or other forms of interference occur. An aspect of this duty that is 
often overlooked is the duty that it places also on courts, through their powers 
of developing the common law and interpreting legislation, to strengthen 
existing remedies or develop new remedies for protection against private 
interference in the enjoyment of rights.59 
 
                                                 
58 The realisation that rights impose such different kinds of duties is usually attributed to 
Henry Shue (H Shue Basic rights: subsistence, affluence and US foreign policy (1980)). His 
typology is widely adopted in international law circles; see eg GJH van Hoof ‘The legal nature 
of economic, social and cultural rights: a rebuttal of some traditional views’ in P Alston & K 
Tomasevski (eds) The right to food (1984) 97 99; and Committee on ESCR General 
Comment No 12 (The right to adequate food (art 11 of the Covenant) UN Doc E/2000/22) 
para 15; General Comment No 14 (The right to the highest attainable standard of health (art 
12 of the Covenant) UN Doc E/C 12/2000/4) paras 33 - 37; and General Comment No 15 
(The right to water (arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) UN Doc E/C 12/2002/11) paras 20 - 29. 
59 See 15 - 19 below for a discussion. 
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The duty to promote rights is difficult to distinguish from the broader duty to 
fulfil rights. Liebenberg describes it as a duty to raise awareness of rights, that 
is, through educational programmes, to bring rights and the methods of 
accessing and enforcing them to the attention of right holders and to promote 
the most effective use of existing access to rights.60 Budlender describes it as 
a duty placed on administrative bodies to use the promotion of socio-
economic rights as a primary consideration in their discretionary decision 
making, much like, I suppose, the constitutional injunction contained in section 
28(2) requires that the best interest of the child be the primary consideration 
in any decision affecting a child.61 In this Chapter, for the sake of 
convenience, I discuss the duty to promote as part of the duty to fulfil.62 
                                                
 
The duty to fulfil requires the state to act, to ‘adopt appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures’63 so that 
those that do not currently enjoy access to rights can gain access and so that 
existing enjoyment of rights is enhanced. 
 
Despite the advantage alluded to above – that it tracks the manner in which 
the courts themselves and most commentators have until now described and 
organised the cases – a typology based on this distinction between the 
different duties imposed by socio-economic rights also suffers from a number 
of difficulties. In short, it is both descriptively inaccurate and normatively 
problematic. 
 
On the basis of section 7(2), a distinction is often made between positive 
duties (duties to do something, to act) and negative duties (duties to refrain 
 
60 Liebenberg (n 8 above) 6.  
61 G Budlender ‘Justiciability of socio-economic rights: some South African experiences’ in Y 
Ghai & J Cottrell (eds) Economic, social and cultural rights in practice. The role of judges in 
implementing economic, social and cultural rights (2004) 33 37. This characterisation has 
recently been given credence in Olivia Road (n 14 above) where Yacoob J held that the City 
of Johannesburg, in taking the administrative decision that a group of people occupying a 
building that had been declared unsafe for human habitation should vacate that building, 
where constitutionally bound to consider, as a factor relevant to their decision, the fact that 
the occupiers would be left without shelter were they indeed to vacate the building (para 46) 
(Yacoob J did not refer explicitly to the duty to promote in his decision). 
62 See in this respect 119 and furtehr below. 
63 Committee on ESCR General Comment No 14 (n 58 above) para 33. 
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from doing something, not to act). The duty to respect is then classified as a 
negative duty, whereas the duties to protect, promote and fulfil are described 
as positive duties.64 This distinction is presented in hierarchical fashion. The 
negative duty to respect is often seen as more amenable to enforcement 
through adjudication than the positive duties to protect, promote and fulfil.65 
The argument is that enforcement of a negative duty does not require courts 
to interfere in allocational choices of the executive or legislature, as the 
enforcement of positive duties inevitably seems to do. By the same token, it is 
argued that the enforcement of a negative duty does not immerse courts in 
the field of policy formulation and evaluation to the extent that the 
enforcement of positive duties supposedly does. However, in reality, the 
distinction between positive and negative duties holds little more moment than 
a simple semantic distinction between acting and not acting. 
 
First, often the same conduct of the state can be described both as an 
infringement of the positive duty to fulfil a right and an infringement of the 
negative duty to respect it. As Liebenberg points out, in Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign, it was not clear whether the refusal to extend 
provision of Nevirapine for purposes of preventing transmission of HIV from 
mother to child at birth to all public health facilities, outside of a select few pilot 
sites, constituted a negative interference in or impairment of the right to have 
access to health care services, or a failure of the state positively to provide an 
essential health service. In effect, it could be characterised as both.66 
Similarly, an element of the supposedly negative duty to respect rights - the 
duty to mitigate interference in the exercise of a right there where such 
                                                 
64 See eg Jaftha (n 43 above) paras 31 - 34, where the Constitutional Court discusses the 
distinction between the negative duty to respect the right to have access to adequate housing 
and the positive duty to fulfil it. See also Grootboom (n 28 above) para 34.  
65 See eg the following remarks of the Constitutional Court in Ex parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: in re certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 78: ‘The objectors argued further that socio-economic rights 
are not justiciable, in particular because of the budgetary issues their enforcement may raise. 
The fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such implications does 
not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic rights 
can be negatively protected from improper invasion.’ 
66 Liebenberg (n 8 above) 19, referring to Treatment Action Campaign (n 6 above). By the 
same token, the provisions of the Social Assistance Act (n 10 above) that were challenged in 
Khosa (n 10 above) could be described as either negative or positive infringements of the 
right to have access to social assistance.  
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interference is unavoidable - clearly requires the state to act, rather than to 
refrain from acting. 
 
Second, the distinction in consequence also does not hold up. Enforcement of 
a negative duty against the state is as likely to have consequences for 
expenditure of resources as enforcement of a positive duty. Enforcement of a 
negative duty also potentially requires a court to interfere as deeply in the 
policy-making powers of the executive or legislature as does enforcement of a 
negative duty. Suppose the state seeks to evict a group of illegal occupants 
from state land, with the purpose of developing that land for low-cost housing, 
to be occupied by a different group of people, next in line on the housing 
waiting list. For a court to prevent the state from doing so (to enforce the 
negative duty to respect the right to have access to adequate housing) will 
have important resource consequences - the state will have to find other 
suitable land and buy it, or use other state land, which itself in turn might have 
been allocated for a different use. Equally, in enforcing the negative duty in 
this respect, a court would interfere very directly in a complex, multi-faceted 
policy choice about how to decide who gets access to housing first, about 
where to situate low-cost housing development, etc.67 
 
But apart from this problem of descriptive accuracy, basing my typology on 
the distinction between these different kinds of duties is problematic because 
it potentially feeds into problematic assumptions about the nature and status, 
relative to other constitutional rights, of socio-economic rights. Objections to 
the inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in the 1996 constitution 
almost all, at basis, operated on the assumption that these rights were 
essentially different form more traditional civil and political rights in that they 
imposed affirmative duties on the state. It is on the basis of this assumption 
that all the stock arguments – that these rights do not pose justiciable 
standards; that they would uniquely require courts to make decisions for 
which they do not have the expertise; that they would uniquely require courts 
                                                 
67 With respect to the blurring of the distinction between positive and negative constitutional 
duties, see, in general, S Bandes ‘The negative constitution: a critique’ (1990) 88 Michigan 
Law Review 2271 - 2347.  
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to meddle in decisions allocating scarce resources – were made. The section 
7(2) typology of duties was introduced into the constitution precisely to 
controvert this basic assumption – to avoid the ‘ghettoisation’ of socio-
economic rights as uniquely affirmative rights that are as a result uniquely 
difficult for purposes of adjudication. Section 7(2) determines that the state 
must respect, protect promote and fulfil all the rights in the bill of rights. 
However, unfortunately, in practice section 7(2) has virtually exclusively been 
applied to socio-economic rights – both by our courts and in academic 
commentary on constitutional law in general.68 Ironically, therefore, reliance 
on section 7(2)’s typology of duties runs the risk of confirming the 
‘ghettoisation’ of socio-economic rights and emphasising their supposedly 
uniquely ‘difficult’ character. This is particularly clear in a case such as 
Modderklip69 where the Supreme Court of Appeal, doing nothing other than 
developing the common law through the so-called horizontal application of the 
bill of rights, elected to describe what it was doing in terms of a ‘duty to protect 
construction’.70 
 
Nevertheless, despite these descriptive and normative problems, I elect in this 
Chapter to use section 7(2)’s typology of duties at least as a structure to 
organise my overview of the case law. The reason is first one of convenience: 
as indicated above, our courts and most academic commentators have used 
the section 7(2) typology in their engagements with socio-economic rights. But 
there is also, again as indicated above, a more substantive reason. 
 
My focus is on the manner in which our courts have decided socio-economic 
rights cases – on the modes of reasoning and conceptual categories in terms of 
which they have operated and on the judicial intuitions and assumptions that 
                                                 
68 See eg D Brand ‘Writing the law democratically: a reply to Theunis Roux’ in Woolman S & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 97 100 – 101, where I criticise the 
Constitutional Court’s failure to interpret voting rights and the constitutional principle of 
democracy in such a way as to impose also positive duties to protect and to promote and fulfil 
on the state. See in this respect also, in general, DM Davis ‘Adjudicating the socio-economic 
rights in the South African constitution. Towards “deference lite” ’ (2006) 22 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 301. 
69 Modderfontein Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) (Modderklip 
SCA). 
70 Van der Walt (n 54 above) 160. 
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have shaped those modes and categories. It is therefore important for me to be 
able to distinguish the different ways in which our courts have approached the 
cases. Because our courts have employed the distinctions of section 7(2) to 
distinguish the different kinds of socio-economic rights cases that have come 
before them, there different approaches also track section 7(2). One example 
relates to the standard of scrutiny employed by our courts in different socio-
economic rights cases. As a rule, courts will scrutinise infringements of so-
called negative duties imposed by socio-economic rights (the duty to respect) 
more strictly than they would failures in meeting positive duties (the duties to 
protect and to promote and fulfil). There is some evidence from the case law 
that this is a matter of judicial attitude in the first place - that courts simply 
‘feel’ themselves less constrained when adjudicating negative infringements 
as the perception is that enforcing negative duties requires of them less 
interference in the sphere of power of the political branches than the 
enforcement of positive duties would.71 However, particularly with respect to 
the qualified socio-economic rights, the difference in degree of judicial 
constraint at play in cases of enforcement of positive as opposed to negative 
duties seems simply to be required by the way in which these rights are 
formulated and by the general structure of constitutional litigation. 
 
Constitutional litigation in South Africa proceeds in two stages. First, the 
complainant bears the onus to persuade the court that a right in the bill of rights 
has been infringed. Should a court find that the right has in fact been infringed, 
the state (or where a constitutional duty has been infringed by a private party, 
                                                 
71 See, eg, the Constitutional Court’s indication in Grootboom that retrogressive steps in the 
process of giving progressive realisation to socio-economic rights (essentially negative 
infringements of such rights) ‘require the most careful consideration and would need to be 
fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the 
context of the full use of the maximum available resources’ – that is, that the Court would 
subject such negative interferences in the exercise of socio-economic rights to especially 
robust scrutiny; Committee on ESCR General Comment No 3 (The nature of States parties 
obligations (art 2, para 1 of the Covenant) UN Doc E/1991/23) para 9 as quoted in Grootboom 
(n 28 above) para 45. See also Jaftha (n 43 above), where the Constitutional Court, having 
found that provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (n 43 above), allowing for the sale in 
execution of a person’s home without adequate judicial oversight, violated the negative duty 
to respect the right to have access to adequate housing, proceeded to order the relatively 
intrusive remedy of reading words into the Act, in spite of submissions by the minister of 
justice that the order of invalidity be suspended to allow the legislature to remedy the 
constitutional defect in the Act (paras 61 - 64). See, further, my discussion of Port Elizabeth 
Municipality (n 27 above) and Modderklip SCA (n 69 above) at 107 - 110 below.  
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the private party in question) bears the onus to justify and so to render 
constitutionally sound its limitation of that right. In principle, the standard of 
scrutiny in terms of which courts decide whether or not any infringement of any 
constitutional right, including any socio-economic right, is justified is prescribed 
by section 36(1) - the general limitation section, which applies to all rights. 
However, despite the fact that section 36(1) in principle applies to all 
infringements of all constitutional rights, courts in practice do not apply section 
36(1) when they must decide whether or not failures by the state to give effect to 
the positive duties to protect, promote and fulfil the qualified socio-economic 
rights can be justified.72 It will be recalled that the positive duties imposed by 
qualified socio-economic rights are explicitly described as duties to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the rights in question.73 The Constitutional 
Court has interpreted this qualifying phrase as an internal limitation clause: in 
essence, a special standard of ‘reasonableness’ scrutiny, used instead of 
section 36(1), according to which to decide specifically whether or not failures in 
meeting the positive duties imposed by qualified socio-economic rights can be 
justified.74 
 
Whether or not the possible justification of an infringement of a socio-
economic right is considered in terms of section 36(1) or in terms of the 
special limitation clause that applies to positive infringements of qualified 
socio-economic rights determines the standard of scrutiny that is applied in 
any given case. Section 36(1) poses both a threshold requirement that an 
infringement of a right must meet in order for it to be capable of justification - 
the infringement must have occurred in terms of ‘law of general application’75 
                                                 
72 M Pieterse 'Towards a useful role for section 36 of the constitution in social rights cases? 
Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council' (2003) 120 South African Law 
Journal 41. See also Khosa (n 10 above) paras 83 & 84. 
73 Secs 26(2) and 27(2) of the constitution. 
74 See 119 and further below for a description of this standard of scrutiny. 
75 In general terms, this means that the infringement must have occurred in terms of a rule (as 
opposed to a once-off decision) that is clear, precise and public (accessible) and that applies 
in equal measure to all those that it reaches; see the dissenting judgment of Kriegler J in 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) 36 n 86. An infringement 
occasioned by ‘mere conduct’, unrelated to law of general application, is incapable of 
justification – if the mere fact of such an infringement is shown, the conduct in question is 
unconstitutional. 
 101
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
to be at all justifiable - and a standard of justification that the infringement 
must satisfy once it has passed the threshold. The standard of justification or 
scrutiny required by section 36(1) is relatively intrusive. It has been described 
by our courts as a proportionality test: a court weighs the purpose and 
benefits of the infringement against its nature, effect and severity, and 
considers the relative efficacy of the infringing measure in achieving its 
purpose, to decide whether or not it is justified. As such, it allows courts a fair 
amount of leeway to interrogate state conduct and to prescribe specific 
alternative options where state conduct is found to be unjustifiable. The 
reasonableness test that applies in cases of negative infringement of the 
qualified socio-economic rights, by contrast, is applied as a shifting standard 
of scrutiny. Usually it operates only at the intermediate level of a means-end 
effectiveness test76 and only in exceptional cases does it rise to the level of 
proportionality.77 Particularly, as a rule it does not allow courts explicitly to 
consider the relative efficacy of challenged state measures compared to other 
possible measures.78 As a result, infringements of the positive duties imposed 
by qualified socio-economic rights are usually evaluated against a more 
lenient standard of scrutiny than that which applies to other infringements of 
rights in terms of section 36(1). Courts are, in other words, more constrained 
in their assessment of such infringements than they are with respect to others 
– their modes of reasoning and the conceptual structures they employ and the 
kind of argument that they find persuasive is determined by the question 
                                                 
76 Grootboom (n 28 above) and Treatment Action Campaign (n 6 above) at paras 39 - 45; 38 
& 123 respectively. In Soobramoney (n 9 above) paras 27 & 29 the Court applied an even 
more lenient basic rationality standard of scrutiny. 
77 In Khosa (n 10 above) the Constitutional Court confirmed a High Court ruling that the 
exclusion of permanent residents from social assistance benefits violated the right to have 
access to social assistance (sec 27(1)(c) of the constitution). The measures were found 
unreasonable because the purpose of the exclusion (to prevent people immigrating to South 
Africa becoming a burden on the state) could be achieved through means less restrictive of 
permanent residents’ rights (stricter control of access into the country) (at para 65) and 
because ‘the importance of providing access to social assistance to all who live permanently 
in South Africa and the impact upon life and dignity that a denial of such access has far 
outweighs the financial and immigration considerations on which the state relies’ (para 82). 
78 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 41: ‘A court considering reasonableness will not enquire 
whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether 
public money could have been better spent. The question would be whether the measures 
that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of 
possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations. Many of these would 
meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this 
requirement is met.’ 
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whether or not a challenge to law or conduct is characterised in ‘duty to 
respect’ or ‘duty to protect’ or to ‘promote and fulfil’ terms.79 
 
For this reason it makes sense for me at least nominally to employ the section 
7(2) typology. However, I attempt throughout the overview that follows also to 
take account of the manner in which socio-economic rights applied in the 
cases that I discuss so as to avoid the ‘ghettoisation’ of these rights warned 
against above.   
 
2.3.2 The cases 
In what follows, I provide an overview of the body of socio-economic rights case 
law defined above, according to the typology I have just described. My purpose 
is not to be exhaustive in the sense of describing each and every case that falls 
within this category – that would be impossible. Rather, I intend to describe in 
more general terms the approach that our court has adopted to deciding 
different kinds of socio-economic rights cases, by referring to representative 
examples of those cases. 
                                                 
79 The question whether or not section 36(1) or the special ‘reasonableness’ limitations clause 
applies is in a strategic sense important for another practical reason, unrelated to judicial 
attitude, but important for the extent to which socio-economic rights litigation can be said to 
operate as a site for transformative political action by impoverished people - it determines the 
nature of the onus of persuasion facing litigants in socio-economic rights cases. As a rule, in 
bill of rights litigation a party that alleges that a right in the bill has been infringed must 
persuade a court that this is indeed so - a complainant has to make a prima facie case that 
the conduct of the respondent has infringed a right in the bill of rights. Once such a prima 
facie case has been made, the respondent bears the onus to persuade the court that the 
infringement is justifiable (S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) para 21). The potential benefit of 
this structure is that it requires very little of a complainant in the way of establishing questions 
of fact - the complainant usually simply has to propose a certain interpretation of the right it 
alleges is being infringed and then has to show that the respondent’s conduct infringes the 
right so described, an exercise that mostly involves arguing questions of law on an abstract 
level. However, in the kinds of socio-economic rights cases referred to above, where the 
allegation is that the state has failed to take reasonable steps, within available resources to 
achieve the progressive realisation of a qualified socio-economic right, this structure is 
bedevilled. In such cases, for the complainant to show that the right has in fact been infringed 
involves making a prima facie case that the state’s existing measures are unreasonable. The 
state then gets the opportunity to rebut this prima facie showing by arguing that its measures 
are in fact reasonable (Liebenberg (n 8 above) 53). The difficulty is that, for a complainant to 
make a prima facie showing that the state’s measures are unreasonable requires it to 
establish a wide range of factual questions, mostly relating to information that is more or less 
uniquely in the knowledge of its opponent, the state (Liebenberg (n 8 above) 53 - 54; D Brand 
‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, or “What are 
socio-economic rights for?” ‘ in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (n 6 above) 33 52 - 53). 
Often, of course, the typical socio-economic rights complainant would not have the required 
access to information and resources to do this. 
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 2.3.2.1 Cases involving the duty to respect socio-economic rights 
The duty to respect socio-economic rights requires the state and others to 
refrain from interfering with people’s existing enjoyment of those rights; when 
such interference is unavoidable, to take steps to mitigate its impact; and to 
refrain from impairing access to socio-economic rights. As pointed out above, 
this ‘negative’ duty is potentially a potent tool with which to ensure people’s 
adequate access to basic resources, as courts, for a variety of reasons, are 
more likely robustly to enforce the different elements of this duty than the 
duties to protect, promote and fulfil. 
 
(a) Refraining from interfering with the existing exercise of socio-
economic rights 
Courts have decided a number of different cases in which this aspect of the duty 
to respect socio-economic rights have been at issue. In the first place, of course, 
courts have enforced legislative translations of socio-economic rights in this 
respect. The most obvious example is the large body of case law that has 
already developed around the eviction provisions of a statute such as PIE80 and 
the enforcement of the statutory entitlements protecting against water 
disconnection created in the Water Services Act.81 However, courts have also 
directly enforced this element of the duty to respect socio-economic rights to 
invalidate laws allowing interference in the existing enjoyment of socio-economic 
rights or to prevent state interference in the enjoyment of such rights. In 
Despatch Municipality v Sunridge Estate and Development Corporation,82 the 
High Court declared that, in light of section 26(3) of the constitution, section 
3B of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act,83 which permitted the demolition 
and removal, also by the state, without a court order of shelters illegally 
erected on land, was ‘no longer of application’, effectively invalidating the 
provision.84 In Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz,85 the Constitutional 
                                                 
80 n 56 above. See eg Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 27 above). 
81 Bon Vista (n 29 above). 
82 1997 4 SA 596 (SE). 
83 Act 52 of 1951. 
84 Despatch (n 82 above) 611B - C/D. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act has since been 
repealed in its entirety. See sec 11(1) read with Schedule I of PIE (n 27 above). 
85 n 37 above. 
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Court found that provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act86 that allowed, 
without adequate judicial oversight, the sale in execution of a person’s home 
to make good a judgment debt, breached, without justification,87 the negative 
duty to respect the right of everyone to have access to adequate housing. The 
Court proceeded to read words into the statute to make provision for 
appropriate judicial oversight.88 Most recently, in Olivia Road, the 
Constitutional Court held that provisions of the National Building Regulations 
and Building Standards Act89 that allowed occupants of unsafe buildings to be 
coerced to vacate those buildings with the threat of criminal sanction, without 
an order of court, contravened section 26(3) of the constitution. The Court 
read words into the statute so that the criminal sanction could only follow once 
an eviction order had been handed down by a court.90 
 
Two examples of where state conduct was challenged as in breach of the 
duty to respect a socio-economic rights are Ross v South Peninsula 
Municipality91 and, again Olivia Road. In Ross the Cape High Court relied 
directly on section 26(3) of the constitution to deny a local authority an 
eviction order, as the granting of such an order would not have been just and 
equitable in all the circumstances.92 Equally, in Olivia Road the Constitutional 
Court denied an application for an eviction order in circumstances where the 
eviction in question was not covered by the PIE Act.93 Relying on section 
26(1) and (2) of the constitution, the Court held that the decision to evict the 
occupiers was taken without all relevant circumstances having been 
considered – the City of Johannesburg had neglected to consider the fact that 
                                                 
86 Sec 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (n 43 above).  
87 The possible justification of this breach was considered by the Court in terms of the sec 
36(1) proportionality test; Jaftha (n 43 above) para 34. 
88 Jaftha (n 43 above) paras 61 - 64. 
89 n 46 above. 
90 Olivia Road (n 14 above) para 49 – 50. 
91 n 102 above. 
92 As outlined above, Ross was overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley (n 49 
above). However, it remains as one example where state conduct interfering in the existing 
enjoyment of a socio-economic right was tested against that right and found to be wanting. 
93 n 27 above. 
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the eviction would leave the occupiers without shelter – and thus set aside the 
decision on administrative law grounds.94  
 
Section 27(3), the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment, can 
perhaps also be interpreted to give expression to the state’s duty to respect 
socio-economic rights by refraining from interfering in their existing exercise. 
In Soobramoney, the Constitutional Court held this right only required the 
state not to refuse arbitrarily emergency medical treatment there where it 
exists95 - an inordinately restrictive reading, which, as Alston and Scott have 
pointed out, render the right virtually redundant.96 A matter which at this stage 
remains unclear is the question whether or not section 27(3) of the 
constitution could also be used to prohibit the state from disestablishing an 
emergency medical service at a public health institution to save costs.97 
 
(b) Cases involving the duty to mitigate the impact of interferences in the 
exercise of socio-economic rights 
The duty to respect socio-economic rights of course does not absolutely prohibit 
the state from interfering in the existing exercise of such rights - there are many 
instances in which it is simply unavoidable for the state to do so, often to 
advance the public interest in some respect or to protect the rights of others. In 
such cases, the duty to respect requires that an effort be made to mitigate the 
effect of the interference in the enjoyment of the right in question, by providing 
some form of alternative access to it. This element of the duty to respect socio-
economic rights is potentially quite burdensome and often requires the 
expenditure of significant resources and significant adjustments in policy. 
Nevertheless, our courts have shown themselves to be willing to enforce this 
duty in a robust fashion. The security of tenure laws referred to above again 
provide a good example of how this constitutional duty has been translated into 
                                                 
94 Olivia Road (n 14 above) para 48. See also Mazibuko (n 14 above) where a decision to 
discontinue water services through the introduction of a pre-paid water meter system was 
held to have breached the rights to have access to adequate water and administrative law 
procedural fairness guarantees. 
95 n 9 above paras 19 - 21. 
96 P Alston & C Scott ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: a 
comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 206 245 - 248. 
97 Liebenberg (n 8 above) 21. 
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a statutory entitlement of sorts. These laws, in some instances, require courts to 
consider to what extent suitable alternative land is available for evictees before 
granting an eviction order and an eviction order can be denied if such an 
alternative is absent.98 A recent case decided in terms of PIE illustrates the 
scope and nature of this aspect of the duty to respect socio-economic rights in 
the context of statutory protection of those rights and indicates the robust 
manner in which courts are willing to interrogate whether or not this duty has 
been met. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,99 the state had 
applied for an order to evict illegal occupants from privately owned land in terms 
of section 6 of PIE. Section 6 allows a court to grant such an order, but only if it 
is just and equitable to do so, taking into account various factors, including ‘the 
availability to the unlawful occupier of suitable alternative accommodation or 
land’.100 The Constitutional Court confirmed the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
decision denying the eviction order.101 The Court held that section 26(3) of the 
constitution, mediated through section 6 of PIE, required the state, when it seeks 
to evict, to provide suitable alternative accommodation to the evictees. This duty 
would not be operative in all cases of state sponsored eviction.102 A court would 
have to decide whether or not to enforce this duty on the basis of a 
consideration of each case’s ‘own dynamics, its own intractable elements that 
have to be lived with (at least for the time being), and its own creative 
possibilities that have to be explored as far as reasonably possible’.103 To decide 
whether or not the duty applies, the Court looked in general terms at the position 
and the conduct of the occupiers, at the conduct of the municipality in its 
management of the matter and at the conduct of the landowners in question. 
The fact that the occupiers in this case had lived on the land in question for a 
                                                 
98 In respect of ESTA (n 20 above), see secs 9(3)(a), 10(2) & (3) & 11(3); in respect of PIE (n 
27 above), see sec 6(3)(b). 
99 n 27 above. 
100 PIE (n 27 above), sec 6(3)(c). 
101 The Supreme Court of Appeal decision is reported as Baartman v Port Elizabeth 
Municipality 2004 1 SA 560 (SCA). 
102 Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 27 above) para 58: ‘The availability of suitable alternative 
accommodation is a consideration in determining whether it is just and equitable to evict the 
occupiers, it is not determinative of that question.’ See also para 28: ‘There is therefore no 
unqualified duty on local authorities to ensure that in no circumstances should a home be 
destroyed unless alternative accommodation or land is made available.’ 
103 As above para 31. 
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long period of time;104 that they would be severely affected by any eviction;105 
that they had occupied the land, not in order to force the municipality to provide 
to them, in preference to others, alternative land when they are eventually 
evicted, but because they had been evicted from elsewhere and had nowhere 
else to go;106 that there was ‘no evidence that either the municipality or the 
owners of the land need to evict the occupiers in order to put the land to some 
other productive use’;107 and that the municipality had made no serious effort to 
reach an amicable conclusion to the matter, but had rushed to apply for an 
eviction order and had acted unilaterally,108 drove the Court to the conclusion 
that an eviction order could not be granted unless suitable alternative land or 
accommodation was provided. The municipality had indeed offered to allow the 
occupiers to move to two possible alternative sites. However, the Court went as 
far as to find that neither of those sites were suitable, most importantly because 
the municipality could not guarantee to the evictees security of tenure if they 
were moved there.109 As a result, the occupiers were allowed to remain on the 
land in question.110 
 
The robust manner in which the Constitutional Court saw fit to deal with this 
element of the duty to respect socio-economic rights in Port Elizabeth 
Municipality could certainly in part be explained by the fact that the Court was 
enforcing a statutory duty in terms of PIE. However, there are also indications in 
the case law that courts are willing to enforce this burdensome element of the 
duty to respect against the state even where a statutory duty to this effect does 
not apply. In Modderfontein Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,111 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was confronted with a claim brought by a private 
landowner, that the state was constitutionally obliged, in order effectively to 
protect his constitutional right to property, to enforce and carry out an eviction 
order that he had obtained in terms of section 4 of PIE against a large group of 
                                                 
104 As above paras 27, 28, 49 & 59.  
105 As above paras 30 & 59. 
106 As above paras 49 & 55. 
107 As above para 59. 
108 As above paras 45, 55 - 57 & 59. 
109 As above para 58. 
110 As above para 59. 
111 n 69 above. 
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squatters illegally occupying his land. The Court held that the state was indeed 
obliged to protect the claimant’s right to property against invasion by unlawful 
occupiers.112 However, at the same time, the state was obliged to protect the 
right of the squatters to have access to adequate housing.113 On the facts of the 
particular case, the Court held that this meant that the state, were it to execute 
the eviction order against the squatters, would have to act ‘humanely’. This 
meant inter alia that the state could not evict the squatters unless it ‘provide[d] 
some [alternative] land’.114 This conclusion led to the Court eventually ordering 
the state to pay damages to Modderklip to make good the breach of its right to 
property and its failure to protect against that breach,115 and to allow the 
squatters to remain on Modderklip’s land until alternative land is made available 
to them by the state.116 In effect, the order required the state to rent the land so 
that the squatters could remain there, without continuing to infringe Modderklip 
Boerdery’s property rights.117 The Court made this intrusive order without 
considering in any meaningful way the substantial resource consequences that 
its decision would have for the state and the extent to which its order prescribes 
a particular policy option to the state, in preference to others. This robust 
approach, as was the case in Port Elizabeth Municipality, is justified by the Court 
with reference to the conduct of the state, the landowner and the squatters 
during the course of the dispute. The Court points out that the state, despite the 
holding in Grootboom118 that it must introduce measures to take account of the 
needs of those in housing crisis, still had no measures in place to deal with the 
plight of people such as the Modderfontein squatters.119 The Court also 
highlights the fact that the state had, despite various opportunities to do so, 
                                                 
112 As above para 21. 
113 As above para 22. 
114 As above para 26. 
115 As above paras 43 & 52. The amount of damages would be determined at a separate 
inquiry into damages (para 44). 
116 As above paras 43 & 52. This order was confirmed by the Constitutional Court when the 
case went on appeal in President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd (Agri SA & others, amici curiae) 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) (Modderklip CC), but the Court did not 
rely on either sec 25 or sec 26 to reach its decision, basing it instead on the principle of rule of 
law and the right to access to court. 
117 Although expressly indicating that it would not be proper for it to order the state to 
expropriate the land in question (n 71 above, para 41), the Court does point out that, in light of 
its order, it would be the sensible thing for the state to do, indeed to expropriate the land (para 
43).  
118 n 28 above. 
119 n 69 above, para 22. See also in this respect Rudolph (n 30 above) 77B - 84H. 
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failed to attempt to solve the dispute between the squatters, the landowner and 
itself. The state had failed diligently to pursue a settlement and had reneged on 
agreements reached,120 despite the fact that it had itself caused the predicament 
of the squatters and the landowner, by previously evicting the squatters from 
state land without providing alternative accommodation.121 As such, to some 
extent, it had made its own bed and now had to lie in it. The conduct of both the 
squatters and the landowner had, in contrast to the state’s, been exemplary. 
The landowner had at all times acted within the law and had throughout sought 
to effect an amicable solution that would vindicate both his and the occupiers’ 
rights.122 The squatters had occupied the land without intending to force the 
hand of the state to provide them with land in preference to others and had also 
sought to reach an amicable solution both with the landowner and the state.123 
 
(c) Refraining from impairing access to socio-economic rights 
The duty to respect socio-economic rights is also violated if the state places 
obstacles in the way of people gaining access to basic resources or in the way 
of people enhancing their existing access to such resources. The most obvious 
way in which the state can fail in this duty is if it arbitrarily refuses to provide 
access to a basic resource that it has the capacity to provide. In, for example, 
Soobramoney,124 the Constitutional Court held section 27(3) of the constitution, 
the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment, to impose a duty on 
the state not arbitrarily to refuse access to such treatment, there where it 
exists.125 Both Treatment Action Campaign126 and Khosa,127 were decided by the 
Constitutional Court as cases of infringements of the positive duty to fulfil the 
rights to have access to health care services and social assistance respectively. 
However, these cases in fact also offer examples of the state breaching the duty 
to respect those rights by refusing to provide access to a resource that it has the 
                                                 
120 As above paras 35 - 38. 
121 As above para 35. 
122 As above paras 33, 37 & 38. 
123 As above para 25. 
124 n 9 above. 
125 This interpretation leaves very little, if any, work for the sec 27(3) right that other rights 
(such as the prohibition on unfair discrimination) and other ordinary legal remedies (such as 
the rules of the administrative law) do not in any event do; see Alston & Scott (n 96 above). 
126 n 6 above. 
127 n 10 above. 
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capacity to give. In Treatment Action Campaign, the policy decision not to make 
Nevirapine available generally at public health facilities to prevent mother-to-
child transmission of HIV at birth was in fact a refusal by the state to provide 
essential health care to pregnant, HIV-positive women, and not only a failure by 
the state suitably to extend health care provision to those women.128 Equally, in 
Khosa, the provisions of the Social Assistance Act129 excluding permanent 
residents and their children from access to social assistance benefits were a 
legislative refusal to provide these benefits to them. 
 
A recent case in which this aspect of the duty to respect socio-economic rights 
was implicitly at issue is Njongi v Member of the Executive Council, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape.130 This case involved a claim of an 
indigent disabled woman for arrears on a disability grant owed her by the 
state. The state raised the defence of prescription, arguing that she had 
brought the case to court only after the prescribed extinctive prescription 
period had lapsed. Yacoob J raised the question whether or not it would ever 
be constitutionally sound for the state to rely on prescription to avoid paying to 
an indigent disabled person arrears otherwise due to her on a disability 
grant.131 However, he declined to decide this issue, as it was possible for him 
to hold on the facts of the case that prescription had not indeed run. 
Nevertheless, the issue he raised in this way provides an example of a 
possible breach of this aspect of the duty to respect socio-economic rights. 
The relevant provisions of the Prescription Act132 in effect operate as 
obstacles to the enforcement of the right to have access to social assistance. 
 
Perhaps a less obvious way in which this element of the duty to respect can be 
breached by the state is where the state impairs access to a basic resource 
through its administrative inefficiency. In Mashava v The President of the 
Republic of South Africa,133 the Constitutional Court confirmed an order of the 
                                                 
128 Liebenberg (n 8 above) 19. 
129 n 10 above. 
130 n 4 above. For an earlier case involving prescription of a claim for damages resulting from 
medical negligence, see Truter v Deysel (n 4 above) 
131 As above para 42. 
132 Act 68 of 1969. 
133 n 15 above. 
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High Court that a presidential proclamation134 assigning the administration of the 
Social Assistance Act135 to provincial governments was invalid. Although the 
validity of the proclamation was challenged on the argument that the president, 
in terms of the transitional arrangements in the interim constitution and the 
allocation of legislative and executive powers between provinces and national 
government, was not competent to make the assignment,136 the case was 
motivated by the fact that the assignment resulted in the right of access to social 
assistance of persons eligible for social assistance grants being impaired. The 
plaintiff was an indigent disabled person who had applied for and been awarded 
a disability grant, but who, for a period of more than a year after his successful 
application, did not receive the grant from the Limpopo department of health and 
welfare.137 It was clear that the failure to pay to the plaintiff the grant to which he 
was entitled was caused by the administrative incapacity of the provincial 
Department of Health and Welfare and by the fact that the administration of the 
social welfare system in the province was woefully under-resourced, due to 
‘demands for the reallocation of social assistance monies to other [provincial] 
purposes’.138 The plaintiff contended that the Social Assistance Act (and the 
payment of his disability grant) could be administered more efficiently and on a 
more equitable basis by the national government than by the provinces. As a 
result, the assignment of the administration of the Social Assistance Act to the 
provinces constituted a negative impairment of the right to have access to social 
assistance. In effect, therefore, the decision of the Constitutional Court 
invalidating the assignment is a decision that the state must give effect to the 
duty to respect the right to have access to social assistance, by removing an 
impediment to its effective exercise. 
 
                                                 
134 Proclamation R7 of 1996, Government Gazette 16992 GN R7, 23 February 1996. The 
assignment was made in terms of sec 235 of the interim constitution. 
135 n 9 above. 
136 Mashava (n 15 above) para 1. 
137 As above para 9. 
138 As above para 10. 
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2.3.2.2 Cases involving the duty to protect socio-economic rights 
The duty to protect socio-economic rights requires the state to protect the 
existing enjoyment of these rights, and the capacity of people to enhance their 
enjoyment of these rights or newly to gain access to the enjoyment of these 
rights, against third party interference. 
 
Courts can, in a number of important ways, act so as to protect socio-
economic rights. In the first place, courts can protect socio-economic rights by 
adjudicating constitutional and other challenges to state measures that are 
intended to advance those rights.139 This protective role of courts has been 
illustrated in Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental 
Association.140 In this case, a state decision temporarily to house destitute 
flood victims on the (state-owned) grounds of a prison outside Johannesburg, 
was challenged by surrounding property owners as in violation of their 
administrative justice rights. The challenge was in part based on the argument 
that the decision was unlawful, as the minister of public works had no 
statutory authority to take such a decision. The Court rejected this argument, 
primarily because it held that the minister had the requisite power to take the 
decision by virtue of the state’s common law rights as property owner,141 but 
also because the decision was taken in furtherance of a constitutional duty to 
provide shelter to those in dire straits.142 Through its decision, the Court 
effectively protected the right to have access to adequate housing of the flood 
victims against private interference. Similarly, in City of Cape Town v 
Rudolph,143 the Cape High Court rejected a property-based constitutional 
challenge to the security of tenure law PIE.144 The Court held that PIE 
authorised neither the arbitrary deprivation145 nor the expropriation of 
property,146 and as such did not infringe property rights. The decision was 
                                                 
139 See, in general, CH Heyns ‘Extended medical training and the constitution: balancing civil 
and political rights and socio-economic rights’ (1997) 30 De Jure 1. 
140 Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association 2001 3 SA 1151 
(CC). See in this respect Budlender (n 61 above) 36. 
141 As above para 40. 
142 As above paras 37 - 40. 
143 n 30 above. 
144 n 27 above. 
145 Rudolph (n 30 above) 72J & 74G. 
146 As above 73F. 
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partly based on the finding that the state was at the very least authorised, but 
probably obliged by the constitution to enact legislation such as PIE, in order 
to give effect to the right to have access to adequate housing and the 
prohibition on arbitrary evictions.147 
 
Courts can also protect socio-economic rights through the exercise of their 
law-making powers in interpreting legislation and developing the rules of 
common law. As pointed out above, courts are constitutionally obliged to 
interpret legislation and develop rules of common law in such a way that the 
‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the bill of rights are promoted.148 Courts are in 
other words required to infuse legislation and the common law with the value 
system underlying the constitution - to read the rights in the bill of rights and 
the values underlying them into the existing law. This power of courts to 
engage constitutionally with the existing (common and statutory) law is, 
particularly with respect to the common law, potentially an extremely 
important, but unfortunately as yet much neglected way in which socio-
economic rights can be advanced. In a private ownership economy such as 
ours, common law background rules of property and transaction centrally 
determine access to and distribution of basic resources.149 Although the 
development of constitutional socio-economic rights so as to establish new 
and unique constitutionally based remedies certainly is an important 
endeavour on its own, to explore the full transformative potential of socio-
economic rights, sustained critical engagement, also with these common law 
background rules, is crucial. Experience with welfare rights campaigning in 
the United States, for example, has shown how a focus on the development of 
constitutional protection for welfare rights150 at the expense of an adequately 
critical engagement with the common law background rules has, in the 
                                                 
147 As above 74H - 75J. 
148 See sec 39(1) of the constitution. 
149 Simon (n 26 above)) 1433 - 1436; Williams (n 26 above) 575 - 577. See in this respect 
also Sen (n 1 above) 166, who writes that access to food (and I would add other basic 
resources) is most importantly determined by ‘a system of legal relations (ownership rights, 
contractual obligations, legal exchanges, etc)’, and that these legal relations, or the law itself 
quite literally ‘stand between’ such resources and those in desperate need of them. 
150 The focus of this movement, which reached its zenith in the Supreme Court decision of 
Goldberg v Kelly (n 20 above), was obtaining for statutory welfare rights the same kind of due 
process protection as that afforded property and other basic personal rights. See Williams (n 
26 above) 571 - 575 for an overview. 
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struggle for social justice, been counter-productive in the longer term, 
because it sublimates deep political questions regarding distribution of basic 
resources.151 In South Africa, some of these common law background rules 
have of course been significantly adapted through legislation - the impact of 
the different security of tenure laws on private property rights is a case in 
point.152  However, courts retain an important responsibility to extend the 
protection afforded socio-economic rights in the ‘ordinary’ law, through their 
powers of interpretation of legislation and development of common law. 
 
Courts have readily engaged with legislation in attempts to broaden the 
protection of socio-economic rights. So, for instance, the Labour Tenants 
Act153 and ESTA,154 both primarily intended to protect what formerly were 
weak rights to land against private interference, have in various respects b
interpreted by courts so that their protection also extends to other rights, such 
as the right to food.
een 
                                                
155 In addition, the decision of the Constitutional Court in 
Jaftha v Schoeman156 provides an interesting example of how courts can, 
when dealing with legislation, advance the duty to protect socio-economic 
rights. In Jaftha, the Court considered provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts 
Act157 that authorised under certain circumstances, without proper judicial 
oversight, the sale in execution of the home of a debtor to satisfy a judgment 
debt. On the basis of the section 26(1) right of everyone to have access to 
adequate housing, the Court, through a combination of interpretation and of 
 
151 Williams (n 26 above) 581 - 582; Simon (n 26 above), 1486 - 1489. 
152 See sections 4.1.1 & 4.1.2 above. See also AJ Van der Walt 'Exclusivity of ownership, 
security of tenure, and eviction orders: a model to evaluate South African land reform 
legislation' 2002 Journal for South African Law 254. 
153 Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (Labour Tenants Act). 
154 n 20 above. 
155 The Land Claims Court has in a number of cases, dealing with either ESTA (n 20 above) 
or the Labour Tenants Act (n 153 above), for example interpreted the term ‘eviction’ broadly 
so as to extend not only to interference with occupation of land for purposes of shelter, but 
also to landowner interference with activities on land through which people gain access to 
food (eg grazing and watering rights). See eg in this respect, re ESTA, Ntshangase v The 
Trustees of the Terblanché Gesin Familie Trust [2003] JOL 10996 (LCC) para 4; and, re the 
Labour Tenants Act, Van der Walt v Lang 1999 1 SA 189 (LCC) para 13 and Zulu v Van 
Rensburg 1996 4 SA 1236 (LCC) 1259. See also In re Kranspoort Community 2000 2 SA 124 
(LCC) (Land Claims Court interpreting the term ‘rights in land’ in the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 22 of 1994 to include also ‘beneficial occupation’, so that the long term use of land 
for grazing and cultivation purposes also constitutes such a right in land that can be 
reclaimed). 
156 n 43 above. 
157 n 43 above. See sec 66(1)(a).  
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reading words into the Act, adapted the Act so that a judgment debtor’s home 
can only be sold in execution if a court has specifically ordered so after 
considering all relevant circumstances.158 Jaftha was argued and decided on 
the basis of the negative duty to respect the right to have access to adequate 
housing.159 However, in effect, the Court’s order amounts to an instance of 
interpretative lawmaking through which the court introduces into the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act a measure of protection for the right to housing - the 
Court gave effect to its duty to protect that right. In addition, the judgment has 
opened the door for further court driven development in this respect. Although 
Jaftha involved only the protection of a judgment debtor’s home and right to 
have access to adequate housing against sale in execution, in future cases 
where a creditor seeks the sale in execution of immovable property that a 
judgment debtor uses, for example, to produce food, courts can certainly 
extend the Constitutional Court’s reasoning. The fact that the immovable 
property is the debtor’s means with which to exercise the right to food must 
also be considered relevant to the decision whether or not to allow its sale in 
execution. In this way courts could further develop the law to protect judgment 
debtors’ right to food against interference from creditors.160 
 
Courts have been far less active in engaging with the common law so as to 
enhance the protection of socio-economic rights than they have been with 
respect to legislation.161 In those few cases where the courts have been asked 
                                                 
158 Jaftha (n 43 above) paras 61 - 64 & 67. The factors that the Court lists that should 
considered are: ‘the circumstances in which the debt was incurred; … attempts made by the 
debtor to pay off the debt; the financial situation of the parties; the amount of the debt; 
whether the debtor is employed or has a source of income to pay off the debt and any other 
factor relevant to the … facts of the case …’ (para 60) (my emphasis). 
159 As above paras 17, 31 - 34 & 52. See also the discussion in sec 4.1.1 above. 
160 The judgment suggests this possibility. The list of factors provided by the Court to take 
account of when considering whether to allow sale in execution of immovable property is not 
exclusive. The Court explicitly stated that any other factor that, on the facts of the case before 
it, is relevant, must be considered (para 60). The Court also emphasised that the severe 
impact that the execution process could have on the human dignity of a judgment debtor and 
on a judgment debtor’s capacity to have access to the basic necessities of life importantly 
influenced its decision (paras 21, 25 - 30, 39 & 43). Certainly, the impact on an indigent 
person’s human dignity and basic survival interests of the attachment and sale in execution of 
immovable property that the person uses to produce food for own use is comparable to the 
impact of the sale in execution of such a person’s home. 
161 This is certainly due in the first place to the fact that, except in the area of eviction law (see 
eg Brisley (n 49 above)), few such cases have been brought to court. Second, courts have in 
those few cases where the development of the common law to protect socio-economic rights 
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to develop the common law so as better to give effect to socio-economic rights
they have declined. In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,
, 
                                                                                                                                           
162 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was invited to develop the common law of contract so that disclaimers in 
hospital admission contracts indemnifying the hospitals against damages claims 
on the basis of the negligence of their staff would be seen as in conflict with the 
public interest and consequently unenforceable. The argument was that such 
disclaimers had the effect that patients were not adequately protected against 
unprofessional conduct at such hospitals and that they as such constituted an 
impairment of access to health care services.163 This argument was rejected and 
the common law position remained intact.164 Equally, in Brisley,165 the Court 
declined to develop the common law of eviction in line with section 26(3) of the 
constitution. More recently, in Tswelopele166 the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
asked to develop the common law figure of spoliation such that a victim of an 
unlawful eviction who had not only been removed from the land in question but 
whose property had been destroyed in the course of such eviction, could claim 
restitution both of occupation and of the destroyed property. The Court, per 
Cameron JA, declined the invitation, instead handing down an order based on 
section 26 of the constitution that the destroyed property of the evictees be 
restored to them. Although, in other words, the evictees received more or less 
the relief they sought, the decision illustrates the unwillingness of our courts to 
develop common law rules so as to give effect to socio-economic rights.167 
Olivia Road possibly represents a departure from this trend. As indicated above, 
in Brisley the Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 26(3) of the constitution 
 
did come into play, readily deferred to the legislature rather than drive the development 
themselves; as pointed out above (section 3.2.2), whereas in Brisley the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was unwilling itself to develop the common law so as to extend the protection of sec 
26(3) to unlawful occupants who ‘hold over’, it was willing to do so in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; 
Bekker v Jika 2003 1 SA 113 (SCA) by extending the legislative protection afforded other 
unlawful occupiers.  
162 n 52 above. 
163 As above para 21. 
164 For critiques of this aspect of the judgment, see D Brand ‘Disclaimers in hospital 
admission contracts and constitutional health rights’ (2002) 3:2 ESR Review 17 - 18; 
PA Carstens & JA Kok ‘An assessment of the use of disclaimers against medical negligence 
by South African hospitals in view of constitutional demands, foreign law and medico-legal 
considerations’ (2003) 18 SA Public Law 430; D Tladi ‘One step forward, two steps back for 
constitutionalising the common law: Afrox Health Care v Strydom’ (2002) 17 SA Public Law 
473. 
165 n 49 above. 
166 n 53 above. 
167 See Van der Walt (n 53 above) for a critique of the case. 
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does not require the development of the common law rules of eviction so that 
courts would acquire a discretion, exercised on the basis of a consideration of all 
relevant circumstances, whether or not to grant an eviction or upon 
application.168 In Olivia Road, which dealt with an eviction that was not covered 
by the PIE Act and to which section 26(3) in other words applied, Yacoob J held 
one circumstance relevant to the decision of a court whether or not in terms of 
section 26(3) of the constitution to grant an eviction order to a municipality is 
whether the municipality had made reasonable efforts to engage meaningfully 
with the evictees before applying for an eviction order.169 In its assumption that, 
in eviction cases where PIE does not apply, section 26(3) requires courts to 
consider all relevant circumstances, Yacoob J seems implicitly to have 
developed the common law rules of eviction to confer an equitable discretion on 
courts and so to have overruled Brisley.170 
 
One example of where courts were willing to develop the common law so as to 
protect socio-economic rights is the case of Permanent Secretary, Department 
of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza.171 Ngxuza dealt with a class action claim 
brought in terms of section 38 of the constitution by a number of social 
assistance grantees for the reinstatement of disability grants that had unlawfully 
been terminated by the Eastern Cape Province. The respondents in the case 
had been granted leave to proceed with such a class action claim by the court a 
quo. The province appealed against this grant of leave to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal, in the absence of any legislative form 
having been given to section 38’s provision for class actions, proceeded to 
develop the common law of standing to make provision for such claims. 
Although the decision certainly opens the door for class action claims, at least 
where any constitutional right is at play, it is centrally important for the protection 
of particularly socio-economic rights. As Cameron JA (as he then was) states at 
the outset of the judgment, for the Court: ‘The law is a scarce resource in South 
                                                 
168 Brisley (n 49 above). 
169 Olivia Road (n 14 above) para 18. 
170 This advance has a hollow ring, however. Subsequent to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Ndlovu (n 161 above), I can think of no other cases of eviction from homes than 
that at issue in Olivia Road that would not be subject to the PIE Act. 
171 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA). 
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Africa. This case shows that justice is even harder to come by. It concerns the 
way in which the poorest of the poor are to be permitted access to both.’172 
 
2.3.2.3 The duty to fulfil socio-economic rights173 
(a) Background 
The duty to fulfil socio-economic rights requires the state to ‘adopt appropriate 
legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other 
measures’174 so that access to basic resources is extended and enhanced - in 
sum, it must act affirmatively to realise the rights. The state breaches the duty 
to fulfil not when it invades the existing exercise of socio-economic rights, but 
when it does not do enough, or does not do the appropriate things fully to 
realise those rights. For courts to enforce the duty to fulfil requires them 
directly to evaluate state policy and practice, to decide whether or not those 
are adequate measures to realise the socio-economic rights in question. 
Courts are constrained in this evaluation by concerns about technical capacity 
and institutional legitimacy and by a perceived absence of justiciable 
standards against which to assess state performance.175 To deal with these 
difficulties, the Constitutional Court has used a traditional model of judicial 
review,176 but has given it new content. As with any breach of any other right, 
when it is alleged that the duty to fulfil a socio-economic right has been 
breached, where prima facie such a breach is established, the Court 
considers whether or not it can be justified. However, the Court has 
developed a special test or standard against which to evaluate the justifiability 
of state measures to fulfil socio-economic rights that allows it, in different 
ways, to mediate its concerns with capacity and legitimacy. Which standard of 
scrutiny applies to breaches of the duty to fulfil socio-economic rights depends 
on which socio-economic rights are at issue.177 If the duty to fulfil a basic 
socio-economic right (children’s rights, rights of detainees, or the right to basic 
                                                 
172 n 171 above, para 1. 
173 I discuss the duties to promote and fulfil as one duty although various understandings of 
the duty to promote as distinct from the duty to fulfil have been proposed. 
174 Committee on ESCR General Comment No 14 (n 58 above) para 33. 
175 See 150 - 151 below. 
176 As suggested by Mureinik in an early article; E Mureinik ‘Beyond a charter of luxuries:  
economic rights in the constitution’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 464. 
177 See 100 - 103 above. 
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education) is breached, the section 36(1) proportionality standard applies. As 
the Court has as yet decided no case on the basis of a basic socio-economic 
right,178 it is unclear how this standard will operate in the context of socio-
economic rights.179 If the duty to fulfil a qualified socio-economic right is 
breached, that breach can be justified only in terms of a special standard of 
scrutiny  - the Court’s ‘reasonableness’ standard - developed on the basis of 
the internal limitation clause attached to these rights.180 
 
(b) Reasonableness review 
The Constitutional Court has described its ‘reasonableness’ standard of 
scrutiny in five cases. In Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal,181 
it denied an application for an order that a state hospital provide dialysis 
treatment to the applicant, finding that the guidelines according to which the 
hospital decided whether to provide the treatment were not unreasonable182 
and were applied rationally and in good faith to the applicant.183 As such, the 
Court held that the denial of treatment did not breach the section 27(1) right of 
everyone to have access to health care services.184 In Government of the 
                                                 
178 It could have, but did not do so in both Grootboom (n 28 above) and Treatment Action 
Campaign (n 6 above). 
179 In B v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 6 BCLR 789 (C), although finding that 
detainees’ right to adequate medical treatment (a basic socio-economic right) had been 
breached, the High Court did not explicitly consider the justification for that breach (but see 
paras 48 - 58, where the Court considers whether the breach can be condoned due to 
resource constraints). See further in this respect Liebenberg (n 8 above) 55 - 57. 
180 This seems to be so also where a positive duty to fulfil is sourced in sec 27(3), ie where an 
argument is made that in terms of this right, emergency medical services have to be 
established at an institution where they do not exist. In Soobramoney (n 9 above), the Court 
held that sec 27(3) only entitled one not to be refused treatment where it is available (see n 
227 below). However, the Court intimated that, should a positive duty be read into this right, it 
would be subject to the sec 27(2) internal limitation; para 11; see also Liebenberg (n 8 above) 
20. 
181 As above. 
182 As above paras 24 - 28. 
183 As above para 29. 
184 As above para 36. The application was argued around the sec 27(3) right not to be refused 
emergency medical treatment and a reading of the right to life in terms of which the state is 
required to keep the applicant alive. The court denied the application in these respects, 
holding that, because health care rights were explicitly protected in the constitution, it was 
unnecessary to give such an interpretation to the right to life (para 19) (Pieterse (n 9 above)) 
and that sec 27(3) did not apply to the applicant’s case, because his was not an emergency 
situation (para 21) and sec 27(3) was a right not arbitrarily to be refused emergency medical 
treatment where it was available, instead of a positive right to make available emergency 
medical treatment where it was not (para 20) (see Alston & Scott (n 96 above)). Having 
disposed of these two arguments, the Court on its own initiative proceeded to consider the 
claim on the basis of sec 27(1) (para 22). 
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Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,185 the Court heard a claim that the 
state was obliged to provide homeless people with shelter. It declared the 
state’s housing programme inconsistent with section 26(1) of the 
constitution.186  In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign,187 the 
Court held that the state’s policy not to provide Nevirapine at all public health 
facilities to prevent the mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of HIV at birth, as 
well as the general failure by the state to adopt an adequate plan to combat 
MTCT of HIV breached section 27(1) of the constitution The Court held that 
the state’s measures to prevent MTCT of HIV breached its duties in terms of 
section 27(1) of the constitution,188 and declared as much and directed the 
state to remedy its programme.189 In Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development,190 the Court held sections of the Social Assistance Act191 
excluding permanent residents from access to social assistance grants 
inconsistent with section 9(3) (the prohibition on unfair discrimination)192 and 
section 27(1)(c) (the right to have access to social assistance)193 of the 
constitution. The Court read words into the Act to remedy the constitutional 
defect.194 Finally, in Olivia Road195 the Court denied an application for an 
eviction order and found inconsistent with the constitution provisions of the 
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act,196 on the basis not 
of the reasonableness test but section 26(3) of the constitution and 
administrative justice standards. Nevertheless, the Court described significant 
new aspects of the reasonableness test in the process of reaching its decision 
on these other bases. 
 
Although the Court has as yet not been explicit about this, it is clear from 
these cases that the reasonableness standard is a shifting standard of 
                                                 
185 n 28 above. 
186 As above para 95. 
187 n 6 above. 
188 As above para 95. 
189 As above para 135. 
190 n 10 above. 
191 n 10 above. 
192 Khosa (n 10 above) para 77. 
193 As above para 85. 
194 As above paras 89 & 98. 
195 n 14 above. 
196 n 46 above. 
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scrutiny. In Soobramoney, the Court applied a basic rationality and good faith 
test to the decision of the state not to provide renal dialysis treatment to the 
claimant.197 In Grootboom198 and Treatment Action Campaign,199 the Court 
applied a more stringent means-end effectiveness test.200 In Khosa,201 in turn, 
the Court applied a yet stricter proportionality test. The Court has not been 
explicit about which factors determine the strictness of its scrutiny,202 but the 
cases indicate that the position of the claimants in society;203 the degree of 
deprivation they complain of and the extent to which the breach of right in 
question affects their dignity;204 the extent to which the breach in question 
involves undetermined, complex policy questions;205 and whether or not the 
breach also amounts to a breach of other rights,206 all play a role.207 
  
The Court derives its reasonableness standard from the state’s duty to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. In describing this 
duty, the Court has described the standards against which to evaluate the 
state’s measures. The Court has presented its reasonabeleness test as a 
means-end effectiveness test: in Grootboom, the Court indicated that the 
                                                 
197 With respect to its evaluation of the guidelines according to which the state made this 
decision, the Court applied a stricter reasonableness test; Soobramoney (n 9 above) paras 23 
- 28.  
198 n 28 above. 
199 n 6 above. 
200 It is also clear that in Treatment Action Campaign, although the standard of scrutiny 
applied by the court was in formal terms the same as in Grootboom, the Court in fact 
scrutinised the state policy at issue there more rigorously than it did in Grootboom; Brand (n 
79 above) 41. 
201 n 10 above. 
202 See for comparison Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier of the Western Cape 
Province 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 127, where the Court lists factors that could play a role in 
determining the strictness of its scrutiny with respect to administrative law reasonableness 
review. 
203 Whether they are a marginalised or especially vulnerable group; De Vos (n 12 above) 266. 
204 Khosa (n 10 above) para 80. 
205 In Grootboom (n 28 above), the issues were much less clearly delineated than in either 
Treatment Action Campaign (n 6 above) or Khosa (n 10 above). Also, in Treatment Action 
Campaign, many of the complex issues the Court had to consider (ie the safety/efficacy of 
Nevirapine and the availability of the necessary infrastructure to provide it properly) had either 
been determined by specialised bodies empowered to decide such issues (ie the Medicines 
Control Council), or the Court had dispositive evidence at its disposal with which to decide. In 
both the latter cases a stricter scrutiny was applied than in Grootboom.  
206 In Khosa (n 10 above), the impugned provisions also breached sec 9(3). In applying this 
section, the Court uses a standard of scrutiny rising to the level of proportionality. It would 
make little sense to apply sec 27(2) to the same breach using a more lenient standard. 
207 See also 240 - 251 below for a more extended discussion of this matter. 
 122
state’s measures are evaluated to determine whether they are ‘capable of 
facilitating the realisation of the right’.208 The Court has been at pains in all its 
judgments so far to emphasise that it does not test relative effectiveness, that 
it ‘will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could 
have been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent’, 
but will leave the ‘precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted 
[to render a programme reasonable] … [to] the legislature and the 
executive.’209 The Court quite obviously adopts this distinction between testing 
effectiveness and testing relative effectiveness to mediate its concern with its 
institutional capacity and legitimacy and to manage its relationship with the 
executive and the legislature. However, the distinction is in many cases a 
fiction. In Grootboom, the Court was clearly able to maintain it. The policy 
issue in question (how best to provide for the needs of the ‘absolutely 
homeless’) allowed for a wide variety of different possible solutions, so that 
the Court could simply declare that the housing programme was inconsistent 
with the constitution to the extent that it made no provision for the ‘absolutely 
homeless’, and leave the choice of specific solution to the state. By contrast, 
in Treatment Action Campaign,210 and particularly in Khosa,211 the specificity 
of the policy issue that the Court evaluated was such that it did not allow th
scope. The Court’s finding in Treatment Action Campaign that the state’s 
restriction of the provision of Nevirapine to the designated pilot sites breached 
section 27(1), ineluctably led to the state having to provide Nevirapine 
elsewhere, despite its unwillingness to do so.
is 
                                                
212 By the same token, in Khosa, 
the Court’s finding of unreasonableness left no option but that permanent 
residents should be included in the social assistance scheme. Indeed the 
Court itself read words to this effect into the Social Assistance Act.213 
However, this fiction is useful as it allows the Court to enforce rights, without it 
 
208 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 41. 
209 As above. 
210 n 6 above. 
211 n 10 above. 
212 The Court did manage to soften the prescriptive edge of its finding and order, by directing 
that Nevirapine be provided only there where the attending physician and the superintendent 
of the facility in question opined that it was indicated; Treatment Action Campaign (n 6 above) 
para 135, para 3(b) of the order. 
213 Khosa (n 10 above) para 98. 
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having to admit to prescribing directly to the state. As such, it helps the Court 
avoid direct confrontation with the political branches.214 
 
The Court’s reasonableness standard requires first that the state indeed act to 
give effect to socio-economic rights, and then requires that what the state 
does, meet a standard of reasonableness. 
 
Having a plan 
The Court’s standard requires first that the state must devise and implement 
measures to realise socio-economic rights - it cannot do nothing.215 Although 
these measures need realise the rights only progressively - the need for full 
realisation is deferred216 - the state must have measures in place to realise 
these rights and must implement them. In addition, the state must show 
progress in implementing these measures and must be able to explain lack of 
progress or retrogression. Particularly any deliberate retrogression would be a 
prima facie breach, requiring convincing justification.217 
 
Reasonableness 
Those measures that the state does adopt must be reasonably capable of 
achieving the realisation of the right in question.218 To be judged as 
reasonable in this sense, the state’s measures must meet at least the 
following basic standards: 
 
The measures must be comprehensive and co-ordinated.219 This means in the 
first place that the state’s programme with respect to a right must address 
‘critical issues and measures in regard to all aspects’ of the realisation of that 
                                                 
214 See, with respect to a similar fiction operating in the context of the Court’s engagement 
with resource allocation issues, T Roux ‘Legitimating transformation: Political resource 
allocation in the South African Constitutional Court’ (2003) 10 Democratisation 92 98. 
215 Secs 26(2) & 27(2) are clearly mandatory provisions with respect to this basic point - ‘the 
state must take … measures … to achieve the … realisation of these rights’ (my emphasis). 
216 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 45. 
217 As above. Deliberate retrogression breaches the negative duty to respect rights. As such it 
is subject for its justification to sec 36(1) rather than to the reasonableness scrutiny that 
applies uniquely to the positive duties imposed by qualified rights; see 100 and further above. 
218 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 41. 
219 As above para 39. 
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right.220 Using the right to food as an example, the Committee on ESCR has 
said that this requires the state to adopt measures with respect to the 
‘production, processing, distribution, marketing and consumption of safe food, 
as well as parallel measures in the fields of health, education, employment 
and social security’, whilst at the same time taking care ‘to ensure the most 
sustainable management and use of natural and other resources for food at 
the national, regional, local and household levels’.221 Grootboom, although 
decided on another basis, offers an example of a case where the state’s 
measures to give effect to the right to housing were not sufficiently 
comprehensive to be reasonable. The state’s mistake in Grootboom was that, 
despite having a programme to provide access to housing that the 
Constitutional Court described as ‘a major achievement’,222 it had done 
nothing with respect to a critical aspect of the right to housing - it had no 
measures in place with which to provide shelter to people with no roof over 
their heads. As such, its housing programme was not comprehensive.223 The 
requirement of co-ordination simply holds that a programme must as a whole 
be coherent, such that responsibilities are clearly allocated to different 
spheres and institutions within government. To ensure that state measures 
are comprehensive and co-ordinated, the Committee on ESCR has suggested 
that states must adopt national strategies or plans of action,224 which may or 
may not be presented in national framework laws, through which to give effect 
to particular socio-economic rights.225 The Constitutional Court’s references in 
Grootboom to the need for a ‘national framework’ with respect to housing 
provision, embodied in ‘framework legislation’226 and to the need for a 
                                                 
220 Committee on ESCR General Comment 12 (n 58 above) para 25. 
221 As above. 
222 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 53. 
223 And, according to the various courts’ remarks in Modderklip SCA (n 69 above) para 22 and 
Rudolph (n 30 above) 77B - 84H, it was not comprehensive for a significant time after the 
decision in Grootboom. 
224 See eg Committee on ESCR General Comment 12 (n 58 above) paras 21 - 30; General 
Comment 14 (n 58 above) para 43; General Comment 15 (n 58 above) paras 37 and 46 - 54. 
225 See Committee on ESCR, specifically General Comment 12 (n 58 above) para 29 and 
General Comment 15 (n 58 above) para 50. 
226 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 40. 
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‘coherent public housing programme’227 seem to endorse this suggestion by 
the Committee.228 
 
Financial and human resources to implement measures must be made 
available. In Grootboom the Court stated that, for a programme to be 
reasonable, ‘appropriate financial and human resources [must be] 
available’.229 The Court has as yet not elaborated on this tantalising phrase. It 
is clear that the Court is loath to prescribe to the state how and on what it 
must spend its money - to tell it that it must expend resources so as to do 
something it did not plan on doing and does not want to do.230 However, this 
phrase does seem to indicate that the Court will not allow the state to adopt 
mere token measures: where the state has itself decided and so undertaken 
to do something, it is under a legal duty, which the Court would be able to 
enforce, to allocate the resources reasonably necessary to execute its plans. 
In Kutumela v Member of the Executive Committee for Social Services, 
Culture, Arts and Sport in the North West Province,231 the plaintiffs had 
applied for the Social Relief of Distress Grant, but despite clearly qualifying fo
it, did not receive it. Their complaint was that although, in terms of the S
Assistance Act
r 
ocial 
                                                
232 and its regulations, provincial governments were required to 
provide the grant to qualifying individuals upon successful application, the 
North West Province had not dedicated the necessary human, institutional 
and financial resources to do so. The grant was consequently available on 
paper only, and not in practice. The case resulted in a settlement order that in 
essence required the province to dedicate the necessary human, institutional 
and financial resources to provide the grant. Specifically, it requires the 
province to acknowledge its legal responsibility to provide Social Relief of 
 
227 As above para 41. 
228 The South African government also seems to understand its duty to fulfil socio-economic 
rights in this manner. See eg the recent adoption by the Department of Agriculture, reacting to 
criticism from various quarters that no coherent and comprehensive plan through which to 
fulfil the right to food existed in South Africa, of the Integrated Food Security Strategy (a 
framework document seeking to create institutions through which the fulfilment of the right to 
food can be co-ordinated), coupled with its ongoing efforts to enact framework legislation in 
this respect.  
229 n 28 above, para 39. 
230 See below for a discussion of the court’s approach to scrutinising the state’s budgetary 
choices. 
231 n 22 above. 
232 n 10 above. 
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Distress effectively to those eligible for it and then to devise a programme to 
ensure its effective provision. This programme must enable it to process 
applications for Social Relief of Distress on the same day that they are 
received, must enable its officials appropriately to assess and evaluate such 
applications and must enable the eventual payment of the grant. Importantly, 
the province was ordered to put in place the necessary infrastructure for the 
administration and payment of the grant, inter alia by training officials in the 
welfare administration in the province.233 
 
The state’s measures must be both reasonably conceived and reasonably 
implemented.234 This element of the Court’s reasonableness test is closely 
related to the requirement of ‘reasonable resourcing’ outlined above. Of 
course (also in terms of the understanding of ‘progressive realisation’ outlined 
above) it is not sufficient for the state merely to adopt measures on paper. 
These measures must also in fact be implemented effectively. The Kutumela 
case,235 described above in the context of adequate resourcing, also 
illustrates this element of the Court’s reasonableness standard. In effect, the 
Court in Kutumela ordered the provincial government to implement a measure 
that existed in concept but not in practice. 
 
The state’s measures must be ‘balanced and flexible’, capable of responding 
to intermittent crises and to short-, medium- and long-term needs,236 may not 
exclude ‘a significant segment of society’,237 may not ‘leave out of account the 
degree and extent of the denial’ of the right in question and must respond to 
                                                 
233 See in this respect also People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India Writ Petition 
[Civil] 196 of 2001, available at http://www.righttofoodindia. org/mdm/mdm_scorders.html 
(accessed 31 October 2004), an Indian case dealing with an application in part directed at 
obtaining orders that the Indian government’s existing measures at national and state level to 
address food insecurity and famine be effectively implemented. The complaint alleged, 
amongst other things that, although adequate food reserves existed in India, and although the 
state had adopted various measures to address food insecurity and famine, these measures 
were not implemented in part because state governments routinely diverted funds from 
national government, intended to implement them, to other needs. In response, the Indian 
Supreme Court has issued a number of interim orders requiring, among other things, that 
funds allocated from national level to state governments for use in public distribution of food 
and famine measures in fact be used for those purposes. 
234 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 42. 
235 n 22 above. 
236 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 43. 
237 As above. 
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the extreme levels of deprivation of people in desperate situations.238 These 
related requirements of flexibility and ‘reasonable inclusion’239 formed the 
basis for the Constitutional Court’s decisions in both Grootboom and 
Treatment Action Campaign. In Grootboom, the Court found that the state’s 
housing programme was inconsistent with sections 26(1) and (2) because it 
‘failed to recognise that the state must provide relief for those in desperate 
need’.240 In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court held the state’s measures 
to prevent MTCT of HIV to be inconsistent with the constitution because they 
‘failed to address the needs of mothers and their newborn children who do not 
have access’241 to the pilot sites where Nevirapine was provided, and because 
the programme as a whole was ‘inflexible’.242 In one sense, these different 
requirements all relate to the idea that the state’s programmes must be 
comprehensive. Any state programme designed to fulfil a socio-economic 
right, will be incomplete (and as such unreasonable) unless it includes 
measures through which short term crises in access to the right can be 
addressed and measures that ‘provide relief for those in desperate need’.243 
However, the intriguing question raised by these requirements related to 
flexibility and reasonable inclusion, and particularly the Constitutional Court’s 
phrase in Grootboom, that a programme must take account of the degree and 
the extent of deprivation with respect to a right,244 is whether the Court’s 
reasonableness test in this respect requires state measures to prioritise its 
efforts, both with respect to temporal order and resource allocation, according 
to different degrees of need. Does the test require the state to engage in 
‘sensible priority-setting, with particular attention to the plight of those in 
greatest need’?245 Roux has made a strong argument that it does not. He 
points out that the Court’s finding in Grootboom requires ‘merely inclusion’ 
and that ‘a government programme that is subject to socio-economic rights 
                                                 
238 As above para 44. 
239 See T Roux ‘Understanding Grootboom – A response to Cass R Sunstein’ (2002) 12:2 
Constitutional Forum 41 49. 
240 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 66. 
241 Treatment Action Campaign (n 6 above) para 67. 
242 As above para 80. 
243 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 66. 
244 As above para 44. 
245 CR Sunstein ‘Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa’ (2001) 11:4 
Constitutional Forum 123 127. 
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will [in terms of this finding] be unreasonable if it fails to cater to a significant 
segment of society.’246 With respect to the finding in Grootboom, Roux’s 
reading is correct:  the Court there clearly simply required the state to take 
account of the needs of those most desperate, without at the same time 
suggesting that the needs of such people should in any concrete way take 
precedence over other needs.247 However, it has been suggested that the 
Court’s reasonableness test can take account of a prioritisation according to 
need, by varying the standard of scrutiny that it applies to particular alleged 
breaches of socio-economic rights according to the degree of deprivation 
suffered by those affected by the breach.248 According to this view, a court 
would scrutinise state measures more rigorously where those complaining of 
their impact are desperately deprived. This idea has recently been given 
credence in Khosa.249 As pointed out above, the Court in Khosa, possibly for a 
variety of reasons, applied a substantially stricter standard of scrutiny to the 
state’s exclusion of permanent residents than it applied to the state’s HIV 
prevention policy in Treatment Action Campaign,250 or the state’s housing 
programme in Grootboom.251 The Court in Khosa applied a proportionality 
test, weighing the impact that the exclusion had on the dignity and pract
circumstances of indigent permanent residents against the purposes for which 
the state had introduced the exclusion. The Court did not only find that the 
basic survival interests of the excluded permanent residents should take 
precedence over the legitimate purposes for their exclusion.
ical 
                                                
252 It also, 
particularly by rejecting the state’s arguments that to include permanent 
residents in the social assistance scheme would place an undue financial 
burden on the state, potentially requiring the diversion of resources from other 
social assistance needs,253 by implication held that the basic survival needs of 
 
246 Roux (n 239 above) 49. 
247 Brand (n 79 above) 50. 
248 See D Brand ‘The minimum core content of the right to food in context: A response to Rolf 
Künneman’ in D Brand & S Russel (eds) Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: 
South African and international perspectives (2002) 108 and D Bilchitz ‘Toward a reasonable 
approach to the minimum core. Laying the foundations for future socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 11 15 - 17. 
249 n 10 above. 
250 n 6 above. 
251 n 28 above. 
252 Khosa (n 10 above) para 82. 
253 As above paras 60 - 62. 
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the permanent residents should take precedence over further expansion of 
the social assistance system as it applies to South African citizens. The most 
important factor determining the Court’s robust scrutiny in this respect was 
‘the severe impact [that the exclusion of permanent residents from the 
scheme was likely to have] on the dignity of the persons concerned, who, 
unable to sustain themselves, have to turn to others to enable them to meet 
the necessities of life and are thus cast in the role of supplicants’.254  
 
The state’s measures must be transparent in the sense that they must be 
made known both during their conception and once conceived to all 
affected.255 This element of the Court’s reasonableness test was added in 
Treatment Action Campaign where the Court held that, in order for it to be 
reasonable, a programme’s ‘contents must be made known appropriately’.256 
As Treatment Action Campaign itself illustrated, litigants in socio-economic 
rights cases face great difficulties if it is not possible to ascertain with certainty 
what the state’s measures entail. In a very basic sense, in order to be able to 
challenge the state’s position, one has to be able to pinpoint what exactly it is. 
In this respect, the requirement of transparency is practically very important.257 
 
When taking a decision or designing a measure that will affect a constitutional 
socio-economic right, the state must engage with those whose rights will be 
affected by the decision or measure.258 This final element of the 
reasonableness test was added in the most recent Olivia Road case, where 
Yacoob J held that section 26(2) of the constitution requires municipalities 
who seek to evict impoverished occupants of land or buildings in 
circumstances where the eviction will leave them homeless, must engage with 
them in a reasonable fashion.259 The engagement must be ‘meaningful’ in the 
sense that the response of a public authority to the engagement must be 
reasonable.260 This element of the reasonableness test was alluded to by 
                                                 
254 As above para 80. 
255 Treatment Action Campaign (n 6 above) para 123. 
256 As above para 123. 
257 See also Liebenberg (n 8 above) 38. 
258 Olivia Road (n 14 above) paras 17 – 18. 
259 As above. 
260 As above para 19. 
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Yacoob J only in the context of decisions to evict. Future cases will indicate 
whether or not it also applies in cases where other decisions or measures are 
at issue.  
 
Within available resources 
The state’s duty to fulfil socio-economic rights must be exercised ‘within 
available resources’. Liebenberg points out that this phrase both provides an 
excuse to and imposes a duty on the state: it allows the state to attribute its 
failure to realise a socio-economic right to budgetary constraints; and requires 
the state in fact to make resources available with which to realise a right.261 
  
The Constitutional Court has been circumspect in scrutinising budgetary 
issues. In some cases it has avoided them altogether. In Soobramoney, the 
Court simply accepted the state’s contention that resources were limited as a 
given, and allowed that fact to determine its decision. The Court interrogated 
neither the allocation for health purposes from national government, nor in 
any rigorous way the manner in which it was used at provincial level.262 In 
Grootboom, resource constraints were not a direct issue. Equally, in 
Treatment Action Campaign,263 with respect to the question whether provision 
of Nevirapine should be extended to public health facilities where the 
necessary counselling and monitoring infrastructure already existed, the 
question of availability of resources was obviated. The manufacturers of 
Nevirapine had undertaken to provide it for free for five years and no 
additional infrastructural spending was required to proceed with the extension 
to such facilities.264 
 
In those instances where budgetary issues could not be avoided, the Court 
has required the state to persuade it of its financial constraint.265 It has then 
proceeded to scrutinise the state’s assertions in this respect, but on its own 
                                                 
261 n 8 above, 44, quoting from Grootboom (n 28 above) para 46. 
262 n 9 above, paras 24 - 28. 
263 n 6 above. 
264 As above para 19. This prompted the Court to hold that the extension of the programme to 
these sites ‘will not attract any significant additional costs’ (para 71). 
265 That the onus in this respect is indeed on the state, rather than on the claimant (see sec 
3.3.2 above) is most clearly established in Khosa (n 10 above). 
 131
terms - that is, taking the limits of the existing budget allocations as a given. 
The Court has not scrutinised initial budgetary decisions at macro-economic 
level. In Treatment Action Campaign,266 with respect to the extension of the 
programme to prevent MTCT of HIV to facilities without the necessary 
counselling and monitoring infrastructure, the state indeed objected that it did 
not have requisite resources. The Court engaged with and rejected this 
argument. First, since the litigation between the Treatment Action Campaign 
and the state had commenced, some provincial governments had proceeded 
with extending provision of Nevirapine to facilities other than the pilot sites,267 
despite the asserted resource constraints. This demonstrated to the Court that 
in fact ‘the requisite political will’, rather than resources, was lacking.268 In 
addition, whilst the case was heard, the state announced that significant 
additional resources had been allocated to deal with the HIV pandemic.269 The 
Court could therefore find that whatever resource constraints had existed 
previously, existed no longer.270 Also in Khosa, the state objected that it would 
not have the resources with which to extend social assistance grants to 
indigent permanent residents.271 Again, the Court considered and rejected this 
argument.272 It could do so first because the state had not provided ‘clear 
evidence to show what the additional cost of providing social grants to … 
permanent residents would be’.273 As a result, the Court could not assess 
whether the additional cost would place an untenable burden on the state.274 
In addition, the state provided the Court with evidence of current spending on 
                                                 
266 n 6 above. 
267 As above para 118. 
268 As above para 119. 
269 As above para 120. 
270 As above. 
271 Khosa (n 10 above) paras 60 & 61. 
272 The Court’s willingness to do so is not insignificant. See by way of contrast Ncgobo J, 
dissenting as above para 128: ‘Mr Kruger … estimates that the annual cost of including 
permanent residents could range between R243 million and R672 million. Policymakers have 
the expertise … to present a … prediction about future social conditions. That is … the work 
that policymakers are supposed to do. Unless there is evidence to the contrary, courts should 
be slow to reject reasonable estimates made by policymakers.’ 
273 As above para 62. 
274 Khosa is significant in that it clearly establishes that it is not for the claimant in a socio-
economic rights case to show that the state is not constrained by lack of resources, but for the 
state to show that it is so constrained (paras 60 - 62). Precisely because the state was unable 
to make this showing satisfactorily, the Court rejected its objection, seemingly without 
requiring the claimants to make a contrary showing (para 62). 
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and projected increases in spending on social assistance.275 This enabled the 
Court to point out that, even at the most pessimistic estimate of the additional 
cost occasioned by an extension of social assistance to permanent 
residents,276 the additional burden on the state would in relative terms be very 
small.277 
 
The Court’s approach to scrutinising budgetary issues and to the 
consequences of that scrutiny is perhaps best captured in a remark from 
Treatment Action Campaign, where the Court indicated that its scrutiny is not 
in itself ‘directed at rearranging budgets’, but that its scrutiny ‘may in fact have 
budgetary implications’.278 This remark seems clearly to indicate that the Court 
will neither directly interrogate, nor prescribe the state’s initial allocational 
decisions at macro-economic level. At the same time, it will not be 
discouraged to interrogate the reasonableness of state measures according to 
the standard described above, even if a finding of unreasonableness would 
have the consequence that the state would itself have to rearrange its 
budget.279 This distinction between itself rearranging budgets and taking 
decisions that have the consequence that budgets must be rearranged by the 
state is of course - as with the distinction between effectiveness and relative 
effectiveness discussed above - at least sometimes a fiction. The effect of the 
decision in Khosa, although the Court does not present itself as ‘rearranging 
budgets’, is that the state has to allocate additional resources (however slight 
an amount in relative terms) to an item that it did not want to finance. 
However, as Roux has argued, this is perhaps a useful fiction, as it has the 
singular virtue of allowing the Court to interfere in allocational choices to the 
extent required to enforce a right, without directly admitting to it. As such, it 
avoids direct confrontation with the executive.280 
                                                 
275 As above para 60. 
276 The state estimated that the additional cost would be between R243 million and R672 
million. The wide range itself indicated to the Court the absence of clear evidence as to the 
possible resource consequences of a finding of inconsistency (as above para 62). 
277 As above. 
278 Treatment Action Campaign (n 6 above) para 38. 
279 In Khosa (n 10 above), this is precisely what the Court did. Its finding of unreasonableness 
forces the state to expend resources on providing access to social assistance benefits, 
something that it has not budgeted for itself.  
280 Roux (n 214 above) 98. 
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 2.3.2.4 Remedies 
In constitutional matters, including matters dealing with socio-economic rights, 
courts have wide remedial powers. Section 38 determines that courts must in 
such matters provide ‘appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights’, 
whilst section 167 empowers courts to declare invalid law or conduct 
inconsistent with the constitution, and in addition to provide any order that is 
‘just and equitable’.281 The Constitutional Court has been clear that these 
powers allow it to fashion new remedies where necessary to ‘protect and 
enforce the constitution’.282 An important consideration for the Court in this 
respect is that the remedies it provides, whether new or existing, must be 
effective.283 
 
In most of the kinds of socio-economic rights cases described above, 
providing ‘appropriate relief’ is unproblematic, requiring courts to do little else 
than they are used to do in cases decided on the basis of other rights or 
indeed cases decided on the basis of the common law or ordinary legislation. 
However, when courts are required to provide relief in cases where the state 
has been found to breach the duty to fulfil socio-economic rights, or where the 
state has been found to have interfered in the existing exercise of a socio-
economic right and is under a duty to mitigate the impact of that interference, 
their position is often more difficult. In these cases, the Court’s finding 
requires the state to act affirmatively in order to remedy its breach of the right; 
to amend its policy or adopt a new policy, or to provide a service that it is not 
currently providing or extend a service to people who do not currently qualify 
for it. Such cases necessarily involve ‘amorphous, sprawling party structures, 
allegations broadly implicating the operations of large public institutions such 
as schools systems … mental health authorities … and public housing 
authorities, and remedies requiring long term restructuring and monitoring of 
                                                 
281 Such ‘just and equitable’ orders could include but are not limited to orders limiting the 
retrospective effect of an order of invalidity or suspending the operation of an order of 
invalidity; sec 172(1)(b)(i) & (ii). 
282 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19. 
283 As above para 69. 
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these institutions’, policies and programmes.284 Courts are consequently faced 
with having to decide to what extent to prescribe directly to the state what it 
must do, and to what extent and in what manner to retain control of the 
implementation of their orders, to see that indeed they will be effective. 
 
An obvious way for courts to retain control of the implementation of their 
orders is through so-called structural or supervisory interdicts.285 These orders 
would usually require the state to draft a plan for its implementation of the 
order, which could then be submitted to the court and the other party for 
approval, and then periodically to report back to the court and the other party 
with respect to its implementation of that plan. The court could manage the 
supervision on its own, through the other party to the litigation or through a 
court-appointed supervisor.286 In the two cases where such a supervisory 
interdict could perhaps have played a role, the Constitutional Court has 
elected not to make use of it. In Grootboom, the Court issued a simple 
declaratory order, leaving the remedy of the constitutional defect in its housing 
programme entirely to the state.287 In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court 
similarly issued a declarator, coupled with a mandatory order requiring the 
state to remedy the constitutional defect in its programme for prevention of 
MTCT of HIV.288 However, despite confirming that it did indeed have the 
power to do so, the Court again declined issuing a supervisory interdict, 
holding that there was no indication that the state would not implement its 
order properly.289 
 
                                                 
284 CF Sabel & WH Simon ‘Destabilisation rights: how public law litigation succeeds’ (2004) 
117 Harvard Law Review 1016 1017. 
285 See, in this respect, W Trengove ‘Judicial remedies for violations of socio-economic rights’ 
(1999) 1:4 ESR Review 8 - 11 9 - 10 and, in general, Sabel & Simon (n 284 above). 
286 The Constitutional Court made use of such a structural interdict in August v Electoral 
Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC), to ensure that the state take the necessary steps to make it 
possible for prisoners to vote in general elections. The various High Courts have made quite 
regular use of such interdicts in socio-economic rights cases. See eg Grootboom v 
Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C). 
287 Grootboom (n 28 above) para 99. 
288 Treatment Action Campaign (n 6 above) para 135. 
289 As above para 129. 
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Although the Court’s failure in particularly Grootboom to make use of a 
supervisory interdict certainly trenched on the effectiveness of its order,290 it is 
understandable that the Court is circumspect in its use of these remedies. 
Structural interdicts have to be very carefully crafted indeed to be effective.291 
More importantly, structural interdicts have the potential to erode the 
legitimacy of the Court, both because they directly and on an ongoing basis 
place the Court in confrontation with the executive, and can involve the Court 
in the day to day management of public institutions, something at which it is 
almost bound to fail.292 Whether or not a structural interdict would be 
appropriate in a given case would depend on the nature of the breach in 
question and particularly on the nature of that which is required for the remedy 
of that breach.293 
 
In two eviction cases decided by the Constitutional Court, where the duty to 
mitigate an interference in the exercise of the right to housing was at issue 
because the Court was required to consider the duty of the state to provide to 
evictees alternative accommodation – PE Municipality and Olivia Road – the 
Court developed a promising new approach to remedies. In PE Municipality, 
having rejected an application for an eviction order on appeal and, in the 
process, having rejected the state’s offer of alternative accommodation, 
Sachs J mentioned the possibility in passing of ordering parties in such 
circumstances to reach a solution amenable to both parties, within the limits 
set by the court’s decision, through mediation.294 This suggestion was taken 
up by Yacoob J in Olivia Road, albeit in an importantly different fashion than 
suggested in PE Municipality. Before he had decided the case and handed 
                                                 
290 In a number of recent cases, courts have pointed out that the state has for all intents and 
purposes simply ignored the order in Grootboom and has put in place no discernible 
measures to take account of the plight of those in housing crises. See eg Modderklip SCA (n 
69 above) para 22 and Rudolph (n 30 above) paras 77B - 84H. See also K Pillay 
‘Implementation of Grootboom: implications for the enforcement of socio-economic rights’ 
(2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 255. 
291 Sabel & Simon (n 284 above) 1017. 
292 As above 1017 - 1018. 
293 It remains an open question, for example whether or not a structural interdict would indeed 
have led to the findings in Grootboom being implemented effectively by the state, or whether, 
instead, the policy issue in Grootboom was so wide and amorphous and required such wide-
ranging and complex adjustment on the side of the state, that the Court would simply have 
become bogged down in debilitating detail had it retained jurisdiction. 
294 PE Municipality (n 27 above) paras 39 – 46. 
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down his judgment (indeed, before he had formulated the judgment) Yacoob J 
ordered the parties to the case (the occupiers and the City of Johannesburg) 
to engage with each other to resolve the case. The parties did so and reached 
an agreement which they submitted to the Court for approval. The Court 
approved the agreement, effectively resolving the dispute between the parties 
in this way, without yet having decided the case.295 I take issue below with 
Yacoob J’s decision to issue his order for engagement before having decided 
the case.296 Nevertheless, the use of the engagement order in Olivia Road 
holds great promise, both because it potentially resolves the problems of 
institutional capacity and institutional relations attaching to remedies in socio-
economic rights cases alluded to above and because it provides a mechanism 
for the powerful legitimation by courts of transformative political action.297 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The overview above demonstrates the range and diversity of cases  - both 
with respect to the manner in which these rights applied in the respective 
cases and with respect to the duties that were at issue in them - that have so 
far been decided by our courts involving socio-economic rights. My analysis 
that follows in Chapters 3 and 4 below cannot take account of all of these 
cases. For my analysis of the process of adjudication in those Chapters to be 
manageable requires a limited focus – I cannot consider all the cases. At the 
same time I cannot lose sight of the diversity of cases that have been decided 
to date. The manner in which I propose to limit my focus is therefore simple – 
I directly consider in my analysis below only cases decided by our two higher 
courts: the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
                                                 
295 Olivia Road (n 14 above) paras 5 & 24 – 30. 
296 See 162 - 165 below. 
297 For two examples in other jurisdictions where engagement orders were used to great 
effect, see the Colombian Constitutional Court decision T-760/2008 (decision requiring 
dramatic restructuring of the health care system, which has to be effected in part through a 
participatory process involving a range of stake-holders) (for a discussion and evaluation of 
this decision see A Ely Yamin & O Parra-Vera ‘How do courts set health policy? The case of 
the Colombian Constitutional Court’ (2009) 6(2) PLoS Medicine 1); and the decision of the 
Argentinian Supreme Court in Mendoza, Beatriz Silvia y otros c/ Estado Nacional y otros 
s/dãnos y perjuicios (danã derivados de la contaminatión ambiental del Río Matanza-
Riachuelo) (decision attributing reponsibility for the degradation of a river, reached on the 
basis of a participatory process managed by the Court during which interested parties 
participated in determining the decision of the Court) (summary in English available at 
http//www.farn.org.ar/participacion/riachuelo/resumen_ingles.html, visited on 28 March 2009). 
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But this choice of focus is not entirely motivated by considerations of 
convenience. As will become clear below, my analysis considers issues of 
judicial attitude; assumption and professional sensibility. In order at all to be 
able to come to conclusions about these issues, I need to be able to identify 
trends in the manner in which courts decided cases. This will in turn only be 
possible if I focus on certain courts alone. 
3 Depoliticisation 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I described different ways in which courts in deciding socio-
economic rights claims can work to limit transformative political action. First, 
so I argued, courts can do so by operating in such cases on the basis of 
outmoded understandings of the nature of interpretation and adjudication, by 
seeing legal interpretation as a more or less mechanical process of 
application of self-evident legal materials to equally self-evident sets of facts 
or an argumentative free-for-all without any foundation in rule or text. I explore 
this theme further in Chapter 4.1 
 
Second, so I continued, courts could limit transformative politics by 
legitimating and confirming in their decisions the various strategies of 
depoliticisation employed by dominant participants in debates about 
impoverishment, need and deprivation to remove those issues from political 
contestation.2 I explore this second theme in this Chapter – that is, I analyse 
the case law described in Chapter 2 and trace to what extent our courts have, 
consciously or inadvertently, relied on and so legitimated these depoliticising 
rhetorical or conceptual tropes. 
 
In Chapter 1 I referred to a range of such depoliticising strategies that courts 
run the risk of replicating in their decisions. I described processes of 
domestication of needs talk (questions of need, impoverishment and 
deprivation are depicted as of domestic, familial concern only, rather than of 
public concern); personalisation of impoverishment (impoverishment is 
attributed to personality failings in poor people such as laziness and chronic 
dependence, so denying the broader social, economic and political causes); 
naturalisation (impoverishment and deprivation are depicted as somehow the 
natural order of things, caused by forces of nature or the impersonal market, 
                                                 
1 See 46 – 61 above. 
2 See 61 - 72 above. 
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so that people can do nothing to address it) and technicisation 
(impoverishment is described as a highly technical and complex problem, 
unsuited for that reason for political debate and resolution). 
 
As I point out in 3.2.1 below, all of these strategies have to a lesser or a greater 
extent operated at times in our courts’ socio-economic rights case law. 
Nevertheless, in this Chapter I focus on only two depoliticising themes in the 
case law. First, in 3.2.2 below, I trace the extent to which the Court, in particular 
in its reliance on separation of powers logic to limit and describe its review 
powers, technicises issue of poverty, describing them as questions that 
impoverished people themselves – as opposed to the state – simply cannot 
engage with. In this way, I argue, the Court depicts impoverished people as 
passive recipients of pre-determined services from the state, rather than as 
active participants in the definition of their needs and in the fashioning of 
appropriate ways in which to address them. I focus here on cases such as 
Soobramoney,3 Grootboom,4 Treatment Action Campaign5 and, most recently, 
Olivia Road.6 At the same time I identify instances in the jurisprudence – in 
cases such as Modderklip,7 PE Municipality,8 Khosa9 and, again, Olivia Road - 
where the Court has instead acknowledged, rewarded and so legitimised the 
political agency of impoverished people, contradicting in the process its 
otherwise depoliticising rhetoric. 
 
Then, in 3.2.3 below, I investigate the operation in the Court’s jurisprudence of 
another form of depoliticising rhetoric, that I do not refer to directly in Chapter 1 – 
the proceduralisation of needs talk. I describe how the Court, in cases such as 
Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign and, most importantly, Modderklip, has 
                                                 
3 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) (Soobramoney). 
4 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom). 
5 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) (Treatment Action 
Campaign). 
6 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) (Olivia Road). 
7 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA amicus 
curiae) 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) (Modderklip (CC)). I also refer extensively in this Chapter to the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in this matter: Modderfontein Squatters v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) (Modderklip (SCA)).  
8 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) (PE Municipality). 
9 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) (Khosa). 
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tended toward deciding socio-economic rights cases on the basis of structural 
good governance principles such as inclusivity, rationality, access to courts and 
rule of law, rather than on the substantive content of socio-economic rights. This 
tendency, so I argue, has the potential to legitimate dominant liberally inclined 
discourses in the political debate about how best to address impoverishment 
that tend to emphasise structural issues – the free operation of the market, for 
example – at the expense of the deeply political redistributive questions inherent 
in the debate. 
 
3.2 Depoliticisation 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Certainly, taken as a whole, the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of our 
higher courts does not create the impression that our courts are unaware of 
the political content and context of their dealings with socio-economic rights or 
even that they tend, as a rule, to deny or subvert that political content and 
context. 
 
As Sandra Liebenberg has pointed out, one way in which courts can resist 
dominant depoliticising strategies in their work is explicitly to ‘locat[e] the 
needs in question within a broader historical and social context of systemic 
injustice.’10 This our courts have more or less consistently done, referring 
often and insistently to, for example, the historical causes of current 
impoverishment11 and the extent to and manner in which the extreme levels of 
impoverishment and socio-economic inequality in South Africa are issues of 
‘political morality and ... collective social responsibility’.12 
                                                 
10 S Liebenberg ‘Needs, rights and transformation: adjudicating social rights’ (2006) 17 
Stellenbosch Law Review 5 34. 
11 See, eg, Grootboom (n 4 above) para 6 (pointing out that the cause of the predicament of 
the Grootboom community and others in their situation lies in the Apartheid policy of ‘influx 
control’); PE Municipality (n 8 above) paras 8 – 10 (describing the centrality of arbitrary 
eviction to the Apartheid project as background to an expansive interpretation of legislation 
giving effect to constitutional guarantees against arbitrary evictions). 
12 Liebenberg (n 10 above) 35. See, eg PE Municipality (n 8 above) para 37 (Sachs J arguing 
that constitutional housing rights and anti-eviction guarantees and the legislation giving effect 
to them are infused by and give expression to ‘the constitutional vision of a caring society 
based on good neighbourliness and shared concern’ and the ‘spirit of ubuntu’ which 
‘combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy’; and Khosa (n 9 above) para 65 
(Mokgoro J referring to a ‘constitutional commitment to developing a caring society’). 
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 Nevertheless, at the same time as courts have in their explicit 
pronouncements so emphasised the political nature of the predicament of 
impoverished people, they have in other ways participated in and so 
legitimated dominant depoliticising discourses. Most often this has happened 
inadvertently, in their choice of conceptual categories or their doctrinal moves, 
rather than in their explicit pronouncements - in what they do, rather than what 
they say. 
 
The most obvious example that springs to mind concerns the domestication of 
needs talk, evident in the first place in Sachs J’s concurring opinion in 
Soobramoney. An inordinate portion of this opinion13 is devoted to an 
explanation why the Court was unable to intervene on behalf of Mr 
Soobramoney – not why in a substantive sense his claim must fail,14 but why 
the Court could not engage with the issues raised by his claim. Indeed the 
opinion can perhaps best be described as a decision not to decide – a rather 
extreme example of what Robert Cover has called ‘the judicial can’t’.15 Sachs 
J invokes the usual arguments of institutional incapacity and limited resources 
to justify his ‘can’t’. He argues, persuasively, that the issues with respect to Mr 
Soobramoney’s medical treatment were technical medical questions that the 
Court is not equipped to decide16 and ‘toll[s] the bell of lack of resources’,17 
pointing out that ‘if governments were unable to confer any benefit on any 
person unless it conferred an identical benefit on all, the only viable option 
would be to confer no benefit on anybody.’18 
 
                                                 
13 8 of the 11 paragraphs; Soobramoney (n 3 above) paras 52 - 59. 
14 Substantive engagement with the claim is limited to a single paragraph, in which Sachs J 
expressed his agreement with Chaskalson P’s finding for the Court that Mr Soobramoney’s 
condition was not an emergency medical condition and did not qualify him for the protection of 
sec 27(3); Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 51. 
15 R Cover Justice accused: anti-slavery and the judiciary process (1975) 119 - 120. 
16 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 58. 
17 R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B [1995] 2 All ER 129 (CA) 137c - d, quoted in 
Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 52. 
18 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 53.  
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But then he goes further still. Referring to US case law dealing with the right 
to die,19 he concludes that ‘[c]ourts are not the proper place to resolve the 
agonising personal … problems that underlie these issues’20 and that ‘[o]ur 
country’s legal system simply “cannot replace the more intimate struggle that 
must be borne by the patient … and those who care about the patient”.’21 The 
message seems clear: because issues surrounding a person’s death are 
intensely personal, the Court is powerless to address Mr Soobramoney’s 
plight: 
 
[C]onsiderations of the wisdom and utility of the actions that might have been taken 
are beside the point. Normative debate [about, for instance, whether or not the 
balance struck ‘between the equally valid entitlements or expectations of a multitude 
of claimants’22 that had resulted in Mr Soobramoney being denied the treatment he 
required, was appropriate] is not invited.23 
 
Questions of death are private, not political. 
 
What makes Sachs J’s assertion of this rhetorical depoliticization strategy so 
startling, is that the US right to die case law he refers to so as to make his 
point is wholly inapposite. Certainly, when the question is whether or not the 
state should allow a person who does not want to live anymore to die, the 
issue whether or not or to what extent a court can prescribe the choice to a 
patient arises. But Mr Soobramoney was in the opposite position – he very 
much wanted to live, and the question in his case was whether or not the 
state is obliged to keep him alive. I fail to see how the issues that arise in 
determining that question are ‘agonising personal problems’ part of an 
‘intimate struggle’ that Mr Soobramoney should be left to go through on his 
own – the essence of Mr Soobramoney’s claim is after all that the state is 
obliged to get involved in his life and possible death. How does one make 
                                                 
19 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, et al 497 US 261 (1990), quoted in 
Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 56. 
20 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 58 (my emphasis). 
21 In re Jobes 529 A2d 434 451 (NJ SCt, 1987), quoted in Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 58 
(my emphasis). 
22 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 54. 
23 T Ross ‘The rhetoric of poverty: their immorality, our helplessness’ (1991) 79 Georgetown 
Law Journal 1499 1511. 
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sense of this mistaken analogy? Sachs J could have made his point relying 
only on the institutional capacity arguments, without having to go any further. 
Thomas Ross has said that ‘judges invoke the rhetoric of judicial helplessness 
most fervently when confronted with a problem of unjust and tragic 
dimensions’.24 Perhaps it was precisely the acutely political nature of Mr 
Soobramoney’s predicament – the tragic fact that his position is compared to 
that of others, and that the state makes a choice not to intervene in his - that 
prompted Sachs J to go to such tortuous lengths to justify his and the rest of 
the Court’s inaction. As such this element of the opinion constitutes an 
extraordinary flight from politics. 
 
A second example of the Constitutional Court’s domestication of needs talk 
occurs in Grootboom. The Grootboom-community’s claim for shelter was 
partly based on children’s section 28(1)(c) right to shelter. Although Yacoob J, 
for the Court, decided the case on the basis of the section 26(1) right of 
everyone to have access to adequate housing, he did provide an 
interpretation of section 28(1)(c). The linchpin of this interpretation is a 
conflation of section 28(1)(c) with section 28(1)(a), which proclaims children’s 
right ‘to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment’. In Yacoob J’s words: 
 
[Sections 28(1)(b) and 28(1)(c)] must be read together. They ensure that children are 
properly cared for by their parents or families, and that they receive appropriate 
alternative care in the absence of parental or family care … Subsection (1)(b) defines 
those responsible for giving care while ss (1)(c) lists various aspects of the care 
entitlement.25 
 
On this basis Yacoob J proceeds to argue that the state has only a residual 
duty to provide shelter to children – the primary duty to do so rests on parents 
and family and the state incurs the direct duty to do so only with respect to 
those children ‘who are removed from their families’.26 Where children are 
cared for by their parents or families (are still with their parents or families) the 
                                                 
24 As above. 
25 Grootboom (n 4 above) para 76. 
26 As above para 77. 
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only duty the state carries with respect to them is ‘to provide the legal and 
administrative infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are accorded 
the protection contemplated by s 28’.27 From this Yacoob J’s conclusion 
follows ineluctably:28 
 
It was not contended that the children who are respondents in this case should be 
provided with shelter apart from their parents. Those of the respondents in this case who 
are children are being cared for by their parents; they are not in the care of the State, in 
any alternative care, or abandoned. [T]herefore, there was no obligation upon the State 
to provide shelter to those of the respondents who were children. 
 
Yacoob J’s interpretative manoeuvring clearly ‘directs dependency away from 
the state [to the family] and [so] privatizes it’.29 The result is profoundly 
depoliticizing. It allows Yacoob J simply to ignore the social fact that often 
children who are ‘properly’ with their parents or family are worse off than 
those who find themselves in some form of alternative care, because their 
parents or family are simply too poor ‘properly’ to care for them. It also allows 
him to ignore the question whether or not the state has a duty, where children 
are with their parents or family but in a situation of indigence, to provide forms 
of material care directly to those children. Finally, it allows him to skirt the 
deeply political question whether or not, in the social provisioning activities of 
the state, children’s needs should enjoy material priority over the needs of 
others. As with Sachs J’s opinion in Soobramoney, what makes Yacoob J’s 
depoliticising strategy in Grootboom all the more remarkable is that it was 
unnecessary – Yacoob J’s interpretation of sections 28(1)(b) and (c) is 
certainly not the only interpretation possible, nor even the most obvious. 
There is no textual reason to subsume subsection (1)(c) into subsection (1)(b) 
as Yacoob J did – the various entitlements listed in the subsections of section 
28(1) (there are nine – (a) to (i)) are connected to each other with an ‘and’ and 
seem to be intended as separate entitlements. It is also a plausible 
interpretation to say that subsection (1)(b) refers to the emotional and other 
                                                 
27 As above para 78. 
28 As above para 79. 
29 MLA Fineman ‘Masking dependency: the political role of family rhetoric’ (1995) 81 Virginia 
Law Review 2181 2205. 
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non-material aspects of care, whilst subsection (1)(c) lists elements of 
material care.30 Yacoob J had to make a conscious choice to adopt the 
interpretation he did, it is not suggested by the text – and his employment of 
the depoliticizing strategy flowing from that interpretation was equally a 
conscious choice. 
 
Striking as they both are, these two examples of the domestication of needs 
talk by the Court do not form the focus of this Chapter. Yacoob J’s 
interpretation of section 28(1)(c) in Grootboom was reversed in Treatment 
Action Campaign. The Court still employed Yacoob J’s view that the primary 
duty to provide shelter, health care, nutrition and social services rests on 
parents and family, with only an alternative duty falling on the state,31 but 
extended the circumstances under which this alternative duty would kick in. 
As the mothers with which the case was concerned were ‘for the most part 
indigent and unable to gain access to private medical treatment which is 
beyond their means’ for them and their children, ‘[t]hey and their children are 
in the main dependent upon the state to make health care services available 
to them.’32 As a result the state incurred a duty to provide health care services 
to their children, even though their children were still in their care. In addition, 
the two instances of domestication that I relate are isolated incidents and 
certainly cannot be used to indicate a trend. In particular Sachs J’s description 
of Mr Soobramoney’s predicament as ‘deeply personal’ seems an aberration 
without any replication in later cases. Rather than in these isolated instances 
of depoliticising rhetoric, I am interested in examples of depoliticisation that 
constitute a trend in the jurisprudence of our courts – that somehow are 
inevitably implied by or are an integral part of their general approach to 
deciding socio-economic rights cases. Such a trend one can ascertain in the 
Court’s inadvertent complicity in two distinct trains of depoliticising thought: 
                                                 
30 See, in general Jooste v Botha 2002 (2) BCLR 187 (T), where the claimant based a 
damages claim on the construction that section 28(1)(b) imposes duties of emotional care on 
parents. For a discussion see K van Marle & D Brand ‘Enkele opmerkings oor formele 
geregtigheid, substantiewe oordeel en horisontaliteit in Jooste v Botha’ (‘Some remarks about 
formal justice, substantive judgment and horisontality in Jooste v Botha’) (2001) 12 
Stellenbosch Law Review 408. 
31 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) para 75. 
32 As above para 79. 
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the technicisation and the proceduralisation of needs talk. It is to these two 
examples that I now turn. 
 
3.2.2 Technicisation: Soobramoney, Grootboom, Treatment Action 
Campaign and Olivia Road 
 
... managerialism is the ism to make all isms wasms ...33 
 
3.2.2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I referred, as one example of a depoliticising strategy that often 
operates in discourses about need, deprivation and impoverishment, to the 
rhetoric of ‘technicisation’: the tendency of ‘[o]fficial-economic capitalist system 
institutions’ to describe impoverishment ‘as [a complex of] technical problems for 
managers and planners ... in contradistinction to political matters’.34 
 
To describe impoverishment as such depoliticises in three related ways. First, it 
does so simply by bluntly depicting impoverishment as non-political, as 
something that must be dealt with on technical or efficiency grounds only and 
that does not implicate substantive political questions of redistribution or social 
justice. Depiction of impoverishment as first and foremost a technical problem 
for which technical solutions must be found can so be linked to what Margaret 
Radin has described as ‘complacent pragmatism.’35 Complacent pragmatism 
elevates the ‘cold measure’36 of efficiency – ‘what works’ - to the only relevant 
standard against which to test social policy. As Joseph Singer has pointed out, 
such an emphasis on ‘what works’, despite its obvious attractions, is potentially 
problematic from the perspective of a concern with transformative politics, for 
two related reasons. Complacent pragmatism works counter to transformative 
                                                 
33 J Cronin ‘End of the century – which is why wipers’ from More than a casual contact (2006) 
22.  
34 See 66 - 67 above. N Fraser ‘Talking about needs: interpretive contests as political conflicts 
in welfare-state societies’ (1989) 99 Ethics 291 299. 
35 M Radin ‘The pragmatist and the feminist’ (1990) 63 Southern California Law Review 1699 
1710. For a South African discussion and application of this idea, see AJ van der Walt 
‘Resisting orthodoxy – again: thoughts on the development of post-apartheid South African 
law’ (2002) 17 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 258 271 – 274. 
36 R Berkowitz The gift of science. Leibniz and the modern legal tradition (2005) x (describing 
the modernist tendency to understand justice as efficiency, as ‘a cold measure that equates 
economic gain with moral rectitude’).  
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politics because it accepts that all the important substantive political questions 
have been answered, so that the only remaining questions are technical ones.37 
By focusing simply on efficiency, it often fails to interrogate who the ‘we’ is that a 
certain course of action ‘works’ for; what the material interests of that ‘we’ are; 
and why it is that ‘we’ believe that a certain course of action ‘works’ for ‘us’.38 In 
this way such an approach downplays conflict between different groups and 
people, presuming that everyone is in agreement about what the goals of social 
policy are.39 An uncritical pragmatist, or technicised approach to issues of 
impoverishment also runs counter to a transformative politics because it is 
inherently conservative, in the sense that it favours retention of the status quo 
rather than transformation. Because the common sense standard of what works 
usually describes settled and existing practices in society, complacent 
pragmatism’s acceptance of what works as the determining standard for social 
policy confirms the legitimacy of accepted social practices and institutions.40 
And further - because which practices and institutions are acceptable is usu
determined by those in power, an uncritical acceptance of what is deemed to 
work fails to take account of the degree to which power shapes social 
institutions and arrangements.
ally 
                                                
41 
 
Second, the technicisation of impoverishment depoliticises by discouraging 
political engagement with issues of need and deprivation. Impoverishment is 
depicted as a complex technical matter that requires of those devising plans to 
address it technical expertise, experience and access to information that 
ordinary participants in the political process do not command. The message to 
impoverished people is that they are simply not capable of understanding the 
complexity of their predicament and can therefore not usefully engage it. 
 
Third, and most importantly, the technicisation of poverty depoliticises by 
privileging certain participants in debates about impoverishment – indeed by 
depicting them as the only participants who may legitimately engage these 
 
37 JW Singer ‘Property and coercion in federal Indian law: the conflict between critical and 
complacent pragmatism’ (1990) 63 Southern California Law Review 1821 1824. 
38 Radin (n 35 above) 1710 – 1711. 
39 Singer (n 37 above) 1824 – 1825. 
40 Radin (n 35 above) 1709; Singer (n 37 above) 1826. 
41 Singer (n 37 above) 1825. 
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issues. Impoverishment depicted as exclusively a technical problem becomes 
the province of the technically proficient alone, to the exclusion of other potential 
participants in the debate. In practical terms this means that the specialist 
administrative agencies of the state and the expert communities that support 
them (think tanks, academic advisers, researchers) establish a monopoly in 
debates about impoverishment. From the lofty heights of their technical 
expertise they determine what the problems are that impoverished people face, 
which of those problems must be solved according to which prioritisation and 
how to solve them. Predetermined solutions can then be presented to passive 
recipients who have no role in determining their fates.42 
 
This third depoliticising effect of the technicisation of issues of impoverishment is 
particularly insidious in South Africa. Government has over the last decade 
regularly and quite explicitly made the claim that the most effective (and in its 
idiom therefore the only legitimate) way in which to address impoverishment in 
South Africa is for the state to take a leading and controlling role, to the 
exclusion of other sectors of society. As Mirjam van Donk and Edgar Pieterse 
put it: 
 
The premise is clear: the government sets the agenda for the progressive realisation of 
socio-economic rights, and other actors and stakeholders have to embrace and support 
the path chosen.43 
 
The fact that this approach leaves no space for the kind of agonistic political 
engagement from other groups or actors in the debate about impoverishment 
that I am concerned with has also been made quite explicit. The state has often 
described the political action of social movements engaged in, for example, 
service delivery protest as a threat to the stability required for socio-economic 
development and ultimately the eradication of impoverishment.44 
                                                 
42 J Habermas ‘Law as medium and law as institution’ in G Teubner (ed) Dilemmas of law in 
the welfare state (1986) 204 210; Fraser (n 34 above) 307. 
43 E Pieterse & M van Donk ‘The politics of socio-economic rights in South Africa. Ten years 
after apartheid’ (2004) 5:5 ESR Review 12 13 
44 As above. See also B Boyle ‘And now for real change’ (15-05-2005) Sunday Times, 
available at http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/articles/article.aspx?ID=ST6A120261, visited on 20 
May 2005. For a detailed overview of the Mbeki government’s reaction to such ‘ultra-leftist’ 
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 3.2.2.2 Technicisation in the cases 
Our courts have consistently and explicitly engaged in the technicisation of 
issues of impoverishment in their socio-economic rights judgments, in a way that 
has in particular caused the third depoliticising effect of such technicisation that I 
described above. 
 
As could be expected, one of the major concerns of the Constitutional Court 
thus far in its socio-economic rights cases has been to determine the scope of 
its review powers with respect to socio-economic rights. This was particularly so 
in its first three cases, Soobramoney, Grootboom, and Treatment Action 
Campaign, but the trend has continued in its most recent case, Olivia Road. In 
all these cases the Court has struggled with basic questions such as which 
kinds of issues that arose in socio-economic rights cases it is competent to 
engage with at all, what its standard of scrutiny should be there where it does 
engage with the issues, and what the scope of its power is to provide relief there 
where it has exercised its review power and found a breach of a socio-economic 
right. 
 
What is interesting is the idiom that the Court has employed to justify the 
choices it has made in this respect. In its first three cases, the Court has, when 
engaging with the different questions related to the nature and scope of its 
review powers, relied in the first place on ‘institutional capacity’ arguments. That 
is, what motivates the Court’s decision to limit the scope of its review powers in 
a particular instance has been its perceived lack of the requisite technical 
expertise and institutional capacity properly to engage with the issues. The 
Court has utilized these institutional capacity arguments when seeking to justify 
its choice not to decide a particular question raised in the course of socio-
economic rights litigation. In Treatment Action Campaign, for example, the Court 
explains its decision not to decide whether or not the state’s constitutional duties 
in terms of section 27(1) requires it to provide formula feed to HIV-positive 
mothers to prevent the transmission of HIV to their children through breast 
                                                                                                                                            
political action, see D McKinley & A Veriava Arresting dissent: state repression and post-
apartheid social movements (2005). 
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feeding by saying that this question ‘raises complex issues’ that it does not have 
the capacity or information on the basis of which to decide.45  The Court’s 
rejection of the ‘minimum core content’ approach to deciding claims for access 
to basic resources has equally been motivated with reference to its institutional 
incapacity to access and analyse the kind and quantity of information that would 
be required to determine what the minimum core of any given right in any given 
set of circumstances entails.46 Finally, the Court has justified its adoption of 
what it has called a ‘restrained role’ in reviewing state conduct in light of s
economic rights, embodied in its ‘reasonableness review’ approach, also with 
reference to its institutional incapacity.
ocio-
                                                
47 
 
The Court’s reliance on these institutional capacity arguments in this respect is 
in itself uncontroversial. Certainly the Court, when it employs this rhetoric, enters 
into a depoliticizing discourse – it effectively technicises the questions that it is 
considering, describing them as ‘technical problems for managers and planners 
… in contradistinction to political matters.’48 However, although there is room for 
argument about the extent to which the Court is institutionally incapable in any 
given context,49 it cannot be denied that it is indeed institutionally constrained 
and that the depoliticisation that it engages in on that basis alone is to some 
extent inevitable. What does make the Court’s use of this particular instance of 
‘technicising’ rhetoric problematic, or more problematic than it would otherwise 
be, is not so much the fact that it defers, but what it is that it defers to. 
 
Central to the Court’s self-limitation of its powers of review and remedy in the 
three early cases is a second set of arguments: ‘constitutional comity’ 
 
45 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) para 128. 
46 Grootboom (n 4 above) para 33; Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) para 37. 
47 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) para 38: ‘Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon 
issues where Court orders could have multiple social and economic consequences for the 
community.’ See also the Court’s justification for the lenient standard of scrutiny adopted in 
Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 29: ‘A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions 
taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to 
deal with such matters’. 
48 Fraser (n 34 above) 299. 
49 It has, for example, been pointed out that the Court is in fact capable of determining the 
minimum core with respect to a given right, despite its protestations to the contrary, provided 
that it understands correctly what the minimum core entails; D Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic 
rights teeth: the minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 118 South African Law Journal 484 
487. 
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arguments. Equally as concerned as the Court is about its institutional 
incapacity, it is concerned about its institutional illegitimacy. When the Court 
defers, declining to decide a particular issue, or to apply a stringent standard of 
scrutiny, or to impose an intrusive order, it defers not only to the complexity of 
the issues at hand, recognizing that it is incapable of deciding them. It also, 
more importantly, defers to, or defers in favour of the other branches of 
government – the executive, the legislature or the state administration – on the 
understanding that it, in the context of institutional spheres of power, is the 
inappropriate forum to decide them. In short, the problem with defining the 
nature and scope of its review powers for the Court ‘comes down mainly, if not 
solely, to a matter of separation of powers’.50 
 
This is true in all the contexts within which the Court has had occasion to 
describe the limits and nature of its powers. In Soobramoney, Chaskalson P 
justifies his choice not to engage with the decisions made with respect to the 
rationing of health care resources that led to Mr Soobramoney’s exclusion from 
treatment as follows: 
 
These choices involve difficult decisions [here is the reference to institutional incapacity] 
to be taken at the political level in fixing the health budget, and at the functional level in 
deciding upon the priorities to be met. [here is the deference to the other branches of 
government] A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by 
the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such 
matters.’51 
 
In Grootboom Yacoob J, in describing the reasonableness review test that the 
Court fashioned in that case, emphasizes that ‘a court considering 
reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable 
measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent.’52 Instead, he proceeds, ‘[t]he precise contours and content of the 
measures to be adopted are primarily a matter for the legislature and the 
                                                 
50 FI Michelman ‘The constitution, social rights, and liberal political justification’ (2003) 1 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 13 15. 
51 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 29 (my emphasis). 
52 Grootboom (n 4 above) para 41. 
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Executive’.53 Finally, in Treatment Action Campaign one of the primary 
motivations for the Court’s decision not to impose structural injunctive relief on 
the government is its concern that in doing so it will have to prescribe particular 
policy and rationing choices to it, instead of determining only the contours of 
what is required and leaving the details of planning and implementation to 
government itself.54 
 
Certainly, one might argue in favour of the Court that at the heart of its concern 
with the constitutional comity of its engagement with socio-economic rights is a 
concern with democracy and so with transformative politics. The Court, acutely 
aware of its position as the least democratically accountable branch of 
government, defers to the other branches, because in doing so it believes it 
respects the democratic will of which the political branches are the 
repositories.55 But the conception of democracy or of politics that underlies this 
concern is a peculiarly limited one. The Court’s concern with constitutional 
comity evinces what Nancy Fraser has described as an institutional 
understanding of politics and democracy, in terms of which ‘a matter is deemed 
political if it is handled directly in the institutions of the official governmental 
system, including parliaments, administrative apparatuses, and the like’56 and in 
terms of which democracy occurs only within these institutions of the official 
governmental system. This understanding of democracy and politics stands in 
contrast to what Fraser describes as a discursive sense of politics, in which 
‘something is “political” if it is contested across a range of different discursive 
arenas and among a range of different publics’ and in which democracy occurs 
not only in the institutions of the official governmental system, but in all of these 
(official and unofficial) ‘discursive arenas’ and ‘publics’.57 Stated differently, the 
Court’s stance reflects a dependent conception of democracy and politics, 
according to which democracy and politics take place only in formally 
                                                 
53 As above. 
54 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) paras 96 - 114 & 129 - 133. 
55 See T Roux ‘Legitimating transformation: political resource allocation in the South African 
Constitutional Court’ (2003) 10 Democratization 92, who explores the currency that this 
concern with democratic legitimacy has in the Court’s conception of its review powers, and 
praises the Court for the extent to which it manages to remain appropriately respectful of 
democratic prerogatives in this respect. 
56 Fraser (n 34 above) 297. 
57 As above. 
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constituted democratic structures, where political questions of, for example, 
distribution of resources are decided for and the results presented to civil 
society. Again, this conception stands in contrast to a participatory model of 
democracy or politics, in which the focus is on creating and maintaining 
structures for the democratic process ‘which maximize the allocation of equal 
political power to the citizenry’ across the board of the different (official and 
unofficial) discursive arenas.58 In my own terms, in other words, the 
understanding of democracy and politics underlying this aspect of the Court’s 
approach, because it equates politics with the formal institutions of democracy, 
disregards the importance to transformative politics of the operation in particular 
of extra-institutional and extra-formal political action. In its focus on process and 
institution, it falls to be described as the liberal kind of understanding of politics 
that Chantal Mouffe decries in contrast to her own agonistic understanding of 
politics.59 
 
Against this background, it becomes clear that the Court’s instrumentalising 
rhetoric that it employs to justify its choices with respect to self-limitation of its 
powers operates to depoliticise issues of poverty, need and social provisioning 
of the state in two respects. First, and most obviously, the Court’s rhetoric 
depoliticises in that it describes the issues in question as of a technical rather 
than a political nature. As pointed out above, this can to some extent be seen as 
inevitable. However, second, the Court’s rhetoric depoliticises in that it relegates 
the discourse about these issues, even in their technical sense, wholly to the 
formally constituted political branches of government ‘whose responsibility [and 
right] it is to deal with such matters’.60 The message to those other, unofficial 
‘publics’ (social movements, NGO’s, ordinary people) who operate 
democratically in those other, unofficial ‘discursive arenas’ is therefore not only 
                                                 
58 DM Davis ‘The case against the inclusion of socio-economic demands in a bill of rights 
except as directive principles’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 475 488 - 
489. See also Pieterse & Van Donk (n 43 above) 13: ‘The realisation of socio-economic rights 
is an inherently political process, which needs to involve rights-holders … in determining the 
desired outcomes, objectives, strategies and acceptable trade-offs so that they are enabled to 
take control of their own destinies. This inevitably implies a political process of negotiation, 
disagreement, conflict, occasionally consensus, and, at a minimum, forms of mutual 
accommodation.’ 
59 C Mouffe The return of the political (1993) 3. See 19 - 23 above. 
60 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 29. 
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that the issues that they deal with are difficult ones in a technical sense, 
requiring of them sustained, informed engagement61 which they, like the Court, 
might not have the capacity for. It is also that the issues are, as with the Court, 
simply not their business. The Court’s rhetoric casts them not as active 
participants in the process of interpretation of their needs, engaged in political 
action, but as the passive recipients of services – their needs, predefined by the 
political branches of government, are administered to them through a process of 
therapeutic assistance.62 
 
3.2.2.3 Khosa, Modderklip, PE Municipality and Olivia Road: recognising 
and legitimating political agency? 
In socio-economic rights decisions of the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal subsequent to Soobramoney, Grootboom and 
Treatment Action Campaign it is possible to see the beginnings of a 
countervailing trend in the Court’s rhetoric that is more closely allied to an 
agonistic conception of democracy and so to a transformative politics and that 
can in this respect be contrasted to the Constitutional Court’s technicising 
rhetoric in the earlier three cases. 
 
(a) Emphasising political agency 
In the first place, in the cases in question (Khosa, Modderklip (both the 
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal decisions), PE Municipality 
and Olivia Road) the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal have 
emphasised the political agency of the impoverished people involved vis-à-vis 
government by taking its operation into account in interpreting the rights in 
question. In Khosa Mokgoro J, for example, in finding that the state had a 
constitutional duty to provide social assistance to indigent (non-citizen) 
permanent residents in South Africa, placed great stock in the fact that 
permanent residents had through their conduct in effect thrown in their lot with 
South Africa. In this respect Mokgoro J points out that permanent residents 
intend to become South African citizens, that they have made their homes 
                                                 
61 S Wilson ‘Taming the constitution: Rights and reform in the South African education 
system’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 418 447. 
62 Habermas (n 42 above) 210; see also Fraser (n 34 above) 307. 
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here and have brought their families here, that for many their children have 
been born here, that they owe a duty of allegiance to the state63 and that they 
pay taxes in South Africa.64 As a result, although not yet formally citizens, they 
have claimed their membership of our community through the exercise of their 
political agency and deserve to be treated equally as fully fledged such 
members.65 
 
In Modderklip (SCA) Harms J for the Supreme Court of Appeal equally 
emphasizes the role of the political agency of the property owner and the 
squatters in determining the resolution of the case. In this respect Harms J 
points out that the landowner had at all times acted within the law and had 
throughout sought to effect an amicable solution that would vindicate both his 
and the squatters’ rights.66 He also points out that the squatters had occupied 
the land without intending to force the hand of the state to provide them with 
land in preference to others and had also sought to reach an amicable 
solution both with the landowner and the state.67 The state, by contrast, had 
failed diligently to pursue a settlement and had reneged on agreements 
reached,68 despite the fact that it had itself caused the predicament of the 
squatters and the landowner by previously evicting the squatters from state 
land without providing alternative accommodation.69 These indications of an 
attitude of political engagement with each other and with the state on the side 
of the squatters and landowner and of recalcitrance by contrast on the side of 
the state, play an important role in eventually persuading the Court to find in 
favour of both the landowner and the squatters against the state.70 
 
                                                 
63 Khosa (n 9 above) para 59. 
64 As above para 74. 
65 As above. 
66 Modderklip (SCA) (n 7 above) paras 33, 37 & 38. See also Modderklip (CC) (n 7 above) 
paras 31 & 38. 
67 As above para 25. See also Modderklip (CC) (n 7 above) paras 35 & 37. 
68 As above paras 35 - 38. See also Modderklip (CC) (n 7 above) paras 32 – 34. 
69 As above para 35. See also Modderklip (CC) (n 7 above) paras 27 – 38, where the 
Constitutional Court similarly recognises the attitude of political engagement of the property 
owner and the squatter in contrast to the recalcitrant attitude of the local authority in order to 
reject an argument by the state that the property owner was to blame for the predicament he 
found himself in. 
70 As above paras 35 – 38. 
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Similarly, in PE Municipality, the Constitutional Court emphasises the political 
agency of the group of squatters that the state sought to evict there. Again the 
Court points to the fact that they had occupied the land in question not in 
order to force the municipality to provide to them, in preference to others, 
alternative land when they are eventually evicted, but because they had been 
evicted from elsewhere and had nowhere else to go.71 Again the Court 
emphasises that they had attempted to negotiate with the property owners 
and the state whilst the municipality had made no serious effort to reach an 
amicable conclusion to the matter, but had rushed to apply for an eviction 
order and had acted unilaterally.72 And again these factors taken together 
played an important part in driving the Court to the conclusion that an eviction 
order could not be granted unless suitable alternative land or accommodation 
was provided. Indeed, in PE Municipality these factors, together with others, 
were seen as so important that the Court took the surprisingly intrusive step of 
rejecting the municipality’s offer of two possible alternative sites, finding that 
they were not suitable to the squatters’ needs. 
 
The focus on the political agency of impoverished people involved in socio-
economic rights litigation in Khosa, Modderklip and PE Municipality and, in 
particular, the implicit recognition in Modderklip and PE Municipality that 
whether a public authority seeking to evict impoverished people from their 
homes had sought to engage them politically will play a role in a court’s 
decision whether to order eviction, culminate in the Constitutional Court’s 
decision in Olivia Road. In this case (decided directly on the basis of section 
26(3) of the constitution in this respect) Yacoob J, in the process of setting 
aside the Supreme Court of Appeal’s granting of an application for an eviction 
order, explicitly pronounces that whether or not a public authority seeking to 
evict impoverished people from their homes had sought to reach a solution 
with those people through political engagement would be an important factor 
in determining whether the eviction order should be granted.73 In the process 
he confirms the existence of a constitutional duty on public authorities to 
                                                 
71 PE Municipality (n 8 above) paras 49 & 55. 
72 As above 45, 55 - 57 & 59. 
73 Olivia Road (n 6 above) para 22. 
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engage with squatters before seeking to evict them, in an effort to find an 
amicable solution to their predicament. 
 
Certainly one has to sound a note of caution here. As with any form of 
community-oriented rhetoric, the Court’s emphasis in particular in the first 
three of these cases on the ‘proper’ political action of the permanent 
residents, the property owner and the squatters runs the risk of being read in 
an exclusionary fashion. So, for example, Mokgoro J explicitly uses this 
rhetoric to distinguish permanent residents from other non-citizens in South 
Africa and then, on the basis of that distinction to deny other non-citizens 
membership of the South African community.74 Equally, the two Courts’ 
reference in both Modderklip (SCA and CC) and PE Municipality to the fact 
that the squatters in question had occupied land illegally not with the intention 
to ‘jump’ the housing queue by forcing government to provide them with 
alternative accommodation when they were evicted, effectively marks the 
conduct of squatters who have indeed acted with that purpose as ‘improper’ 
and excludes their conduct (certainly equally born of desperation) from the 
realm of ‘proper’ political action. In this respect the two Courts run the risk of 
creating an idea of acceptable civic action that one has to comply with in order 
to form part of the South African political community, excluding other forms of 
political action.75 Nevertheless, this aspect of the cases is important because 
at least it casts the permanent residents, property owner and squatters in the 
role of political actors, actively (and legitimately) engaging in the interpretation 
of their needs together with the state, who is in turn cast as just one more 
(albeit particularly authoritative) such participant in the process of need 
interpretation. In this way it avoids the depoliticising effect of the Constitutional 
Court’s earlier unqualified separation of powers rhetoric. 
 
                                                 
74 Khosa (n 9 above) para 59: ‘For these reasons, I exclude temporary residents …’. 
75 See in this respect K van Marle ‘Love, law and the South African community: critical 
reflections on “suspect intimacies” and “immanent subjectivity” ’ in H Botha, AJ van der Walt & 
JWG van der Walt (eds) Rights and democracy in a transformative constitution (2004) 231 
245 - 246. 
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(b)Transformative politics-friendly remedies  
This new concern with transformative politics shows also in the manner in 
which the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal exercised 
and described their remedial powers in the four cases. This is evident first in 
Modderklip (SCA). Modderklip was presented by the state as an intractable 
situation. The state argued that it could not enforce Modderklip’s eviction 
order against the squatters, because it did not have the resources to do so, 
particularly as it would have to provide alternative land to the squatters were it 
to evict them.76 This it would not be able to do also because it did not have the 
requisite resources, but, more importantly, because to provide the squatters 
with alternative land would allow them to jump the housing queue, thus 
legitimating unacceptable social behaviour.77 This stance of the state’s is a 
particularly clear example of the strategy of naturalisation referred to above: 
the state throws its hands in the air, overwhelmed by the intractable nature of 
the problems facing it and so attempts to remove the issues in question from 
the arena of political contestation. Harms J is unambiguous in his rejection of 
this strategy. Holding that ‘Courts [and by implication the state] should not be 
overawed by practical problems’ but should instead ‘mould an order that will 
provide effective relief to those affected by a constitutional breach’78 he 
proceeds to find a solution where the state said there was none, ordering the 
state to pay damages to the property owner and to allow the squatters to 
remain on the land in question until alternative accommodation is found. This 
order was in essence confirmed on appeal by the Constitutional Court, albeit 
on grounds different to Harms J’s.79 Harms J’s ‘can do’ rhetoric powerfully 
counteracts the state’s attempts at depoliticisation and places the kinds of 
issues that were dealt with in the case (homelessness, land invasion and 
eviction) squarely back in the domain of political contestation. In addition, 
because it amounted to the implementation of a proposal that both the 
property owner and the squatters had made in the course of their attempted 
                                                 
76 Modderklip (SCA) (n 7 above) para 13. 
77 Modderklip (SCA) (n 7 above) para 29. 
78 Modderklip (SCA) (n 7 above) para 42. 
79 See Modderklip (CC) (n 7 above) para 68. Although the Court decided the case not on the 
basis of the rights to property and to have access to adequate housing, as did Harms J, it 
confirmed the order in substance, changing it only to reflect the different bases upon which its 
decision rested. 
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negotiations with the state,80 it emphasises the involvement of these non-
official political actors in the process of defining their needs and finding ways 
to satisfy them.81 As such, it underscores an agonistic understanding of 
democracy and a transformative understanding of politics and counteracts the 
idea that it is only the state who can engage politically with the issues and 
then hand down solutions from on high. 
 
The repoliticising trend continues in the Constitutional Court’s description of 
its remedial powers in PE Municipality and in the remedy used to resolve the 
dispute in Olivia Road. Both Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign 
have been criticised for the Court’s failure to employ structural injunctive relief. 
In Grootboom, the Court issued a simple declaratory order, leaving the 
remedy of the constitutional defect in its housing programme entirely to the 
state.82 In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court similarly issued a declarator, 
coupled with a mandatory order requiring the state to remedy the 
constitutional defect in its programme for prevention of MTCT of HIV.83 
However, despite confirming that it did indeed have the power to do so, the 
Court again declined to issue a supervisory interdict, holding that there was 
no indication that the state would not implement its order properly.84 The 
critiques of the two cases in this respect have focussed on the extent to which 
the failure to employ such structural relief trenched on the effectiveness of the 
Court’s remedies.85 However, Dennis Davis has recently instead emphasised 
the role of such structural relief in promoting democratic accountability. To 
him, the failure of the Court to employ structural relief has caused it to miss an 
opportunity to allow those affected by its judgments to be involved in their 
implementation as active political agents and as such has undermined the 
idea of participatory democracy (read, for my purposes, transformative 
politics).86 
                                                 
80 Modderklip (SCA) (n 7 above) para 14. 
81 See also Modderklip (CC) (n 7 above) para 55. 
82 Grootboom (n 4 above) para 99. 
83 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) para 135. 
84 As above para 129. 
85 See eg K Pillay ‘Implementation of Grootboom: implications for the enforcement of socio-
economic rights’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 255. 
86 DM Davis ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa. The record of the Constitutional Court 
after ten years’ (2004) 5:5 ESR Review 3 6 - 7.  
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 In PE Municipality Sachs J seems to heed this call. Although in the event 
declining to do so,87 Sachs J raises the possibility that a court, in providing a 
remedy in an eviction case such as the one the Constitutional Court was 
faced with could order compulsory mediation between the parties. That is, a 
court could make a normative finding, in the sense of describing the outcomes 
that the constitutional and other legal duties at play in the case required, but 
could then order the parties to enter into a process of mediation in order to 
agree upon the most appropriate means with which to reach those 
outcomes.88 
 
As Charles Sabel and William Simon have pointed out,89 this kind of 
‘experimentalist’90 structural injunctive relief combines the virtues of the Court 
requiring constitutional duties to be met in a practically effective way, whilst 
remaining respectful of its own institutional incapacity with respect to the 
substantive issues involved in the implementation of its normative findings. 
For my purposes it shows a further important virtue. Courts employing such 
relief would certainly, as Sabel and Simon argue, remain appropriately 
respectful of their own institutional incapacity by deferring to another forum 
than themselves with respect to the implementation of their orders. However, 
they will defer in this respect not in favour of the political branches of 
government only, as the Constitutional Court has been wont to do, but to the 
political process in the wider, transformative sense of the word outlined 
above. In this way courts would be able to subvert the technicising rhetoric 
that they seem inevitably to have to engage in when adjudicating socio-
economic rights claims and give effect to a transformative, rather than 
institutional understanding of politics. 
 
                                                 
87 PE Municipality (n 8 above) para 47. 
88 As above para 39 - 46. 
89 CF Sabel & WH Simon ‘Destabilisation rights: how public law litigation succeeds’ (2004) 
117 Harvard Law Review 1016 1019 & 1053 - 1056. 
90 As opposed to ‘command-and-control’ injunctive regulation; Sabel & Simon (n 89 above) 
1019. 
 161
Again, it is in Olivia Road that Sachs J’s obiter remarks regarding 
engagement in PE Municipality bear fruit. As I outline in Chapter 2 above,91 in 
Olivia Road Yacoob J did what Sachs J only spoke about in PE Municipality: 
he resolved the case by ordering the parties to engage with each other to 
reach a mutually acceptable solution. This they did, reaching an agreement 
that was subsequently approved by Yacoob J and became an order of court. 
At first glance, this decision is unalloyed good news for someone like me 
concerned about the Court’s relationship with transformative politics – Yacoob 
J seems in a simple and concrete fashion to have recognised the importance 
of fostering transformative politics in deciding socio-economic rights cases. 
However, two rather troubling features of the judgment go a long way to 
dispelling this first impression. 
 
(c) Olivia Road’s instrumentalisation 
 
… have you heard, she said 
 
 Solidarity’s clenched fist 
 Just turned 
Into a competitive elbow?92 
 
First: when Sachs J wrote about the possibility of ordering engagement or 
mediation to find a practical solution to the eviction application before him and 
when Sabel and Simon wrote about structural relief requiring engagement 
between the parties before a court they all clearly had in mind that such 
orders would issue as remedies only once a case has been decided. The 
reasons for this seem obvious. Parties to a dispute approach a court 
presumably because they have themselves been unable to resolve that 
dispute amicably. They want, and can legitimately expect the court to 
determine authoritatively which of their conflicting claims are valid, so that a 
practical solution to their dispute can be found on that normative basis. The 
engagements orders contemplated by Sachs J and Sabel and Simon will 
issue only once the court has set a normative framework within which 
engagement can operate – once the court has decided what the rights and 
                                                 
91 See 136 - 137 above. 
92 J Cronin ‘Switchback’ from More than a casual contact (2006) 10. 
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duties of the parties are and what the results of the engagement must be.93 
Not only does this set the limits within which engagement may operate, it also, 
importantly, places the parties to the negotiation, with their rights and duties 
now authoritatively determined and with the end goals of the negotiation clear, 
on an equal footing. 
 
Yacoob J in Olivia Road, however, issued his order that the parties should 
engage long before he had decided the case – shortly after argument for 
leave to appeal had been heard in the Court, but with judgment long still 
pending.94 This had a number of unfortunate consequences. It meant that the 
parties had to negotiate a solution without an authoritative indication of what 
the legitimate goals of their engagement are – in the dark, as it were. The fact 
that, in this case, they were able to reach an agreement that accorded with 
constitutional requirements is neither here nor there. It may not be the same 
in other cases. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Yacoob J failed to 
provide clear reasons for his approval of the agreement, stating only that 
‘there was no doubt that the agreement represented a reasonable response to 
the engagement process’95 and listing as reasons for this conclusion that the 
City and the occupiers had entered into engagement and submitted the 
agreement ‘in compliance with’ the Court’s order; that the City had incurred 
considerable expense in implementing the agreement; and that ‘the City and 
the occupiers would have been in an invidious position if this Court had later 
held that the agreement was not a reasonable response to engagement’.96 
 
Yacoob J’s pre-decision engagement order also allowed him to escape the 
need to decide important points of law raised by the case – for example, 
whether the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
                                                 
93 In fact, both Sachs J and Sabel & Simon contemplate that courts would hold that either of 
the parties before them are entitled to certain things and would then order engagement as a 
way in which they can work out how best to acquire those things. See PE Municipality (n 8 
above) paras 39 - 46; Sabel & Simon (n 89 above) 1019 (courts should decide on ‘governing 
norms’ for the negotiation that will ensue – those ‘governing norms ... express the goals the 
parties are expected to achieve’). 
94 Olivia Road (n 6 above) para 4. The engagement order itself is reproduced in the judgment 
at para 5. 
95 As above para 28. 
96 As above para 29. 
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Land Act97 applied to the kind of eviction at issue. This, of course, dilutes the 
broader significance of the case, in significant part rendering it a narrow, 
instrumental decision that affects the interests only of the specific parties 
before the Court. This aspect of the decision significantly undercuts the gains 
for transformative politics occasioned by the engagement order. It both plays 
into and confirms the narrow liberal understanding of politics as the pursuit of 
individual interest without regard to a public good that I distinguished from my 
understanding of transformative politics in Chapter 1 above,98 and reduces 
the extent to which the decision can affect the broader, systemic (political) 
causes of impoverishment and homelessness.99 
                                                
 
The decision to require engagement to take place before the case had been 
decided also meant that the clear imbalance in bargaining power that existed 
between the City and the occupiers was not addressed as it would have been 
had the case first been decided and engagement ordered after that. Fresh 
from a Supreme Court of Appeal decision holding that they were entitled to 
much less than they had initially claimed from the City,100 the occupiers were 
expected to negotiate a solution to their dire situation without any indication 
from the Court what they could validly claim from the City. In short, litigation 
had not placed them in a stronger position in their negotiations with the City 
than they had been in before they approach the courts for relief – if anything 
their position had become weaker after the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
decision. Again, the fact that they were able to negotiate an acceptable and 
constitutionally consistent solution in this case is neither here not there. It 
might not be so in other cases.101 
 
97 Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). 
98 See 23 – 26 above. 
99 For my own elaboration on this point, see 169 - 176 below. 
100 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) 
(Olivia Road (SCA)). The Supreme Court of Appeal granted an order to evict the occupiers, 
subject only to the condition that the City provide to those of the occupiers ‘desperately in 
need of housing assistance’ temporary alternative shelter once they were evicted (para 74). 
101 It is not clear from Yacoob J’s judgment whether or not he sees Olivia Road as an 
exception, in the sense that there were exceptional circumstances indicating that the 
engagement order should issue pre-judgment, rather than only after the case had been 
decided. If anything, there are indications that he holds the contrary view – he seems to 
contemplate that there would be many cases in which engagement would be ordered while 
judgement is still pending (see eg para 30). In addition, the Constitutional Court, in the very 
next socio-economic rights matter to be heard by it – Mamba v Minister of Social 
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 The second troubling feature of Yacoob J’s decision is that, having resolved 
the dispute between the parties before him by ordering them to engage with 
each other, he declined the invitation of the parties also to consider the City’s 
housing plan in general and the provision it makes for other people who find 
themselves in the same predicament as the occupiers before the Court. 
Yacoob J’s reason for declining to consider the City’s housing plan and the 
related question of the position of those inner city dwellers in the same 
position as the occupiers before the Court (some 72 000 people on a 
conservative estimate) was first that the housing plan was a new one that had 
not been considered by either the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and that it was undesirable for the Constitutional Court to sit as Court of first 
and last instance on the question of its constitutional consistency, without the 
benefit of the opinion of the lower courts on that question.102 Yacoob J also 
indicated that the predicament of other groups of inner city dwellers in a 
similar position to the occupiers before the Court can and should be 
addressed on a case by case basis through the same kind of engagement 
that had occurred in this matter and that there was no reason to believe that 
the City would not negotiate with such other groups in good faith and on a 
reasonable basis.103 
 
Yacoob J’s decision to resolve only the dispute between the specific parties 
before him and to leave the broader question raised by their dispute for 
another day is surprising. First, although it certainly is good policy for the 
Constitutional Court as a rule not to consider matters as court of first and last 
instance, the Court cannot be absolutely barred from doing so. Most 
obviously, the Court does in exceptional cases allow for direct access, which 
                                                                                                                                            
Development Case no: CCT 65/08 – issued a similar pre-judgment engagement order (see 
Case no: CCT 65/08, order dated 21 August 2008). This case concerned the plight of victims 
of the xenophobic violence that rocked South Africa in the middle of 2008, who had been 
placed in refugee camps by the state. The state wanted to close these refugee camps and the 
refugees objected that they would then have nowhere else to go. The case was never 
decided by the Constitutional Court, as the applicants withdrew the matter shortly after the 
Court had heard argument on leave for direct access. The order which I refer to, which was 
initially available on the Court’s website, has since been removed. The author has a copy on 
file. 
102 Olivia Road (n 6 above) paras 34 – 35. 
103 As above. 
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requires it to consider both questions of law and questions of fact as court of 
first and last instance.104 
 
Also, the Court has certainly not in other cases, and in particular in other 
socio-economic rights cases, been averse to changing the legal basis upon 
which a case is decided mero motu, so that, at least as far as questions of law 
are concerned, it sat as court of first and last instance. Here one need think 
only of Soobramoney, where Chaskalson P opted to decide Mr 
Soobramoney’s claim on the basis of the section 27(1) right of everyone to 
have access to health care services rather than only on the basis of the 
section 27(3) right not to be refused emergency medical treatment.105 
Similarly, in Grootboom, which in the High Court was decided on the basis of 
section 28(1)(c) read with section 28(2), the Constitutional Court elected to 
decide on the basis of section 26(1) and (2).106 Although in both these cases 
the Court, strictly speaking, considered only new points of law without the 
benefit of the contribution of the lower courts, its change in tack with respect 
to law inevitably required it to consider much new factual information also. 
This is so because the legal questions were through the change in legal basis 
placed in a much broader socio-political context than that which was 
considered by the lower courts. 
 
Finally, and to me most tellingly, the Court has on a number of occasions in 
the past allowed – indeed invited – new parties to enter the fray for the first 
time when a case reached it and has so itself opened the door for both new 
points of law and new factual material to be presented to it.107 This has 
happened where the Court has extended a general invitation to interested 
                                                 
104 Section 167 of the constitution allows a person ‘when it is in the interest of justice and with 
leave of the Constitutional Court’ to bring a case directly to the Constitutional Court. For a 
recent interpretation of this section see Dudley v City of Cape Town unreported, case no CCT 
5/04, [2004] ZACC 4, 20 May 2004. 
105 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 22. 
106 Grootboom (n 4 above) para 20. 
107 My thanks to Stu Woolman for alerting me to this point and to Ann Skelton, of the Centre 
for Child Law at the University of Pretoria for pointing me to fruitful examples of where this 
has occurred. 
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parties to join as amici curiae.108 In such cases, of course, the role of such 
amici is mostly restricted to presenting new points of law to the Court, with 
limited opportunity to present new information. But the Court has also invited 
specific entities to join litigation when a case has already reached it as parties 
to the litigation. In such cases the newly joined parties are not equally 
restricted in the extent to which they can place new facts before the Court in 
their affidavits – and indeed, in a case such as AD v DW the minister of social 
development, who had joined before the Constitutional Court as a party at the 
Court’s invitation presented extensive such information that the Court had to 
consider as court of first instance.109 The point is that, although it is of course 
always preferable for the Constitutional Court to have the benefit of the 
decisions of lower courts with respect to issues of both law and fact that it 
considers, it is clearly not barred in absolute fashion from deciding issues 
raised for the first time before it. 
 
There seems to be ample reason why the Court could in Olivia Road have 
made an exception to the general rule and considered the new facts that were 
placed before it. The legal issue of the constitutional consistency of the City’s 
general approach to dealing with the problem of inner city homelessness and 
inadequate housing was not raised for the first time before the Constitutional 
Court – it was raised before and dealt with by both the High Court110 and the 
                                                 
108 See, for example S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC). In this case, which concerned the 
constitutionality of the imposition of a term of imprisonment for fraud on a primary care-giver 
of minor children, the Court issued an invitation to interested parties to address it as amici 
curiae on a number of specified issues (para 5). The Centre for Child Law at the University of 
Pretoria joined as amicus and ‘made wide-ranging written and oral submissions on the 
constitutional, statutory and social context in which the matter fell to be decided’ (para 6) (my 
emphasis). The Court also appointed a curator ad litem who, with the aid of a social worker, 
compiled a report that was considered by the Court. Finally, counsel for the department of 
social development and the department of justice and constitutional development also 
submitted an extensive report on the position of children whose primary care-givers were 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment, compiled by a group of social workers. Both the 
submissions of the amicus and reports of the curator ad litem and counsel for the various 
state departments contained extensive new factual information. That the Court indeed 
carefully considered this new information is clear from Sachs J’s remarks complimenting the 
parties on the comprehensiveness and quality of the information thus presented and 
indicating that the information was of great help in reaching his conclusions in the case (para 
9). 
109 AD v DW 2008 3 SA 183 (CC). 
110 The High Court declared the City’s housing plan inconsistent with the constitution, ordered 
the City to devise a plan to meet the housing needs of the occupiers and those other inner 
city dwellers in dire housing straits, and interdicted the eviction of the occupiers pending the 
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Supreme Court of Appeal.111 What was new before the Constitutional Court 
was not the legal issue, but the plan that the City had newly fashioned and 
submitted to the Court. Also, both parties wanted the Court to deal with this 
matter and presented argument on it. Finally, Yacoob J’s decision not to 
decide the question of the constitutional consistency of the City’s housing plan 
leads to nothing short of an absurd conclusion. When appearing before the 
High Court the City had no plan to deal with inner city homelessness – for this 
reason its housing plan was found to be in breach of the constitution.112 In 
response to this holding the City then fashioned a plan to deal with inner city 
homelessness, which was submitted to the Constitutional Court when the 
parties appeared before it. Yacoob J’s decision not to consider that housing 
plan because it was not considered by either the High Court or the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, means that, under similar circumstances - that is, where a 
claimant complains to a lower court that a public body’s response to, for 
example, a housing problem is constitutionally deficient because the body has 
no plan to deal with that problem - all that the public body has to do to get that 
issue off the table when the case reaches a higher court is then to place a 
plan, of whatever kind and quality before the higher court. The higher court 
would then, if Yacoob J’s reasoning is taken to its logical conclusion, be 
precluded from considering it, because it was never considered by the lower 
court!113 
 
                                                                                                                                            
finalisation of such a plan (City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 
(1) SA 78 (W) (Olivia Road (High Court)) para 67). 
111 The Supreme Court of Appeal declined to interrogate the City’s housing plan on separation 
of powers grounds – on the argument that it, as opposed to the City, did not have the 
expertise to do so (Olivia Road (SCA) (n 100 above) para 45. 
112 Olivia Road (High Court) (n 110 above) para 67. 
113 The same would apply where, in the High Court, an existing plan is found to be inadequate 
and the public authority then adopts a wholly new plan, which it submits only at the 
Constitutional Court stage. A further point, along the same lines: the Supreme Court of 
Appeal also declined to deal with the challenge to the City’s housing plan, but on a ground 
different than the Constitutional Court’s. As outlined in n 111 above, it held that it would not 
consider the plan because it was not institutionally capable of doing so, and had to defer to 
the superior capacity of the City in this respect (Olivia Road (SCA) (n 100 above) para 45). 
Had the City submitted its inner city housing plan already to the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
not for the first time in the Constitutional Court, Yacoob J’s reasoning would have lead to a 
further absurd conclusion: because the Supreme Court of Appeal, even though the plan was 
before it, declined to deal with its substance, the Constitutional Court would not be able to 
consider it, because with respect to the substance it would then sit as court of first and last 
instance. 
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But Yacoob J’s decision not to consider the constitutional consistency of the 
City’s housing plan is also surprising for another reason, more germane to my 
concern with transformative politics. A strength of the Constitutional Court’s 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence leading up to Olivia Road was precisely 
the manner in which it was able to negotiate the apparent friction that often – 
in fact almost invariably – arises in socio-economic rights cases between the 
interests of the individual people or the specific group of people who bring a 
case to court in the first place of course to alleviate their own plight on the one 
hand, and broader collective interests and systemic issues that arise in the 
course of deciding the case on the other – described in slightly different terms, 
the need for a court in a socio-economic rights case to account for both the 
plight of the particular people before it and the structural causes of the 
broader social problem that the case before it is only one example of.114 
 
One of the main features of the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence before Olivia Road is the extent to which that jurisprudence 
moves on a general rather than a particular or specific plane. Although this 
approach was already evident in Soobramoney115 (where the potential for 
conflict between individual and collective interests was of course illustrated 
very starkly), it was first clearly articulated in Grootboom. Here the Court was 
faced with a claim of a specific group of impoverished people that the state 
was constitutionally bound to provide them with temporary shelter to tide them 
over after an eviction until such time as they could find their own permanent 
accommodation. The Court, instead of deciding the claim as presented to it – 
a claim of a particular group of people for a specific form of concrete relief – 
decided it as a challenge to the state’s housing policy in its entirety. The relief 
it provided was also general – a declarator that the policy was unconstitutional 
to the extent that it failed to make provision for the interests of the completely 
homeless. 
                                                 
114 For accounts of this problem in the South African context, see LA Williams ‘Issues and 
challenges in addressing poverty and legal rights: a comparative United States/South African 
analysis’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 436. 
115 The Court took great care to indicate that Mr Soobramoney’s claim should be judged in 
light of the health care needs of the broader society and the scarcity of resources to meet 
those more general needs. See in particular Sachs J’s concurring judgment in Soobramoney 
(n 3 above) paras 53 – 54. 
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 Of course, there was first and foremost a practical reason why it did this – the 
case as far as the interests of the particular group of people was concerned 
had been settled before the Constitutional Court heard it, so it was left only 
with the general concerns raised in the matter. However, the Court’s decision 
to depart from the High Court’s reliance in that case on the right of children to 
shelter and to decide the case on the basis of the right of everyone to have 
access to housing, coupled with the focus throughout the judgment on the fact 
that there were large numbers of people who faced at the time the same 
difficulties as the Grootboom community to me indicate strongly that the Court 
consciously generalised its approach to the case to make sure its collective, 
structural implications were also addressed. This point is further underscored 
by the fact that in the only other socio-economic rights case similar to 
Grootboom – that is, a case in which policy, rather than a specific decision or 
legislation was considered by the Court – Treatment Action Campaign – this 
same general policy review approach was also employed and explicitly 
asserted as the approach that the Court would use to decide such cases.116 
Equally, in the only other non-eviction socio-economic rights case to date 
decided by the Court, the generalised reasonableness standard was 
applied.117 
 
For this generalisation of its approach to deciding the Grootboom/Treatment 
Action Campaign kinds of socio-economic rights cases the Court has been 
roundly criticised. Essentially the objection has been that the Court has 
converted what are rights of real people to real things into rights of everyone 
(but of no one in particular) to reasonable policies – in other words, that the 
Court has over-emphasised the collective/systemic issues raised in these 
cases at the expense of the individual/particular.118 This criticism has been 
                                                 
116 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) paras 30 – 39. 
117 Khosa (n 9 above) para 43. See also para 35, where Mokgoro J rejects an attempt by the 
state to settle the matter inter partes only, because ‘the impact of the settlement would have 
been too limited and would not resolve the unconstitutionality of the impugned provisions and 
the impact that they have on the broader group of permanent residents who qualify in all other 
respects for social grants’ (my emphasis). 
118 It is necessary at the outset to distinguish this particular strain of criticism from another – a 
critique of the effectiveness of the Court’s orders in socio-economic rights cases. The critique 
I am concerned with here focuses on the need to generate through socio-economic rights 
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implicit and at times explicit in academic writing urging the Court to adopt the 
‘minimum core content’ approach to deciding socio-economic rights cases.119 
It has also directly played a role in litigation subsequent to Grootboom. In 
Treatment Action Campaign the first and second amici curiae (the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Community Law Centre of the 
University of the Western Cape) urged the Court to depart from the 
generalised review method established in Grootboom and to adopt an 
interpretation of section 27(1) of the constitution in terms of which that section 
‘establishes an individual right vested in everyone’.120 This individual right, so 
it was argued, would entitle impoverished people to be provided with at least 
the most basic levels of access to health care (and presumably other basic 
resources implicated by section 27(1) and the similar section 26(1)). This 
entitlement would not be subject to the qualifications of resource constraint 
and time and the reasonableness standard contained in section 27(2) and 
section 26(2). On this interpretation sections 27(2) and 26(2) (and the 
generalised standard of review the Court derived from section 26(2) in 
Grootboom) would apply only to cases where the most basic levels of access 
to resources (the minimum core content) was not at issue.121 In the event the 
Court rejected this interpretation, holding that the positive duty described in 
section 27(2) clearly refers to and describes the content of the right 
established in section 27(1); that this right and duty were qualified in the 
manner described in section 27(2); and that claims based on this right are to 
be decided on the basis of the reasonableness review standard enunciated in 
Grootboom.122 
                                                                                                                                            
litigation concrete relief for specific impoverished people. The critique of the effectiveness of 
the Court’s orders is not necessarily linked to the idea that socio-economic rights should in 
the first place be seen as individual rights generating concrete individual benefit for 
impoverished people and to the accusation that the Court has too broadly generalised its 
approach to deciding socio-economic rights cases. Rather, it focuses on finding ways in which 
the relief in such cases, whether of a generalised or a specific nature, can be effectively 
implemented. For representative examples of this ‘effectiveness’ critique (which, it has to be 
said, poses its own problems, ones that I won’t engage with here), see M Swart ‘Left out in 
the cold? Crafting constitutional remedies for the poorest of the poor’ (2005) 21 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 215; and Pillay (n 85 above).  
119 See as a representative example of this kind of criticism S Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s 
evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: an effective tool in challenging poverty?’ 
(2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 159 176. 
120 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) para 26. 
121 As above paras 28 – 29. 
122 As above paras 30 – 39. 
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 The criticism that the Court has over-emphasised collective interests to the 
detriment of the urgent, concrete individual needs of particular impoverished 
people is, I believe, misplaced, or has at least been overstated. Broader 
collective and specific individual interests are inevitably both at play in socio-
economic rights cases. The predicament facing a specific impoverished 
litigant who approaches a court for relief, in a country such as South Africa 
where there continues to exist wide-spread impoverishment, with limited 
resources to deal with it, is inevitably only one example of the predicament 
faced by many, many other people – one manifestation of a systemic 
problem. Just as a court neglecting the individual interests of the litigants who 
appear before it would be shirking its duty, a court that does not take account 
of the broader systemic problems raised by a case in some way would do the 
same. Courts deciding these cases, whatever their nature, inevitably have to 
take account of both the collective and the individual interests at issue, trying 
to find a way best to address both. 
 
To my mind the Constitutional Court has by and large managed, whether by 
design or accident, to maintain a proper balance between the individual and 
collective interests, the particular and the systemic at play in the socio-
economic rights cases it has decided. This is most obvious in Grootboom, 
where the parties’ settlement of the particular claims of the Grootboom 
community before the case was argued dealt with the individual interests at 
stake,123 so leaving the Court free to deal in its judgment with the collective, 
systemic issues that arose. In the other cases in which the reasonableness 
test played a role - Treatment Action Campaign and Khosa - the issue did not 
arise in the acute manner that it did in Grootboom. 
 
Treatment Action Campaign was never a case only about the interests of a 
specific group of people. The Treatment Action Campaign brought the case 
                                                 
123 I am for the moment not concerned here with the question whether or not the terms of the 
settlement order were indeed complied with and whether the Grootboom community indeed 
received the shelter they required. Clearly, there were problems with the implementation of 
the settlement order, such that the community’s predicament was never satisfactorily 
resolved. See in this respect Pillay (n 85 above) 264 – 265. 
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not on behalf of a specific group of indigent, HIV-positive women about to give 
birth at a specific public health facility, but on behalf of all such women, with 
respect to all public health facilities.124 At the same time, the Court’s judgment 
and order in that case also, whilst applying generally to all indigent HIV-
positive women giving birth at any public health facility, once the problems 
with its enforcement were sorted out, generated concrete individual benefit for 
particular such women, precisely because it was aimed at all of them. 
 
Khosa, which was indeed brought by a particular group of people, also could 
never be only about their interests. In Khosa the challenge was of course to 
statutory provisions that excluded the claimants and others like them from 
access to social assistance benefits. The Court’s judgment that these 
provisions were inconsistent with the constitution and its reading in of words 
to remedy that inconsistency inevitably generated concrete benefit for the 
group of people who brought the case and at the same time for everyone else 
in their position. Indeed, it was to ensure that the case also had this more 
general impact that Mokgoro J rejected an offer by the state to settle the 
matter inter partes, holding that ‘[t]he impact of the settlement would have 
been too limited and would not resolve the unconstitutionality of the impugned 
provisions and the impact that they have on the broader group of permanent 
residents who qualify in all other respects for social grants.’125 
 
In the eviction cases – Modderklip and PE Municipality – the interplay 
between individual and collective or systemic interests played out in a slightly 
different fashion. Of course, these cases were always first and foremost about 
the specific interests of the squatters that the property owner in Modderklip 
and the property owner in concert with the state in PE Municipality sought to 
evict. The decision in Modderklip to allow the squatters to remain on the 
disputed land until the state presented them with suitable alternative 
                                                 
124 Unlike in Khosa (n 9 above), where the state challenged the standing in the public interest 
of the specific group of impoverished permanent residents who brought the case to court 
(para 36), standing was in Treatment Action Campaign never an issue – in fact, it is unclear in 
what capacity, in formal terms, the Treatment Action Campaign acted there. The best guess 
would be that they acted on behalf of a group or class of persons (sec 38(c)) and/or that they 
acted in the public interest (sec 38(d)). 
125 Khosa (n 9 above) para 35 (my emphasis). 
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accommodation and to pay constitutional damages to the property owner to 
compensate him for the breach of his property right clearly benefited those 
particular parties in the first place. Equally, in PE Municipality, the 
Constitutional Court’s decision to confirm the denial of the eviction order, in 
spite of the offer of alternative accommodation by the state, clearly and 
concretely benefited the specific group of squatters that the state sought to 
evict. Nevertheless, despite the centrality of individual interests in these 
cases, broader collective, systemic issues were not left aside. In both cases 
the broader, collective or systemic context was taken into account through the 
creation of law, which would apply in similar cases in the future. In Modderklip 
the most important such principle was the idea, first, that an eviction dispute 
between a property owner and impoverished people unlawfully inhabiting her 
land is a public rather than a private matter that, second, the state was duty-
bound to resolve.126 In PE Municipality this point was also emphasised,127 and 
further important conclusions were reached about the manner in which to 
interpret the PIE Act,128 and about factors that play a role in determining 
                                                 
126 See AJ van der Walt ‘The state’s duty to protect property owners v the state’s duty to 
provide housing: thoughts on the Modderklip case’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 144 147 – 150, but in particular 148. In Modderklip (SCA) (n 7 above) this 
conclusion was reached on the basis of the state’s duty to promote and fulfil the right to have 
access to adequate housing and the state’s duty to protect the right to property; in Modderklip 
(CC) (n 7 above) the Court reached the same conclusions on the basis of the principle of rule 
of law and the right of access to court. See however Van der Walt’s (above) problematisation 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reliance in this respect on the duty to protect rights (160 – 
161) (noting that the theoretical basis for this construction is not clearly thought through in 
Modderklip (SCA) and that its origin is also not clearly indicated, such that the construct’s 
theoretical coherence potentially suffers). A second important aspect of the decision is the 
Court’s conclusion that that property rights and the right to have access to adequate housing 
inevitably implicate each other and that the solution to the apparent conflict between these 
rights that arises in eviction cases is to focus on the state’s duty to protect rights. In eviction 
cases, the state’s duty to protect property rights, so the argument proceeds, can only be 
properly met if the state’s duty to protect the right to have access to adequate housing is also 
met in the sense that the state ensures in some way that the evictees/occupiers are not left 
out in the cold (see Van der Walt (above) 59). For my own problematisation of the shift 
between the two decisions in the basis for these conclusions, see 180 - 187 below. 
127 PE Municipality (n 8 above) paras 16 – 19, referring with respect to this point to First 
National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Westbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services; First National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Westbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 50 – 52. See in this respect, in general, also AJ van der 
Walt ‘Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: a critical evaluation of 
recent case law’ (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 371, cited with respect to 
this point by Sachs J in PE Municipality (paras 20 & 23). 
128 The Court, per Sachs J, emphasised the importance of the historical and current socio-
political context in interpreting the provisions of the PIE Act (n 97 above) (PE Municipality (n 8 
above) paras 8 – 23, but in particular para 11). See in this respect also AJ van der Walt 
‘Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure, and eviction orders: a mode to evaluate South 
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whether or not a court should grant an eviction order in circumstances where 
impoverished people inhabit private property.129 
 
The apparent negotiation that our higher courts by hook or by crook seem to 
have managed in their socio-economic rights cases between individual 
interests and collective/systemic issues is potentially turned on its head in 
Olivia Road by the Court’s decision not to evaluate the constitutional 
consistency of the City’s plan to deal with inner city homelessness. In contrast 
to earlier decisions where the Court consciously emphasised the 
collective/systemic issues raised and insisted that they be addressed, in Olivia 
Road the Court, by deciding not also to consider the City’s inner city housing 
plan, seems consciously to have decided to focus only on the specific, 
concrete, individual interests at stake in the case. Indeed, Yacoob J’s remarks 
justifying his decision not to deal with the housing plan present a picture of 
socio-economic rights litigation as purely an instrument through which 
individuals or specific groups of people can engage the state to advance their 
particular interests and of court-driven transformation as something that must 
occur on an incremental, case-by-case basis only: 
 
[T]he desperate situation of the [Olivia Road] occupiers has been alleviated by the 
reasonable response of the City to the engagement process. 
... 
The City has undertaken to negotiate permanent housing solutions for the occupiers 
in consultation with them.  It is not unreasonable to expect that the City will, in the 
ordinary course, adopt a similar approach in respect of other people who are affected 
in the future. ... A case can always be brought in the High Court in relation to 
particular occupiers with specific allegations as to the respects in which the housing 
obligations imposed by the Constitution have not been complied with.130 
 
As with the Court’s decision to order engagement before the case had been 
decided, the Court’s failure to address also the systemic/collective issues 
                                                                                                                                            
African land-reform legislation’ 2002 Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 254 259 – 263, cited in 
this respect by Sachs J in PE Municipality (para 10). 
129 The Court held that an eviction order should not be granted under the PIE Act (n 97 
above) unless the state could show that it had seriously attempted to resolve the dispute 
through discussion and mediation (as above paras 39 – 47). 
130 Olivia Road (n 6 above) para 35. 
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raised in Olivia Road works to the detriment of transformative politics. In 
rejecting the invitation to consider the housing plan and so the plight of the 70 
000 or so other people in the same position as the occupiers who came to 
court, the Court renders the process of (potentially political) engagement that 
it had set in motion an instrumental process through which narrow individual 
interests are advanced without regard to any conception of the public good. In 
this respect the Court confirms an individualist liberal conception of politics at 
odds with the transformative politics that I outline in Chapter 1 above.131 At the 
same time the Court manages to avoid the systemic or structural aspects of 
the problems of homelessness at issue in the case – stated differently, it 
manages to avoid the substantively political aspects of the case. 
 
3.2.3 Proceduralisation: Soobramoney, Grootboom, Treatment Action 
Campaign, Modderklip and Olivia Road 
 
Our enclave ship, best-world, benchmarked, stirs, 
yearns for venture 
 
There’ll be, we’d concede, the inevitable 
 left behinds 
 
The unspoken, the stigmatised, the castaways 
 nursing their stuttering fir 
 
From our crow’s nest their stranded looks 
 will soon dwindle 
 
To less than a smudge 
 on the south horizon 
 
As we bound now, 
 bound away, bound for global 
 
Our lyrical sails billowing with 
 the winds of denial132 
 
3.2.3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 above, I briefly described the depoliticising rhetoric of 
naturalisation – the tendency to describe impoverishment as somehow part of 
the natural order of things, either because it is a problem of such 
overwhelming proportions that we simply cannot do anything about it, or 
                                                 
131 See 24 – 25 above. 
132 J Cronin ‘The tide has turned’ from More than a casual contact (2006) 58. 
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because it is caused by natural factors (drought; floods; naturally determined 
scarcity of resources) over which we have no control.133 
 
One manifestation of such naturalising rhetoric posits impoverishment as 
something over which we have no control because it is determined and 
maintained by the impersonal, inexorable forces of the market. In this view the 
market is depicted as a ‘natural construct’, a mechanism with a life and logic 
of its own, something that it is impossible to control, or at least something that 
we should not interfere with, lest we upset that internal life and logic.134 
 
This kind of naturalising market-rhetoric is of course closely linked to a 
particular view of proper economic ordering – what Sampie Terreblanche 
describes as ‘liberal (or free market) capitalism’.135 For those holding this view 
the best mechanism through which to ensure general social welfare is the free 
market. Citing Adam Smith’s description of the market as controlled by an 
‘invisible hand’ that, if left to operate freely, would ensure that ‘the attempts of 
individuals and corporations to maximise their profits will be miraculously and 
perfectly “coordinated” ... to the benefit of all ...’,136 liberal capitalists hold that 
impoverishment will be best addressed if dominant market participants (the 
corporate sector) are left to operate freely and without restriction to generate 
wealth. This wealth, so they continue, will, through the creation of jobs and in 
other ways ‘trickle down’ to impoverished people over time.137 The role of the 
state, in this view, is procedural, limited to providing the regulatory framework 
- the procedures and institutions - within which market participants can pursue 
                                                 
133 See 65 – 66 above. 
134 S Terreblanche A history of inequality in South Africa 1652 – 2002 (2002) 61. 
135 As above 56. Patrick Bond uses the term ‘social-contract capitalism’ – see his Elite 
transition (2d ed 2005) 53 and further. 
136 As above 58. Terreblanche points out that the notion of Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ that liberal 
capitalists rely on is a ‘vulgarised’ rendition. Smith, so he continues, claimed only that under 
certain very specific and strict conditions – the existence of ‘an open, well-organised, and 
civilised society in which all individuals would be disciplined and educated to pursue their self-
interest with circumspection, and with due regard for the interests of others, and with the 
necessary prudence; ... a sound judicial system for protecting property and contract rights and 
preventing all forms of fraud and corruption; and ... the existence of competitive markets in 
which nobody has monopolistic power to influence market prices and wages or to hamper the 
tendency of market prices and wages to move to their natural level or true values’ – would the 
‘invisible hand’ operate to coordinate individual and corporate pursuit of self-interest such as 
to operate for the benefit of all. 
137 As above 62. 
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their self-interest without restriction and the market can arrange the 
distribution of resources freely and ‘naturally’.138 
 
This liberal capitalist understanding of economic ordering is problematic first 
from a descriptive point of view. In short, it is highly abstract and so fails to 
take account of the role of power in structuring society and its economic 
realities. The linchpins of this view are first the idea of neutrality – the idea 
that the market is an ideologically neutral ‘natural construct’, controlled within 
a minimal and ideologically neutral framework of ‘rules of the game’ – and, 
second, the assumption of equality (that the ‘playing field’ – the market – is 
level in the sense that it provides to all an equal opportunity for self-
advancement). It is only on the basis of these two assumptions that the idea 
that the market, if left to operate freely, will render a just distribution of 
resources holds any currency. 
 
Both these assumptions are, of course, false. The market and the rules 
according to which it operates are not ideologically neutral. Indeed, a major 
preoccupation of critical legal theory over the last three decades has precisely 
been to show how seemingly neutral ‘rules of the game’, such as the common 
law background rules of property and exchange are not natural or neutral, but 
are ideologically determined and serve and entrench particular interests – and 
in this it has succeeded, to the extent that this point is probably trite.139 
                                                 
138 As above 59 – 62. This liberal capitalist view of economic ordering is reflected neatly in 
liberal views of politics. As I briefly outline in Chapter 1 above (24 – 25), liberal conceptions of 
politics are procedural rather than substantive. That is, just as liberal views of economic 
ordering advocate leaving substantive distributive question to the free operation of the market, 
where the pursuit of self-interest will inevitably result in the most just ordering of resources, 
liberal views on politics do not attempt to achieve any form of collective truth or any 
conception of the common good. Rather, such conceptions of politics focus on creating the 
procedures and institutions within which individuals can freely pursue their self-interest, 
without direct concern for collective truth or the common good (Mouffe (n 59 above) 128 – 
129). Politics is reduced in this view to a set of procedures and institutions, and to the pursuit 
of self-interest. Importantly, politics is presented as ideologically neutral, precisely avoiding 
the pursuit of a common good or collective truth. See C Mouffe ‘For an agonistic model of 
democracy’ in N O’Sullivan (ed) Political theory in transition (2000) 113 114, where she refers 
to the liberal ‘aggregative’ understanding of politics and democracy mooted by Joseph 
Schumpeter in his Capitalism, socialism and democracy (1947) (viewing politics as nothing 
but the aggregation of self-interest). See also, in general, A Downs An economic theory of 
democracy (1957). 
139 See in this respect WH Simon ‘Rights and redistribution in the welfare system’ (1986) 38 
Stanford Law Review 1431 1433 - 1436 and LA Williams ‘Welfare and legal entitlements: the 
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 The assumption of equality is also unrealistic. The liberal capitalist idea that 
the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, if left free of state interference, will 
coordinate individual pursuit of self-interest such as to achieve general 
welfare quite obviously fails to take account of the extent to which, particularly 
in South Africa, the ability to participate in the market (and indeed the ability to 
determine the rules according to which it operates!) is curtailed by 
entrenched, systemic inequality in access to basic resources such as 
education, information, livelihood and political voice and power. As Sampie 
Terreblanche puts it: 
 
... South African society was (and still is) a divided and conflict-ridden one. It was 
(and still is) a “closed” society in which whites (always less than 20 percent of the 
total population) were (and still are) in a privileged position and powerful and 
educated enough to dominate, manipulate, and exploit the majority of people other 
than white. These features of domination, manipulation, and exploitation lasted for the 
greater part of the 20th century ... Many of these features are perpetuated in subtle 
ways in the “new South Africa”.140 
  
In this light it is clear that liberal capitalist understandings of economic 
ordering are also highly problematic from a transformative politics-oriented 
point of view. This is so in the first place because, through their focus on the 
free pursuit of self-interest, these approaches render the debate about 
impoverishment and efforts to address it wholly instrumental, geared toward 
advancing the interests of specific, discrete groups of people.141 In this way it 
disregards collective interests and systemic issues. Second, and more 
importantly for purposes of this section, this is so because these 
understandings, by pretending to leave deeply political questions of 
                                                                                                                                            
social roots of poverty’ in D Kairys (ed) The politics of law: a progressive critique (1998) 569 
575 - 577. See also A Sen Poverty and famines. An essay on entitlement and deprivation 
(1981) 166 (detailing the extent to which access to a basic resource such as food is 
determined by politically constructed legal background rules). For an account of the extent to 
which basic rules of contract law in South Africa, such as the maxim pacta servanda sunt, 
despite being depicted as neutral, in fact reflect very specific ideological positions, see AJ 
Barnard-Naudé ‘ “Oh what a tangled web we weave …” Hegemony, freedom of contract, 
good faith and transformation – towards a politics of friendship in the politics of contract’ 
(2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review (forthcoming). 
140 Terreblanche (n 134 above) 58 – 59. 
141 See 24 - 26 above. 
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distribution of wealth and resources to the ‘natural’ play of the market, 
‘proceduralise’ issues of impoverishment, need and deprivation. That is, these 
approaches disregard political questions of distribution of wealth and side-
step the deep conflict, competition and political contestation, negotiated 
through entrenched currents of power and inequality that in fact continually 
occur around these questions, by pretending that impoverishment can best be 
addressed by creating the framework of procedures and institutions within 
which the market can work its distributive magic. 
 
It is this proceduralisation of impoverishment that I trace in the socio-
economic rights case law of the Constitutional Court in the rest of this section. 
Focussing on the decisions in Soobramoney, Grootboom, Treatment Action 
Campaign and, most importantly, Modderklip (CC), I trace the extent to which 
the Court, motivated by entirely appropriate separation of powers concerns, 
has relied in these judgments on seemingly neutral ‘good governance 
principles’ and argue that this tendency replicates the depoliticising 
proceduralist rhetoric of liberal capitalist approaches to economic ordering 
outlined above. At the same time, I point to counter-currents in cases such as 
Khosa, where the Court did not shy away from politically imbued distributive 
questions. 
 
3.2.3.2 Taking refuge in structure: Soobramoney, Grootboom, Treatment 
Action Campaign and Modderklip 
Earlier in this Chapter, I described the solution that Harms JA fashioned in 
Modderklip (SCA) to the conundrum facing him in that case (an order that the 
unlawful occupiers be allowed to remain on the land until the state finds 
suitable alternative land for them and that the state pay compensation to the 
landowner for the breach of his property right that it had failed to protect 
against) as a powerful legitimation of transformative politics.142 Undaunted by 
the seeming intractability of the problem brought before him Harms J found a 
practical solution where at first there seemed to be none. In this way he 
counteracted the helplessness professed by the state in the case, 
                                                 
142 See 159 - 160 above. 
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demonstrating in the process that problems of impoverishment are indeed not 
so overwhelming as to be part of the natural order of things. Further, Harms J, 
by basing his decision on the right to have access to adequate housing and 
the right to property, also squarely confronted and dealt with the political 
aspects of the case: the conflict between the basic housing interests of the 
occupiers and the property interests of the landowner, the distributive issues 
related to that conflict and the question where the responsibility lies to solve 
such conflicts. 
 
In Modderklip (CC) the Constitutional Court confirmed Harms J’s order, so 
replicating its politicising effect. However, a ‘surprising’143 aspect of the 
decision in the highest court is the change in tack with respect to the basis of 
the decision. The Constitutional Court did not follow Harms J in deciding the 
case on the basis of the right to property and the right to have access to 
adequate housing.144 It invoked instead the section 34 right of access to court 
and the section 1(c) constitutional principle of rule of law.145 It held that the 
right of access to court would be illusory if court orders were not enforced. 
This means that the right imposes on the state a duty to have in place the 
infrastructure necessary for court orders to be enforced.146 Further, however, 
the state is obliged, in cases where a court order cannot be enforced without 
assistance from the state to provide such assistance as could reasonably be 
required of it. On the facts of this case, it meant that the state was obliged 
reasonably to assist Modderklip in implementing the eviction order.147 At the 
same time, so the Court continued, the principle of rule of law requires that 
the state ensure that court orders are not enforced in such a way that ‘large-
scale disruptions in the social fabric’ result.148 Here, where the enforcement of 
the eviction order would result in the displacement of upwards of 40 000 
impoverished people this meant that the state would have to enforce the 
eviction order whilst ensuring that the evictees have access to alternative 
                                                 
143 Van der Walt (n 126 above) 159. 
144 Modderklip (CC) (n 7 above) para 26. 
145 As above para 39. 
146 As above para 41. 
147 As above paras 47 – 48 & 51. 
148 As above para 43. 
 181
land.149 In sum, the Constitutional Court reached exactly the same substantive 
conclusions as the Supreme Court of Appeal – that the state was obliged both 
to protect the property rights of the landowner by enforcing the court order 
and to protect the right of the occupiers to have access to adequate housing 
by ensuring that they would have alternative land to find shelter on if they 
were evicted – without relying on the most obvious legal mechanisms for that 
purpose – the rights to property and to have access to adequate housing. 
Why would the Court so ‘studiously avoid’ reliance on property and housing 
rights whilst reading into section 34 and the principle of rule of law 
constitutional duties ‘remarkably similar-looking’ to those obviously imposed 
on the state by these rights?150  
 
The Court’s opting for the structural principle of rule of law and right of access 
to court in Modderklip presents the high point of a tendency of the Court to 
rely in socio-economic rights cases on similar structural good-governance 
principles rather than substantive rights. This is clearly illustrated in three such 
cases decided before Modderklip: Soobramoney, Grootboom and Treatment 
Action Campaign. In Soobramoney, and Grootboom, the Court’s actual 
review151 clearly was motivated by procedural or structural rather than 
substantive concerns and in Treatment Action Campaign those same 
concerns, although not predominant, loomed large. 
 
In Soobramoney the only standard used by the Court to evaluate, in terms of 
section 27(1) and (2), the policy guidelines for admission to the renal dialysis 
programme and the way it was applied in the applicant’s case was a standard 
of rationality and good faith.152 The Court explicitly eschews delving into the 
questions of prioritisation of access to treatment and allocation of resources, 
holding that, as long as the choices made by the public authorities responsible 
for these decisions were taken in terms of a rational set of criteria, applied in 
good faith, a court could not interfere with them. Perhaps not directly in point, 
                                                 
149 As above paras 44 – 47 & 51. 
150 Van der Walt (n 126 above) 159. 
151 Rather than its rhetoric. 
152 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 29 (‘A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions 
taken in good faith ... ‘). 
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but also significant is the Court’s description of the section 27(3) right not to 
be refused emergency medical treatment as no more than a right not to have 
existing emergency treatment withheld arbitrarily.153 The underlying value that 
drives the Court’s review in both instances is not in the first place the need for 
access to essential medical treatment, but the good governance standards of 
rationality and good faith – the Court confines its review to the manner in 
which the state’s policies are conceived and applied, rather than to the 
question what they are likely to achieve. 
 
The same seems true of Grootboom. Despite the fact that the Court’s 
reasonableness policy review standard is potentially a quite strict and 
substantive standard for government conduct to be tested against,154 in 
actually applying it in Grootboom the Court hardly flexed its muscles, and 
reached its decision on the basis of the more structural, rather than 
substantive elements of that test. The Court presented Grootboom as a 
decision based on reasonable inclusivity – government policy was found to be 
unreasonable because it excluded particularly vulnerable or destitute groups 
from its scope.155 The Court invalidated the state’s housing policy ‘to the 
extent that it fail[ed] to recognise that the state must provide for relief for those 
in desperate need’156 and because ‘no provision was made for relief to . . . 
people in desperate need.’157 The Court’s order required that the state’s 
housing policy ‘must include reasonable measures ... to provide relief for 
people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are 
living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations’.158 This finding of 
‘unreasonable exclusion’ could have meant that some measure of priority 
concern was owed to desperately impoverished people, requiring the state to 
take steps urgently to alleviate their plight. But, as Theunis Roux persuasively 
                                                 
153 Soobramoney (n 3 above) para 20. 
154 See Roux (n 55 above), arguing that the reasonableness review standard is ‘clearly stricter 
than the rational-basis standard applied under sec 9(1) of the 1996 constitution’ and likening 
the standard to the standard of review applied by the Court in assessing unfair discrimination 
under s 9(3) of the 1996 constitution (97). 
155 In Grootboom the ‘truly homeless’ (Judge Dennis Davis’s term – see Grootboom v 
Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C) 280D/E) and in Treatment Action Campaign 
indigent HIV-positive mothers and their newborn children. 
156 Grootboom (n 4 above) para 66 (my emphasis). 
157 As above para 69 (my emphasis). 
158 As above para 99(2)(b) (my emphasis). 
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points out, this is exactly what is missing from the finding and order: any 
indication that the Court’s reasonableness standard requires a substantive 
prioritisation (temporally or otherwise) of effort and expense in favour of those 
‘living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations’. It is not clear whether it 
requires anything more substantive of government than to be inclusive – that 
is, to include in its policies some reference to, or some consideration of the 
needs of those most desperate. Roux himself puts it as follows:  
 
Although it undoubtedly pushes out the boundaries of socio-economic rights 
adjudication, the decision falls short of obliging the South African Government to order 
its spending priorities in any particular way. Rather, the decision is authority for the 
more limited proposition that socio-economic rights of the kind contained in the South 
African constitution may require the diversification of affected policies so as to cater for 
particularly vulnerable groups.159 
 
If this (to my mind entirely plausible) reading of the Court’s order is accepted, 
it becomes clear that the Court’s concern in Grootboom was quite narrow: it 
seems to have been concerned in some sense only with the logical 
consistency of the state’s housing policy, the fact that it made no reference to 
those who had nowhere to live. This is a structural concern only. It did not 
seem to be concerned with posing a substantive standard, that effort and 
expenditure should be prioritised in time according to differing degrees of 
need.160 
 
In Treatment Action Campaign, although the reasons for the Court’s decision 
are nowhere stated succinctly, the finding of unconstitutionality seems to have 
been based on the proposition that government’s policy position regarding 
provision of Nevirapine was not flexible enough to provide for all eventualities 
and unreasonably excluded indigent HIV-positive mothers and their newborn 
                                                 
159 T Roux ‘Understanding Grootboom – A response to Cass R Sunstein’ (2002) 12:2 
Constitutional Forum 41 42. 
160 See also C Sunstein Designing democracy: what constitutions do (2001) 224 – 237 
(arguing that Grootboom was decided on the basis of standards such as arbitrariness and 
rationality alone). 
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children outside the pilot sites from access to the drug.161 However, on closer 
inspection it again seems that the standard of rational coherence played an 
important role in the decision. Discussing government’s objections to the 
safety and efficacy of Nevirapine, the Court makes the following illuminating 
statement: 
 
The decision by government to provide nevirapine to mothers and infants at the 
research and training sites is consistent only with government itself being satisfied as to 
the efficacy and safety of the drug. These sites cater for approximately 10% of all births 
in the public sector and it is unthinkable that government would gamble with the lives or 
health of thousands of mothers and infants. . . . The risk of nevirapine causing harm to 
infants in the public health sector outside the research and training sites can be no 
greater than the risk that exists at such a site or where it is administered by medical 
practitioners in the private sector.162  
 
In this excerpt the Court indicates an evident flaw in the state’s argument in 
that runs along the following lines: 
 
There were no valid concerns about the efficacy and safety of Nevirapine for 
use in prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV at birth – had there 
been the state would not have used it at the pilot sites in the first place. There 
were no significant cost implications involved in broadening access to 
Nevirapine. The only remaining reason that the state could conceivably 
advance to restrict the use of Nevirapine to the pilot sites would be the 
absence of capacity to administer and monitor the use of the drug effectively 
outside the pilot sites. The evidence had shown that significant capacity to 
administer and monitor the use of the drug did exist outside the pilot sites. In 
this light there was no reason, and it was simply irrational, to refuse to extend 
the provision of Nevirapine to public health facilities outside the pilot sites 
where the capacity to administer and monitor the use of the drug did exist. 
 
                                                 
161 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) paras 70 & 95. See also D Bilchitz ‘Towards a 
reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying a foundation for future socio-economic 
rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 1 4. 
162 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) para 62. 
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Against this background it does not seem outlandish to suggest that an 
important element of the Court’s eventual finding in TAC was this lack of 
sense, this simple irrationality in government’s policy position. Again, the 
decision can plausibly be explained as motivated at least partly by concern for 
the most basic of the structural good governance principles enunciated in the 
Court’s reasonableness test – rational coherence. 
 
The Constitutional Court’s ‘flight from substance’163 into the arms of procedure 
or structure explicitly articulated in Modderklip and implicit in Soobramoney, 
Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign is not entirely unexpected and, 
to an extent, understandable. The Court falls back on these seemingly neutral 
good-governance principles in politically contested cases in an attempt to 
present itself as politically neutral – as, in the Courts own words, able to ‘cut 
through the overlay of [political] contention’ present in all the cases and to 
‘arrive at straightforward and unanimous conclusions’.164 It does this primarily 
to manage its institutional relations with the executive and legislature and so 
to ensure its institutional security, by avoiding the impression that it takes 
ideologically informed sides in these disputes. This motivation one cannot 
dismiss out of hand. The protection of the institution of judicial review as a 
building block of constitutional democracy can certainly in itself be seen as a 
transformative endeavour, so that the Court’s self-protective impulse 
evidenced by its reliance on structure rather than substance is an entirely 
appropriate transformative strategy.165 
 
                                                 
163 I borrow the phrase from JE Flemming ‘Constructing the substantive constitution’ (1993) 
72 Texas Law Review 211, who uses it (211 – 214) to describe American constitutionalism’s 
retreat into ‘process and original understanding’ in reaction to the Lochner era. See the 
sources he refers to at 213 n 12. 
164 Treatment Action Campaign (n 5 above) para 21. 
165 Just such a claim, although it is nowhere made explicitly, can be distilled from the various 
contributions of Theunis Roux that deal with the process of judicial review within a 
constitutional  democracy. Roux is consistent in claiming that an important aspect – perhaps 
the foundational aspect – of the role of courts operating in the context of a transformative 
constitution, is to maintain their institutional security, so that they can continue to operate in 
the exercise of their constitutional review powers, so that constitutional democracy can in that 
way be maintained. See in this respect, in general, Roux (n 55 above) and T Roux ‘Principle 
and pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 106. 
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However, this transformative gain is attained at a not insignificant 
transformative cost. Consider for a moment from a bird’s eye view the role 
that the Court scripts for itself in socio-economic rights cases by relying on 
such structural good-governance principles. The Court paints itself in this way 
as an impartial referee, and no more than that. It depicts its role in enforcing 
socio-economic rights as regulatory only - it must set down the limits within 
which the real actors (the state, market forces, individuals) may move, but it 
may not tell them how and where to move within those limits. The central 
theme in this image of itself is the Court’s impartiality, its steadfast refusal to 
adopt a particular political point of view, or a particular political philosophy. In 
short, the role the Court scripts for itself in this way is a mirror image of the 
role attributed to the state in the liberal capitalist understandings of economic 
ordering outlined above. In doing so the Court participates in and confirms the 
depoliticising rhetoric characteristic of those understandings. It buys into the 
descriptions of impoverishment as something that is not politically determined 
and that cannot be addressed through political contestation, as something 
that is natural, that must be addressed through the unfettered operation of the 
ideologically neutral market. It also manages in this way to avoid and so to 
subsume the deeply political questions of distribution of resources and the 
operation of power that are implicated by impoverishment, need and 
deprivation. 
 
3.2.3.3 Counter-currents 
Although a trend can be detected, it can certainly not be said that the 
proceduralisation that I outlined above characterises the Court’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence as a whole. First, in all of the cases I have 
cited, with perhaps the exception of Soobramoney, counter-currents conflict 
with the Court’s depoliticising reliance on structure and procedure. So, for 
example, as Murray Wesson has argued, although Grootboom can plausibly 
be described as having been decided purely on a principle of rational 
coherence, there are strong indications that the Court in fact had applied a 
much more substantive test to evaluate the state’s housing policies. In his 
words, 
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Far from [only] emphasising that the [state’s housing] programme is “arbitrary” or 
“irrational” ... the Court expressly states that “[a]llocation of responsibilities and 
functions has been coherently and comprehensively addressed. The programme is 
not haphazard, but represents a systematic response to a pressing social need.”166 
 
Also, in the strongest proceduralist case – Modderklip (CC) – the Court’s 
confirmation of the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal167 and its implicit 
recognition that the matter was not simply a private matter to be resolved by 
the parties themselves but a public matter implying extensive responsibilities 
for the state,168 constitute strong re-politicising moments. 
 
Finally, in cases decided subsequent to the line of cases I discuss above – in 
particular PE Municipality and Khosa – the Court has avoided relying on 
structural good-governance principles only, and has instead immersed itself in 
the political dimensions of the issues before it. In PE Municipality this is 
evident both from the fact that the Court in that case emphasised the role of 
historical and current political context in interpreting socio-economic rights 
and the legislation enacted to give effect to them;169 and in the Court’s 
rejection of the offer of alternative accommodation as unsuitable, so that the 
eviction order was refused (an aspect of the decision that clearly involved the 
balancing of conflicting interest and implicated questions of distribution of 
resources).170 In Khosa Mokgoro J for the Court equally emphasised historical 
and current socio-political context.171 In addition, she articulated a particular 
vision of social ordering that to her mind was implicated by the constitution 
and relied on that conception to influence her interpretation of the rights in 
question.172 She also did not shy away from distributive questions, scrutinising 
and in the event rejecting the state contentions about resource constraints.173 
                                                 
166 M Wesson ‘Grootboom and beyond: reassessing the socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
of the South African Constitutional Court’ (2004) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 
284 291 – 292, quoting Grootboom (n 4 above) para 54. See also, in general, C Steinberg 
‘Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264. 
167 Modderklip (CC) (n 7 above) para 68. 
168 As above para 39 – 49. 
169 PE Municipality (n 8 above) paras  
170 As above para 54 – 55. 
171 Khosa (n 9 above) paras 49, 59, 63 – 65 & 76 – 77. 
172 As above para 74. 
173 As above paras 58 – 62. 
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 3.3 Conclusion 
In this Chapter I described a particular way in which the work of courts 
adjudicating socio-economic rights claims can inhibit transformative political 
action. I focussed on instances in which our higher courts have in their 
decisions participated in and so confirmed and legitimated depoliticising 
rhetorical strategies at play in socio-political debates about impoverishment, 
need and deprivation. 
 
Although I identified a number of isolated instances of such participation, my 
focus was on identifying and analysing trends in the courts’ jurisprudence. In 
this respect I focussed on two instances of depoliticising rhetoric at work in 
the jurisprudence. 
 
First, I analysed the extent to which our courts have participated in discourses 
of technicisation of impoverishment – have dealt with impoverishment as 
though it is a technical problem to be solved on the basis of standards of 
efficiency, by technically proficient institutions and people. I pointed out that 
courts routinely engage in this kind of technicising rhetoric in order to take 
account of their own technical incapacity when it comes to deciding socio-
economic rights cases. This technicisation, so I continued, is in itself not 
problematic. However the link made by our courts between its technicising 
rhetoric and separation of powers concerns – in other words the idea that 
courts, because of their technical incapacity, should defer exclusively to the 
other branches of government ran the risk of establishing the state as the only 
legitimate institution to engage issues of impoverishment and rendering 
impoverished people themselves not as politically active participants in the 
shaping of their lives, but as passive recipients of services from departments 
of state. 
 
I continued by identifying some countervailing trends that contrasted with the 
courts’ depoliticising rhetoric in this respect. I pointed, for example, to 
instances where the political agency of impoverished people was confirmed 
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and legitimated by courts, and to certain developments with respect to 
remedies in socio-economic rights cases – the handing down of orders 
requiring resolution of socio-economic rights disputes through mediation. To 
conclude this section, I pointed to a number of problems with the decision of 
the Constitutional Court that most obviously gives expression to these 
transformative politics-friendly remedial developments – Olivia Road. I argued 
that the decision of the Court in that case to hand down its order for 
engagement between the parties before it had formulated or handed down its 
judgment, coupled with its decision not to evaluate for constitutional 
consistency the inner city housing plan of the City of Johannesburg but to 
decide only the application for an order for the eviction of the particular group 
of impoverished people before it, rendered its decision individualised and 
instrumental and so diluted its transformative politics-friendly impact. 
 
Second, I traced the operation in the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of 
our higher courts of the depoliticising rhetorical strategy of proceduralisation – 
that is, the tendency to describe issues of impoverishment in procedural 
rather than substantive terms in order to avoid the deeply political questions 
inevitably at issue in debates and disputes about impoverishment, its causes 
and ways in which to address it. I linked this particular depoliticising strategy 
to a particular – liberal capitalist - view of economic ordering in terms of which 
impoverishment is best addressed through a neutral state that, through 
providing only a minimal framework of regulation and infrastructure, allows the 
‘natural’ processes of the market to order distribution of resources. I then 
pointed out how our higher courts tended to rely in a number of socio-
economic rights cases on supposedly ‘empty’ or neutral good governance 
principles such as non-arbitrariness, rationality, access to courts and rule of 
law instead of on substantive rights provisions, or the substantive aspects of 
socio-economic rights. They did so in an attempt to depict themselves as 
neutral arbiters in often hotly contested socio-economic rights disputes in 
order to maintain their relationship with the other branches of government and 
so ensure their institutional security. However, this – admittedly transformative 
– motivation came at the transformative cost that the courts at the same time 
mirrored and so legitimated and confirmed the liberal capitalist, transformative 
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politics-unfriendly understandings of political ordering that I outlined at the 
start of the section. 
 
I concluded this section by again pointing to a number of cross-currents 
present in the cases that mitigated this proceduralist tendency and its 
depoliticising consequences. First, I pointed out that in the very same cases in 
which the proceduralist tendency was most obvious, there was evidence of 
more substantive engagement by the courts with the political dimensions of 
impoverishment. Second, I pointed to other cases – most notably PE 
Municipality and Khosa  - in which the Constitutional Court’s focus on 
historical and socio-political context and its willingness in particular to engage 
with questions of distribution of resources powerfully counter-acted the 
depoliticising proceduralist tendencies identified elsewhere. 
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4 Problematising certainty and finality 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, while considering different ways in which adjudication can work 
to limit transformative political action, I investigated three related critiques in 
South African legal writing of the tendency of law and, in a narrower sense, 
adjudication to pursue certainty and finality.1 
 
I recounted how Karl Klare, drawing on Duncan Kennedy, shows that South 
African lawyers and judges, in the grip of a conservative legal culture, tend to 
over-emphasise the extent to which legal materials constrain legal outcomes.2 
Klare criticises this tendency first because it is inaccurate – he points out that, 
although judges are indeed constrained (by the legal materials; by their 
professional sensibilities and habits of mind; by their concern for their own 
reputation of professionalism; and by their capacity for creative interpretation), 
constraint is not an innate characteristic of legal materials, but an 
experience.3 Because constraint is culturally constructed in this manner, he 
continues, it can be resisted and formed by judicial work – constraint is a 
pliable construct. He therefore characterises adjudication and legal 
interpretation as a play between freedom and constraint, where judges 
sometimes able to overcome their initial experience of constraint when 
confronted with a legal text, and through the application of intellectual effort, 
are able to achieve their preferred outcomes without disregarding the 
materials completely and so jeopardising both their professional and their 
broader public legitimacy.
are 
 
                                                
4 To see adjudication thus, Klare continues, first has
 
1 See 46 - 72 above. 
2 See 48 - 51 above, discussing K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ 
(1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146 drawing on D Kennedy A critique of 
adjudication: {fin de siècle} (1997) (Kennedy Critique); 'Strategizing strategic behavior in legal 
interpretation' (1996) Utah Law Review 785 (Kennedy ‘Strategizing’); 'The stakes of law, or 
Hale and Foucault!' in Sexy Dressing Etc. (1993) 83 (Kennedy ‘Stakes’); and 'Freedom and 
constraint in adjudication: a critical phenomenology' (1986) 36 Journal of Legal Education 518 
(Kennedy ‘Freedom’). 
3 Klare (n 2 above) 160. 
4 As above 163. 
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the signal virtue that it would alert judges to the fact that they are able to attain
possibilities with their work that are not immediately evident in the materials, 
so that an easy reversion to the status quo is resisted and the possibility for 
transformative outcomes is enhanced. Second, and more importantly for m
purposes, it also has the virtue that, if judges are able to achieve results, 
through judicial work, not evident in the materials and if they acknowledge tha
they are able to do so, they become responsible for the results generate
through their work – responsible and therefore accountable. This, so Klar
concludes, opens judicial work up to political contestation and enhances 
 
y 
t 
d 
e 
ansformative politics.5 
e 
l 
, 
rest’ of 
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I also considered Henk Botha’s related analysis of Duncan Kennedy’s various 
metaphorical depictions of the process of adjudication.6 Botha points to thre
different ways in which metaphorically to depict the operation of legal rules 
within the process of adjudication discussed by Kennedy. The first, traditiona
depiction presents legal rules as straight lines or clear borders. Constraints 
imposed by legal rules on judging are seen in this view as ‘physical objects
as innate properties of legal materials’. Freedom in judging is seen as the 
exception and occurs only where there are gaps or ‘clearings in the fo
constraint. The role of a judge is seen as simply subjecting herself to 
constraint, mechanically applying legal rules as these are presented 
common law or legislation. Thus the political content of judging and 
responsibility for judicial work product are denied – this operates to 
discourage transformative political engagement.7 The second depiction
presents legal rules as argument sound-bites, assertions coupled with 
counter-assertions. Law inheres in this depiction in the ritualistic exchange
sound-bites. This account, in contrast to the view of law as straight lines, 
 
5 As above 162 - 163.  
6 See 55 – 61 above, discussing H Botha ‘Freedom and constraint in constitutional 
adjudication’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 249 (Botha ‘Freedom’) 
drawing on Kennedy 'Freedom’ (n 2 above) and Critique (n 2 above). See also Botha’s 
‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2)’ 2003 Tydskrif vir die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg /Journal for South African Law 20; ‘Metaphoric reasoning and 
transformative constitutionalism (part 1)’ 2002 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse reg/Journal for 
South African Law 612 and ‘Democracy and rights. Constitutional interpretation in a 
postrealist world’ (2000) 63 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 561. 
7 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 260. 
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focuses on the indeterminate and contradictory nature of legal rules and 
emphasises the exercise of judicial choice in adjudication. However, to se
law thus also discourages transformative political action, as it ‘ultima
results in an instrumental and cynical view of adjudication, in which 
constraints are seen as
e 
tely 
 illusory and the possibility of a sincere normative 
ialogue is ruled out’.8 
rocess 
r 
 
he 
 
 that 
o 
 as 
d 
ards 
urs on a field of action rather than in terms of straight lines or 
orders.11 
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Botha then turns to a third metaphor in terms of which to present the p
of adjudication – that of law as ‘field of action’. In this view, judges do 
experience constraint in legal interpretation. However, constraint is not seen 
as an innate property of the legal materials that is either there and absolute o
not there at all. Rather, constraint here is seen as culturally constructed, an 
experience judges have of the nature of the materials.9 This means that they
can, through interpretation, work through constraint and find solutions in t
materials that did not at first glance present themselves. Judicial work is
therefore presented as a ‘field of action’ upon which interplay between 
freedom and constraint takes place. This view of the matter has the virtue
it recognises the political nature of the search for legal meaning (judges 
construct rather than find in the legal materials the outcomes of their work, s
that they become responsible for those outcomes) without depicting law
wholly political so that normative dialogue becomes impossible (judges 
remain constrained by the materials, by their own professional habits of min
and sensibilities and by their need to have their outcomes accepted by the 
professional culture of which they are a part).10 Botha’s final move is his most 
significant. He identifies the use and fashioning of general, flexible stand
in adjudication as one way in which judges can be true to the view that 
judging occ
b
 
8 As above. See 56 - 58 above. 
9 As above 261. See 58 above. 
10 As above 262. See 60 above. 
11 As above 275 and what follows. See 61 above. 
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Finally, I turned to André van der Walt’s work on the prospects for the 
transformation of South African land law.12 Van der Walt considers two cases 
in which courts were confronted with two plausible interpretations of the 
materials, one the application of which would lead to a reversion to the status 
quo; the other the application of which would lead to transformation or 
change. In both cases courts opted for the status quo affirming interpretation 
rather than the (equally plausible) transformation generating one. Van der 
Walt explains this with reference to the phenomenon of ‘structural inertia’: 
given the prominence of the values of certainty and finality in legal thinking, 
courts, where they could equally plausibly in terms of standards of legal 
professionalism generate transformation or revert to the status quo, would 
always choose the interpretation that doesn’t unsettle the existing scheme of 
things.13 Van der Walt then asks whether a solution to the problem of 
structural inertia would be to fashion and adopt a whole new system of law, so 
that there is no status quo to fall back upon. His answer is no: he points out 
that the linear conception of transformation underlying such an attempt in 
terms of which the old is rejected and replaced by the new simply results in 
the imposition of a new orthodoxy. Not only would this mean the end of 
transformation, as a linear conception of transformation always has an end in 
mind – it would also, operating as any orthodoxy does in a hierarchical 
fashion, suppress other voices and possibilities and so stifle the diverse 
energies required for real transformation.14 
 
In this, the final substantive chapter of the dissertation, I trace the operation in 
the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the two 
themes that are the focus of the three accounts again related above – the 
                                                 
12 See 52 - 55 above, discussing AJ van der Walt ‘Resisting orthodoxy – again: thoughts on 
the development of post-apartheid South African law’ (2002) 17 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 
258 (‘Orthodoxy’) who draws in this respect on R Cover ‘Violence and the word’ (1986) 95 
Yale Law Journal 1602 and ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 term - foreword: Nomos and narrative’ 
(1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4 (Cover ‘Narrative’). See also Vander Walt’s ‘Dancing with 
codes – protecting, developing and deconstructing property rights in a constitutional state’ 
(2001) 118 South African Law Journal 258 and ‘Tentative urgency: sensitivity for the 
paradoxes of stability and change in social transformation decisions of the Constitutional 
Court’ (2001) 16 SA Publiereg/Public Law 1.  
13 Van der Walt ’Orthodoxy’ (n 12 above) 264 267 - 268. See 53 above. 
14 As above 271. See 53 - 54 above. 
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search for legal certainty (Klare and Botha) and the tendency toward finality 
(Van der Walt) in adjudication. 
 
4.2 Certainty/flexibility, finality/openness 
4.2.1 Introduction 
My concern in studying the operation of the two themes of certainty and 
finality in South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence remains to 
determine in which ways these two themes have affected and formed the 
relationship between the adjudication of socio-economic rights claims and 
transformative politics. Before I turn to the cases to trace the operation of 
these themes there, I first describe different ways in which the two ideas of 
certainty and finality can be problematised in adjudication. 
 
I use the term problematised advisedly. Following Kennedy, Klare and Botha, 
I intend that term to convey the idea that certainty and finality, despite their 
uncomfortable relationship with transformative politics, remain important 
ideals to pursue in adjudication. As Botha argues so persuasively, a complete 
abandonment of these two ideals would militate as effectively against 
transformative politics as an unthinking embrace of them would.15 In what 
follows, therefore, I describe ways in which these two ideals can be 
problematised, without being abandoned altogether. 
 
First, in section 4.2.2, I unpack Botha’s suggestion that the proper use of 
broad and flexible standards as the basis for adjudication, rather than rules, is 
potentially one way in which to move in the space in-between complete 
certainty (absolute constraint) and complete freedom (absolute flexibility). 
Then, in section 4.2.3 I explore the use of context sensitivity in the application 
of standards, and the use of innovative remedies as ways in which a measure 
of openness in the face of finality and closure can be maintained in 
adjudication. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 260. 
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4.2.2 Certainty 
The possible import of the distinction between rules and standards was first 
introduced into South African legal writing through the work of Duncan 
Kennedy on the structure of private law adjudication. In his ‘Form and 
substance in private law adjudication’, Kennedy describes how a preference 
in private law adjudication for rules – seen as he later described it as straight 
lines – reflected and tended to give effect to an individualist ethic, whilst a 
preference for flexible and general standards instead reflected and gave effect 
to an altruistic ethic.16 Kennedy’s analysis in this respect was first utilised in 
South Africa by Alfred Cockrell in an early (pre-constitutional) critique of the 
rule-boundedness of the South Africa law of contract.17 Most recently, it has 
been taken up by Jaco Barnard-Naude, again in a critique of South African 
contract law – in a series of articles Barnard-Naude has criticised the 
penchant of South African courts to eschew broad standards of good faith as 
operative rules of contract law and has pointed out how that continued choice 
for rules and against standards reflects an individualistic, capitalist inspired 
ethic inconsistent with the transformative character of the constitution.18 
 
South African public lawyers are of course much more used to the application 
of broad and flexible standards than their private law colleagues. Much of 
South African administrative law, for example, has long operated on the basis 
of standards instead of rules – one needs think in this respect only of 
procedural fairness standards, which have always been held for their content 
to depend on the circumstances of individual cases.19 Constitutional and 
administrative law jurisprudence developed after the advent of the new 
constitutional order has seen an explosion in the fashioning and use of such 
standards. In administrative law, for example, the conception of 
reasonableness enunciated by O’Regan J in Bato Star is explicitly described 
                                                 
16 D Kennedy ‘Form and substance in private law adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law 
Review 1658. 
17 A Cockrell ‘Substance and form in the South African law of contract’ (1992) 109 South 
African Law Journal 40. 
18 AJ Barnard-Naude ‘ “Oh what a tangled web we weave …” Hegemony, freedom of contract, 
good faith and transformation – towards a politics of friendship in the politics of contract’ 
(2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review (forthcoming). 
19 See eg C Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa (2007) 362. 
 198
as a flexible standard, dependent for its exact content and for the stringency 
of its application on the circumstances of each case.20 Examples of such 
standards from constitutional law include the standard for determining unfair 
discrimination in terms of section 9(3) of the constitution adopted by the 
Constitutional Court in Hugo;21 the test for determining whether a breach of a 
constitutional right is legitimate in terms of section 36(1) of the constitution;22 
and more relevant to this dissertation, of course, the reasonableness test 
fashioned by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom with which to determine 
whether or not the state has met its duty to take ‘reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation’23 of socio-economic rights.24 
 
The use by our courts of such general standards has been the object of some 
debate. Some have criticised the manner in which some of these standards 
have been applied, arguing that they are used by courts to mask the absence 
of clear, substantive reasoning as basis for judicial decision25 and that, as 
such, they potentially also mask the operation of judicial choice.26 Others 
have welcomed the use of such standards, pointing out that they potentially 
accord well with the constitution’s transformative ethos and a constitutional 
‘culture of justification’.27 In this section, I explore this debate about the m
and demerits of the use by our courts of broad standards in constitutio
adjudication, as precursor to my analysis in the section to follow of the socio-
economic rights reasonableness test of our courts as an example of such a 
standard.
erits 
nal 
                                                
28 In the background remains my basic concern with the relationship 
 
20 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) (Bato 
Star). 
21 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) (Hugo). 
22 ‘36(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors …’ 
23 Section 26(2) and sec 27(2) of the constitution. 
24 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom). 
25 A Cockrell ‘Rainbow jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights 1. 
26 IJ Kroeze ‘Doing things with values: the role of constitutional values in constitutional 
interpretation’ (2001) 12 Stellenbosch Law Review 265. See also, in this respect, H Botha 
‘Rights, limitations and the (im)possibility of self-government’ in H Botha, AJ van der Walt & 
JWG van der Walt (eds) Rights and democracy in a transformative constitution (2005) 13. 
27 For an overview of such accounts, see Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 275 - 277. 
28 See 217 and further below. 
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between adjudication – and specifically adjudication of socio-economic rights 
claims – and a transformative politics.29 That is, first and foremost in my 
consideration of broad standards here I am interested in the extent to which 
the use by courts of such standards has the potential either to enhance or to 
erode such transformative politics. 
 
Writing in 2003, Stu Woolman and I, in a piece investigating the changes 
wrought to constitutional jurisdiction in the cases of Ex parte Minister of Safety 
and Security: In re S v Walters30 and Afrox Healthcare v Strydom31 noted the 
emphasis placed by Brand J in his opinion in Afrox on the distinction between 
rules and standards.32 It will be recalled that the case was about the assertion 
by a private hospital of a disclaimer in their contract with a patient, in 
response to a damages claim arising from breach of contract (the patient lost 
his foot due to negligence of the hospital’s nursing staff), and about the 
patient’s challenge to that disclaimer. The distinction between rules and 
standards is evident at two places in the judgment. First, in response to an 
argument of the respondent’s that the disclaimer is unenforceable because it 
is unreasonable, unfair and in conflict with the principles of good faith, Brand 
JA responded as follows (my translation from the Afrikaans): 
 
Regarding the place and role of abstract ideas such as good faith, reasonableness, 
fairness and justice … although these considerations underlie our law of contract, 
they do not constitute an independent, or “free –floating” ground for the invalidation or 
non-enforcement of contractual terms; stated differently, although these abstract 
considerations form the basis and underlying justification for legal rules and can lead 
to the forming and changing of legal rules, they are not legal rules themselves. When 
                                                 
29 I discuss the nature of such a politics and the problematic of the relationship between such 
a politics and socio-economic rights adjudication in Chapter 1. See in particular 15 – 26 
above. 
30 2002 4 SA 613 (CC). 
31 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) (Afrox). 
32 S Woolman & D Brand ‘Is there a constitution in this courtroom? Constitutional jurisdiction 
after Afrox and Walters’ (2003) 18 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 37. For another discussion of 
this feature of Afrox see Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 267 – 271. For critiques of the judgment 
more generally see D Brand ‘Disclaimers in hospital admission contracts and constitutional 
health rights’ (2002) 3:2 ESR Review 17; P Carstens & A Kok ‘An assessment of the use of 
disclaimers against medical negligence by South African hospitals in view of constitutional 
demands, foreign law, medical ethics and medical law’ (2003) 18 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 
430; D Tladi ‘One step forward, two steps back for constitutionalising the common law: Afrox 
Health Care v Strydom’ (2002) 17 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 473. 
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it comes to the enforcement of contractual terms the Court has no discretion and 
does not act on the basis of abstract considerations but rather on the basis of 
crystallised and established legal rules.33 
 
Second, the distinction arose also with respect to the point that interested us 
in the case – the SCA’s holding with respect to the constitutional jurisdiction of 
the High Courts. Brand JA had, in the process of rejecting the respondent’s 
challenge to the disclaimer that it was out of step with constitutional values 
underlying the right to have access to adequate health care, held that High 
Courts, although they had jurisdiction to test and invalidate common law rules 
against constitutional rights, had no jurisdiction to develop the common law as 
laid down in the prior judgments of higher courts in light of constitutional 
values as mandated by section 39(2) of the constitution, whether the rule in 
question was laid down before or after the interim constitution entered into 
operation.34 How to explain this seeming anomaly, that High Courts had 
jurisdiction to apply the constitution directly to pre- and post constitution 
precedent, but not indirectly? We speculated that it may have had something 
to do with Brand AJ’s distinction between rules and values. Brand JA makes it 
clear in the judgment that he holds that High Courts do not have jurisdiction 
indirectly to apply the constitution to pre- and post constitutional South African 
law in part because indirect application involves evaluating existing law 
against constitutional values rather than constitutional rules. He is 
uncomfortable with values, so he continues, because the content given them 
by individual judges depends on their ‘individuele beskouinge’ (individual 
views).35 If he were to allow High Court judges to develop the common law on 
the basis of constitutional values, the subjective nature of the value judgments 
that would arise would render the resultant law uncertain and unstable.36 On 
this basis we speculated that Brand JA was willing to allow High Court judges 
the power to depart from precedent through direct application of the 
constitution, because direct application required the evaluation of common 
law rules not against values, but against other rules – specific provisions of 
                                                 
33 Afrox (n 31 above) para 32. See Woolman & Brand (n 32 above) 65 n 104. 
34 As above para 29. See Woolman & Brand (n 32 above) 47 – 48. 
35 As above para 30. See Woolman & Brand (n 32 above) 64 47 – 48. 
36 As above. See Woolman & Brand (n 32 above) 64 47 – 48. 
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the bill of rights, rather than the values underlying them. Were this so, we 
concluded, it would reflect a particularly fundamentalist (but not uncommon) 
version of formalism, in terms of which legal rules (the specific provisions of 
the constitution) have a fixed, neutral and self-evident content, while legal 
values (constitutional values) are infinitely mutable, their meaning determined 
by the subjective perspective of the individual interpreter.37 
 
The different ways related above in which Brand JA presents the distinction 
between rules and standards and the implications of that distinction in Afrox 
provides an entry point for Henk Botha into his discussion of the operation 
and significance of this distinction in South African law more generally, and 
South African constitutional law specifically, and his appraisal of the merits of 
and problems attached to the use of standards in constitutional adjudication.38 
Botha notes that a penchant for rules and a suspicion of standards, based 
upon the traditional view related above of legal rules as long straight lines that 
mechanically predetermine outcomes in adjudication ‘still exerts a powerful 
hold on the South African legal imagination.’39 The distinction between rules 
and standards, he argues, reflects a range of other ‘dichotomies’ prevalent in 
our legal imagination: those between ‘law and politics, law and morality, 
legislation and common law, objectivity and subjectivity, and stability and 
progress.’40 In the traditional view, rules, so Botha points out, have self-
evident meaning, so that their application during adjudication to decide cases 
involves a mechanical exercise of finding the right rule and applying it to the 
facts at hand. Standards, on the other hand, are vague and open-ended, so 
that their meaning is determined through a process of interpretation by each 
individual interpreter. Reliance on rules, on this account, is presented as 
having the signal virtue of avoiding the instrumentalisation of law – the 
subjugation of law to the personal political and other preferences of the 
individual interpreter - and of maintaining the distinction between law and 
politics.  Although broad standards inform and provide legitimacy to legal 
rules, elevation of these standards to rules upon which cases can be decided, 
                                                 
37 Woolman & Brand (n 32 above) 64 – 65. 
38 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 267 and what follows. 
39 As above 267. 
40 As above 271. 
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would render the process of adjudication akin to the legislative process: the 
law would then be developed according to an instrumentalist ethic, its content 
determined by whatever the individual interpreter, driven by her subjective 
political and other leanings, prefers as a just outcome to a specific case.41 
This would threaten the ‘generality, predictability and certainty associated with 
the rule of law’.42 
 
This traditional depiction of the nature of legal rules and standards as binary 
opposites and of the implications of this fact for their respective use in 
adjudication, is problematic, both because it is descriptively inaccurate and 
because it is normatively undesirable, particularly in a South African context of 
transformative constitutionalism. 
 
4.2.2.1 Descriptive accuracy 
To see rules as absolutely constraining in the sense that their meaning is self-
evident and that they therefore predetermine the outcome of case (judges 
simply have to find and apply the law to the facts, and the legally correct 
answer will pop out) and standards as infinitely mutable, with their meaning 
dependent on the subjective will of the specific interpreter, so that they 
operate in an instrumentalist and ultimately arbitrary fashion, is first and 
foremost simply incorrect descriptively. 
 
The idea that legal rules are clear and self-evident fails to take account of the 
fact that legal rules are texts that, in order to have any use, have to be 
interpreted by those who apply them. Stated differently, legal rules are in the 
process of being used, being applied to a given set of facts, inevitably 
interpreted and moulded.43 As such the traditional depiction also fails to take 
account of the nature of the process of interpretation – of the role of ‘context, 
purpose and imagination in the construction of meaning’.44 In short, the 
constraining nature of rules, their determinate character, is hopelessly over-
estimated in the traditional account. 
                                                 
41 As above. 
42 As above 271 – 272. 
43 Klare (n 2 above) 157. 
44 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 273. 
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 At the same time, the description of standards as wholly unconstraining, 
dependent for their meaning on the instrumentalist preferences of their 
interpreters, under-estimates the extent to which standards can be 
constraining. Botha, for example, argues persuasively that standards, despite 
their vague and open-ended appearance, may very well under some 
circumstances be more constraining than seemingly clear and certain rules. 
With the knowledge that constraint is always a cultural construct rather than 
an innate characteristic of the materials, says Botha, comes the 
understanding that the extent to which not only rules, but also standards, are 
constraining, ‘depends on a host of factors’.45 He then refers to the ‘concepts 
and categories employed in a rule or standard and their capacity (within the 
context of a particular legal culture and set of sedimented background 
understandings) to generate interpersonal agreement; the relative 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of a particular legal community; [and] the views 
on law and the judicial function that are embedded in a given legal culture’46 
as some of the factors determining the extent of constraint. One can think, for 
example, that the task of justification or explanation that broad and vague 
standards impose on their interpreters and those that apply them, can 
significantly constrain interpreters, particularly if the professional community to 
which they have to explain or justify their interpretations and applications of a 
standard accept – as do lawyers and judges – only a quite specific repertoire 
of such justifications and explanations.47 
 
4.2.2.2 Normative desirability 
More important than that the bright line distinction between rules and 
standards described above is descriptively inaccurate, is the fact that the 
depiction of rules and standards respectively in that distinction is normatively 
problematic. In short, the penchant for rules as seen in the traditional view 
does not square easily with the transformative ethos of the constitution, whilst 
                                                 
45 As above 274. 
46 As above 274 – 275. 
47 Klare (n 2 above) 166 - 167. 
 204
standards, if freed of the negative connotation attached to them in the 
traditional view, seem capable of a better fit. 
 
Botha argues that rules seen as determinate, self evident in meaning and 
constraining, as in the traditional view, do not fit well with the transformative 
nature of the constitution in the following ways. First, the idea of formal 
equality of treatment that underlies the quest for predictability, finality and 
certainty that drives the traditional view of rules seems to be at odds with the 
ideal of substantive equality that permeates the constitution, which requires 
precisely the sensitivity to context and the particular that the traditional view of 
rules explicitly eschews.48 That is, the very attempt to apply rules in an even-
handed fashion to all cases that is in the traditional view regarded as 
necessary for the ‘generality’ of law and to avoid arbitrariness,49 militates 
against the sensitivity for context and the particular that the constitution’s 
vision of substantive equality seems to demand. Brand JA’s refusal in Afrox to 
accept and even to consider whether the interests that were at stake in the 
contract concluded between the parties in that case (access to quality health 
care on the one hand and commercial viability - profit - on the other) worked 
to establish important inequality in bargaining power is telling in this respect.50 
 
Second, in an echo of Duncan Kennedy’s coupling of rules with individualism 
and standards with communitarianism,51 Botha points out that the application 
of rules according to the traditional view, because it seeks to exclude any 
formative role for the interpreter, often results in singularly inequitable 
results.52 Afrox again provides a good example: the attempt of Brand JA in 
that case to present the process of adjudication as a mechanical ‘finding’ and 
‘application’ of clear, ‘crystallised’ rules evidently results in him standing 
indifferent to the impact of his findings on the parties before him.53 
                                                 
48 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 272.  
49 A Scalia ‘The rule of law as a law of rules’ (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 
1175 1182. 
50 Afrox (n 31 above) para 12. 
51 Kennedy (n 16) above. 
52 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 272. 
53 Of course, I cannot and do not suggest that Brand JA on a personal level was indifferent to 
the plight of Mr Strydom, the patient in Afrox whose foot had to be amputated because of 
negligence of the hospital’s nursing staff. But it is the very judicial instinct to, in spite of such 
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 Third, the attempt to present as neutral rules that are in fact informed by the 
highly contested and politically specific ideas of freedom, equality and the rule 
of law that underlie the traditional view, and in that way to attempt to insulate 
these rules from constitutional scrutiny seems to breach the supremacy of the 
constitution and the constitutional mandate to subject all law to transformative 
leavening.54 Again, Afrox is instructive – consider Brand JA’s uncritical 
acceptance of the ‘reading in’ of the principle of freedom of contract into the 
constitution by Cameron JA in the earlier case of Brisley v Drotsky,55 on the 
basis of which he then holds it to be unnecessary – indeed, undesirable – to 
re-evaluate the rules of contract law pertaining to the validity of disclaimers of 
liability.56 Compare this to his suspicion of the supposedly uniquely subjective 
content of ‘vague’ and ‘abstract’ constitutional principles and open-ended 
concepts of good faith.57 The principle of freedom of contract is no less vague 
and open-ended than the concept of good faith that Brand JA rejects – no less 
open to different and conflicting interpretations reflecting the different social 
philosophies implicitly supported by different individual judges.58 The fact that 
its content appears to Brand JA to be fixed, concretised and ideologically 
neutral has much to do with the fact that the dominant interpretation that has 
been given to that principle expresses a social philosophy that is so 
entrenched and hegemonic that it appears neutral.59 Brand JA’s non-reflexive 
acceptance of the principle of freedom of contract as neutral, simply indicates 
his own implicit acceptance of that social philosophy. As such it indicates an 
implicit preference for that which is settled and long-accepted (common law 
principles understood according to dominant interpretations) to the detriment 
of that which is new and potentially unsettling (constitutional principles).60 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(possible) personal concern, ‘apply’ the ‘law as it stands’, whatever its consequences, that 
concerns me here. 
54 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 273. 
55 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA); referred to in Afrox (n 31 above) para 22 in this respect. 
56 Afrox (n 31 above) para 24.  
57 As above para 32.  
58 Barnard-Naudé (n 18 above). 
59 As above. 
60 Woolman & Brand (n 32 above) 65 – 66. See also Barnard-Naudé (n 18 above). 
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Just as there are good reasons to suggest that an understanding of rules as 
certain, self-evident in meaning and determinate runs counter to the 
transformative ethos of the constitution and the openness to transformative 
politics that it suggests, Botha also points out, there are a number of good 
reasons to suggest that an understanding of rules reconceptualised as flexible 
standards is better suited to that ethos and the openness to transformative 
politics that it suggests. 
 
First, an understanding of law consisting of a series of open-ended and 
flexible standards, open – within limits, of course – to be moulded and re-
moulded through interpretive work, squares better with the widely adopted 
idea that the constitution presents a shift from a culture of authority to a 
culture of justification.61 Despite the admitted problems attached to this 
metaphor of justification,62 it does powerfully depict the fact that, in our 
constitutional democracy, judges may not make decisions with consequences 
for people without explaining why they decided in a particular way. As Karl 
Klare has illustrated: the realisation that rules are not clear boundaries that 
allow for mechanical application, yielding pre-determined outcomes, but are 
instead flexible entities, formed through a process of interpretation and in 
every act of their application, highlights the responsibility of judges for the 
results of their work.63 In such a conception judges cannot divest themselves 
of responsibility for the outcomes they generate by simply saying that they 
apply the law as it stands. Knowledge of their interpretive role brings 
responsibility for it. An approach to adjudication that acknowledges this 
responsibility and attempts to give effect to it is patently more capable of 
engagement with transformative politics than one that pretends otherwise. Of 
course, the use of broad standards in constitutional adjudication will not 
necessarily lead to this kind of openness to scrutiny. Much depends on how 
such standards are conceived of and applied by courts. South African courts 
have, for example, been criticised for using broad constitutional values in an 
                                                 
61 E Mureinik ‘A bridge to where: introducing the interim bill of rights’ (1994) 10 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 3. 
62 See H Botha & JWG van der Walt ‘Democracy and rights in South Africa: beyond a 
constitutional culture of justification’ (2000) 7 Constellations 341. 
63 Klare (n 2 above) 164. 
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unreflexive, almost ritualistic manner, so that the use of such broad standards, 
rather than that it encourages substantive reasoning, takes it place.64 When 
done in this mechanical way, the use of constitutional values in constitutional 
interpretation has also been criticised as indeed masking controversial 
assumptions from critical scrutiny rather than opening them up to evaluation.65 
 
In addition, even where broad standards are applied in the reflexive manner 
described above, with an awareness of interpretive responsibility and a 
consequent willingness to explain substantively how and on what bases a 
particular case was decided, it might run into another line of critique 
questioning its transformative credentials. Much has been written in South 
African constitutional scholarship about the merits of a strategy of ‘judicial 
avoidance’ – that is, a conscious strategy to avoid substantive reasoning in 
decision-making, both to avoid deciding matters unless it is absolutely 
necessary to do so and, when deciding matters, to do so on as narrow a basis 
and as shallow a reasoning as possible.66 This strategy of avoidance is 
justified in transformative terms with the argument that, in a society such as 
South Africa, a strategy of deciding as few issues as possible and deciding, 
where it is inevitable to do so, on as narrow a basis as possible has the virtue 
of allowing courts to ‘keep open a space in which different constitutional 
imaginations and interpretive visions can contend with each other’.67 In 
addition, a strategy of avoidance has been punted as enabling courts, by 
avoiding decision on politically contentious issues, to avoid confrontation with 
the other branches of government and so to safeguard its own institutional 
legitimacy – something which in itself has been depicted as in line with the 
constitution’s transformative vision.68 
 
                                                 
64 See eg Cockrell (n 25 above). 
65 Kroeze (n 26 above). 
66 H Klug Constituting democracy: law, globalism and South Africa’s political reconstruction 
(2000) Chapters 7 – 8; I Currie ‘Judicious avoidance’ (1999) 15 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 138. 
67 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 280. 
68 Klug (n 66 above) chapter 7 - 8; Currie (n 66 above); T Roux ‘Legitimating transformation: 
political resource allocation in the South African Constitutional Court’ (2003) 10 
Democratization 92. 
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Botha responds to the judicial avoidance charge against substantive 
reasoning in a characteristic way: its not that simple, he says. First, he 
argues, while a strategy of avoidance might sometimes indeed work to keep 
open political contestation around socially contentious issues, this is not 
necessarily the case – that ‘there comes a point where a clever rhetorical 
device to cut through some of the political controversy surrounding an issue, 
looks more and more like a manifestation of a lack of commitment and a 
denial of judicial responsibility.’69 In addition, he points out, it is inaccurate to 
depict the substantive reasoning engendered by the application of broad 
standards as necessarily leading to normative closure. Instead, while a 
substantively reasoned judgment might certainly close off some lines of 
inquiry and exclude certain interpretive possibilities, ‘it does not preclude a 
careful interpretation – or re-interpretation – of the grounds for the decision in 
subsequent cases, or an analysis of the meaning of the norm announced in 
that case within the concrete context of later cases.’70 In short: avoidance 
does not always engender openness (in fact, it sometimes has the opposite 
effect); and proper substantive reasoning can, instead of necessarily closing 
out different constitutional voices on contentious social issues, simultaneously 
focus and broaden the scope of subsequent political engagement. 
 
Botha’s second reason for preferring, in the context of a transformative 
constitution, a flexible, culturally determined notion of legal rules embodied in 
the use of broad standards to an understanding of rules as straight lines, 
imbued with self-evident meaning, has to do with the extent to which the 
constitution requires a fundamental break with the past - ruptures in the 
‘seamless web’ of the common law. Botha points out that the straight line view 
of legal rules tends to emphasise the continuity between past and present and 
to de-emphasise the extent of the rupture required by the constitution – to 
privilege stability over change.71 One is reminded here of André van der 
Walt’s identification of the problem of ‘structural inertia’ related above – the 
problem that, in a legal culture that emphasises certainty and finality as 
                                                 
69 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 281. 
70 As above 280. 
71 As above 276. 
 209
foundational values, where a court is presented with two equally plausible 
interpretations of the materials, one that confirms the status quo and the other 
that engenders change, courts will more often than not opt for the status quo 
affirming one. It does seem that the emphasis on the plasticity of legal 
material and the culturally constructed nature of legal meaning that potentially 
operates in the application of broad legal standards is one way of overcoming 
such structural inertia, without falling into the trap Van der Walt warns against 
of imposing a ‘new orthodoxy’ as exclusionary as the current. 
 
To recapitulate: a variety of commentators have warned against the tendency 
in adjudication for judges to seek certainty and finality in their decision 
making. The view of legal rules as self-evident in meaning and determinate of 
the results they generate that underlies such a traditionalist search for 
certainty and finality, so the arguments go, is both an inaccurate depicting of 
the nature of legal materials and, in a normative sense, fails to give effect to 
the transformative nature of the constitution – most importantly because the 
normative closure that such a view of legal rules invites closes off judicial 
work product from transformative political engagement. Instead of this view of 
legal rules a depiction of legal rules as flexible and dependent on interpretive 
work for their meaning and for the results that they generate is proposed, both 
because such a view more accurately depicts the nature of legal rules and 
because such a view squares better with the transformative aspirations of the 
constitution – most importantly for my purposes because it emphasises 
judicial responsibility for the results generated by adjudication and so 
potentially opens judicial work product to transformative political evaluation 
and engagement. 
 
One way in which this more flexible view of the nature of legal rules can be 
given effect to or operationalised is through the use in constitutional 
adjudication of broad, flexible, multi-part standards. Because such standards 
for their proper application invite a judicial method aware of the plasticity of 
legal material they potentially also share the fit with the constitution’s 
transformative ethos that such a method engenders. Importantly, however, 
this remains subject to a proviso: broad standards can only operate in the 
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transformative politics-friendly manner described above if they are applied in a 
flexible and open manner, without completely abandoning certainty and 
finality. Complete flexibility and openness would instrumentalise adjudication 
and so again denude it of transformative politics.   
 
4.2.3 Finality 
 
 Finality is a good thing, but justice is better.72 
 
In Chapter 1, relying on André van der Walt, I pointed out how the tendency in 
adjudication to seek finality or closure works to limit or discourage 
transformative politics. Finality does so in the first place by bringing an end to 
change, settling a previously contended matter once and for all. Secondly, 
finality or closure works against transformative politics by presenting a 
particular view of a contentious matter as authoritative and so excluding 
alternative voices and visions.73 
 
In this section I briefly recount two ways in which finality or closure in 
adjudication can be problematised so that continuing change is not foreclosed 
and diverse voices and visions not excluded – rendering legal rules or 
standards more sensitive to particular context in their application, and 
developing remedies that, whilst setting out a normative framework clear 
enough to resolve specific disputes, does not prescribe a specific solution that 
would bind also future cases and so exclude possible alternative views. 
 
4.2.3.1 Context    
 
[I]ndeterminacy of outcome is not a weakness. A truly principled ... approach requires 
a close and individualised examination of the precise real-life situation of the 
particular [person] involved. To apply a predetermined formula for the sake of 
certainty, irrespective of the circumstances, would in fact be contrary to the best 
interests of the [person] concerned.74 
                                                 
72 Lord Atkin in Ras Behari Lal v King-Emperor 60 IA (1933) 345 361. 
73 Van der Walt ‘Orthodoxy’ (n 12 above) 271. 
74 Sachs J in S v M (Centre for Child Law as amicus curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 24. 
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 The modest position is not weak, it is responsible.75 
 
A central aspect of the objection in traditional legal thought to the use of broad 
and flexible standards is, as recounted above, that the uncertainty of the 
content of such standards renders law and adjudication arbitrary, as the 
outcomes generated by such standards cannot be predicted with any level of 
certainty.76 These objections are based on a view that legal rules, to qualify as 
such, must achieve a certain measure of generality – must be capable of 
even-handed application to a range of different but similar cases. Only in this 
way, so the argument goes, can arbitrariness be avoided.77 
 
Viewed from the perspective of someone concerned about the relationship 
between transformative politics and adjudication, however, the traditional 
emphasis on generality of legal rules is problematic. On this view – the one I 
espouse – the application of a generally applicable, ‘predetermined formula’ to 
different fact situations in order to achieve predictable results, although 
certainly in itself desirable, holds the disadvantage that it invites, indeed 
imposes normative closure or finality. In short, so the objection goes, the 
fashioning and application of abstract, generalised rules to decide a range of 
different cases predetermines the outcomes of cases according to a certain 
dominant view and so prevents the assertion of alternative understandings, 
solutions and visions. As such, the conclusion follows, it occludes further 
transformative political engagement with such issues. Paul Cilliers, writing 
about what he calls a ‘modest’ approach to understanding complex systems 
that remains wary of the reduction that inevitably occurs when we attempt to 
provide a certain description of such systems, puts it as follows: 
 
...[A] self-assured [read ‘certain’] position is deeply problematic since its complacency 
forecloses further investigation. Modest [read ‘context-sensitive’] claims are not 
                                                 
75 P Cilliers ‘Complexity, deconstruction and relativism’ (2005) 22 Theory Culture Society 255 
260. 
76 See eg Scalia (n 49 above) 1182. 
77 As above. 
 212
relativistic and, therefore, weak. They become an invitation to continue the process of 
generating understanding.78 
 
One way in which to avoid this danger, without at the same time abandoning 
generality wholesale, is for courts, operating within a settled broad normative 
framework, to pay greater attention to the particular circumstances and 
context of each case, and to allow that context and those circumstances to 
influence the interpretation and the application of legal rules – in part to 
determine it anew in each case.79 
 
In South African public law, this kind of sensitivity to context has most clearly 
operated in the manner in which courts have applied broad standards, and 
particularly in the manner in which courts have determined the intensity of 
scrutiny with which they would apply such standards in specific cases. Two 
examples from administrative law will suffice. First, the extent of the burden 
that procedural fairness standards in the administrative law impose on 
administrators has always been held to vary from case to case, depending on 
circumstances. In some cases, for example, the requirement of a pre-decision 
hearing to affected parties is satisfied if affected parties are simply allowed to 
make written representations, whilst, at the other end of the spectrum, it is 
only satisfied if a personal appearance before the administrator is allowed, 
with the opportunity to make oral representations, to question witnesses and 
to rely on legal representation. What determines the level of procedural 
fairness required in any particular case is the context of each case – in 
general terms, for example, the more onerous the impact of a decision 
potentially is for an affected party, the more substantive the procedural 
fairness entitlement becomes.80 
 
Similarly, the intensity of the administrative law requirement of 
reasonableness has been held to differ from case to case, depending on 
context. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs, for 
                                                 
78 Cilliers (n 75 above) 260. 
79 See eg AJ van der Walt & H Botha ‘Coming to grips with the new constitutional order: 
critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO’ (1998) 13 SA Publiekreg/Public Law 17 35. 
80 See eg Hoexter (n 19 above) 362. 
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example, O’Regan J famously held that ‘[w]hat will constitute a reasonable 
decision will depend on the circumstances of each case’.81 She then 
proceeded to list a range of factors as examples of the kinds of circumstances 
that will determine the content of reasonableness as a standard in any given 
case. This holding of O’Regan J’s has been read to indicate that the 
reasonableness test potentially comprises a number of discrete legal tests – 
at a minimum a basic rationality test (itself comprising a number of 
components) and perhaps a proportionality test. Whether in a given case only 
the more basic and less stringent rationality test will apply to a decision, or 
that together with the proportionality requirement, is determined by the 
circumstances of each case.82 
 
A similar shifting standard of scrutiny operates also in another context – 
constitutional property law. In First National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a 
Westbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Westbank v Minister of Finance83 
the Constitutional Court formulated a test with which to determine whether or 
not a deprivation of property is ‘arbitrary’ as meant in section 25(1) of t
constitution. This test is explicitly formulated by Ackerman J as a) a test that 
varies in its intensity from case to case – as Theunis Roux puts it, it ‘will 
vacillate between two fixed poles: rationality review at the lower end of the 
scale, and something short of a review for proportionality at the other’
he 
                                                
84 - 
depending on b) the circumstances of each case, but with the circumstances 
relevant to the enquiry specified by the Court.85 
 
These examples from administrative and property law have the virtue that 
they seem to allow courts, in applying them, to decide cases with a measure 
of generality so as to avoid arbitrariness, but with enough sensitivity to context 
 
81 n 20 above, para 45. 
82 See eg Hoexter (n 19 above) 318 – 321; JR De Ville Judicial review of administrative action 
in South Africa (2003) 211 - 216. 
83 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (FNB). 
84 T Roux ‘Property’ in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa (2d ed OS) (2003) ch 46 24.  
85 FNB (n 83 above) para 100. See also Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) paras 34 – 35. 
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that cases are not predetermined by rigid, abstract and wholly generalised 
rules. All three standards – procedural fairness and reasonableness; and 
arbitrariness – pose a settled basic normative framework that applies in the 
same way from case to case (a requirement of notice, a hearing and a post 
decision notification in the case of procedural fairness; a basic rationality test 
and a proportionality test in the case of reasonableness; a set list of factors to 
consider in the property context) but the intensity with which that content 
applies in any given case is determined by the specific context. As such, all 
three tests potentially problematise, without abandoning, finality and closure.86 
 
4.2.3.2 Open remedies 
Potentially the moment in the process of adjudication where finality operates 
most obviously comes with the handing down of an order. There is every 
reason for courts to pursue finality in the remedies it provides. Remedies are 
the mechanisms with which courts dispose of disputes – with which they are 
practically resolved. Also, parties to litigation, having approached a court 
precisely because they want a final resolution to a dispute that they 
themselves cannot get past, have every right to expect courts to hand down 
orders that are indeed final. For these reasons the handing down of an order 
is probably also potentially the most transformative politics-unfriendly moment 
in the process of adjudication. A final order handed down in a case quite 
graphically closes down political contestation around the issues that were at 
stake in the case and imposes, to the detriment of other visions and 
imaginations, an authoritative view of things.87 
 
To deal with this problem, courts have developed remedies that, whilst still 
giving effect to the decision in a case, avoid the finality and closure described 
above. So, for example, courts may hold a state programme to be 
unconstitutional, but simply issue a declaratory order to that effect, leaving the 
fashioning of the solution to the problem to the state agencies involved.88 This 
retains a measure of openness in that the court does not dispositively 
                                                 
86 But see Roux (n 84 above) 23, who criticises the property arbitrariness test as retaining for 
the Court ‘an almost absolute discretion to decide future cases in the manner it deems fit’. 
87 Cover ‘Narrative’ (n 12 above) 1602. 
88 The Constitutional Court handed down precisely such an order in Grootboom (n 24 above). 
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describe one authoritative solution to the problem, to the exclusion of others. 
In a slightly more structured and intrusive fashion, courts may also attach to 
such declaratory order a supervisory interdict, managing the openness that 
results from the simple declaratory order, but retaining jurisdiction over the 
case to ensure that a suitable solution is indeed found by the state agencies 
involved. Both these approaches to remedies hold the advantage that political 
discussion and contestation around the issues decided in the case are not 
foreclosed – the specific solution to the problem is left undetermined by the 
court. However, both these approaches hold the disadvantage that they 
privilege the political agency of the state to the detriment of the transformative 
politics that I am concerned with – the fashioning of a solution to the problem 
is explicitly left to the state and the state only. 
 
A further refinement of this open approach to remedies also has the potential 
to resolve this problem. It is possible for courts to resolve cases through the 
use of open-textured declaratory orders bolstered with supervisory interdicts, 
but in a way that also involves and legitimises transformative political action. 
That is, a court could make a normative finding, in the sense of describing the 
outcomes that the constitutional and other legal duties at play in the case 
required, and embody that in a declaratory order. Then, instead of leaving the 
fashioning of a particular solution to the problem within that normative 
framework to the state, the court could then order the parties (the state and 
those challenging its measures) to enter into a process of mediation in order 
to agree upon the most appropriate means with which to reach those 
outcomes. This kind of ‘experimentalist’ approach, as Charles Sabel and 
William Simon have termed it,89 holds a number of advantages. First, it retains 
the openness that was attractive about the simple declarator – it establishes 
only a normative framework, without prescribing a particular solution. Second, 
it remains mindful of institutional sensitivities, both paying due regard to the 
institutional incapacity of courts to resolve complex technical problems and to 
monitor the enforcement of their orders and paying due respect to the political 
branches of government, so maintaining good institutional relations. But third, 
                                                 
89 CF Sabel & WH Simon ‘Destabilisation rights: how public law litigation succeeds’ (2004) 
117 Harvard Law Review 1016 1019 1053 - 1056. 
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and most importantly, it manages to remain mindful of institutional concerns 
without in the process privileging the political agency of the state at the 
expense of transformative politics. As I also point out in Chapter 3, an order 
requiring the state to negotiate a solution to an intractable problem with 
ordinary people potentially has a powerful legitimising effect on the political 
agency of the state’s subjects.90 
 
4.3 The cases 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The reasonableness test explicitly adopted by the Constitutional Court in 
Grootboom with which the Court evaluates state conduct for compliance with 
constitutional socio-economic rights potentially is a good example of the kind 
of broad standard that allows for the flexibility and openness required by 
sensitivity to transformative politics that I describe above. 
 
As I explain in Chapter 2 above, the test is in essence a means-end 
effectiveness test. That is, the Court asks the basic question with it whether 
the state measure under consideration is reasonably capable of achieving the 
realisation of the right at issue, over time and given the strictures of available 
resources.91 To aid itself in that inquiry, the Court announced in Grootboom a 
number of ‘elements’ of the test and developed an additional few in 
subsequent cases. At this stage in the development of the Court’s 
jurisprudence it seems that, in deciding whether or not a measure is 
reasonable, the Court will consider at least the following factors: the extent to 
which the measure is comprehensive in the sense that it deals with all aspects 
of the realisation of the right in issue;92 the extent to which implementation of 
the measure is coordinated, such that it involves all relevant institutions of 
state at all different levels of government necessary to make its successful 
implementation reasonable possible;93 whether or not sufficient financial and 
human resources have been allocated to the implementation of the plan for its 
                                                 
90 See 159 and further above. 
91 Grootboom (n 24 above) para 41. 
92 As above para 39. 
93 As above. 
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successful implementation to be a reasonable possibility;94 the extent to which 
the measure existing on paper is in fact being implemented and plans and 
timelines have been set for its complete implementation;95 the extent of the 
flexibility of the measure, such that it is capable of responding to short-term 
crises and changes in circumstances;96 the extent to which the measure is 
‘reasonably inclusive’ in the sense that it caters for the needs of all members 
of South African society;97 the extent to which the measure takes account of 
differing degrees of need with respect to the right at issue;98 and the extent to 
which the state can show that both the conceptualisation and implementation 
of the measure occurred with a sufficient measure of transparency and – were 
one to take the most recent decision in Olivia Road to its logical conclusion – 
engagement with those that stand to be affected by it.99 
 
As with any such broad, multi-element test or standard, the extent to which 
the socio-economic rights reasonableness test in fact operates as an example 
of the understanding of legal rules as fields of action and so engenders 
transformative politics depends on the manner in which it is applied. As I 
pointed out above in section 4.2, the application of a broad standard can 
lapse into the imagery of law as a set of straight lines and the denial of the 
political nature of adjudication first if it is reduced to a set of fixed elements or 
requirements that are applied mechanically by courts, without sufficient 
substantive reasoning or attention to the particulars of each case – if certainty 
overtakes flexibility.100 Second, application of a broad standard can revert to 
straight line thinking if it occurs without enough care being taken to limit its 
application in each case to that case alone without laying down too many 
general rules for future cases – if finality overtakes openness. In what follows 
below, I explore the extent to which our courts have managed to apply the 
                                                 
94 As above. 
95 As above para 42. 
96 As above para 43. 
97 As above. 
98 As above para 44. 
99 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 13, 21 & 22. 
100 See pp 194 - 195 above. 
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reasonableness test with the requisite degree of flexibility and openness to 
ensure that its application does not work to discourage transformative politics. 
 
4.3.2 Certainty 
One of the central objections to the inclusion in constitutions of justiciable 
socio-economic rights has always been that they are too vague - that is, that 
their content is not sufficiently determinate for them to pose justiciable 
standards that courts can use to decide actual cases.101 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly in this light, despite the nature of its first socio-
economic rights case – Soobramoney – where the Court reached its decision 
focussing on the case at hand alone, without creating broad swathes of law, in 
Grootboom the Court was at pains to describe in quite concrete and 
comprehensive terms its chosen approach, the reasonableness test.102 
Indeed, the Court’s description was so comprehensive and occurred in such 
abstract terms that, in retrospect, it raises concerns that the Court was 
tending toward the kind of certainty warned against above. At the same time, 
and equally unsurprisingly, one of the main critiques of the Court’s 
reasonableness test as enunciated in Grootboom and other early socio-
economic rights cases was precisely that the test was too vague, that it 
provided too little in the line of clear standards for the state to arrange its 
conduct by and for courts to decide cases with any measure of generality. 
Were these critiques to prove accurate that would also raise the spectre of a 
transformative-politics unfriendly approach. A standard without any clearly 
constraining content would lapse into the kind of normative instrumentalism in 
its application that I, following Botha’s critique of Kennedy’s description of law 
                                                 
101 See eg C Courtis Courts and the legal enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Comparative experiences of justiciability (2008) 15. 
102 The extent to which Grootboom still, 5 cases later, represents the authoritative and 
comprehensive description of the Court’s chosen approach is reflected in the fact that in the 5 
subsequent cases, only one, perhaps two additional elements of the reasonableness test 
have emerged: the requirement of transparency mentioned in passing in Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 123 and – were one to accept that 
Olivia Road (n 99 above) indeed referred also to the reasonableness test and not only to 
evictions – the requirement of engagement laid down in that case. Equally telling is the extent 
to which the Court clearly regards Grootboom as the touchstone-case in socio-economic 
rights matters: subsequent cases are invariably peppered with references to Grootboom to 
the effect that in that case, the Court laid down its approach in an authoritative manner. See, 
eg, in the most recent case Olivia Road (n 99 above) para 10 and what follows. 
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as a series of sound-bite pairs, warn against above.103 As such it would deny 
the political nature of the process of socio-economic rights adjudication as 
effectively as normative closure would. In between these two seemingly 
contradictory depictions of the Court’s chosen approach, where does the truth 
lie? 
 
In what follows I explore this question by investigating two aspects of the 
Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights reasonableness test: the manner 
in which the Court has interpreted and applied the ‘within available resources’ 
qualification found in section 26(2) and 27(2) of the constitution; and the 
extent to which the Court has applied its reasonableness test using 
substantive reasoning rather than either/or logic. I conclude this section with a 
brief consideration of the implications for the tension between certainty and 
flexibility of the Court’s most recent socio-economic rights decision – Olivia 
Road.    
 
4.3.2.1 ‘[W]ithin available resources’ 
Soobramoney104 – the Court’s very first socio-economic rights decision – 
although it does not explicitly introduce the Court’s reasonableness test, 
nevertheless established a number of important points that have kept 
returning in the Court’s later decisions where this test was applied. 
 
Perhaps the most important of these is the interpretation the Court gave in 
that case of the term ‘within available resources’ found in section 27(2) of the 
constitution. This aspect of the Court’s decision appears so often in 
subsequent decisions that it is worth quoting it here in full. In the process of 
describing the content of section 27 of the constitution the Court, per 
Chaskalson J, says the following: 
 
What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations imposed on the State 
by ss 26 and 27 in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water and social 
security are dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the 
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources. Given 
                                                 
103 See 57 – 58 above. 
104 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
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this lack of resources and the significant demands on them that have already been 
referred to, an unqualified obligation to meet these needs would not presently be 
capable of being fulfilled. This is the context within which s 27(3) must be 
construed.105 
 
This excerpt, if read only within the context of Soobramoney, speaks of 
straight line thinking that excludes transformative politics in two ways. 
 
(a) The negative interpretation of section 27(3) 
The first relates to the last sentence in the quote: ‘This is the context within 
which s 27(3) must be construed’.106 As will be recalled, in Soobramoney the 
applicant relied on section 27(3) of the constitution – the right not to be 
refused emergency medical treatment. The Court rejected the claim on this 
basis, holding that the section 27(3) right was only a right not to be refused 
emergency medical treatment arbitrarily there where it is available, and that, 
in any event, the applicant’s predicament was not an emergency as 
contemplated in section 27(3).107 The throw-away reference to section 27(3) 
in the quote above prefigures the first element of the Court’s rejection of th
section 27(3) claim related above – that section 27(3) provides for a 
prohibition only on the arbitrary refusal of emergency medical services that 
are available. This negative interpretation is significant – and controversial – 
because it summarily excludes an entirely plausible affirmative reading of 
section 27(3) – that it seeks to prioritise emergency medical treatment 
(however that is defined) above other forms of medical treatment and requires 
that it be made available wherever needed. The reference in the quotation 
above – that the resource limitation on section 26 and 27 constitutes the 
‘context’ within which section 27(3) should be understood – lays the 
groundwork for the negative reading of section 27(3) that the Court adopts. 
Although it is not stated explicitly, the argument seems to be that the phrase 
‘within available resources’ found in section 27(2) applies also to section 
27(3); that this implies that the content of section 27(3) is determined also by 
the fact of limited resources; and that section 27(3) can for that reason not be 
e 
                                                 
105 As above para 11. 
106 As above. 
107 As above paras 20 & 21. 
 221
read to impose also a positive duty to provide emergency medical treatment 
also there where it is not readily available. 
 
In light of the structure of section 27 as whole, this reading is at best strained. 
Section 27(2) follows directly on section 27(1), which provides for the right of 
everyone to have access to health care services. Section 27(2) determines 
that ‘the State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right’. 
Section 27(3) follows only after section 27(2). The most obvious reading 
seems clearly to be precisely that the qualifications contained in section 27(2) 
are meant to apply only to the right proclaimed in section 27(1) and not to the 
right not to be refused emergency medical treatment found in section 27(3). 
Nevertheless, the Court adopts this strained reading without any substantive 
argument to support it – it simply states as a fact that section 27(2)’s 
qualification is the ‘context’ within which section 27(3) must be interpreted, as 
though this self-evidently appears from the text. 
 
In doing so the Court disregards virtually the entire body of scholarship about 
the content of the socio-economic rights in the constitution extant at the time 
Soobramoney served before it.108 It also, more importantly, simply brushes 
aside the difficult and important political questions involved in the 
interpretation of section 27(3). An affirmative reading of that section holding 
that the state incurs a priority duty in terms of it to create the structures and 
capacity necessary to provide emergency medical treatment wherever it is 
needed reflects a muscular view of the social provisioning role of the state in 
terms of which the state, regardless of resource constraints, must provide in 
certain basic survival needs of its people. Such a reading inevitably holds 
strong redistributive implications - it reflects an understanding of social justice 
that is at least partly distributive in content. This is a much thicker conception 
of social justice than the emaciated vision of a state simply required not to 
                                                 
108 For a critique along these lines, see D Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in 
South Africa’ in D Brand & CH Heyns Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) 1 33; P 
Alston & C Scott ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: a comment 
on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 206 245 - 248. 
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withhold services that are already available without good reason reflected in 
the Court’s interpretation of section 27(3). Such a reading reflects what can be 
called a liberal vision of the role of the state and a proceduralist vision of 
social justice, devoid of distributive content.109 
 
The difficulty here, seen from a perspective emphasising the need for 
sensitivity to transformative politics in the Court’s work is two-fold. First, the 
Court simply brushes aside, without substantive argument, a vision of social 
justice alternative to its own. In doing so, it denies ‘different constitutional 
imaginations and interpretive visions’ and closes down a space within which 
such imaginations and visions can contend with one another.110 Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, the Court presents this move as if its reading is not 
informed by any particular social vision – as if it is neutral, dictated by the self-
evident terms of the provision. In doing so the Court enacts precisely the kind 
of straight line thinking warned against above, where its role is reduced to 
mechanically finding and applying self-evident meaning. The result is that it 
denies that it makes a choice in presenting the reading that it does and so 
denies its responsibility for that interpretation. Presenting the holding in such 
neutral terms works to discourage political engagement with it. 
 
(b) Resource constraints and section 27(1) 
The second way in which the excerpt from Soobramoney quoted above 
speaks of straight line thinking insensitive to transformative politics relates to 
the manner in which the Court dealt with the claim on the basis of section 
27(1). 
 
Having found that the claim for access to renal dialysis treatment could not 
succeed on the basis of the section 27(3) (the right not to be refused 
emergency medical treatment), the Court, it will be recalled, considered 
whether or not the claim would have succeeded had it been brought on the 
basis of section 27(1) – the right of everyone to have access to health care 
                                                 
109 C Mouffe The return of the political (1993) 128 – 130. 
110 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 280. 
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services.111 The Court holds that it would have failed on this basis also.112 
Central to this holding is the Court’s findings about the extent to which the 
state was financially constrained with respect to the health care services it 
could provide. The Court kicks off its consideration of the claim on this basis, 
by characterising the right provided for in section 27(1) and (2) as a right of 
everyone to ‘have access to health care services provided by the state “within 
its available resources” ‘.113 On this basis it then proceeds simply to recount 
as fact the state’s assertion that the KwaZulu-Natal health ministry does not 
have sufficient funds at its disposal to meet all of the needs it should cater 
to.114 This leads to the conclusion that the ministry is forced to ration the 
limited resources at its disposal.115 The Court then finds that it did so showing 
a legitimate preference for preventative and curative treatment, rather than 
treatment simply prolonging life, a choice that the Court did not have the 
capacity to question.116 Because the specific decision to deny the applicant 
the treatment he sought was taken in terms of a rational set of criteria 
designed to give effect to this preference, so the Court concludes, that 
specific decision must be left to stand.117 
 
This whole line of argument, presented by the Court as inexorable, rests on 
the Court’s unquestioning acceptance of the state’s assertion of a lack of 
resources. This acceptance has been criticised, and rightly so.118 The 
applicant had argued that, although it was certainly so that the provincial 
ministry had a large shortfall on resources with which to provide health care 
services, this was not the level at which questions should be asked. Instead, 
so it was argued, the question is why more resources were not allocated to it 
from national government. The Court acknowledges this argument, but fails to 
deal with it substantively in any way.119 This simple acceptance by the Court 
of the constraint under which the provincial health ministry operated as an 
                                                 
111 Soobramoney (n 104 above) para 22 and what follows. 
112 As above para 36. 
113 As above para 22. 
114 As above para 23. 
115 As above para 24. 
116 As above paras 24 & 28 – 29. 
117 As above para 24. 
118 See in particular Alston & Scott (n 108 above) 245 – 248. 
119 Soobramoney (n 104 above) para 23. 
 224
accomplished fact again speaks of traditional straight line thinking – both in 
respect of the interpretation of section 27(2) implicit in it and the manner in 
which the Court engages with the information regarding resource availability 
that the state placed before it. 
 
The Court’s unquestioning acceptance of the fact that the provincial 
government did not have enough resources at its disposal implies a certain 
understanding of section 27(2). In simply accepting without question the 
state’s reliance on that section as an excuse for why it could not provide in the 
applicant’s health care needs, the Court endorses the limited reading of 
section 27(2) that it operates only as such an excuse. That is, it implies that 
the only function of the phrase ‘within available resources’ is to allow the state 
– if the simple fact of limited resources is asserted – to escape responsibility 
for a failure in the provision of health care services. 
 
This is perhaps a plausible reading of section 27(2), but it certainly is not the 
only plausible one, nor, I would venture, even the most plausible one. 
Although section 27(2) does operate as a mechanism allowing the state to 
escape responsibility for health care service delivery failure, it seems to be, 
much more importantly, also a device for calling the state to account. That is, 
in attempting to use the existence of limited resources as an excuse, section 
27(2) requires the state not only to assert the fact, however true, that it 
operates within limited resources (that will always be the case). It also 
requires the state to account for why it has only such limited resources at its 
disposal for the provision of health care services and why it chose to expend 
the limited resources it has at its disposal in the manner that it did. 
 
The limited reading instead attributed to the resource constraint aspect of 
section 27(2) by the Court indicates straight-line thinking discouraging 
transformative politics in two ways. First, the Court’s reading unabashedly 
depicts section 27(2)’s resource constraint phrase in straight-line, either/or 
terms – it seems to say that the phrase requires only that the state assert 
resource constraint, and if that assertion (the simple assertion ‘we do not have 
enough money’) is true, the Court has no choice but to accept it as an excuse. 
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This scripts for the Court a mere mechanical role of applying clear law to clear 
facts and rendering a pre-determined result – simply giving voice to a 
conclusion dictated by the brutal facts. As such it can be seen as an attempt 
by the Court to escape responsibility and accountability for accepting the 
state’s resource constraint excuse – a transformative politics-limiting moment 
in the Court’s decision 
. 
Second, the Court accepts the province’s factual assertion of resource 
constraint as though it is self-evident, incontrovertible. And, on it own terms, it 
certainly is: it is clear that the provincial health department has a large short-
fall on its budget. But that fact on its own is unremarkable. The Court’s 
acceptance of it operates as a – conscious or unconscious – device to avoid 
the really difficult and really important political question lurking in the 
background: why is it that the province does not have enough resources to 
meet the health care needs of its inhabitants? The answer to this question is 
of course that ideologically informed political choices were made at the 
national level to allocate to the province a limited budget for health care 
services – choices that are not set in stone and that, if informed by different 
ideologies and political aims, could have been different. The Court’s complete 
disregard of this question hides the politically and ideologically charged nature 
of the ‘fact’ that the province’s resources are limited. In short, it denies the 
human and political agency that shaped the predicament of the provincial 
government. In doing so, it also denies responsibility for and discourages 
transformative political contestation of those choices.120 
 
This is true also in a more practical or concrete sense. In simply, without 
more, accepting the province’s assertion that it was operating under severe 
resource constraints, the Court failed in the real sense of the term to call the 
province to account – that is, to explain its predicament. Instead, the Court 
seems to think that, once such a bald assertion of resource constraints is 
made, it is up to the applicant to challenge it and to show that it does not hold. 
                                                 
120 Note that my concern here is not that our courts should arrogate themselves the power to 
prescribe allocational choices to the legislature or executive. Rather, I suggest that they 
should not be unwilling to scrutinise such choices – as was done in Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC). 
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In the absence of such a challenge, so the Court seems to think, the state’s 
assertion will simply be accepted.121 This, as Sandra Liebenberg has argued, 
is a wholly unrealistic way of doing things.122 There is an absolute imbalance 
of power between the state and an impoverished claimant such as 
Soobramoney when it comes to the question whether or not the state is 
indeed constrained by limited resources to such an extent and in such manner 
that it cannot provide in the claimant’s needs. The state has all the 
information, expertise and infrastructure needed to prove such a claim at its 
disposal (indeed, it controls the information necessary to interrogate such a 
claim) – the typical claimant in a socio-economic rights claim has none. In 
short, it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, that an individual claimant, or even 
a large group of claimants, would be able to marshal the resources and 
access the information necessary to challenge such an assertion 
successfully.123 This failure effectively to call the state to account again 
discourages political engagement – or at least misses an opportunity for 
political engagement to take place. 
 
Soobramoney, the Court’s first socio-economic right case, reflects in the two 
ways indicated above, in its engagement with the issue of resource 
constraints, the kind of straight line depiction of legal rules that tends to 
disregard the political nature of interpretation and so to discourage political 
engagement with judicial work product that I set out above. How has the 
theme of resource constraints, if read through a concern with transformative 
politics, fared in the later cases? 
 
In Grootboom resource constraint was not in issue – it was not raised by the 
state and there was therefore no need to engage with the problem. It is only in 
Treatment Action Campaign that the issue rears its head again – and after 
that in Khosa.124 
 
                                                 
121 Soobramoney (n 104 above) para 23. 
122 S Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: an effective 
tool in challenging poverty?’ (2003) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 159 177. 
123 As above.  
124 Khosa (n 120 above). 
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In Treatment Action Campaign in relation to the question whether Nevirapine 
should be provided at all public health facilities where the necessary 
counselling and monitoring infrastructure already existed, the question of 
availability of resources did not arise, as the manufacturers of the drug had 
undertaken to provide it for free for five years and no additional infrastructural 
spending was required to proceed with provision at such facilities.125 However, 
with respect to the provision of Nevirapine to prevent transmission of HIV from 
mother to child at birth at facilities without the necessary counselling and 
monitoring infrastructure, the issue did arise, as the state objected that such 
infrastructure had to be put in place before Nevirapine could be provided. 
Here, different from in Soobramoney, the Court engaged with and rejected the 
state’s reliance on resource constraints. It did so on the basis, first, that since 
litigation in the case had commenced, some provincial governments had 
proceeded with extending provision of Nevirapine to facilities other than the 
pilot sites,126 despite the fact that at the time no counselling and monitoring 
infrastructure existed at these sites (such infrastructure was then put in place). 
For the Court, this showed that it was the ‘the requisite political will’, rather 
than resources, that was lacking.127 Second, the Court took account of the fact 
that at the time of the hearing before it, the state had announced the 
allocation of substantial additional resources to fight HIV/AIDS,128 so that it 
could conclude that, even if resource constraints limited the capacity for 
extension of provision of Nevirapine previously, this was no longer the case.129 
 
In this respect, therefore, Treatment Action Campaign presents a significant 
improvement on Soobramoney. Clearly, the Court was willing to interrogate 
the state’s assertion of resource constraints and, if it was found wanting, to 
reject it – this surfaces the politically determined rather than inevitable nature 
of resource constraints and so encourages transformative political 
engagement in a powerful manner. 
                                                 
125 Treatment Action Campaign (n 102 above) para 19. This prompted the Court to hold that 
the extension of the programme to these sites ‘will not attract any significant additional costs’ 
(para 71). 
126 As above para 118. 
127 As above para 119. 
128 As above para 120. 
129 As above. 
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 However, perhaps not too much should be read into this. In the same way as 
in Soobramoney, the Court in Treatment Action Campaign does not 
interrogate and reject the state’s assertion of resource constraints on its own 
initiative. Rather, its interrogation was prompted by the Treatment Action 
Campaign, and its rejection of the assertion made possible because it was 
provided with up-to-date relevant information by the Treatment Acton 
Campaign.130 The Treatment Action Campaign was only able to take the 
initiative in this respect and to provide the Court with the information it needed 
because it was a highly organised, well-resourced, politically powerful 
organisation with strong links to expert researchers and research 
institutions.131 The same is unlikely to be the case in many socio-economic 
rights cases – most such cases will involve poorly resourced litigants 
advancing politically unpopular causes, without expert research backing.132 In 
short, therefore, in Treatment Action Campaign the Court still did not 
effectively call the state to account for its resource allocation. In addition to 
this, the basis upon which the Court interrogated and rejected the state’s 
reliance on resource constraint also limits the extent to which Treatment 
Action Campaign can be read as a wholesale advance on Soobramoney. The 
Court did not at all interrogate the allocational choices made by the state, that 
is, it did not question the choice made by the state to allocate the available 
resources to other needs than the prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV/AIDS at birth. Rather, it was presented with and accepted evidence 
that the state was not, as it had claimed, constrained by limited resources. 
The political questions inherent in the issue of resource constraint – why it is 
that certain choices favouring certain needs were made – were left 
untouched.  
 
To my mind Khosa represents the high water mark with respect to the Court’s 
dealings with the issue of resource constraints. In Khosa this issue arose as 
                                                 
130 M Heywood ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in South Africa: background, 
strategies and outcomes of the treatment action campaign case against the minister of health’ 
(2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 278 303 – 307. 
131 As above. 
132 See D Brand ‘Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign: the right to have access to 
health care in the South African constitution’ (2003) 11 Tilburg Foreign Law Review 671 702. 
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one of the state’s responses to the claim that non-citizen permanent residents 
living in South Africa if otherwise eligible should be included in the public 
social assistance provisioning net. The state objected to this claim that its 
finite resources would preclude extending social assistance grants to indigent 
permanent residents.133 With what seemed at the time to be startling 
boldness, Mokgoro J rejected this objection.134 First, she was unconvince
that the information provided by the state to back up its objection in fact did 
so.
d 
e 
ro J 
and 
                                                
135 In this respect Mokgoro J held that the state’s estimation that allowing 
indigent permanent residents into the system would add an additional R234 
million to R672 million to the social assistance budget was simply too 
imprecise to prove anything – it did not allow the Court to decide whether th
additional burden would be unbearable. In more intrusive fashion, Mokgo
also scrutinised the evidence provided by the state of current spending on 
projected increases in spending on social assistance.136 Here she found that, 
even at the most pessimistic estimate of the additional cost that the inclusion 
of permanent residents in the system would cause,137 the additional burden on 
the state would in relative terms be so small as to be negligible.138 
 
Mokgoro J’s holdings with respect to resource constraints in Khosa are 
significant for my purposes in a number of respects. First, as in Treatment 
Action Campaign, the simple fact that she does not accept the assertion of 
resource constraints at face value, but interrogates it and, having found it 
wanting, rejects it again dispels the kind of straight line, either/or thinking 
evidenced in this respect in Soobramoney. As Botha points out, the depiction 
of legal rules as straight lines or boundaries that, if applied to a set of facts 
that they fit, mechanically render a self-evident result, is not only inaccurate 
 
133 Khosa (n 120 above) paras 60 & 61. 
134 The Court’s willingness to do so is not insignificant. See by way of contrast Ncgobo J, 
dissenting in Khosa (para 128): ‘Mr Kruger … estimates that the annual cost of including 
permanent residents could range between R243 million and R672 million. Policymakers have 
the expertise … to present a … prediction about future social conditions. That is … the work 
that policymakers are supposed to do. Unless there is evidence to the contrary, courts should 
be slow to reject reasonable estimates made by policymakers.’ 
135 Khosa (n 120 above) para 62. 
136 As above para 60. 
137 The state estimated that the additional cost would be between R243 million and R672 
million. The wide range itself indicated to the Court the absence of clear evidence as to the 
possible resource consequences of a finding of inconsistency (as above para 62). 
138 As above. 
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as a description of legal rules. It also under-estimates the contingency of the 
facts or evidence to which legal rules are applied. Facts and evidence are 
also ‘texts, the interpretation of which is contingent upon the experience, 
values and imagination of the interpreter.’139 The process of applying legal 
rules (or standards) to a set of facts or a body of information in order to reach 
conclusions implies work, not application by rote. It is, in Botha’s words, ‘a 
dynamic interplay between rules and facts, by means of which both are 
moulded and remoulded to fit each other’.140 For Mokgoro J to interrogate and 
question the information presented by the state and the conclusions the state 
draws from that information, is to surface the contingency of that information, 
to dispel the impression of inevitability with which it is presented and 
acknowledge that such presentation is politically contestable. This opens 
space for the operation of a transformative politics – or at least, avoids closing 
down such space, as would have happened had the resource constraint 
assertion been accepted without interrogation. 
 
But Khosa goes further than Treatment Action Campaign. By scrutinising the 
state’s assertion of constraint on her own initiative, without a contrary showing 
having to be made by the applicants in the case, Mokgoro J implicitly 
abandons the approach applied in Soobramoney and still evident in 
Treatment Action Campaign in terms of which the state only has to allege 
resource constraint and it then remains for the complainant to rebut that 
allegation. Mokgoro J’s approach to the matter indicates that it is indeed the 
state that has to persuade the Court of the cogency and correctness of an 
assertion of resource constraint. Mokgoro J in other words powerfully imposes 
a duty to account on the state and in so doing again opens space for 
transformative politics. 
 
Again, perhaps, not too much should be read into Khosa. Although Mokgoro 
J, as happened in Treatment Action Campaign, both surfaces the political 
contestability of the issue of resource constraint and goes one step further in 
clearly imposing a duty to account in this respect on the state, she was, at 
                                                 
139 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 273. 
140 As above. 
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least in part, able to do so because Khosa was an easy case. This is true both 
with respect to the basic issue in the case (exclusion from social assistance 
eligibility of indigent permanent residents, children, disabled and the elderly 
alike just seems intuitively wrong) and with respect to the resource constraint 
question. In short, the state’s bungling – presenting vague figures capable of 
conflicting interpretations - made possible Mokgoro J’s holding. One can only 
speculate whether or not she would have been as bold in her interrogation if 
the state were more precise in asserting the resource constraint point. 
 
4.3.2.2 Application of the reasonableness test 
In an influential early response to the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
Grootboom, Theunis Roux attempted to formulate the precise basis upon 
which the Court in that case found the state’s housing programme to be 
inconsistent with the constitution, and so, I suppose, to formulate the test or 
rule that emerged. He wrote that the case was decided on the basis of a 
requirement of ‘mere[ ] inclusion’ and that ‘a government programme that is 
subject to socio-economic rights will [in terms of this finding] be unreasonable 
if it fails to cater to a significant segment of society.’141 Specifically, so he 
continued, Grootboom was not authority for the proposition that a measure 
would be unreasonable if it fails to engage in ‘sensible priority-setting, with 
particular attention to the plight of those in greatest need’.142 At the time this 
prompted from me an analysis of Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign 
in which I argued that both cases were decided on the basis of narrow 
rationality concerns only – a basic requirement of ‘rational coherence’.143 In 
Grootboom, so the argument went, the Court was concerned in the final 
analysis only with a logical inconsistency in the state’s housing policy – with 
the fact that no reference was made to absolutely homeless people. 
Treatment Action Campaign, so I continued, was similar. Ostensibly that case 
was decided on the basis that the state’s policy with respect to the provision 
                                                 
141 T Roux ‘Understanding Grootboom – A response to Cass R Sunstein’ (2002) 12:2 
Constitutional Forum 41 49. 
142 CR Sunstein ‘Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa’ (2001) 11:4 
Constitutional Forum 123 127. 
143 D Brand ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, or: 
“What are socio-economic rights for?” ’ in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) (n 26 
above) 33 50. 
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of Nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV was unduly 
inflexible.144 However, I pointed to passages from the judgment which to me 
made it clear that in fact at least part of the underlying rationale of the 
decision was, just as in Grootboom, a basic logical inconsistency in the state’s 
position. Responding to the state’s argument that Nevirapine could not be 
provided at all public health facilities where it is needed, the Court pointed out 
that the state was indeed providing Nevirapine to mothers and new-born 
babies at the designated pilot sites. These pilot sites constituted 10% of public 
health facilities at which mothers gave birth. It was for the Court ‘unthinkable’ 
that the state would provide to babies and women a drug the safety and 
efficacy of which it was not convinced about.145 In short, one part of the state’s 
position – its questioning of the safety and efficacy of Nevirapine – did not 
square logically with another – its provision of the same Nevirapine to real 
women and children at the pilot sites. 
 
In Chapter 3 I criticised this aspect of the two judgments as an example of the 
Court using and legitimising a depoliticising rhetoric. I characterised the 
requirement of ‘rational coherence’ as a ‘structural good governance principle’ 
and argued that the Court’s reliance on this requirement pointed to an attempt 
to depict socio-economic rights as a set of technical good governance 
guidelines or rules, devoid of political content. This, I concluded, fed into a 
general tendency in the political discourse about need and deprivation to 
describe these issues, in an attempt to remove them from political 
contestation, as best left to the impersonal forces of the market for solution, 
with the role of the state depicted as that of a neutral arbiter or regulator 
only.146 
 
Here my concern is slightly different. In Chapter 1 I related how the traditional 
understanding of legal rules as straight lines depicts rules in an either/or 
fashion. Either a set of facts falls right next to the rule in a space well-
populated by settled precedent, in which case the rule is absolutely 
                                                 
144 As above. 
145 As above. 
146 See 176 and further above. 
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constraining upon the adjudicator; or the set of facts does not fit the rule, or 
falls right next to the rule but in a space not yet filled in by settled precedent, 
in which case the adjudicator is absolutely free. I further related how this view 
of legal rules allows judges to present their work as wholly mechanical and so 
empty of political content.147 
 
There is something of this either/or logic for me in the Court’s reliance on the 
requirement of rational coherence in Grootboom and Treatment Action 
Campaign. A logical inconsistency is something that one notices and declares 
– or, at least, it is easy to present it as such. It is not a matter of opinion, 
something that can be debated, it is a fact. For the Court to spot and latch 
onto this kind of logical flaw in the state’s position allows it, whilst finding the 
state’s measure to be inconsistent with the constitution, to maintain the image 
of mechanical operation so central to the straight line-view of law. This in turn 
allows it to escape, at least ostensibly, responsibility for its holdings and so to 
avoid political engagement with them. 
 
Of course, there are good reasons why the Court would opt to base its 
holdings in controversial cases such as Grootboom and Treatment Action 
Campaign on the kind of technical rational coherence requirement related 
above. The pretence of political neutrality that comes with such reliance is 
useful for the Court in its management of its institutional relations with the 
other branches of government. It allows the Court to enforce the rights in 
question, whilst maintaining at the same time that there is in substance 
nothing wrong with the state measure at issue – to enforce rights whilst at the 
same time legitimising the state’s transformative programme.148 It also 
presents a good example of the kind of ‘judicious avoidance’ that I briefly 
touched upon above – deciding a case on as narrow a basis and in as shallow 
a manner as possible, so as to avoid having to make decisions on and so 
bringing about closure with respect to contentious social questions.149 The 
importance of this both strategic and democracy-oriented advantage should 
                                                 
147 See 54 – 55 & 57 above. 
148 See, in general, Roux (n 68 above). 
149 See 208 and further above. 
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not be discounted. Nevertheless, both come at a cost: the device used to 
attain them works, as I have argued here, to discourage transformative 
political action. 
 
The reading of Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign as reflecting 
elements of traditional straight line thinking presented above should 
immediately be placed in perspective or, more to the point, qualified. First, 
with the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that the decision in Grootboom 
was motivated by more than a simple rational coherence concern – that, 
indeed, the decision exhibits in a concrete and operationalised fashion a 
concern that some form of priority be accorded the needs of those who are 
desperately deprived. As I will show in more detail below150 cases subsequent 
to Grootboom have shown that the Court operates with a sliding standard of 
scrutiny when applying its socio-economic rights reasonableness test, 
scrutinising state measures more strictly in some cases than others. One of 
the factors that seem to determine the level of scrutiny the Court will apply in 
any given case is the level of deprivation experienced by the claimants before 
the Court and the impact that the state’s alleged failure to give effect to their 
rights has on them. In cases where the claimants are severely deprived and 
are drastically affected by the failure of the measures in question, the Court 
applies a stricter standard of scrutiny than in cases where the level of 
deprivation is more attenuated and the impact less severe. It has, to my mind 
persuasively, been argued that one reason why the Court opted in Grootboom 
for a level of scrutiny far stricter than that used in Soobramoney is that the 
claimants in Grootboom were simply much worse off in general terms than the 
claimant in Soobramoney.151 This does make it seem as though, although it is 
not articulated in the judgment, a substantive concern for different levels of 
deprivation was at play in the decision, with concrete results. 
 
In addition, in subsequent cases, the Court has engaged in much more 
substantive analysis and reasoning than is evident in Grootboom and 
                                                 
150 See 240 and further below. 
151 See P de Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as 
contextual fairness’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 258. 
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Treatment Action Campaign and has clearly not relied on a requirement of 
rational coherence. PE Municipality would have been the perfect example for 
this point, with Sachs J’s focus on the position of the squatters in that case in 
society, the impact the eviction would have on them, the reasons for their 
initial occupation of the land in question and the reasons why the landowner 
now wanted to have them removed, as well as his articulation of a particular 
vision of a just society making for a richly substantively argued judgement. 
However, PE Municipality was not decided on the basis of the section 26(2) 
reasonableness test, but on the basis of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act.152 As such, its usefulness as 
comparator for Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign is limited. 
 
Once more, Khosa steps into the breach. In Khosa Mokgoro J does not avoid 
the substantive issues of need, deprivation, marginality and social exclusion 
that the case raises or deny their politically contested nature. Instead, she 
makes them central to her judgment. Mokgoro J kicks off her consideration of 
whether or not the exclusion from the social security system of permanent 
residents is reasonable for purposes of section 27(2) by describing the 
reasonableness test and its manner of application. First, she emphasises the 
fact that, when applying the reasonableness test, ‘context is all important’.153 
This, so it transpires, means that the content of the test is determined by the 
circumstances of each case: Mokgoro J lists a number of factors or 
circumstances that would be relevant to determining the reasonableness of 
the measure at issue in this case (the purpose served by social assistance; 
the relevance to this purpose of the requirement of citizenship; and the impact 
the exclusion has on impoverished permanent residents) with the unstated 
implication that in other cases, other factors might be important.154 Her 
description of the test in the abstract is illuminating – she seems to regard the 
reasonableness standard in precisely the ‘field of action’ terms that I relate 
earlier in this Chapter and in Chapter 1 below.155 That is, it is clear that for 
                                                 
152 Act 19 of 1998. 
153 Khosa (n 120 above) para 49. 
154 As above. 
155 See 58 - 60 above. 
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her, although the test poses certain broad outline requirements,156 its 
operative content is determined by its interpreter anew in each case in light of 
the facts and circumstances of that case. Again, her understanding of the 
application of the reasonableness test seems to square with the idea that 
interpretation and application is ‘a dynamic interplay between rules and facts, 
by means of which both are moulded and remoulded to fit each other’.157 
                                                
 
The description of the standard in the abstract is also translated into her 
decision in the case. In eventually holding the exclusion of permanent 
residents inconsistent with the constitution, she introduces a number of 
important innovations into the reasonableness test, all of which seem to be 
dictated by the peculiar circumstances of the case before her. So, for 
example, it is clear from her judgment that she sees that the stringency of 
application of the test will vary from case to case. She emphasises the 
uniquely marginalised and vulnerable position in society of the claimants 
before her and the fact that their exclusion from the social assistance system 
has a severe impact on them.158 She then proceeds to test the measure 
excluding them amongst other things against a standard of proportionality, 
weighing up the importance of the purpose of the exclusion against the impact 
that it has on the claimants.159 
 
In this light, it is clear, as with the development of the Court’s interpretation 
and application of the resource constraint qualification related above, that the 
initial indications of straight line thinking encountered in Grootboom and 
Treatment Action Campaign and the disengagement with transformative 
politics that suggested, has gradually been supplanted by a reading and 
application of the reasonableness test much more aware of the interpretive 
role of the judge, the indeterminate nature of the standard, and the resultant 
fact of judicial responsibility. This development seems to indicate a growing 
sensitivity in the Court’s jurisprudence to transformative politics. The next step 
in the development of the Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence – Olivia 
 
156 Such as that a measure must be rationally related to its purpose. 
157 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 273. 
158 Khosa (n 120 above) paras 76 – 78. 
159 As above para 82. 
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Road – unfortunately seems in this respect to be a step in the wrong direction, 
or one too far in the right direction. 
 
4.3.2.3 Olivia Road – collapse into instrumentality? 
In Olivia Road, it will be recalled, Yacoob J dealt with the application for an 
eviction order before him on appeal in a novel manner. Rather than himself 
deciding the matter, he left it to the parties to resolve it amongst themselves. 
After hearing the case, but before handing down judgment, he ordered the 
parties to engage with each other in order to find a solution to their common 
problem.160 This they did, submitting an agreement to the Court. Yacoob J 
approved this agreement so that it became an order of court – again before 
handing down judgment in the case.161 In the result the main live issue in the 
case – the question whether or not the occupiers should be evicted before 
suitable alternative accommodation had been found for and made available to 
them – was disposed of without any direct involvement by the Court.   
 
Despite its intuitive appeal to anyone interested in the relationship between 
transformative politics and socio-economic rights adjudication (transformative 
politics seems almost to have been injected into the process of socio-
economic rights adjudication), Yacoob J’s approach to the case viewed from 
the perspective employed in this Chapter is highly problematic. In Chapter 1 I 
pointed out that a view of adjudication just as problematic as the straight line 
view in its relationship to transformative politics, is the view of adjudication as 
the play of sound-bite pairs. In this view adjudication is nothing but the almost 
ritualistic exchange of sets of contradictory sound-bites. Botha feels more or 
less the same unease about this depiction of adjudication as he does about 
the straight line view. He is concerned that it too denudes adjudication of its 
political nature and content. Because adjudication in the sound-bite depiction 
occurs absent any constraint, so he reasons, judges are completely free to 
pursue their own ideological purposes and preferred outcomes in cases. This 
                                                 
160 Olivia Road (n 99 above) para 5. 
161 As above para 27. 
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means that adjudication degenerates into something completely instrumental, 
devoid of broader political significance.162 
 
This, unfortunately, seems exactly what happens in Olivia Road. Yacoob J’s 
choice to order engagement and to approve the agreement reached before 
having decided the case means that a solution is reached for the predicament 
of the group of occupiers before the Court only. The dispute is resolved 
without any judicial decision – without the application and elaboration of law, 
that is. This means that, apart from establishing the rule that a court may, 
even at the level of final appeal, before having decided a case order parties to 
resolve the dispute between them by engaging with each other, no new law is 
created, no rules of general application in terms of which future similar cases 
can be resolved. As a result the process of adjudication becomes wholly 
instrumentalised, aimed at generating a practicable solution to the specific 
dispute before the court only, in the terms that the specific parties see fit, 
without any concern shown for its broader political significance. That this is 
indeed so is underscored by Yacoob J’s response to the challenge of the 
occupiers to the general housing plan of the City of Johannesburg. This 
aspect of the case represented to me the attempt of the specific occupiers 
before the Court to bring to the fore the broader political significance of their 
particular plight – to point out that their predicament was shared by a large 
number of other people and raised political questions that transcended their 
specific concerns. Yacoob J, on the argument that the dispute directly before 
the Court (the specific eviction dispute) had been resolved declined the 
invitation to consider this matter, holding that future groups of people who 
suffer the same fate as the group of occupiers then before him could each go 
to court on their own behalf and solve their problems on their own terms.163 
The message, seemingly, could not be clearer – the process of adjudication is 
intended for specific people or specific groups of people to solve their own, 
narrow instrumental concerns. It is not concerned with the resolution of or 
engagement with broader political questions. 
 
                                                 
162 Botha ‘Freedom’ (n 6 above) 264. 
163 Olivia Road (n 99 above) paras 34 – 35. 
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4.3.3 Finality 
4.3.3.1 Introduction 
In section 4.2.3 above I related two ways in which the tendency in 
adjudication toward finality, with its transformative politics-unfriendly results, 
could be problematised: greater context sensitivity in the interpretation and 
application of standards or rules; and the use of innovative remedies. Below I 
explore to what extent these two approaches have had an impact on the 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence of our courts. 
 
4.3.3.2 Context 
As soon as the second socio-economic rights decision of the Constitutional 
Court – Grootboom - was handed down, it was clear that context sensitivity 
plays an important role in the application of the Court’s reasonableness test. 
At the time, for example, Pierre de Vos attributed the different outcomes in 
Soobramoney and Grootboom to the Court’s sensitivity to context, arguing 
that the more vulnerable position of the claimants in Grootboom if compared 
with the claimant in Soobramoney persuaded the Court in the latter case to 
employ a more intrusive standard of scrutiny and to find in favour of the 
evicted squatters.164 I also, in a contribution published just after Grootboom 
was handed down, speculated that the case indicated that the Court was 
fashioning a variable standard of scrutiny, the intensity with which it will be 
applied in any given case being determined primarily by the position of the 
claimants before the Court in society and the impact that the state measure in 
question has on them.165   
 
These predictions have since proven to be true. The Court’s subsequent 
decisions have indicated that it indeed applies different degrees of scrutiny in 
different cases. This is certainly most clearly evident with respect to the 
Court’s standard of review. As will be recalled, the Court applies a 
reasonableness test to review the compliance of state measures with socio-
economic rights. This reasonableness test – essentially a means-end 
                                                 
164 De Vos (n 151 above). 
165 D Brand ‘The minimum core content of the right to food in context: a response to Rolf 
Künneman’ in D Brand & S Russell (eds) Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: 
South African and international perspectives (2002) 99 108. 
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effectiveness test in which the Court asks whether or not and to what extent a 
measure is capable of achieving the realisation of the socio-economic right in 
question – is explicitly designed by the Court to manage its concerns with 
institutional capacity and democratic legitimacy, as, in theory it allows the 
Court to find a policy unreasonable, without having to prescribe to the state 
specifically what it must do to act reasonably. However, it has been applied as 
though on a sliding scale, with the Court in particular varying the extent to 
which it by implication directly prescribes to the state what it must do. In 
Soobramoney, the standard was one of simple rationality. The Court simply 
asked whether the policy was rationally conceived and applied in good 
faith.166 Its inquiry was limited to whether the policy, on its face, was rationally 
linked to the goal of providing access to health care services, in the sense 
that, within the bounds of logic, it could conceivably achieve its goal. 
 
The standard applied in Grootboom was clearly much more substantial. The 
Court there indicated that its standard of reasonableness requires the state’s 
policies and programmes intended to implement socio-economic rights to be 
comprehensive and coherent, coordinated, flexible, inclusive of all significantly 
at-risk sectors of society, sensitive to various degrees of deprivation and 
reasonably implemented as well as conceived.167 Taken together, these 
factors indicate that the Court in Grootboom required a much stronger link 
between the policy at issue and its constitutionally mandated goal than in 
Soobramoney. The Court significantly narrows the range of policy options that 
it would be legitimate for government to choose from and thinks about the 
relative efficiency of different policy options - the question now seems to have 
become whether the policy at issue was likely to achieve its goal. 
 
In Treatment Action Campaign the scrutiny becomes stricter still. Apart from 
adding a new factor to the list of factors used to determine the 
reasonableness of policies (transparency),168 the Court here limits the range 
of policy options that would be reasonable in light of the right to have access 
                                                 
166 Soobramoney (n 104 above) paras 25 & 29. The court applied, in other words, the low end 
of the arbitrariness standard enunciated in FNB (n 83 above). 
167 See 120 and further above. 
168 Treatment Action Campaign (n 102 above) para 123. 
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to health care services even further. The Court in Treatment Action Campaign 
makes a number of quite detailed findings of fact,169 interrogates the wisdom 
of government’s policy choice not to extend the provision of Nevirapine 
beyond the designated pilot sites closely,170 and finds the policy option 
proposed by the respondents in the matter to be superior in a number of 
respects to government’s position.171 Indeed, the Court in Treatment Action 
Campaign comes close to asking whether government’s chosen policy option 
will achieve its constitutionally mandated end. 
 
In Khosa, the Court’s scrutiny is even more intensive. The Court in Khosa 
finds the measures excluding permanent residents from the social assistance 
net to be unreasonable both because the purpose of the exclusion (to prevent 
people immigrating to South Africa becoming a burden on the state) could be 
achieved through means less restrictive of permanent residents’ rights 
(stricter control of access into the country) and because ‘the importance of 
providing access to social assistance to all who live permanently in South 
Africa and the impact upon life and dignity that a denial of such access has far 
outweighs the financial and immigration considerations on which the state 
relies’.172 The Court here applies a proportionality test to the state’s measures 
- the measures in question have to be necessary and the importance of the 
purpose of the measures must outweigh the adverse impact they have on 
individual rights and interests. The question has now become not only 
whether the measures in question will achieve their constitutional goal, but 
whether they are the best measures with which to do so. 
 
Finally, in PE Municipality, the Court goes the furthest. Here the Court does 
not only, based on a contextual consideration of a range of factors, find that 
the squatters may not be evicted without being provided with suitable 
alternative accommodation – an analysis which of itself already required the 
                                                 
169 The Court for instance rejects government’s contentions that Nevirapine is not safe for use 
in prevention of MTCT of HIV (as above paras 60 – 63) and that no capacity to counsel 
patients before the administration of Nevirapine and to monitor the use and effect of the drug 
after administration existed outside the designated pilot sites (paras 84 - 88). 
170 As above paras 48 – 81. 
171 As above paras 93 – 95. 
172 Khosa (n 120 above) paras 65 & 82. 
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Court to enter into a significant measure of interest balancing and policy 
evaluation – but goes so far as to prescribe to the state what suitable 
alternative accommodation for the squatters would be, by rejecting the offers 
of alternative land that the state had made and indicating what basic 
requirements suitable land would have to meet.173 
 
The same ‘sliding scale’ approach is exhibited in the Court’s remedial 
approach. The Court has drawn a fair measure of criticism with respect to its 
approach to providing remedies in socio-economic rights cases. The criticism 
has focussed on the Court’s unwillingness to impose supervisory interdicts on 
the state in cases such as Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign 
instead of simply declaratory or directory orders. However, the Court’s 
penchant for declaratory rather than specific directory relief is an extension of 
its reasonableness test – just as the Court tries as far as possible ‘only’ to 
determine that the state’s conduct is unconstitutional, without prescribing how 
it must rectify that conduct, the Court through its remedies tries to avoid 
prescribing specific policy options to the state. But again, the extent to which it 
has managed to leave a range of options open to the state in this respect 
differs from case to case. In Grootboom the Court issued a simple declarator, 
without at all prescribing to the state what kind of action it should take to take 
account of the needs of the homeless.174 In Treatment Action Campaign its 
order was more specific – it issued a declarator but coupled with an order 
directing the state to make Nevirapine available at all public health facilities to 
prevent MTCT of HIV and directing it to adopt a general plan to combat MTCT 
of HIV.175 However, the Court’s decision to add a directory order to its arsenal 
in this case was precisely motivated by a desire to defer to the technical 
judgment of health care professionals and health care managers. Had the 
Court simply declared the state’s decision not to make Nevirapine generally 
available unconstitutional, the implication would have been that the state must 
provide it at all public health facilities. By adding a directory order, the Court 
qualified the effects of its finding of unconstitutionality – it indicates in its 
                                                 
173 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 54. 
174 Grootboom (n 24 above) para 99. 
175 Treatment Action Campaign (n 102 above) para 135. 
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directory order that the state must make Nevirapine available at public health 
facilities, but only there where, in the opinion of the attending physician and 
her supervisor, it is appropriate and feasible. Nevertheless, the Treatment 
Action Campaign order is certainly far more specific and direct than the order 
in Grootboom. In Khosa the Court issues its most specific order – not only is it 
very specific in what adjustments it requires the state to make in its conduct 
(the state must simply include permanent residents in its social assistance 
net), it goes so far as to step into the shoes of the legislature and read the 
requisite words into the challenged statutory provision.176 
 
More interesting than the simple fact of this variability in scrutiny and remedial 
approach is the question of what it is that persuades the Court that it is less 
constrained by its institutional incapacity and inappropriateness and can 
therefore act more robustly in one case than in another. The Court has not 
itself explicitly indicated which principles and factors influence it in this 
respect, so that one has to deduce from the judgments what the position is. 
An analysis and comparison of the different judgments show that at least the 
following factors play an important role: 
 
(a) Positive or negative duties 
Certainly, whether or not the case in question is presented as aimed at 
enforcing a positive or a negative duty plays a distinguishing role. As a rule, 
courts will scrutinise infringements of negative duties imposed by socio-
economic rights more strictly than they would failures in meeting positive 
duties. Although this is also simply a question of judicial attitude the difference 
in degree of judicial constraint at play in cases of enforcement of positive as 
opposed to negative duties is simply required by the way in which these rights 
are formulated and by the general structure of constitutional litigation in South 
Africa. 
 
Constitutional litigation in South Africa proceeds in two stages. First, the 
complainant bears the onus to persuade the court that a right in the bill of 
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rights has been infringed. Should a court find that the right has been infringed 
the state bears the onus to justify its limitation of that right. In principle, the 
standard of scrutiny in terms of which courts decide whether or not any 
infringement of any constitutional right is justified is prescribed by section 
36(1) - the general limitation section, which applies to all rights. However, 
despite the fact that section 36(1) in principle applies to all infringements of all 
constitutional rights, courts in practice do not apply section 36(1) when they 
must decide whether or not failures by the state to give effect to the positive 
duties to protect, promote and fulfil socio-economic rights can be justified.177 
The positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights are explicitly described 
by the constitution as duties to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the rights in question.178 The Constitutional Court has interpreted this 
qualifying phrase as an internal limitation clause: a special standard of 
‘reasonableness’ scrutiny, used instead of section 36(1), according to which to 
decide whether or not failures in meeting the positive duties imposed by 
socio-economic rights can be justified. 
 
Whether or not the possible justification of an infringement of a socio-
economic right is considered in terms of section 36(1) or in terms of this 
special limitation clause significantly determines the degree of intensity with 
which a court operates. This is so because the standard of scrutiny that is 
applied under the two tests is different. Section 36(1) poses both a threshold 
requirement that an infringement of a right must meet in order for it to be 
capable of justification - the infringement must have occurred in terms of ‘law 
of general application’179 to be at all justifiable - and a standard of justification 
that the infringement must satisfy once it has passed the threshold. The 
standard of justification or scrutiny required by section 36(1) is a 
proportionality test: a court weighs the purpose and benefits of the 
infringement against its nature, effect and severity, and considers the relative 
                                                 
177 As above para 83 & 84. 
178 See eg ss 26(2) and 27(2). 
179 The infringement must have occurred in terms of a clear, precise and accessible rule (as 
opposed to a once-off decision) that applies in equal measure to all those that it reaches; see 
the dissenting judgment of Kriegler J in Hugo (n 21 above) para 86. 
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efficacy of the infringing measure in achieving its purpose, to decide whether 
or not it is justified. As such, it allows courts a fair amount of leeway to 
interrogate state conduct and to prescribe specific alternative options where 
state conduct is found to be unjustifiable. The reasonableness test that 
applies in cases of positive infringement of socio-economic rights, as pointed 
out above, rises only in exceptional cases to the level of proportionality. As a 
result, infringements of the positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights 
are usually evaluated against a more lenient standard of scrutiny than that 
which applies to other infringements of rights in terms of section 36(1). 
  
Although seemingly unavoidable, as the constitution mandates it, the 
distinction made with respect to the treatment of negative infringements and 
positive infringements is problematic. This is so because the distinction 
between positive duties and negative duties itself has been shown to have 
neither an empirical nor a principled basis. First, often the same conduct of 
the state can be described both as an infringement of the positive duty to fulfil 
a right and an infringement of the negative duty to respect it. As Liebenberg 
points out, in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, it was not clear 
whether the refusal to extend provision of Nevirapine for purposes of 
preventing transmission of HIV from mother to child at birth to all public health 
facilities, outside of a select few pilot sites, constituted a negative interference 
in or impairment of the right to have access to health care services, or a 
failure of the state positively to provide an essential health service. In effect, it 
could be characterised as both.180 Similarly, an element of the supposedly 
negative duty to respect rights - the duty to mitigate interference in the 
exercise of a right there where such interference is unavoidable - clearly 
requires the state to act, rather than to refrain from acting. 
 
Second, the distinction in consequence on the basis of which it is said that it is 
less problematic for courts to enforce negative duties than positive duties also 
does not hold. Enforcement of a negative duty against the state is as likely to 
have consequences for expenditure of resources as enforcement of a positive 
                                                 
180 S Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in Woolman, Roux & Bishop 
(eds) (n 84 above) ch 33 19. 
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duty. Enforcement of a negative duty also potentially requires a court to 
interfere as deeply in the policy-making powers of the executive or legislature 
as does enforcement of a negative duty. Suppose the state seeks to evict a 
group of illegal occupants from state land, with the purpose of developing that 
land for low-cost housing, to be occupied by a different group of people, next 
in line on the housing waiting list. For a court to prevent the state from doing 
so (to enforce the negative duty to respect the right to have access to 
adequate housing) will have important resource consequences - the state will 
have to find other suitable land and buy it, or use other state land, which itself 
in turn might have been allocated for a different use. Equally, in enforcing the 
negative duty in this respect, a court would interfere very directly in a 
complex, multi-faceted policy choice about how to decide who gets access to 
housing first, about where to situate low-cost housing development, 
etcetera.181 
 
As a result the distinction between negative and positive duties is a rather 
crude mechanism according to which to calibrate the intensity of a court’s 
review and the intrusiveness of its remedies. Nevertheless, cases which were 
presented by claimants as complaints of negative interferences with a socio-
economic right – such as Jaftha – have been decided by the Court in 
accordance with the strict section 36(1) proportionality standard of review and 
in such cases the Court has seen fit to apply also significantly more intrusive 
remedies than in others.182 
 
(b) Where the state has acted 
In cases where courts are required simply to enforce socio-economic rights as 
the legislature, the executive or the state administration have themselves 
defined those duties, rather than to interpret constitutional socio-economic 
rights, define duties on the basis of those rights and then to impose them on 
the state, courts have been more intrusive than in others. Arguing a case on 
                                                 
181 With respect to the blurring of the distinction between positive and negative constitutional 
duties, see, in general, S Bandes ‘The negative constitution: a critique’ (1990) 88 Michigan 
Law Review 2271. 
182 See also in this respect President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd (Agri SA & others, amici curiae) 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) and PE Municipality (n 173 
above). 
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the basis of such self-defined duties or second tier socio-economic rights, 
rather than directly on the basis of a constitutional socio-economic right, is 
therefore generally to be preferred. The most obvious examples of the 
enforcement of such self-defined duties are cases where courts enforce 
statutory socio-economic rights, in any one of the two senses described 
above.183 In most such cases, constraint is diluted not only by the fact that 
courts are not faced with themselves having to define duties to impose on the 
state, but also because courts are able to make use of remedies from the 
existing law to enforce statutorily defined duties. The many instances where 
courts have enforced statutory entitlements to social assistance through 
administrative law remedies illustrate this point.184 
 
By the same token, courts will be more comfortable to enforce socio-
economic rights as they have been defined through executive or 
administrative action, as described above. In B,185 the willingness of the Court 
to order the state to provide at its own cost anti-retroviral medication to the 
two applicants to whom the state had prescribed it, in contrast to its refusal to 
make the same order with respect to the two applicants for whom it had not 
yet been prescribed, turned on the fact that the prescription of the medication 
to the first two applicants amounted to an administrative self-definition of the 
state’s duty. The Court was willing to enforce that duty because, in doing so, it 
was not required itself to determine what adequate medical treatment 
entailed, a task that it felt it did not have the requisite expertise to 
undertake.186 Treatment Action Campaign provides a similar example, 
although with respect to an executive policy formulation decision rather than a 
decision by the administration. The relatively robust manner in which the 
Constitutional Court in that case engaged with issues of AIDS policy and the 
willingness of the Court in that case, as opposed to other cases, to impose a 
precise and intrusive directory order on the state can in significant part be 
explained by the fact that the Court was simply requiring the state to extend a 
                                                 
183 See 83 and further above. 
184 See N de Villiers ‘Social grants and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act’ (2002) 18 
South African Journal on Human Rights 320 for an overview. 
185 B v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 6 BCLR 789 (C). 
186 As above para 37. See also paras 35, 36 & 60. 
 248
policy decision that it had itself already taken (that Nevirapine was suitable 
and safe to provide to mothers giving birth at select public health facilities and 
their new-born children to prevent transmission of HIV) to its logical 
conclusion (to extend the provision to all public health facilities for the same 
purpose).187 Again, an element of self-definition of duties, this time through an 
executive policy decision, influenced the Court’s perception of constraint. 
 
The fact that the state has acted with respect to a socio-economic right is 
relevant to the Court’s degree of intensity in review and remedy in another 
way. In Grootboom, Modderklip and PE Municipality the Constitutional Court 
emphasised the fact that the squatters in those cases were placed in the 
predicament that they faced by the state itself – that the state had previously 
evicted them from land without providing to them alternative accommodation, 
so that they had to occupy the land from which the state then again sought to 
evict them. This fact clearly influenced the Court in favour of the squatters, 
persuading it in particular in Modderklip and PE Municipality to make 
particularly robust findings and impose particularly intrusive remedies on the 
state.188 
 
(c) The impact of the state’s conduct 
The extent to which the state’s conduct has an adverse impact on the rights 
and interests of those affected by it further clearly determines the intensity of 
its review and the intrusiveness of its orders. This is true in both a general and 
a particular fashion. First, the Court’s intensity is enhanced when it deals with 
claimants from some historically marginalised or particularly vulnerable group, 
such as children or rural women. With respect to children, the constitution 
seems to mandate the application of the stricter section 36(1) proportionality 
review standard, as their rights are not subject to the special limitations 
clauses to which the rights of everyone are. In addition, the Court has, in 
particular in Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign and Khosa indicated 
that its willingness to act robustly in review and remedy will be enhanced if the 
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188 See eg PE Municipality (n 173 above) para 55. 
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claimants hail from such a particularly vulnerable group.189 Second, the real 
adverse impact that the state’s conduct has on the actual claimants before the 
Court, irrespective of which group they are from, has also been cited by the 
Court as a justification for more robust action than in other cases.190 
 
(d) The conduct of the parties to litigation 
The final factor that has seemed to influence the Court’s intensity of review 
and intrusiveness of remedy is the conduct of the parties to the litigation 
leading up to and during the dispute before the Court. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by Modderklip and PE Municipality. As will be recalled, in both 
these cases the Court utilised a particularly intense standard of review. It did 
not only ask the question whether or not the state is obligated to provide to 
the squatters alternative accommodation should they be evicted, but also 
inquired into and rejected the suitability of accommodation that the state had 
selected and offered to the squatters. Furthermore, it translated these findings 
into particularly specific orders that had significant resource implications for 
the state (denying the eviction orders sought by the state, unless suitable 
alternative accommodation as described by the Court was provided by the 
state). In both cases, the Court cited the conduct of the parties to the litigation 
as relevant to determining its intensity of review and remedy. The Court 
focussed on the fact that the state, by evicting the squatters previously from 
other land without providing alternative accommodation, had caused the 
squatters’ predicament in the first place and had then subsequently made no 
effort to solve their problem and rejected their own efforts to do so amicably. It 
also noted that the squatters had moved onto the land in question not to force 
the state to provide them with alternative accommodation but simply because 
they had nowhere else to go, and had subsequently tried to negotiate an 
amicable solution to the problem with both the state and the private 
landowners in question. These circumstances clearly influenced the Court to 
act robustly in favour of the squatters.191 
 
                                                 
189 See eg Khosa (n 120 above) para 74 (identifying permanent residents as a particularly 
vulnerable group). 
190 See eg as above paras 76 & 77. 
191 See eg PE Municipality (n 173 above) paras 57 & 59. 
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I have shown above how the Constitutional Court has managed, through 
adopting a flexible or variable standard of review and remedial approach in 
socio-economic rights cases, to take account of the specific circumstances 
and context of each case coming before it in a practical, operationalised 
fashion. I have also shown which factors seem to influence the Court in 
calibrating the intensity of its review and the intrusiveness of its orders in any 
given case. 
 
The contextual awareness the Court displays in this way, its willingness to be 
responsive to the specific requirements of each and every case, rather than to 
rely on rigid conceptualist distinctions to determine its reasoning and findings, 
is encouraging. It potentially presents a powerful way in which the Court can 
avoid the closure and finality that a more generalised approach would have 
resulted in. Importantly, however, the Court still manages to retain a measure 
of generality in its application of the reasonableness standard. It operates in 
terms of a broad settled normative framework (the elements of the 
reasonableness test have been clearly enunciated) but simply varies the 
intensity with which that framework is brought to bear on any particular 
measure. 
 
At this stage the development of a set of principles on which to base its 
approach of variability is still in its infancy. In this respect the Court’s reliance 
on the distinction between positive and negative duties is problematic, as it 
seems to recall the very conceptualist logic that the approach of variability is 
intended to avoid, falling into the kind of either/or straight line thinking that 
works against the fostering in adjudication of transformative politics. The 
increasing indications that the Court is relying on other factors – the extent to 
which it is actually required to define duties and impose those unilaterally on 
the state, instead of simply enforcing duties as the state has defined them; the 
impact of the state’s conduct; and the conduct of the parties to litigation – to 
calibrate its intensity of review and the intrusiveness of its orders shows 
promise in this respect. 
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4.3.3.3 Remedies 
(a) Introduction 
To date much criticism has been levelled at the Constitutional Court for the 
remedies it has awarded in socio-economic rights cases. The cases that have 
attracted most of the criticism have been those in which a failure by the state 
to provide in some basic need was at issue – cases, that is, such as 
Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign, Khosa, PE Municipality and Olivia 
Road. In these cases, the relief fashioned by the court must prompt the state 
to act affirmatively in order to set things right - to amend a policy or adopt a 
new one, or to provide a service that it is not currently providing or extend a 
service to people who do not currently qualify for it. Such cases necessarily 
involve ‘amorphous, sprawling party structures, allegations broadly implicating 
the operations of large public institutions such as schools systems … mental 
health authorities … and public housing authorities, and remedies requiring 
long term restructuring and monitoring of these institutions’, policies and 
programmes.192 Courts are therefore confronted in their fashioning of 
remedies in these cases with institutional capacity concerns – questions about 
their capacity both to prescribe particular conduct to the state (to determine 
policy) and to monitor whether or not their orders are in fact implemented by 
the state. 
 
Criticism of the remedies fashioned in these kinds of cases has focussed on 
the effective implementation of court orders and has mostly been directed at 
the Court’s failure in any of the cases to impose on the state supervisory 
interdicts that would allow the retention of jurisdiction to ensure compliance.193 
I argue in Chapter 2 that this criticism is overstated, primarily because it fails 
to take account of the difficulties attached to the implementation of such 
supervisory interdicts. 
 
In this section, my concern is different. My purpose here is to ask to what 
extent the Court has, in fashioning remedies in these kinds of difficult cases, 
                                                 
192 Sabel & Simon (n 89 above) 1017. 
193 See eg K Pillay ‘Implementation of Grootboom: implications for the enforcement of socio-
economic rights’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 255. 
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managed to maintain a degree of openness that would create space for 
transformative politics, whilst still providing effective relief. I focus on just four 
of the cases listed above – Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign, PE 
Municipality and Olivia Road. Although Khosa involved the same kind of issue 
as the other four cases – the failure by the state to provide in the needs of a 
group of impoverished people – fashioning appropriate relief in that case was 
unproblematic: as the challenge was directed against a statutory provision, 
the Court could simply read words into the statute to remedy its exclusionary 
defect. The four cases that I do consider quite clearly fall into two distinct 
categories – Grootboom with Treatment Action Campaign and PE Municipality 
with Olivia Road. 
 
(b) Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign 
 In Grootboom, the Court issued a simple declaratory order that the state’s 
housing policy was inconsistent with the constitution to the extent that it failed 
to make provision for the housing needs of absolutely homeless people. The 
remedy of this constitutional defect was left entirely to the state.194 In 
Treatment Action Campaign, the Court similarly issued a declarator that the 
state’s failure to make Nevirapine available at public health facilities to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV at birth was inconsistent with the right to 
have access to health care services. However, now the declarator was 
coupled with a mandatory order requiring the state to remedy the 
constitutional defect in its programme for prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV at birth, by making Nevirapine available at all public 
health facilities were mothers give birth when in the opinion of the attending 
physician in consultation with the superintendent of the facility concerned, it is 
medically indicated.195 
 
Both Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign are noteworthy for the 
extent to which closure and finality is avoided in the orders handed down. In 
Grootboom this is most evident. No particular course of action is prescribed to 
the state – the constitutional deficiency is simply pointed out and the state is 
                                                 
194 Grootboom (n 24 above) para 99. 
195 Treatment Action Campaign (n 102 above) para 135. 
 253
left to its own devices to remedy it. But Treatment Action Campaign also 
exhibits a fair measure of openness in its order. Although a particular course 
of action is prescribed – making Nevirapine available at all public health 
facilities – this direct prescription is attenuated by the proviso that it needs be 
made available only when the attending physician in consultation with the 
superintendent of the facility in question believes it to be medically indicated. 
In this way the Court also defers the final decision as to a course of action to 
the state – or, to be more accurate, to those officials who have the expertise 
needed to make that kind of decision. 
 
Despite the clear avoidance of closure exhibited by both Grootboom and 
Treatment Action Campaign, neither case can be described as sensitive in 
particular to transformative politics as a result. The difficulty with both cases is 
that the openness and flexibility exhibited in the orders is directed only at the 
state. It is the state and the state alone that gets the opportunity to engage 
with the search for solutions to the problems raised in the cases. Indeed, it is 
fair to say that the openness exhibited in the orders handed down in both 
cases was motivated not by a concern for transformative politics, but by a 
concern about institutional capacity. That is, the Court sought with keeping the 
orders open, to defer to the superior technical expertise and democratic 
legitimacy of the executive and state administration. As I argue more 
comprehensively in Chapter 3 above, this tendency to defer to the executive, 
state administration or legislature is in itself an example of depoliticising 
rhetoric with the potential to discourage, delegitimise and limit transformative 
political action.196 In PE Municipality, however, the beginnings of a new 
remedial direction, that directly engages transformative politics, can be 
detected.  
 
(c) PE Municipality and Olivia Road 
Both PE Municipality and Olivia Road, it will be recalled, were eviction cases. 
In PE Municipality the eviction order was denied primarily because the state 
                                                 
196 See 150 and further above. 
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had failed to provide suitable alternative accommodation to the evictees.197 In 
Olivia Road it was denied on administrative law grounds, with the Court 
holding that the City of Johannesburg had failed in coming to its decision to 
evict the occupiers to consider whether suitable alternative accommodation as 
available.198 
 
Because the eviction order was denied in PE Municipality, it was not 
necessary to provide further relief to the squatters in that case. Nevertheless, 
Sachs J had much to say about remedies in eviction cases in his judgment. 
Although in the event declining to do so,199 Sachs J raised the possibility that 
a court, in providing a remedy in an eviction case such as the one the 
Constitutional Court was faced with could order compulsory mediation 
between the parties. That is, a court could make a normative finding, in the 
sense of describing the outcomes that the constitutional and other legal duties 
at play in the case required, but could then order the parties to enter into a 
process of mediation in order to agree upon the most appropriate means with 
which to reach those outcomes.200 
 
This approach alluded to by Sachs J reminds of the ‘experimentalist’ 
approach to remedies mooted by Sabel and Simon that I relate above.201 The 
issue that would have remained for determination in PE Municipality had the 
Court granted the eviction order would have been the question of alternative 
accommodation for the evicted squatters. One can well imagine that, had the 
Court granted the eviction order and ordered the parties to enter into 
mediation, it would have taken care to describe the basic requirements that 
the alternative accommodation would have to meet. Although the resolution of 
the case would be left to the parties to determine through a process of 
mediation, that mediation, in other words, would occur within a normative 
framework setting limits to what can be decided by the parties. This aspect of 
the remarks is important. For the court to set the normative framework – to 
                                                 
197 PE Municipality (n 173 above) para 59. 
198 Olivia Road (n 99 above) para 46. 
199 PE Municipality (n 173 above) para 47. 
200 As above para 39 - 46. 
201 See 136 above. 
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describe the desired outcomes of the mediation it orders - could work to 
encourage and legitimate transformative politics not only by providing a space 
within which such politics can occur. It could also address the imbalance of 
power that would inevitable be an issue where impoverished people negotiate 
solutions to the predicament with the state. 
 
In Olivia Road the opportunity arose for the Court to give effect to Sachs J’s 
remedial suggestions in PE Municipality. In that case the background was 
such that it seemed clear that, for their own safety and health, the occupiers 
would have to be removed from the two buildings in question, even if only 
temporarily. This meant that the question what to do with them once they 
were removed arose – a question eminently suited to being resolved through 
mediation between the parties. At first glance it seems that Yacoob J in Olivia 
Road indeed did give effect to Sachs J’s remedial suggestions. He indeed 
resolved the case by ordering the parties to engage with each other in order 
to reach an agreement that would satisfy them both. However, Yacoob J’s 
solution departs in one important respect from the suggestions Sachs J made 
in PE Municipality. Instead of first deciding the application for an eviction 
order, granting that subject to the proviso that suitable alternative 
accommodation, described with a fair level of detail, be provided to the 
evictees, the Court ordered the parties to engage with each other and 
approved the agreement they reached before having decided the case. The 
result is unfortunate. Although Yacoob J’s approach to resolving eviction 
cases exhibited in Olivia Road has the dual virtues of maintaining a measure 
of openness and directly involving impoverished people in fashioning a 
solution to their problems with the state, it suffers from the fact that the Court 
made no normative pronouncement on the basis of which the negotiations 
between the parties could proceed. Without a normative framework within the 
limits of which the negotiations can proceed, the power imbalance that exists 
between the occupiers and the state is left undisturbed. This quite obviously 
limits the extent to which transformative politics can in fact operate properly 
within the space created for it by the engagement order. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I considered the manner in and extent to which the two 
themes of legal certainty and finality or closure in adjudication have featured 
in the development of the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of our courts. I 
argued that any resort to absolute certainty or absolute finality, by denying 
judicial responsibility and effecting normative closure respectively, runs 
counter to a transformative politics. Equally, I pointed out that any complete 
abandonment of the two ideals, by causing adjudication to resort to mere 
instrumentalism, would have the same depoliticising effect. 
 
Turning to the case law, I investigated ways in which the tension between 
complete certainty and complete flexibility; complete finality and complete 
openness can be maintained. I showed that the Constitutional Court, up to its 
decision in Olivia Road more or less consistently managed to maintain this 
tension satisfactorily – in its interpretation and application of the phrase ‘within 
available resources’; in its interpretation and application of its reasonableness 
test, through the increasing employment of substantive reasoning; in the 
sensitivity shown to particular context by way of the use of a shifting standard 
of scrutiny; and in the fashioning and use of open-ended remedies that avoid 
normative closure. However, I identified within each of these themes a 
worrying turn toward instrumentalism heralded by the latest socio-economic 
rights decision of the Court – Olivia Road – that runs counter to the sensitivity 
shown to transformative politics shown in the Court’s decisions before it.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
My broad purpose with this study was to investigate to what extent and in 
which ways South African courts have, through their adjudication of socio-
economic rights claims, taken account of the transformative vision of the 
South African constitution. 
 
I focussed on one aspect of that transformative vision – I asked specifically 
how South African courts have related their work in adjudicating socio-
economic rights claims to transformative political action. In this respect I 
distinguished my study from scholarly work that has depicted socio-economic 
rights adjudication as one form of transformative political struggle or as an 
instrument supportive of transformative political action. I focussed particularly 
on the ways in which socio-economic rights adjudication limits rather than 
promotes transformative political action.1 
 
I chose two such ways as a theoretical framework on the basis of which to 
analyse the case law. First, I traced the operation in the socio-economic rights 
case law of the legal ideal of neutrality – that is, the ideal to separate law and 
politics and present adjudication as a value neutral exercise. In this respect I 
investigated to what extent our courts have in their socio-economic rights 
judgments participated in prevalent de-politicising discourses about the issues 
of poverty and need that arise in disputes about impoverishment, need and 
deprivation. Have or courts, in other words, in the attempt to ‘rise above’ 
politics, presented the issues facing them in such ways that they themselves 
could be said to stand outside of political contestation?2 
 
I chose to investigate the operation in the socio-economic rights case law of 
three ‘de-politicising rhetorical tropes’ – three stock strategies through which 
issues of impoverishment and need are often represented as non-political. 
                                                 
1 I make this distinction in Chapter 1 above 39 and further. 
2 See Chapter 3 above. 
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First, I identified in the Constitutional Court’s early socio-economic rights 
cases a tendency for the Court to describe the legal standard against which it 
evaluates social policy (the reasonableness standard enunciated by the 
Constitutional Court in Grootboom)3 in politically neutral ‘good governance’ 
terms. I showed how, on one reading, the Court decided Grootboom and 
Treatment Action Campaign4 on the basis of a standard of ‘rational 
coherence’. I identified as high point of this ‘proceduralisation’ of socio-
economic rights claims the decision in Modderklip,5 where the Court decided 
a housing and property rights dispute on the basis of the constitutional 
principle of ‘rule of law’ and the right of access to courts. I argued that, as 
these are structural standards only, they allowed the Court to decide these 
cases whilst ignoring and so denying the deeper, and politically far mor
contested distributive questions and questions about responsibility to alleviate 
desperate deprivation that the cases raised. In short, I argued that it allowed 
the Court to present its reasoning and decision as though somehow ‘abo
political contestation. I then placed these two decisions in the context of the 
Court’s later socio-economic rights judgments, and pointed out that these
cases showed a greater awareness on the side of the Court of the poli
contested nature of issues of impoverishment and deprivation. This is so, I 
argued, both in individual cases (Khosa,
e 
ve’ 
 
tically 
n 
                                                
6 PE Municipality),7 and if one looks 
at the cases together. The different levels of scrutiny employed by the Court i
the different cases, and the different levels of intrusiveness of the orders 
handed down, in part determined by the degree of deprivation and need at 
issue in the different cases, shows that more substantive and therefore more 
candidly political questions played an important role in the Court’s decisions 
throughout – also in Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign.8 
 
Second, I investigated how the Court dealt with the potentially conflicting 
individual or particular, and the collective interests at play in the socio-
 
3 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
4 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
5 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA & others, 
amici curiae) 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). 
6 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC). 
7 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC). 
8 See 176 and further above. 
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economic rights cases it has decided. Were the Court to have decided its 
cases on too narrow an individualised basis, so I warned, it could depict the 
issues involved in a narrow, instrumental and privatised fashion, so denying 
the broader structural – and political – aspects of the disputes before it. At the 
same time, were it to ignore the particular and concrete interests at issue in 
these disputes, it would to a large extent remove the incentive for 
impoverished people to use litigation to advance their interests and so 
potentially to place broader issues of the public good before the Court and 
could fall into the trap of disregarding the particular in typical legal 
generalising fashion. I then pointed out that the Court, whether by accident or 
design, had in fact managed in most of its cases up to Olivia Road,9 to be 
attentive to both the individualised, particular interests at issue and the 
broader collective (and political) issues raised in the cases. This the Court has 
done by employing its reasonableness standard of review as a generalised 
policy review standard, scrutinising policies and programmes as they apply to 
everyone for whom they are intended and issuing orders with a general rather 
than only a specific application (so addressing collective or ‘public’ issues) 
whilst at the same time in different ways ensuring that the particularised 
interests of the claimants before it were (at least nominally) addressed. I then 
argue that Olivia Road – explicitly eschewing as it does decision on the 
broader issues raised by the case – runs the risk of drawing the Court’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in a direction that privileges narrow, 
instrumental, individual interests above more collective and structural 
questions of impoverishment and deprivation and so to deny the difficult 
political dimensions of the issues involved.10 
 
Third, I focussed on the Court’s engagement in its socio-economic rights 
judgments with separation of powers concerns and related issues of 
institutional capacity, legitimacy and security. I argued that the tendency of the 
Court to defer in its judgments on complex technical matters or politically 
intractable questions to the other branches of government potentially sends a 
                                                 
9 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). 
10 See 161 - 176 above. 
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powerful de-politicising message. In doing so the Court depicts the issues 
involved as difficult technical or politically sensitive issues that only the state 
(the executive, legislature or state administration) properly should and can 
engage with, to the exclusion of other political actors. This tendency, however, 
I further point out, has to some extent been counteracted by the Court in its 
recognition of a requirement in eviction cases that the state must engage with 
occupiers who stand to be evicted and through its employment, prefigured in 
PE Municipality but put into practice in Olivia Road, of remedies requiring 
engagement to resolve eviction disputes.11 
 
The second leg of my theoretical framework on the basis of which to analyse 
the case law focussed on the traditional legal ideal of certainty. Here I argued 
that a non-reflexive belief by judges in the self-evident nature (the certainty) of 
legal meaning, by discounting the active role of judges in creating legal 
meaning and adjudicatory results, works against a transformative politics 
because it discourages scrutiny and engagement with judicial work product. 
At the same time a non-reflexive belief in the complete indeterminacy of legal 
materials, by leaving the generation of legal meaning and adjudicative 
outcomes wholly to the instrumental agendas of individual judges, renders law 
arbitrary and instrumental and so equally works against transformative 
politics. In addition, so I continued, the drive toward achieving finality inherent 
in adjudication and law more generally that is closely linked to the ideal of 
legal certainty, also works against transformative politics by bringing about 
normative closure and so ending off political contestation and by privileging 
certain voices and visions over others, so excluding the diversity of visions 
necessary for the operation of a transformative politics.12 
 
The belief in the self-evidence of legal meaning that I warn against, I identified 
in operation in some of the earlier socio-economic rights cases 
(Soobramoney,13 Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign) in the Court’s 
interpretation and application of the resource constraint aspects of the socio-
                                                 
11 See 155 and further above. 
12 See Chapter 4 above. 
13 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
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economic rights in the constitution. I pointed to instances where the Court 
interpreted those aspects according to an idea of legal rules as straight lines 
that allow for a mechanical either/or application to facts, thus excluding the 
role that judges play in determining the application of rules and the results 
generated. I also identified instances where the Court indeed applied these 
resource constraint qualifications in this mechanical fashion. I then pointed out 
how, in later cases, the Court, by scrutinising the assertions relating to 
resource constraint made by the state, moved closer to depicting its role as 
moving on a ‘field of action’ – participating in the forming of legal meaning and 
the generation of adjudicative results, that is – and so showed a greater 
sensitivity to transformative politics. Next I showed how the Court, through 
relying on the structural ‘good-governance’ standards referred to above in its 
earlier cases managed also to depict and apply its reasonableness standard 
as a straight-line rule, denying its active role in determining the outcomes of 
its application. This tendency in the earlier cases, I continued, is not reflected 
in later cases such as Khosa in particular, where the Court showed a much 
greater willingness to engage in substantive reasoning, avoiding reliance on 
structural good governance standards alone.14 
 
I then traced the extent to which the drive to finality referred to above 
operated in the Court’s jurisprudence. Here I pointed out that the Court had, in 
two ways, managed to retain a fair degree of normative openness in its socio-
economic rights judgments. This it managed first by employing a shifting 
standard of scrutiny, stricter in some cases, more lenient in others, with its 
level of intrusiveness determined by the particular circumstances of each 
case. The context sensitivity reflected in this approach, so I argued, meant 
that the conclusion reached in one case cannot without more determine the 
results in another, so that, even whilst a determination of one case is indeed 
attained, questions not directly pertinent to it are left open for future decision 
and contestation. Normative openness was further achieved by the Court 
through the manner in which it fashioned remedies in socio-economic rights 
cases. It is clear that the Court, there where it was possible to do so, tailored 
                                                 
14 See 219 and further above. 
 263
its remedies in such a manner that as few of the specific contentious 
questions as possible where conclusively decided and prescribed. Instead, 
the Court seems to have wanted to fashion a broad normative framework 
only, leaving the determination of particular solutions to problems to other 
actors. In the cases leading up to PE Municipality and eventually Olivia Road, 
the Court employed this normatively open approach to remedies primarily 
because it was one way in which to manage its institutional relations with the 
other branches of government. This, as I pointed out earlier, holds the 
disadvantage that it privileges the state as political actor over other political 
actors involved in the political debate about impoverishment and deprivation. 
However, I pointed out that the Court’s approach took a turn in PE 
Municipality, where Sachs J’s obiter remarks about the possibility of ordering 
mediation to resolve an eviction dispute – and in particular the dispute about 
the provision of adequate alternative accommodation to evictees – raised the 
possibility that the Court could retain the normative openness characterising 
its other judgments, whilst at the same time empowering political actors other 
than the state to participate in the process of reaching solutions. These obiter 
remarks where given concrete effect in Olivia Road with Yacoob J’s 
engagement order there. However, so I conclude that section, the potential of 
Olivia Road as an example of a transformative politics-sensitive decision is 
undercut by the choice to hand down the engagement order before the 
application for the eviction order was decided. This deprived the Court of the 
opportunity to set a normative framework within which engagement had to 
occur, so that the power imbalance between the state and the occupiers in 
that case was left unaddressed.15 
 
From all this, unsurprisingly, no one clear conclusion arises. At most my 
different analyses of the cases show, I believe, that it is indeed so that courts 
in deciding socio-economic rights cases, at the same time as that they 
promote through their judgments transformative politics, inevitably and 
importantly also limit it. This would lead one to the practical conclusion that 
judges should be aware of this fact – aware and willing constantly to think of 
                                                 
15 See 238 and further above. 
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ways in which the limiting effect of their work can be mitigated. But, so I 
further believe, my analyses also show that such awareness and such 
willingness is not enough. All of the instances to which I pointed where the 
Court’s jurisprudence has indeed showed sensitivity to transformative politics 
have also been problematic in their own right. So, for example, the normative 
openness I identified in the Court’s remedial approach has, as I also point out, 
worked to privilege the political agency of the state to the detriment of other 
political actors;16 the legitimising remarks made about the political agency of 
impoverished people in cases such as Modderklip and PE Municipality; run 
the risk of marginalising political actors who do not conform to the Court’s 
view of acceptable political contestation;17 the attempt by the Court in a case 
such as Olivia Road to concretely draw impoverished people into the political 
arena potentially degenerates into an instrumental, privatised interest-driven 
negotiation.18 Each attempt, so it seems, has its cost. In the end it shows little 
more than how difficult it is. 
 
But even this realisation need not lead to despair. An awareness about the 
difficulty of things – eschewing the reduction that a clear, confident taking of 
position implies – does not imply weakness. Instead, it is ‘an invitation to 
continue the process of generating understanding’.19 It is only by remaining 
aware of the difficulty of things, by refraining from making confident findings 
and statements about the transformative politics-affirming nature of judgments 
and positions and taking account of both the gains and the costs of all 
transformative strategies, that judges can keep working at meeting their 
ethical responsibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See eg 238 and further above. 
17 See 158 above. 
18 See 162 and further above. 
19 P Cilliers ‘Complexity, deconstruction and relativism’ (2005) 22 Theory Culture Society 255 
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